The Role of Third Party in Sino-Japanese Rapprochement
-- Informal Political Actors and Mechanisms

The role of third party intervention in international negotiation and conflict resolution has increasingly drawn attention from both academia and practitioners (Young 1967; Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch and Rubin 1991; Damrosch 1993; Hampson 1996). The third party intermediaries can include both domestic and international actors. In many cases, international third party players most likely include not only a third country, but also international governmental organizations. On the domestic front, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and informal political actors and networks may play the role of a third party. This paper, by using Japan’s rapprochement negotiations with China in the 1971-72 period as a case study, will illuminate crucial functions of the third party role. The focus of the paper primarily concentrates on domestic players in Japanese society and politics, summarized in this paper as “informal mechanisms.” The paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons, particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the Japanese kabuki theater, there are players who act as informal actors called *kuromaku* (meaning “black veils”). They set the stage and assist the formal actors in full view of the audience, but they are not acknowledged as part of the performance because of their black dress. They can be seen on the stage, but the audience is supposed to ignore their presence. Richard Samuels (1982: 127-146) used this analogy to refer to behind-the-scenes figures in Japanese politics who are really in charge. In this study, I will use this behind-the-scenes concept to include not only individual actors but also organizations, whose activities are normally invisible to the public. I define the *kuromaku* concept neutrally without the somewhat negative sense it may have in the Japanese language (e.g., a *yakuza*, or a mafia head). In this paper, the concept of *kuromaku* indicates informal political actors and networks that do not necessarily have formal (or official) status, but who often use behind-the-scenes channels to get things done. These figures may include both “big fish” and “small fry,” that is, someone who is in control of others or someone who is being used by others.

In their study of the U.S.-Japan conflict over textile issues, I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Satô (1979: 122, 183-184, 197) paid special attention to a phenomenon called back-channel negotiation, where both sides (the Japanese in particular) made extensive use of behind-the-scenes channels to solve difficult political issues. These back channels were used to counter information leaks and to “strengthen the national leaders' capacity to manage the politics of the issue by controlling what information became available to the public and to different parts of the two governments” (327-328). The motivations are similar when the Japanese conduct these informal practices—the back channels and *kuromaku* activities.

It is easy to find a real *kuromaku* in Kabuki Theater, but it would be difficult to identify and understand *kuromaku* activities that are part of the process of Japanese foreign policy. An understanding of Japanese policymaking requires thorough
investigation and research of informal political actors and networks, and a detailed knowledge of Japan's political institutions, as well as Japanese society.

Important parts of organizational theories include the internal structures of the organizations, the relationship between the leaders and the people, and the issue of legitimate authority. These structures and relations can be established either through legality and formality, or through informality and tradition. Studies on formal and informal organizations have received wide attention in the field of organizational theories.

Max Weber (1968: 46-47) identified three types of legitimate authority in his analysis of charisma and institution building: rational, traditional, and charismatic. The first describes “the legally established impersonal order,” which extends to leaders exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office they hold. The second type of legitimate authority emphasizes “personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations,” which requires impersonal order as a base. The third type refers to “the charismatically qualified leader as one who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities.” The function of these classifications of legitimate authority, according to Weber, is to promote systematic analysis of organizational and institutional structures. To examine organizations and political institutions using Weber's approach is to view “rational” legitimate rule as formal organizations, and “traditional” and “charismatic” rule as informal organizations. In the case of Japan, informal organizations are often based on a second type of authority—personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations.

According to Nicos Mouzelis (1967: 59-61), a formal organization, consists of rules that define the tasks and responsibilities of each participant, as well as the formal mechanisms that could permit the integration of these tasks. Such rules constitute the formal structure of the organization; whereas rules and mechanisms of informal organizations appear to be more flexible and more difficult to identify. “This formal-informal conflict” Mouzelis claims, “gives to the organization a dynamic, ever-changing aspect.” This chapter examines activities and interactions among formal and informal organizations in Japan's political life with regard to the 1972 Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The study of Japan's political institutions by using formal-informal organizational theories will shed new light on the idea of the “dynamic, ever-changing aspect” of organizations, and will provide a deeper understanding of Japanese politics and foreign policymaking.

Chester Barnard (1938: 73) defined a formal organization as “a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons.” F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson (1941), and Wilbert E. Moore (1946) emphasized the importance of informal structures within various types of organizations. Philip Selznick (1961: 22) claimed that “in large organizations, deviations from the formal system tend to become institutionalized, so that 'unwritten laws' and informal associations are established.” He further elaborated that “the informal patterns (such as cliques) arise spontaneously, are based on personal relationships, and are usually directed to the control of some specific
situation.” The LDP's internal factions have followed this formal-informal pattern in their development.

There are many informal organizations in Japanese political life. Bradley Richardson and Scott Flanagan (1984: 100) define informal organizations as “interpersonal networks of friendship and mutual ideological agreement, and as other relationships or groups which come to exist within parties and which are not called for by the party's formal organizational plans.” They conclude that, “in Japan, informal relationships and groups are so important in party organizations that it is at times possible to see them as more important than the parties' formal structures.” John Campbell's argument (1984: 305) further enhances Richardson and Flanagan's observation. He took the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its policy issues as an example, contending that open polarization of LDP's informal groups seems to occur often with regard to foreign policy. It makes this study, a closer examination of Japanese foreign policy toward China, more necessary.

Many political actors and organizations were involved in the 1972 Sino-Japanese rapprochement. This study does not explore this process in every detail. Instead, emphasis is placed on those elements that are closely connected with formal and informal political actors and networks, including LDP politicians, the bureaucracy, leaders of organized business, Diet members of opposition parties, intellectuals, and the news media. With time, interviews with Japanese politicians and government officials, and data related to the rapprochement process have become more accessible, compared to the period of normalization in the early 1970s when behind-the-scenes negotiations were considered highly confidential and sensitive. In addition to the internal actors, the changing international environment and China's strategies toward Japan will also be taken into consideration.

BACKGROUND AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The Japanese move toward normalizing relations with China was not as dramatic or shocking as the changes in U.S. foreign policy toward China in the period of 1971-72, known as Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy. Instead, the 1972 rapprochement between China and Japan is viewed as an evolution of the pro-normalization movement that had existed for over twenty years prior to 1972. In Japan, the decision to normalize relations with China was both highly political and controversial. It attracted attention from virtually all circles of Japanese society. The China issue became a topic of national debate. The Japanese were concerned about China mainly for three reasons: (1) Chinese culture greatly influenced Japanese culture; the traditional relationship between the two countries needed to be restored after Japan's invasion of China during the Sino-Japanese conflict beginning in the early 1930s and ending in 1945. (2) China was a huge, untouched market, and Japan should not be left behind by the United States and Western European countries. (3) maintenance of good Japanese-American relations was in Japan's national interests; therefore, any move toward rapprochement with China required consultation with the U.S. government.
Japan's historic decision to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in the fall of 1972 was heavily influenced, if not determined, by the changing international environment. This environment included the global strategic structure of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China, and regional changes in the East Asian and Pacific areas. Several external factors significantly influenced Japan's decision: China's changing attitude toward the outside world in the beginning of the 1970s; the dramatic change in the United States' China policy marked by the "Nixon Shock"; the question of China's legal seat in the United Nations; and the development of new structures in world politics and East Asia.7

Other developments regarding China also caused concern in Japan. The Zhou-Nixon Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, issued during Nixon's highly publicized visit to China, indicated the emergence of the U.S.-USSR-China strategic triangle in global politics and highlighted the multipolarity of international relations. In East Asia, the four-power structure became clear: China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These regional and global changes prompted Japanese leaders to reconsider Japan's China policy.

China's own changing international outlook, the United States' shift in its policy toward China, the changing status of the PRC and Taiwan in the United Nations, and the emergence of a multipolar structure were four major international factors that greatly contributed to Japan's decision to normalize relations with the PRC. However, external elements alone are not enough to explain Japanese foreign policy and its policymaking process. We must also examine the internal factors of Japanese politics.

There are many informal political actors and networks within the main body of Japanese politics, namely, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and governmental bureaucracy. Take the LDP for example; a number of informal study groups and inner party factions played a crucial role in the normalization process with China. By the same token, government bureaucrats, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in particular, also had a number of informal practices which highlighted the differences between its official and unofficial stances. This paper, however, will not provide detailed analysis on the LDP and MOFA, but rather will focus on informal networks played by such internal actors as “duck diplomacy”, business communities, opposition parties, intellectual and think tanks, and the news media.

“DUCK DIPLOMACY”

The actions of those who work behind-the-scenes in informal diplomatic negotiations, or what is termed kuromaku here, have also been called informal channels as a research topic.8 Informal political actors and networks indeed played a large part in the process of Japan-China rapprochement.

Japan's informal diplomacy toward China can be traced back to as early as the 1950s. According to Heishirō Ogawa, Japan's first ambassador to Beijing, in the early 1950s Japan's official position was to prohibit its citizens from visiting a Red China.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was extremely unhappy with the illegal visit to China by three opposition party Diet members in 1952. Nevertheless, MOFA gradually relaxed its rules and developed a policy known as seikei bunri (differentiation of economic from political activities), which was initially put forward by Ogawa himself. Under seikei bunri, any Japanese, except governmental officials, could go to China without having to obtain a permit from MOFA. This practice greatly facilitated nonpolitical contact, especially in the economic arena such as with the Memorandum Trade Agreements of the 1960s.

