Why has the United States, with its long-standing Liberal tradition, come to embrace the illiberal policies it has in recent years? Abroad, the United States has pursued a strategy of hegemony, verging on empire, and almost unilaterally launched a preventive war in Iraq in a fashion inconsistent with its Liberal values. At home, policies such as those flowing from the USA Patriot Act, including even the rendition and torture of terror suspects, have called into question the U.S. commitment to other important tenets of Liberalism, such as respect for individual rights and civil liberties.

The conventional wisdom is that al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism have made the United States less Liberal. The logic of this argument is straightforward: interstate war has historically undermined domestic liberties, and the war on terrorism is causing the United States to follow this well-worn path. As the American Civil Liberties Union notes, “Throughout this country’s history, the phrase ‘national security’ has often been used as a pretext for massive violations of individual rights. . . . Most recently, the terrorist attacks on September

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This explanation for recent U.S. policies confronts a puzzle, however: illiberal policies in the United States—including the pursuit of global hegemony, launching of a preventive war, imposition of restrictions upon civil liberties in the name of national security, and support for torture under certain circumstances—emerged even before the September 11 terrorist attacks and were embraced across the political spectrum. Clearly, the September 11 attacks cannot explain the United States’ illiberal policies in the war against terror.

I argue that it is precisely American Liberalism that makes the United States so illiberal today. Under certain circumstances, Liberalism impels Americans to spread their values around the world and leads them to see the war on terrorism as a particularly deadly type of conflict that can be won only by employing illiberal tactics. What makes the war on terrorism so dangerous, in this view, is not so much the physical threat to the United States, but rather the existential threat to the American way of life and the uncivilized means adversaries employ in seeking to destroy it. Were it not for this Liberal tradition, the United States would view the threat from global terrorism in a less alarmist light (more akin to a chronic crime problem than to World War IV) and would adopt more restrained policies in response (i.e., containment rather than global transformation).

Because the Liberal tradition is a constant feature of politics in the United States, it cannot, by itself, explain changes in U.S. policy, particularly why Liberalism has not consistently affected all aspects of U.S. foreign or domestic policies. The two best applications of Louis Hartz’s argument that American Liberalism contains the seeds of illiberal behavior—Samuel Huntington’s Htheory of U.S. civil-military relations and Robert Packenham’s account of the politics of the United States’ development strategy in the third world—

concede that the effect of the Liberal tradition is mediated by other variables. Huntington employed the Liberal tradition thesis to explain recurrent civil-military tension in the United States as the result of efforts by civilian leaders to liberalize the conservative realism of the country’s officer corps. For Huntington, a key variable in explaining changing patterns of civil-military relations is threat. In a high threat environment, civilian Liberalism is muted; when threats recede, civilian Liberalism reasserts itself. Similarly, Packenham argued that the Liberal tradition manifested itself during the Cold War not so much in U.S. military policy toward the Soviet Union in Europe, but in U.S. development strategies in the third world, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States had much greater freedom of action because of weaker Soviet power. I argue that with the end of the Cold War and the rise of unprecedented U.S. hegemony, there have been fewer physical constraints on the excesses of U.S. Liberalism, which is why American illiberalism has become a more acute problem both at home and abroad.

To support this admittedly counterintuitive claim, I begin by laying out the paradoxical argument that U.S. illiberalism has deep roots in the Liberal tradition. Next, I show that George W. Bush and the neoconservative activists both inside and outside his administration share the Liberal tradition’s core premises. I then trace the links between the Liberal tradition and the rise of U.S. illiberalism abroad and at home during the Bush presidency. I also address likely objections to my argument. I conclude by arguing that the United States ought to embrace a non-Liberal foreign policy by adopting realism as a check on Liberalism’s excesses.

The Liberal Tradition in the United States

Given the many meanings of the term “Liberalism,” it is useful to begin with an explanation of what it means in the context of this article. Liberalism, with a

small “l,” usually refers to those on the left of the U.S. political spectrum, such as members of Americans for Democratic Action and the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as political figures such as former Massachusetts Governor and Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis and Senator Edward Kennedy. Liberalism with a capital “L” refers to “Lockeanism,” that is, a political system or set of political values based on some combination of individual freedom, equality of opportunity, free markets, and political representativeness. Historian Arthur Schlesinger referred to this as the “vital center” of U.S. politics.

HARTZ AND LOCKEAN ABSOLUTISM

Although there have been other Liberal regimes in history (e.g., Great Britain beginning in the nineteenth century), what made the United States unique, in Hartz’s view, was its lack of a feudal past. Unlike most other Liberal regimes, the United States was “born” democratic and thus did not have to reconcile its Liberalism with other political ideologies or define its Liberalism in opposition to other ideologies. Making this possible was the country’s favorable geographical position far from powerful adversaries in Europe. U.S. Liberalism is characterized by four unique premises: (1) political and economic development is easy; (2) all good things go together; (3) radicalism and revolution are bad; and (4) democracy is more important than political order. These last two premises may seem contradictory, but they can be made consistent by arguing, as many Liberals do, that instability in the short term is acceptable to achieve “perpetual peace” over the long term. Not surprisingly, “perpetual war for perpetual peace” has been a recurrent theme in the history of Liberal states. Individually, these four premises seem benign; taken together, however, they can be the source of illiberalism.

Hartz argued that, at its core, the United States’ Liberal tradition contains a “deep and unwritten tyrannical compulsion” that “hampers creative action

11. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, chap. 3.
abroad by identifying the alien [e.g., the non-Liberal] with the unintelligible, and it inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce.”¹³ He referred to this as the problem of “Lockean absolutism.” Or as Eric McKittrick put it, “With nothing to push against it, [Liberalism] thinks in absolutes; the occasional shadows which cross its path quickly lengthen into monsters; every enemy is painted in satanic terms, and it has no idea how it would behave if the enemy were either bigger or different.”¹