Under the Satō administration, little progress was made toward normalizing relations with China. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that Satō did nothing to explore possibilities for a new China policy. For a better understanding of the Japanese foreign policymaking process, we should examine Satō’s informal diplomacy, or ahiru gaik宍 (duck diplomacy). The analogy of a duck was used because just as a duck may appear to look calm above water, it busily uses its feet under water (Iwanaga 1985: 174; C. Lee 1976: 106).

Satō and other top leaders under his administration seriously considered sending messages to the Beijing government regarding normalization negotiations by using duck diplomacy. It is still an open question as to how many people were involved and what kind of actions actually took place, but we can now name at least five ahiru in Satō’s duck diplomacy. They were LDP Secretary General Shigeru Hori, Tokyo Governor Ryū kichi Minobe, Japanese Consul General in Hong Kong Akira Okada, the Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office Director Yaeji Watanabe, and pro-Beijing LDP Diet member Seiichi Tagawa (Ijiri 1987: 107; Tagawa 1972: 24-25).

After the Nixon Shock and the entry of the PRC into the United Nations, LDP's Secretary General Shigeru Hori was eager to find informal channels of communication with China to prepare for normalization negotiations. He first contacted pro-Beijing Diet member Seiichi Tagawa and asked him to communicate with Beijing. After receiving oral assurance of a one-China position from Hori, Tagawa wrote to Wang Guoquan, vice-chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, informing him of Hori's strong desire to visit China. In early October 1971, Tagawa talked about Hori's intention in a telephone conversation with a Chinese official working at the China-Japan Memorandum Trade Tokyo office. The Chinese official quickly received approval from China to contact Hori. Through Tagawa's arrangements, the trade official and a Chinese journalist held a two-and-a-half-hour secret meeting with Hori (Tagawa 1983: 128-136).

In December 1971, Tagawa and Yaeji Watanabe visited Beijing with a memorandum trade delegation and tried to clarify Japan's position to his Chinese counterparts, including Wang Guoquan, on a wide range of topics, such as the Taiwan issue and the territorial dispute over the islands of Diaoyu (or “Senkaku” as named by the Japanese) (Tagawa 1973: 303-334).

At almost the same time, the Satō administration opened up another channel. Hori asked Tokyo Governor Minobe of the Japan Socialist Party, who was about to visit
Beijing in mid-October, to carry his personal letter to Zhou Enlai. This “personal letter” was the result of consultations with both Satō and Hira. On the one hand, the letter claimed that “The People's Republic of China is a government representing China,” and stated that Hori hoped to visit Beijing in preparation for normalization. On the other hand, it indicated that Taiwan was a “territory of Chinese people.” The ambiguity of the letter was not to Zhou Enlai’s liking. Zhou criticized the letter as a deception, because of the phrase “territory of Chinese people,” which might be construed as supportive of a Taiwan independence movement, instead of “territory of China.”\textsuperscript{11} The Chinese leaders were also unhappy about Satō’s decision to co-sponsor, with the United States, the pro-Taiwan resolution at the United Nations. Zhou Enlai rejected the Satō-Hori overture and said China would not consider governmental negotiations “as long as Satō was the leader of the Japanese government.” Therefore, Hori failed to make a breakthrough.\textsuperscript{12} After the Hori letter incident was publicized, the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats were upset and embarrassed for not being informed of the Satō-Hori move. They requested a clarification of the China policy from leading politicians.

The case of Akira Okada, the consul general in Hong Kong, was a different story. Okada was a “dissident” within the Foreign Ministry in terms of China policy. He was one of the few who very early on predicted the possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement when the majority opinion within MOFA was that “it is impossible that the Americans would go over our heads in opening talks with the Chinese.” Even after the Nixon Shock, MOFA bureaucrats maintained the majority position. On September 1, 1971, at the Asia-Pacific region Ambassadorial Conference, MOFA bureaucrats reached a “unified view” that it would be premature to take an active approach toward normalization talks with the PRC. Okada, representing the minority view at the conference, said he would like to openly oppose (which was unusually bold within the Japanese bureaucratic world) this “unified view,” and hoped that his opinion on China policy would be communicated to the government leaders (Ijiri 1987: 148-149; Okada 1983: 147).

Okada's dissident opinion was referred to LDP's Secretary General Hori by a Sankei Shimbun reporter. Hori quickly arranged to meet Okada for two hours to hear Okada's proposals regarding the China policy. Then Hori made arrangements for Okada to meet Prime Minister Satō. On September 11, at the prime minister's office, Satō listened to Okada's views and then disclosed his own position that “Taiwan is a province of China,” and Japan would not block China's entry to the United Nations. Satō also made it clear that he would send the foreign minister or the secretary general to visit China. However, Satō expressed reservations about immediately breaking ties with Taiwan. Satō gave Okada a special assignment to visit Beijing to communicate the prime minister's message to the Chinese. Satō also asked Okada to keep his assignment in secret, even from Foreign Ministry colleagues, and to report directly to him or Secretary General Hori (Ijiri 1987: 149-150; Okada 1983: 150-151).

Since Okada had previously lived in both Hong Kong and Beijing, he had many Chinese friends, including high-ranking officials. Through these connections, Okada did pass Satō’s message on to Chinese leaders including Premier Zhou Enlai and top Japan-
hand Liao Chengzhi who was a member of the Party Central Committee and the Chinese cabinet. Nevertheless, like the Hori letter, Okada's duck diplomacy did not bring results, simply because of the previous “unfriendly actions” by the Satō government, such as its pro-Taiwan position in the United Nations. Again, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats were kept unaware of this behind-the-scenes action. After the failure of Satō’s duck diplomacy, further overtures toward normalization had to wait until the next administration.

Although Satō’s duck diplomacy was not successful, it had significant implications: informal actors and channels were important in both Japanese thinking and Japanese behavior, especially when facing issues that were controversial. New directions could be explored while maintaining official and formal policies on the surface. At the same time, numerous channels for different opinions were made available within and outside of the ruling party/bureaucracy apparatus as indicated by the case of Okada.

THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S “FREEDOM OF ACTION”

Japan's business community has a tradition of maintaining a cooperative relationship with the government. The government bureaucracy has been able to perform a function of administrative guidance to influence the industry and business community, thereby fulfilling its “developmental state strategy” (Chalmers Johnson 1982). In most circumstances administrative guidance, rather than political directions, is used in economic development. In particular, when the central bureaucracy is in a state of confusion and uncertainty and is split within itself (such as in the case of the China policy prior to normalization), the business community enjoys a greater degree of “freedom of action” in its international activities. Such actions are usually economic-oriented, but sometimes they may serve as a catalyst for political decisions. We can clearly see this catalytic role of the business community in the normalization process.

There are three different groups within the Japanese business community. In her article “The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy,” Sadako Ogata (1977: 175-176) distinguishes the three groups: zaikai (the leaders of major economic organizations), gyō kai (the industrial groups), and kigyō (the individual corporations). Zaikai are regarded as representative of big business interests including top economic organizations, such as Keidanren (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations); Nihon Shō kō Kaigisho or Nisshō (the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry); Keizai Dōgyō kai (the Japanese Committee for Economic Development); and Nikkeiren (the Japanese Federation of Business Managers). Gyō kai literally means “industrial world” and represents specific industrial interests, which range from manufacturing to finance and commerce and from small to large-sized industries. Steel, electricity, and banking, for example, are considered among the most powerful gyō kai in the business society. A gyō kai’s function is to coordinate competitive interests among individual kigyō, or corporations, within their respective spheres.

Now let us examine how the Japanese business community contributed to the normalization process. As noted earlier, in April 1970 Zhou Enlai stipulated four
conditions for Sino-Japanese trade. The Taiwan issue was the core consideration behind these conditions. China made it clear that it would not have trade relations with those Japanese firms that did business with Taiwan. This move could be regarded as part of an effort by the Chinese leaders to gain support from Japanese business circles and thus pave the road to rapprochement. Each Japanese company was now forced to make a choice in its business dealings: Beijing or Taipei. Given the consideration of China's huge untouched market and the economic interests involved, we can see a gradual change in the Japanese business community toward accepting Zhou's four conditions.

Gyō kai and kigyō were the first to respond to the four conditions, especially those businesses that already had considerable trade relations with the PRC. In 1970 steel was the top export item to the PRC with 41.8 percent of total exports, followed by chemical fertilizer which accounted for 20.8 percent. Next came the machinery industry with 12.4 percent and the textile industry with 4.5 percent of total exports. For example, Sumitomo Kagaku, one of the biggest producers of chemical fertilizer with more than half of its annual production exported to China, was criticized as a firm “supporting Taiwan and South Korea,” prompting Beijing to cut off trade ties. Sumitomo Kagaku quickly announced acceptance of Zhou's conditions, and trade relations with China were restored. This induced other major chemical fertilizer companies to follow suit. By doing so, the Japanese companies were able to maintain their near monopoly share of the China chemical fertilizer market.

By contrast, zaikai leaders and some big trading companies, such as Mitsui Bussan, Mitsubishi Shōji, Itochu, and Marubeni, which either had deep roots in Taiwan or maintained close relations with Prime Minister Satō, were much slower to join the China bandwagon. The slowness of the Satō administration and the hesitation of MOFA in formulating a China policy led to freedom of action by the business community, given the lack of clear official guidelines. During this period, big business as a group was by no means united (Fukui 1977: 93). Therefore, any firm had a free choice in whether to side with Beijing or with Taipei.

The individual kigyō with vested interests in the China market took the initiative to accept the four conditions. These decisions were made as a result of profit-making calculations, and were largely in line with the people-to-people diplomacy advocated by the Beijing government. Their economically oriented actions produced significant political influence. This influence became clearer after the zaikai leaders took action.

The first step was taken by Keizai Dōyō kai, one of the four biggest business organizations, and indicated the position of mainstream businessmen. In the spring of 1971, its president Kazutaka Kikawada announced that “the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations is a national goal [for Japan] in the 1970s.” In July, Yoshihiro Inayama, president of Shin Nihon Seitetsu (Japan's biggest steel company), announced that the company would not participate in either the Japan-Taiwan Cooperation Committee or the Japan-South Korea Cooperation Committee meetings scheduled in late July. Soon after, Japan Air Lines (JAL) made a similar decision.
In September 1971 a large business mission from the Osaka-Kobe area (Kansai area, western part of Japan) visited Beijing. It was headed by Isamu Saeki, president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and included virtually every business leader in the Kansai area. In a meeting with Zhou Enlai, Saeki confirmed his organization’s pro-PRC stance and one-China policy. Zhou praised the Kansai business leaders and sharply criticized the Satō administration, saying that rapprochement was possible only “after Satō’s resignation.” In November a large-scale Tokyo business leaders' mission made a similar trip to Beijing. The interests of the top four business organizations were well represented. This mission was headed by Takeo Shōji, former president of Keizai Dō yō kai, and included President Kazutaka Kikawada of Dō yō kai, President Shigeo Nagano of Nisshō, Director General Hiroki Imasato of Nikkeiren, and Vice-President Yoshizane Iwasa of Keidanren. Upon return from Beijing, the mission stated that Japan should begin to normalize its relations with the PRC (Japan-China Economic Association 1975b: 163-169). Shortly thereafter, the three leading zaikai organizations, Keidanren, Nisshō, and Dō yō kai, decided to set up their own research groups on the China problem.

On June 14, 1972, Mitsubishi Shōji and Mitsui Bussan finally announced that they would accept the four conditions. The leaders of these giant companies felt they could no longer wait for formal normalization, believing that the Japanese government was moving too slowly in this direction. Their action marked a conclusion of the business community's two-year move toward acceptance of Zhou's four conditions. There are also other business missions that visited Beijing prior to Tanaka's official visit in 1972.

The go-ahead actions of the business community with regard to Japanese-Chinese relations had a major impact both directly and indirectly on the LDP leaders and the bureaucracy. After the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, for example, Vice-President Ryōichi Kawai of Keizai Dō yō kai gave a frank suggestion to the Satō government that Japan should closely follow Nixon's lead in opening the door to China (Ijiri 1987: 191). The Foreign Ministry felt increasing pressure from business leaders who were beginning to make political demands on the bureaucracy.

Japanese corporations are well known for business in informal gatherings. Similar to the informal organizations within the ruling LDP discussed earlier, the business community has its own informal groups, specifically, various social entertainments and social clubs for networking with top politicians and bureaucrats.

On December 16, 1971, Prime Minister Satō was invited as an honorary guest to participate in the twenty-fifth meeting of Keidanren's board of counselors. Chairman Kogorō Uemura, who was a personal friend of Satō and a longtime pro-Taiwan advocate, expressed his position to the prime minister that Japan should normalize its relations with China as soon as possible, inasmuch as China had already been admitted to the United Nations.14

Business leaders became increasingly impatient with the slow pace of the Satō administration's China policy. Many of them even advocated an early rapprochement.
with the PRC at the expense of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In the spring of 1972, just before Tanaka became prime minister, top zaikai leaders organized Getsuyō-kai (the Monday Association) to support the future prime minister. Tanaka met with this group of business leaders every month to discuss various issues over dinner. It was believed that the business community was ready to approve anyone as the new prime minister who could open the door to China. The pro-normalization movement of powerful business leaders pressed politicians to make up their minds. MITI minister Yasuhiro Nakasone went so far as to ask Yoshihiro Inayama, who was scheduled to head the second zaikai mission to China, to convey a clear and concrete message to their Chinese counterparts that Japan was ready for economic cooperation with China. In particular, Japan was interested in participating in the development of the undersea oil-fields of Bohai. After Tanaka's inauguration, “China fever” in the business community reached a peak. Before the Mitsubishi group left for China, its leaders paid a visit to Tanaka. Tanaka was reportedly happy with the upcoming mission to China, saying, “When the politically influential Mitsubishi moves, it certainly makes things easier for us politicians” (Ijiri 1987: 279-280; and Yamamura and Yamamoto 1972: 16).

Compared to the active involvement of top politicians and government bureaucrats, the role played by the business community in the process of Sino-Japanese rapprochement seemed more indirect and less dramatic. But considering the broad social base of the business community and its close ties with top political and governmental leaders, we can discern a catalytic function and the powerful influence it had on both politicians and bureaucrats. It was clear that a de facto economic rapprochement between China and Japan preceded diplomatic negotiations. In this sense, the informal actions of the business community laid a foundation for the formal political rapprochement later.

THE OPPOSITION PARTIES’ YATŒ GAIKŒ

Many informal political institutions from the ruling party/bureaucracy apparatus, such as the informal duck diplomacy used by the Satō administration, have been examined. These efforts were part of Japan's informal diplomacy. However, the ruling party and the central bureaucracy were not the only informal political channels used during the process. Although Satō 's duck diplomacy depended heavily on the ruling party/government apparatus, Tanaka's effort to open up relations with China depended largely on yatœ gaiš (opposition party’s diplomacy).

Japan has four major opposition parties: the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Kœ meitœ Clean Government Party (CGP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The opposition parties played and important role in normalization and it is therefore worthwhile to examine the minor parties closely. The opposition parties had long been active in developing relations with the PRC prior to normalization.
Table 1
Number of Japanese Diet Members Visiting China, 1955-71

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<td>14</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Up until October 1971.


Table 1 leads to three conclusions. First, even though the LDP commanded a much larger number in the Diet, it was not as active as the JSP in visiting China during the pre-normalization period of 1955-71. The JSP sent the largest number of its Diet members (217 out of 392) to China during this period. Second, the Japanese Communist Party had been active in developing relations with China until the early 1960s when it became heavily involved in the Sino-Soviet disputes. As a result, there was a break in relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the JCP after that period. Third, in contrast, the CGP did not send any Diet member to China until 1971 when nine CGP Diet members (accounting for almost 20 percent of the total CGP Diet membership) visited China, compared to 6 percent of the LDP Diet members and 12 percent of the JSP Diet.
members visiting China in the same year. It is not surprising then that the two largest opposition parties, the JSP and the CGP, played dynamic roles in normalization, especially during 1971 and early 1972 when the process reached final and subtle decision-making stages.

In August 1970 former JSP Chairman Kōzō Sasaki visited China. While in Beijing, he and the Chinese leaders discussed ways to form a broad coalition to promote a mass normalization movement in Japan. According to Sasaki, the “broad coalition” included the following six principles: (1) to support the anti-American imperialism position; (2) to oppose the revival of Japanese militarism; (3) to fight against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system; (4) to overthrow the reactionary Sato government and its followers; (5) to expand trade, culture, and personnel exchange with China based on principles of equality, reciprocity, and the inseparability of politics from economics; and (6) to promote true friendship and to restore diplomatic relations with the PRC (Ijiri 1987: 161).

Two months later, the JSP’s fifth official mission, led by Party Chairman Narita, visited Beijing. The visit resulted in a joint statement on bilateral relations: “The movement for Sino-Japanese friendship and restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries is a part of the Japanese people's struggle against U.S. imperialism and revival of Japanese militarism by American and Japanese reactionaries.” The successful visits to Beijing and the cordial relations with the Chinese helped the JSP’s left-wing faction gain the upper hand over the conservative faction within the party. At the thirty-fourth party convention in December 1970, two left-wing leaders, Narita and Tanzah Ishibashi, were elected as party chairman and secretary general, respectively, defeating conservative representatives Saburō Eda and Jiichirō Matsumoto. This new leadership further paved the way for the JSP to promote relations with China.

A more direct role in the normalization process played by the JSP came in the summer of 1972, when the former Chairman, Kōzō Sasaki, visited China on July 14-20 as an informal communicator between the newly elected Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Zhou Enlai. Before this visit, Sasaki had a meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira. In Beijing, Sasaki gave the Chinese a detailed and frank assessment of Tanaka’s China policy. He told Zhou that Tanaka and Ōhira were sincere in accepting China’s condition on Taiwan. In return, Zhou stated that Tanaka’s visit to Beijing would be welcomed.

In addition to the informal invitation for Tanaka, Sasaki also received personal assurances from Zhou Enlai on several important issues: (1) China would be satisfied if Japan expressed a “full understanding”—short of acceptance—of the three principles (on the issue of Taiwan); (2) China would accord the same protocol to Tanaka’s visit as it did to Nixon’s; (3) an arrangement would be made for Tanaka’s direct flight from Tokyo to Beijing; (4) China understood the LDP’s internal disputes over the question of Taiwan and allowed Tanaka more time to deal with the issue of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty; and (5) China would take a flexible position on the issue of war reparations (C. Lee 1976: 114). All these messages were passed on to Tanaka and Ōhira immediately upon Sasaki’s
The CGP was the second largest opposition party during the normalization process. As early as January 1969, the CGP issued a new China policy with the following four points: (1) to recognize the PRC and restore diplomatic relations; (2) to refrain from interfering in the problems between Beijing and Taipei, regarding them as China's internal affairs; (3) to actively promote the PRC's entry into the United Nations; and (4) to promote intergovernmental trade and cultural exchanges. This was in opposition to the Satō government's official line. In June 1970 CGP Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri claimed that the “Japan-China normalization was the most important task for the party.” To fulfill its promise, the CGP sponsored the National Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, which was inaugurated that December. Among the 210 members of this new Council were leading politicians, university professors, and novelists.

The most dramatic role undertaken by CGP leaders occurred two months before Tanaka's visit. In July 1972, although it was broadly believed that Sino-Japanese rapprochement would soon be realized, no one could forecast the method or the timing. There was no preliminary discussion between China and Japan. Before his visit to Beijing, Takeiri discussed the China issue four times with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira. After these discussions, Takeiri made a twenty-one-point draft proposal based on his understanding of the Tanaka cabinet's negotiating position. He showed the draft to Tanaka and Ōhira, who expressed neither approval nor objection. Meanwhile, Tanaka and Ōhira expressed their willingness to visit Beijing (C. Lee 1976: 116-117; and Jiji Tsūshinsha Seijibu 1972: 27).

On July 25, five days after JSP's Sasaki returned from China, Takeiri began his second visit to Beijing that year. Takeiri presented Zhou Enlai the twenty-one-point draft, which contained some differences from the previous official Chinese stance. It did not mention, for instance, the issue of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (T. Ishikawa 1974: 158-159). Takeiri had a total of nine hours of discussion with Chinese leaders. At the end of the discussions, Zhou bluntly asked whether the Japanese government would move to normalization if China accepted the draft proposal. Takeiri guaranteed the proposal by taking personal responsibility. That evening he telephoned Tokyo to consult Tanaka and Ōhira, and he received positive answers.

On the third and last day of Takeiri's stay in Beijing, Zhou made a surprising move by presenting Takeiri with the first Chinese draft of a tentative Zhou-Tanaka Joint Communiqué. Takeiri took notes word by word through an interpreter and was amazed by the Chinese leader's flexibility. It was later labeled the “Takeiri Memo,” and it was quite similar to the final communiqué actually signed in late September establishing formal diplomatic relations between Japan and China. The Takeiri Memo did not mention the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, which had long been criticized by the Chinese (Tanaka 1985: 234-236). This flexibility paved the way for Japan's leaders to visit Beijing in late September, for this was an appropriate time for the Chinese. On August 4, the day after Takeiri's return to Tokyo, Tanaka received the...
Takeiri Memo. After two hours of reviewing the memo, the prime minister told the CGP chairman that he would go to Beijing (Ijiri 1987: 223-230; and Japan-China Economic Association 1975a: 5).

Other opposition parties such as DSP and JCP also played positive roles in the normalization process. Japan's opposition party diplomacy is often well coordinated with the ruling Liberal Democrats. For example, on September 9, 1972, five weeks after the Takeiri Memo was issued, pro-Beijing LDP Diet members Yoshimi Furui and Seiichi Tagawa visited China ostensibly for the purpose of memorandum trade negotiations. With this secret cover, Furui delivered ō hira's proposals for the Zhou-Tanaka statement to the Chinese leaders, and he conducted preliminary diplomatic negotiations with Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi. Chae-Jin Lee (1976: 117-118) gave a detailed description of Furui's function as an informal actor: “Furui, who had in the long process of trade negotiations accumulated a great deal of first-hand knowledge on China's thinking and negotiating patterns, became a principal element of ō hira's brain trust, as well as a confidential messenger in the execution of ō hira's diplomatic strategy toward China.”

In the middle of 1970, there was an increasing demand for the formation of a pro-China coalition, known as the united front that would promote early normalization of relations with China. This united front included not only opposition parties, but sometimes also members from the ruling LDP, making it a nonpartisan, informal organization.

One of the first joint actions taken by three major opposition parties (namely the JSP, CGP, and DSP) was for all three opposition leaders to meet Prime Minister Satō two days before his departure to the United States. They strongly urged Satō not to co-sponsor with the United States the anti-PRC resolutions in the U. N. General Assembly, but to support China's entry into the United Nations.

In July 1971 the Diet Members' League introduced a resolution in the Lower House calling for normalization of relations with the PRC and the recovery of China's seat in the United Nations. This time they collected signatures from 54 LDP members and 184 opposition members and independents. The total number of co-sponsors (238) fell only six votes short of a simple majority of the House of Representatives. After dissuasion by top leaders of the LDP, thirty-three LDP members “changed” their minds and withdrew their endorsement of the resolution. But twenty-one LDP members went forward to co-sponsor the resolution with opposition members. Although the resolution eventually failed to reach the floor, it represented a new pattern of cooperation between opposition members and dissident LDP members.

In April 1972 a new united front of pro-Beijing forces called Nitchō Kokkō Kaifuku Sokushin Renraku Kaigi (the Council for Promoting Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations) was established. This was a coordinating organ for the nationwide pro-rapprochement forces including the Diet Members' League, the JSP, and the DSP (Ijiri 1987: 80 and 175-176). It gave the opposition camp great leverage to begin its own diplomacy, and it allowed yatō gaikō (opposition parties' diplomacy) to become more
active. As it became increasingly clear that the top foreign policy issue would be normalization of relations with China, opposition parties competed with one another to open new channels for carrying out the rapprochement task with Beijing.

_Yatō gaikō_ was an important channel for opening up negotiations for rapprochement. The actions of both DSP's Sasaki and CGP's Takeiri prepared the way for the visit of Japan's prime minister to China. Under normal circumstances, the top bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would perform these actions. However, because of a lack of normal channels between the two countries, these informal political actors, Takeiri in particular, fulfilled the role of “Japan's Kissinger.” The point here is that although Takeiri performed a similar function as Kissinger, he had no official position either in the government or in the ruling party. However, he was the chairman of an opposition party and a personal friend of the prime minister. This indicates that _yatō gaikō_ allowed the opposition camp to play a significant catalytic role in crucial political events. This case has further enhanced the importance of informal political institutions and channels (known here as _kuromaku_) in Japanese political life.

### THE INTELLECTUALS AND THINK-TANK

Intellectual participation in politics began to be noticed in the Meiji period. Almost every circle of society accepted the slogan “a rich country and a strong army” as national goals during the period of Japan's modernization. Mainstream intellectuals of the time were no exception, thereby supporting the government's efforts to achieve the national goals. From the late nineteenth century to 1945, Japan began to emulate Western colonial behaviors by pursuing an aggressive policy toward its Asian neighbors, notably China and Korea. During those years, a few Japanese intellectuals, including university professors and journalists, began to criticize and oppose Japan's aggressive foreign policy toward its Asian neighbors. This change of attitude corresponded with the introduction of Western democratic ideas into Japan. This critical attitude toward the government was partially a result of the academic independence demanded by intellectuals and partially a result of the fact that intellectuals did have _Adissident opinions._

During World War II, owing to the rapid development of new technology and the changing nature of international affairs, the Japanese government began to seek advice from scholars and experts through more cooperative relations with intellectuals. A typical example was the Shōwa Kenkyū kai (the Shōwa Research Association), which was made up of scholars from the imperial universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, and other intellectuals, founded by Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Nevertheless, intellectuals' participation in the policymaking process was rather limited in both scale and duration, and many intellectuals still continued to criticize governmental policies. The critical attitude toward the government has been inherited by a good portion of the postwar intellectuals, many of whom were in line with opposition parties such as the JSP, CGP, and DSP.

Beginning in the early 1970s, this anti-establishment sentiment began to change among certain intellectuals. A small group of scholars and experts in various fields
started to actively participate in the policymaking process. Their new attitude was that, in order to influence policy, one must participate in the process. This attitude was further enhanced by the LDP's de facto one-party domination. Some intellectuals had tired of always being “outsiders” and wanted to become “insiders.” This change of attitude, though not very noticeable, was quite significant, for it showed the evolution of mass participation in Japanese politics and the development of a pluralistic society.

The participation of intellectuals in the policymaking process is far from being formal and institutionalized. Although groups of scholars are referred to as *shinkutanku* (think-tanks, or research institutions), normally they do not form their own advisory or consultative institutions as their counterparts do in the United States. They can participate in the policymaking process in three ways. First, they can become private advisers to the prime minister. Almost every prime minister has had a small circle of his own private advisers. These inner groups are usually informal, having various degrees of influence depending on the individuals involved. Several prime ministers, such as Sato, Ohira, and Nakasone, have deliberately included scholars in their inner groups. Scholars are “selected” as advisers if they share similar political views with the prime minister; if they maintain a good personal relationship with the prime minister; and if they have a scholarly reputation. Once included in the inner groups, scholars retain their close contact with the prime minister. It is not unusual for a scholar-adviser to meet with the prime minister once or twice a month.

The second way is for intellectuals to join various governmental advisory committees. These committees are organized at three different levels: the office of the prime minister, the ministries, and the bureaus within ministries. These governmental services normally carry no remuneration except for reimbursement for transportation expenses to and from committee meetings.

Third, intellectuals can influence national policy by participating in policy seminars sponsored by the news media. Scholars are invited to discuss issues concerning domestic politics or foreign policy together with politicians or high-ranking bureaucrats. It is not unusual for the prime minister himself to appear at such discussions. These seminars, highly publicized through television programs and newspapers, naturally have an impact on public opinion, as well as contribute to achieving consensus within the government.

Most think-tank members are technical experts or economists, and they assist the governmental bureaucrats who lack expertise or technical know-how on specific issues. Because the formation of foreign policy has traditionally been monopolized by political leaders and Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, few outsiders participate in the process of foreign policymaking. However, under certain circumstances, when government agencies need advice on certain issues, they accept help from scholars. This was the case during the process of rapprochement when Japan's China policy was reexamined. Because of the over twenty year political vacuum between Japan and China, both political leaders and Foreign Ministry bureaucrats had little up-to-date knowledge about China's domestic political system and foreign policy. Therefore, some leading scholars in Chinese politics...
and international relations were constantly consulted.

In the summer of 1971, under increasing pressure to seek normalization of relations with China and to work out a “correct” policy toward the issue of China's representation in the forthcoming United Nations Assembly, the Satō administration desperately needed advice from such experts. An informal study group was formed; it was composed of thirteen leading specialists on China and international relations, including Professors Shinkichi Etō (University of Tokyo), Tadao Ishikawa (Keio University), Tadao Miyashita (University of Kobe), Chō Ichiko (Ochanomizu Women's University), Tadao Umesao (University of Kyoto), Seiji Imabori (University of Hiroshima), Yonosuke Nagai (Tokyo Institute of Technology and Science), Jun Etō (Tokyo Institute of Technology and Science), Fuji Kamiya (Keio University), Masakazu Yamazaki (Kansai Gakuin University), Masatake Kosaka (University of Kyoto), and Mineo Nakajima (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies). On August 26, the study group held its first meeting to discuss the China policy. Kosaka and Nakajima were appointed as coordinators, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Noboru Takeshita and Acting Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura participated in this first discussion (Ijiri 1987: 84-85; and Kusuda 1975: 116-117).

Professor Shinkichi Etō of the University of Tokyo, a leading conservative China specialist, became one of the inner-circle advisers to Prime Minister Satō. He was frequently consulted by both the prime minister and the top bureaucrats of MOFA. In December 1970, when Satō disclosed his strategy for a gradual change on China policy to improve relations with the PRC, while maintaining close ties with Taiwan, Etō suggested that the prime minister should be cautious and “pay close attention to public opinion.” Since pro-Taiwan political forces were still active at that time, the real meaning of this advice was to let the prime minister slow down the normalization process with Beijing.

There is yet another example of the influence of the group. Prior to LDP Secretary General Hori's request to Tokyo Governor Minobe to communicate his personal letter to Premier Zhou Enlai at the end of 1971, Mineo Nakajima, a China specialist at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and author of several books on China, was asked to review the draft of the letter and make some modifications (Ijiri 1987: 106; and Nakajima 1982: 149).

After rapprochement in 1972, the number of bilateral personnel exchanges between China and Japan grew rapidly, making it possible for governmental bureaucrats to increase their knowledge of Chinese affairs. Since then, the role of think-tank in the formation of China policy has not been as prominent as it was during the pre-normalization era.

Nevertheless, since the early 1970s the role of intellectuals has become increasingly prominent in Japan's political life. There are three reasons for this development. First, the development of advanced technology and a complex world economy have required the acquisition of highly specialized knowledge by governmental
agencies. Second, an increasing number of scholars believe that participation in the policymaking process is one way to do research in their own fields. In this sense, participation is used as a means of what Shumpei Kumon called “social experiment.”

Third, owing to the de facto one-party rule since 1955, some intellectuals feel strongly that in order to increase their influence in society, they have to actively participate in the policymaking of the “mainstream” politics.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE NEWS MEDIA

An assessment of the function of political institutions in the normalization process cannot be complete without a discussion of the news media, in particular Japanese newspapers. The role of the news media in Japanese political life and their influence on society has increased remarkably owing to their large circulation and active political participation.

There are three categories of newspapers. The first category encompasses national papers, including five major ones, Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nihon Keizai, and Sankei. They all enjoy a large circulation with Yomiuri and Asahi at the top; they had a circulation of 8,852,610 and 7,533,727 (morning and evening editions as a set in large cities), respectively, in 1984. The second category includes the block papers that cover Western Japan, Central Japan, and Hokkaido. The third category encompasses regional papers such as Chō goku (Hiroshima), Kyoto (Kyoto), Tohoku shinpō (Miyagi), and Niigata nippō (Niigata) (Haruhara et al. 1986: 33). Japan is number one in the world in terms of the distribution rate of newspaper circulation, maintaining 569 copies per 1,000 people (more than twice the number of the United States), with the average Japanese household receiving more than one paper.

Japan's print media also include a large variety of wide-circulation magazines. The most influential and widely read monthlies include the relatively conservative Chō Kōron (with a circulation of between 60,000 and 70,000) representing the “mainstream” of society; and Bungei Shunju (530,000), which is noted for its treatment of controversial political and social issues that the newspapers will not touch. There is also Sekai (100,000), which has a strongly antiwar and leftist editorial policy, and has covered a number of controversies including nuclear disarmament, world peace, and the situation on the Korean peninsula in recent years (Haruhara et al. 1986: 74).

Japan has six nationwide television networks: one is publicly operated---NHK (the Japan Broadcasting Corporation)--and the other five are privately owned--NTV, TBS, Asahi, Fuji, and NET. According to recent polls conducted by NHK, despite a slight decline in the last decade the average Japanese views television at least three hours per day, reflecting the degree of TV network influence.

On many occasions, Japanese newspapers have followed editorial policies that strayed from the official government line. This tendency has made them a powerful political force. In fact, all newspapers had their own political agenda on the China issue.
during the normalization period. Japanese newspapers led Japanese political actors in entering into agreements with the Chinese on Chinese terms. They also furnished the editorial support for other political actors to take new positions in furthering relations with China. They created a popular milieu in which formal recognition (normalization) became possible.

Throughout 1971, major national dailies gave extensive coverage to the issue of China's representation in the United Nations and the normalization of relations between Japan and China. Every major national paper carried an average of forty-seven editorials, or about four each month, on the subject (Kim 1981: 151).

In this regard, Asahi played a leading role. In a poll conducted by Asahi on June 23, 1970, only 19 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that “in order to establish diplomatic relations, it cannot be helped if ties with Taiwan are severed.” Forty-six percent opposed it. Asahi then decided to launch an all-out effort to “educate” the public on the China question, and in the January 1971 issue devoted two entire pages to this purpose. Asahi called for the termination of efforts to maintain Taiwan's representation at the United Nations and pushed for government-to-government contact with Beijing for the restoration of formal diplomatic relations. After an extensive five-month campaign, Asahi took another opinion poll on the China question by making similar statements to the previous ones. This time, 33 percent of the respondents agreed with the statements while 22 percent disagreed. On June 23, 1971, exactly one year after the first opinion poll, Asahi declared in an editorial that, although the great majority of the people wanted normalization of relations with China, the ruling Liberal Democrats and the central bureaucracy were holding stubbornly to the policy of “one China and one Taiwan.” Other newspapers during the same period obtained similar results from their polls, although their questions were not exactly the same as Asahi's (Miyoshi and Etô 1972: 97-115).

Asahi made another move a year later. Dissatisfied with Prime Minister Satô 's passive position on the China issue, the newspaper went even further and asked for a pro-PRC candidate to replace Satô . In a column article of June 7, 1972, Asahi's Beijing correspondent suggested that a new prime minister of Japan must accept Beijing's three principles for normalization and must demonstrate, by concrete action, that its pledge to do so was genuine. The article went on to argue that Fukuda's assumption of power would make the normalization of relations with China difficult, since he served as Satô 's foreign minister and was deeply involved in “unfriendly activities” toward Beijing.29

Based on these events, we could argue that the media were trying to influence public opinion in Japan's China policy. On the other hand, as can be seen from numerous opinion polls conducted periodically by the newspapers, the pro-Beijing stance of the newspapers indeed reflected the changing public mood in Japan.

The press clearly benefited from a favorable public image. According to a survey, 64 percent of the respondents expressed an opinion that the press reflected the “feelings” (kimochi) of the people; while a mere 8 percent answered this question negatively. The
central government did poorly in the same survey, with only 27 percent of the respondents believing the government reflected the feelings of the people and 52 percent saying the government did not represent them. The Diet did not fare much better than the government (Shinohara 1971: 14).

Facing domestic and international pressure, Prime Minister Satō finally announced his intention to resign from office on June 16, 1972. Having for years been portrayed by the newspapers as a reactionary political figure and the incarnation of Japanese militarism, Satō was angry and frustrated with the press. In the conference room where he announced his resignation, he discourteously told reporters, “I don't like the biased press.” When reporters protested, Satō said “Please get out.” After all the newspaper reporters left, he allowed himself to be covered only by television cameras desiring “to talk to the people directly” (Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 1973: 39).

Initially, Kakuei Tanaka, the new prime minister, was received warmly by the press. He was praised as “a man of determination and action,” “a computerized bulldozer,” and he was described as “cheerful and folksy.” In return, Tanaka firmly assured the press that “it is natural to seek the understanding of the people through the mass media. I will show respect for the newspapers” (Kusumoto 1976: 122). His stance showed that “voter-conscious” politicians are more careful than bureaucrats toward the news media, because of their tremendous influence on public opinion.

The good relationship between Tanaka and the news media did not last long, however. About a month after his inauguration, Tanaka indicated his real feelings about the news media, regarding them as a potential threat. At a dinner with nine reporters, Tanaka warned them, “Don’t pursue any trivial matters. If you don’t cross a dangerous bridge, I will be safe. So will you. If I think a particular reporter is dangerous, I can easily have him removed.” Ironically, two years later, it was Tanaka who was forced to resign from office partially due, at least on the surface, to personal scandals, which were investigated and revealed to the public by the news media, led by the monthly magazine Bungeo Shunjō (Kim 1981: 168-169).

The intellectual community widely admires the news media's tradition of criticizing political leaders, known as “opposition spirit” (Watanuki 1977: 26-27). However, the pro-Beijing stance of the majority of the news media and the actions taken by Asahi in particular were not without criticism. Shinkichi Etō, for example, criticized Asahi's reporting of the Japanese-Chinese normalization issue as a display of manipulating public opinion and active advocacy of its own biased opinion (Miyoshi and Etō 1972: 219-224).

Not all Japanese newspapers adopted a pro-Beijing stance. In its editorial of June 14, 1971, for example, Mainichi insisted that Beijing governed the mainland but did not rule Taiwan; Taipei ruled Taiwan but did not govern the mainland. This was reality, and a foreign policy must be formulated on the basis of reality, implying a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. Later, Mainichi's attitude did change with the changing international
environment and domestic mood toward the China issue.

Press-government relations in Japan deserve close attention. Some intellectuals would like to emphasize the “opposition spirit” of the news media. For example, right after the downfall of the Kishi administration in 1960, a principal editorial writer of Asahi said, “If Asahi rendered overall support to the JSP, because it judged that the LDP was not good at all—though this is, needless to say, strictly hypothetical, this alone might cause a loss of the majority on the part of the LDP” (Ryu 1961). Although this statement appears to exaggerate the political impact of the newspapers, it nevertheless reflected the critical function of the news media in Japan's political life.

An opposite view holds that collaboration exists between the news media and the government. In the postwar era, there has been well-established coordination between the news media and the government through the press club system. These clubs are exclusively established, professional organizations that are given such perquisites as rooms, equipment, and staff by major news sources within the government, major industries, and other corporate bodies. The government agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regularly hold press conferences at the clubs, which a few scholars have described as “collaboration between the government and the newspapers,” and “government control and guidance of the news” (Yamamoto 1989: 371-388).

These differing arguments are examples of the dual function played by the news media in Japanese society. On the one hand, the newspapers will “monitor” the actions taken by the conservative ruling coalition (the LDP and the central bureaucracy). On the other hand, the news media will try to assure a stable social environment and the realization of Japan's “national goals,” thereby preventing the society from going in radical directions.

This dual function of the news media can also be described as a valve function, which may be further explained in terms of three aspects. First, the press coverage can affect the career of individual political leaders: for example, the careers of two prime ministers, Satō and Tanaka. Second, the press helped block attempts by the conservative ruling coalition to amend the postwar constitutional frameworks such as the issue of Japan's rearmament. The newspaper attacks on Satō’s alleged militarism are a good example. It may also push the conservatives to be aware of new developments, such as calling for normalizing relations with China to follow the new trends in the international community. Third, the press contributed to restraining the left-wing opposition parties and direct mass actions from taking more radical lines (J. B. Lee 1985: 171-176). With this valve function, the news media may help to maintain a moderate climate of public opinion between conservative LDP and left-wing social forces such as JSP and JCP.

BEIJING'S STRATEGY

Informal political actors and networks are so important in Japan that they should not be ignored. At the same time, since they are informal, it is important to identify their
background and real intent. The important thing is “to learn, to know, and to play the game.” As Guy Olivier Faure (1998: 139) points out, “The question of how the Chinese understand the type of game that is played during a negotiation is fundamental.” With its thorough understanding of the political culture of Japan, Beijing played the game well.

At various stages the PRC leaders, particularly Premier Zhou Enlai, skillfully used a strategy of insisting on certain principles, such as the three principles for normalization and the four conditions for trade, to enlarge Japan's pro-Beijing forces. This effort to create a China bandwagon phenomenon was known as people's diplomacy which applied pressure to Japan through the cooperation of the Japanese people. The strategy was especially effective with opposition parties and the business community. Besides these tactics, China had more direct ways by which to influence Japanese politics. As A. Doak Barnett (1977: 126) suggested, although the Japanese had had no direct impact on politics within China since 1949, the Chinese involved themselves “deeply in Japanese domestic politics.”

Before 1971 China constantly criticized the “revival of Japanese militarism.” After the 1969 Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué, Zhou Enlai accused the Satō government of attempting to step up militarism and realize its old dream of a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.” In April 1971, Zhou visited Pyongyang and issued the China-North Korea Joint Statement, which claimed that Japanese militarism was already revived.

In the prevailing international situation marked by competition and hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, Mao Zedong developed the idea that Japan and West Europe should be regarded as an intermediate zone between the revolutionary forces and the two reactionary superpowers. It became necessary for China to cultivate friendly relations with these countries. The need for economic development was also a catalyst for China to seek closer relations with Japan. After Nixon's visit, vigorous criticism of Japanese militarism in the Chinese press gradually diminished and then completely disappeared after Tanaka had become prime minister. A new campaign calling for Sino-Japanese friendship and normalization of relations was launched. Chinese leaders believed that the political transition from Satō to Tanaka presented the best opportunity for China to conduct direct contacts with the Japanese government.

Allen Whiting (1989: 193-196) pointed out that positive and negative images of Japan and the Japanese coexisted in official Chinese statements and media at that time. Since the state controlled virtually all the propaganda tools (newspapers, books, films, and other media) in China, Japan's image in China could be manipulated by the Chinese government, corresponding to the normalization steps between the two countries.

China's campaign for friendship encompassed three routes. The first route used Zhou's conditions for selecting “friendly firms” and promoting economic rapprochement prior to political rapprochement. The second route carried out propaganda in the Chinese news media and worked hard at gaining support from the Japanese news media. According to Seiichi Tagawa, an agreement to exchange reporters between the two
countries was concluded in the negotiation on memorandum trade in 1968, based on the understanding that China's three political principles would be a guideline. Unless a Japanese newspaper signed a pledge to abide by the three principles, Japan could not dispatch a correspondent to China. Japanese reporters who violated these principles were expelled from China (Mainichi, Sankei, Yomiuri, and Nishi Nippon dailies), denied reentry into China (NHK), or arrested on charges of espionage activities (Nihon Keizai). These strict rules in Beijing and intense competition among the Japanese newspapers subsequently forced the Japanese press to practice self-restraint in editing and writing articles on the China issue (Miyoshi and Etō 1972).

The third route sent China's informal envoys, who were China's diplomatic Japan-hands (but without official status when visiting Japan), to go to Japan on various crucial occasions. These were the so-called first Wang whirlwind, second Wang whirlwind, and Sun whirlwind, each of which created an enormous impact on the process of rapprochement.

The first Wang whirlwind referred to the visit of Wang Xiaoyun in March-April 1971. Wang visited Japan as deputy head of the Chinese ping-pong team at the thirty-first World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya without using his official position as deputy secretary-general of the China-Japan Friendship Association and director of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Wang's one-month visit proved fruitful. He held a series of meetings with the LDP's anti-Satō leaders such as Takeo Miki, and with leaders of opposition parties (the JSP Chairman Tomomi Narita in Tokyo and the Kōmeitō [CGP] Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri in Fukuoka). The highlight of his visit was a meeting held in Tokyo with the business organization leaders from Keizai Dōyōkai, Keidanren, and Nikkeiren. It was the first time business community leaders met with a high-ranking Chinese official. After the meeting, Dōyōkai President Kazutaka Kikawada told the press that "the improvement of Japan-China relations is a national issue in the 1970s."

Four months later, Wang Guoquan made a follow-up visit known as the second Wang whirlwind on the occasion of the funeral of Kenzō Matsumura, a longtime pro-Beijing LDP leader and active promoter of Japan-China trade. Wang was vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a veteran Chinese diplomat. During his one-week stay, he contacted various political and economic leaders. The impact of this visit was particularly notable among business leaders. Some previously pro-Taiwan leaders, such as the chairman of the Board of the Shin Nihon Seitetsu (Japan's largest steel company) Shigeo Nagano, came to announce acceptance of Zhou's four conditions and called for improvement in Japan-China relations. These meetings were in opposition to the official stance of the Japanese government at the time. Prime Minister Satō was reportedly angry about the quick switch in attitude among zaikai (the business community) leaders, many of whom had close relations with him (Ogata 1977: 195).

During the 1971-72 period, China made several important conciliatory overtures toward Japan in order to accelerate the normalization process. In May 1972 Zhou Enlai received an opposition party delegation from Japan, and announced that China was
willing to waive its claim of war reparations against Japan estimated at $50 billion; that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of 1969 would no longer be regarded as an obstacle for normalization between the two countries; and that a peace treaty between China and Japan (which China had long proposed as a replacement of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty) would not be insisted on. These announcements showed the flexibility of the Chinese leaders and encouraged the new Tanaka-hira leadership to make a decisive move toward normalization.

The Sun whirlwind refers to the visit of a Chinese delegation led by Sun Pinghua in August 1972. Sun's official position was deputy secretary-general of the China-Japan Friendship Association, but during his visit to Japan he was head of the Shanghai Dance Drama Troupe. After the Tanaka administration was inaugurated in July 1972, both Japan and China speeded up the process for rapprochement. Sun's visit stimulated greater "China fever" among the Japanese. Many important political and business leaders wanted to confer with the Chinese officials. Most important was an official invitation which Sun conveyed to Foreign Minister hira from Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei stating that "Premier Zhou Enlai welcomes and invites Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to visit China." Tanaka warmly received Sun and the Chinese dancers and accepted Zhou's invitation.

Thus, this historic invitation from China's premier to Japan's prime minister was the result of a series of informal maneuvers between the two countries, conveyed through an informal channel. As a master of informal practice, Japan fully understood the official implications behind the unofficial status of the Chinese dance group.

**INFORMAL POLITICAL ACTORS AND NETWORKS SHARING POWERS**

This examination of the process of Sino-Japanese rapprochement demonstrates that the rapprochement decision resulted from many political and social forces. These forces included LDP politicians, government bureaucrats, business leaders, opposition parties, intellectuals, and the news media in Japan, as well as external factors--China, the United States, the China-related debates at the United Nations, and the changing international environment. Here we have a picture of Japan that is similar to the one described by Richard Neustadt (1960: 26) in his examination of American politics—"a government of separated institutions sharing powers."

What has made this process distinctive in Japan is the *kuromaku* phenomenon whereby so many informal political actors, institutions, and organizations were involved in important political decisions. The catalytic and valve functions of informal political institutions were crucial in the process of normalizing relations with China. This conclusion coincides with Donald Hellmann's conclusion on Japanese foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Hellmann (1969: 56, 69) argued that the LDP factional struggle became synonymous with the foreign policymaking process, and the party's formal decision-making apparatus "was incapable of constraining the policy formulation process." It can be said that in Japan, political powers are shared not only by the established formal institutions, but also by informal political actors and networks, such as...
LDP study groups, the Satō administration's five ahiru of duck diplomacy, the opposition parties' informal channels, freedom of action in the business community, the think-tank function of the intellectuals, and the dual role of the news media.

Informal practice is used not only externally but also internally. Informal political actors and networks often serve as a tool connecting and coordinating activities among various power centers in society. This can be seen in the subtle relationship (rival yet cooperative) between the ruling LDP and opposition parties (in this case the JSP and the CGP) during the normalization process. Such connecting and coordinating functions are important to the effectiveness of the society, making the system work more smoothly and rationally. The process of Sino-Japanese normalization demonstrates that the dynamic activities of Informal political actors and networks have enabled Japan's political system to be highly sensitive to both domestic demands and international changes.

On the other hand, because of its informal nature, the negotiation process often appears “closed.” Thus, as I. M. Destler and others (1979: 327-328) point out, it may become “ineffective” because of difficulties for policy implementation. The roles played by informal political actors and informal networks vary greatly, and are heavily dependent on individual efforts and circumstances, thus making these actors less predictable, if not less reliable. The lack of institutionalization (in a relative sense) in this political process may cause confusion and uncertainty for foreigners, particularly for Westerners.

Informal political actors and networks can be further explained from the perspective of organizational theories. Informal activities, as Selznick (1961: 22-23) pointed out, are deviations from formal organizations that tend to force a shift away from the purely formal system as the effective determinant of behavior to (1) a condition in which informal patterns buttress the formal, as through the manipulation of sentiment within the organization in favor of established authority; or (2) a condition wherein the informal controls effect a consistent modification of formal goals, as in the case of some bureaucratic patterns.” This is to say, informal actors and networks tend to support the formal system, while making modifications to formal goals. This trend eventually results in the “formalization of erstwhile informal activities,” with the cycle of deviation and transformation beginning again on a new level (Selznick 1961: 23). One obvious example is the LDP factions, which were once regarded as informal organizations within the LDP but over time gradually became formalized, and a part of the formal political institution.

This study would not be complete without making international comparisons between Japan and other societies. Nevertheless, this paper is not intended as a full-fledged comparative study. Since Japan is a society influenced by both the East and West, this comparison will focus on the informal aspects of Japanese politics and policymaking against the backgrounds of East Asian societies and the United States.

As an East Asian society, Japan shares common cultural legacies—Confucianism, for example—with China, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. In studying East Asian politics, many believe that cultural differences are important
contributions to distinctive patterns of these societies (B. Richardson 1974: 2-4). It is not enough, however, to emphasize only cultural traditions. Political institutions and social structures should also be taken into account.

When we compare the Japanese with the Chinese political and economic systems, we see obvious differences between capitalist and socialist systems. However, we also see similarities in the policymaking mechanisms between the two societies, particularly the informal aspects of the policymaking processes.

A number of China specialists have emphasized informality in China's political life. Andrew Walder (1986: 76-80), for example, in his study of China's social structure and workers' politics, emphasizes the importance of an informal network in Chinese society. Walder claims that informal relationships are the real arena for the pursuit of interests. Indeed, social connections and network are as important in Chinese politics as they are in Japan. *Guanxi* is a widely used term referring to social networking and is arguably the equivalent of the Japanese term *tsukiai*. In China, *guanxi* is regarded as a catalyst to increase one's social network and to get things done. Without *guanxi* one would hardly have any significant influence in China's political arena.

Tang Tsou (1986: 98) has conducted a specific study on informal groups in Chinese Communist Party politics. He analyzes informal rules, groups and processes and how they are transformed into formal ones, and he describes this practice as one of the most interesting phenomena in the dynamics of bureaucracy and the political system. Evidence of informality in Chinese politics is abundant. Other than *guanxi*, the counterpart of *tsukiai* discussed above, there is also a Chinese type of *kuromaku*, behind-the-scenes influential political figures who may not necessarily hold formal positions; and a Chinese-style *nemawashi* emphasizing informal contacts for preparation of decisions. While the Japanese and Chinese styles are not entirely the same, there are striking similarities in East Asian political structures and cultures that influence political mechanisms. Looking at the recent experience and the developmental patterns of Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, and other societies, we may wonder that, in spite of different economic and political systems, the direction of development for the East Asian societies may become even more politically pluralistic, though perhaps in an informal way.

The Japanese political system resembles that of other advanced industrial democracies, as T. J. Pempel (1992: 8-9) points out, in most of its political and social institutions and behavioral traits, but it emerges from a non-Western cultural tradition. Hence, Pempel further argues, Japan has become a good case study for examining ideal conceptions of democracy in contrast to practical democratic realities. In neither Japan nor the United States is there a single source of authority and concentration of power in the sense of the absolutist state. The most striking similarity between the two countries is their democratic and pluralistic societies. The institutionalization of political leadership, the determination to form a government with popular consent through elections, and the citizens' basic political rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association have made both Japan and the United States different from authoritarian states. The setting of the democratic political system in both countries has permitted interest groups
to voice their demands, which in turn influence the policymaking process. The role of organized farmers in the case of Japan's raw silk protectionism is similar to that of many lobbying activities in the United States.

Before turning to differences between Japan and the United States, I should make it clear that comparing a presidential system such as that in the United States and a parliamentary system like Japan's is like comparing an apple with an orange. Despite similarities in terms of the democratic nature of the regimes, there are many differences between the two nations, particularly with regard to institutional functions and the policymaking process. A Brookings book *Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States* (S. Kernell, 1991) makes an extensive comparison between the two countries' political systems and the policymaking process. In Samuel Kernell's concluding chapter (pp. 325-378), he discussed in detail similarities and difference with regard to the party system, election, the legislature, executive leadership (presidents versus prime ministers, etc.), and the governmental bureaucracy. Since this paper is not intended to provide a comprehensive comparison between the two political systems and I do not want to repeat general arguments presented by previous studies, here I will only discuss a few points related to the informal aspect of the policymaking.

Informal practice is an inherent feature of Japan's political life. It has a prominent role in Japan's legislative politics partially because of the structural limitation of the Japanese Diet. The government provides only two or three congressional aides for Diet members, so that Diet members have to rely heavily on informal channels and advisory groups in conducting policy research, and on bureaucracy in drafting legislation. In contrast, members of the U.S. Congress have enough funds from the government to hire both administrative and legislative aides. The average number of aides a senator has, for example, is about twenty-five or more, and it may reach seventy-five. Many legislative aides have higher academic degrees, often Ph.D.s, in their fields and write drafts for legislation without outside help. There are also additional staff members on the committees and subcommittees. Even when the White House initiates legislation (and asks individual senators or congressmen to sponsor it), it often relies on the help of congressional aides in drafting the legislative proposals. Instead of relying on the bureaucracy as Japanese politicians do, American politicians rely on congressional staff.

Many of the differences between the U.S. and Japanese political systems can be attributed to the informality of Japanese politics. The prominent role played by the special social network, informal political actors and organizations, and personal contact for preparing consensus demonstrate distinct mechanisms in Japan in exercising political influence. There are differences in terms of attitudes toward authority: acceptance of informal authority as well as legal authority is much greater in Japan than in the United States. In Japan, informal channels are widely used to help the ruling party and government bureaucracy apparatus coordinate different interests in preparing policies. Through these informal and non-legislative means, it is relatively easy for the Japanese to reach a consensus among themselves, whereas in the United States, highly publicized political debates and a powerful legislative branch have made some highly sensitive policy issues more visible.
To be sure, there is also an informal aspect in American politics. In Washington, for example, some so-called super lawyers are politically influential but often exercise their power quietly without appearing in the press. After-work dinners for cultivating political ties are also popular in Washington, and one constantly hears behind-the-scenes bargaining, negotiations, and compromise at Capitol Hill and other political battlegrounds. The old boy connections of Ivy League graduates on the East Coast, who enjoy similar socioeconomic backgrounds, are also important in Washington politics. In this sense, there are similarities between Tokyo and Washington even in the aspect of informal politics.

But when we examine Japan's policymaking mechanisms, such as social network (tsukiai), informal political actors and organizations (kuromaku), and behind-the-scenes consensus-building (nemawashi), we can sense a difference in scope and degree. For example, although both countries have gakubatsu, or a school clique, within the government bureaucracies, there is a much higher degree of concentration in Japan in a single university (the University of Tokyo) than in the United States. Furthermore, the differences in policymaking mechanisms may often become sources of misunderstanding between the two countries. For example, as Robert Christopher (1989: 32) points out, Americans are apt to regard the nemawashi process as inordinately time consuming, or even as a deliberate delaying tactic or mechanism for deceit.

The third party intermediaries via informal political actors are not unique to Japan of course, but are common to all political systems. One hears of under-the-table-politics all the time in Tokyo, as well as in Western democracies such as Washington and London. If informal politics simply means that many informal networks and groups (that is, groups without legal jurisdiction over an issue) are involved, then every nation has informal politics. But Japan's informal networks do have their own characteristics, and one can discern a distinct Japanese way of policymaking. Use of social connections for political influence and mobilization is “a common phenomenon in Japan, perhaps a more visible or a more frequent activity there than in any other industrialized country” (B. Richardson 1991: 338). In other words, with regard to informal politics and networks there is a difference in degree of intensity between Japan and the Western democracies. One of the key elements for successfully using third parties is a full understanding of related parties. As Benjamin Broome and John Murray (2002: 96) point out, “Preparation is a key component to effective third-party decision making.” Furthermore, “a valuable goal for preparation is to develop the ability to spot patterns or cues in the context of the dispute.” To fully comprehend patterns and characteristics of the negotiation parties is indeed the foundation for success.

This study on Japan’s informal political actors will not only provide a base for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of the role third party intermediaries play in international negotiations. Obviously, this study on Japan’s practice is only an initial step in this direction. We need more analytical framework and thorough case studies to examine third party intermediaries in international negotiation processes.
This paper is largely based on a case study in my early book – Part III of Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policy Making— the Politics Behind Politics, Hong Kong and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.


3 The Japanese dictionary lists two explanations for kuromaku: (1) A black veil that is used in Japanese traditional play, such as kabuki or ningyo jōruri, for the purpose of hiding behind the scenes; and (2) people who have real influence or power but never show their movement in public (for example, kuromaku in politics). See Kyosuke Kindaichi, ed., Shin meikai kokugo jiten [New Japanese Dictionary], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1974). Also Hidetoshi Kenbo, ed., Sanseido kokugo jiten [Sanseido Japanese Dictionary], 3rd ed. (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1982).

4 The 1972 Sino-Japanese rapprochement, as well-known diplomatic event, has been one of the most thoroughly researched cases conducted by a number of scholars. In addition to my own research and interviews in Japan, this chapter has also depended on the published books or articles of Haruhiro Fukui (1970 and 1977), Sadako Ogata (1977 and 1988), and Chae-Jin Lee (1976) in terms of original materials. In addition, it benefited particularly from Hidenori Ijiri's dissertation (University of California at Berkeley, 1987) entitled “The Politics of Japan's Decision to Normalize Relations with China, 1979-72.” A number of original sources in this case study are quoted from the works of Ijiri as well as Fukui, Ogata, and Lee. While acknowledging the valuable help from the above-mentioned works, I nevertheless bear all responsibility for conclusions based on this and other case studies.

5 When I conducted interviews in Japan, I heard this argument many times from scholars, bureaucrats, and politicians alike. Among those expressing this view were Heishirō Ogawa, the first Japanese ambassador to Beijing (interviewed on February 13, 1986); Shinkichi Etō, then professor of Chinese politics and international relations at Aoyama University (February 6, 1986); and Ichirō Watanabe, a Ka' meita Diet member (May 29, 1986).

6 Interview with Mikio Kata, associate managing director of the International House of Japan, April 17, 1986, Tokyo.

7 Interview with Heishirō Ogawa, March 8, 1986, Tokyo.

8 Interview with Heishirō Ogawa, March 8, 1986, Tokyo.

9 Interview with Heishirō Ogawa, March 8, 1986, Tokyo.

10 For detailed accounts of the Memorandum Trade Agreements, see Chapter 4 of Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policy Making— the Politics Behind Politics.

Over the years Japan's opposition party diplomacy has been conducted not only with China, but also with North Korea and the former Soviet Union.

Interview with Junnosu Masu, professor of Japanese politics at Tokyo Metropolitan University, October 25, 1985, Tokyo.

Interview with Akio Watanabe, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, October 31, 1985, Tokyo.

Interview with Seizabura Sata, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, October 31, 1985, Tokyo.

Interview with Takashi Inoguchi, professor of international relations and Japanese politics at the University of Tokyo, January 12, 1986, Tokyo.

Interview with Taадo Ishikawa, professor of Chinese politics and president of Keio University, October 1, 1985, Tokyo.

Interview with Shumpei Kumon, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, October 31, 1985, Tokyo.

Interview with Yoshikazu Sakamoto, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, January 29, 1986, Tokyo.

The four conditions for Sino-Japanese trade were raised by Zhou Enlai in April 1970. For these conditions and other details of Sino-Japanese trade relations.

Peking Review (December 5, 1969), 11.


Peking Review (August 18, 1972), 3; also see C. Lee (1976: 177).

For a detailed account of the Chinese foreign policymaking system, see Quansheng Zhao (1992), Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism.

There are some subtle differences between the Chinese guanxi and the Japanese giri and tsukiai. According to Lucian Pye (1982: 91), giri implies a more explicit sense of indebtedness and obligation than the diffusely binding Chinese concept of guanxi, which may have made the Japanese wary of getting too close to the Chinese. The Japanese are much more sensitive
to the potential dangers of backlash by a people whose wishes for dependency cannot be gratified.

K. John Fukuda, for example, has analyzed the differences between the Chinese and the Japanese in terms of managerial style. Fukuda (1988: 113) argues that the Chinese pattern of leadership emphasizes rational commitment to the leader, rather than emotional ties as generally found in Japan. Therefore, any attempts at creating a more informal affective atmosphere on the part of subordinates, especially those who do not belong to the clan, are interpreted by Chinese leaders as efforts to undercut leaders' prerogatives. . . . Unlike Japanese leaders who admit their dependence on subordinates, Chinese leaders attempt to achieve goals through fostering competition among subordinates.

One useful account of Washington's political life, for example, is Charles Peter's *How Washington Really Works* (1980).

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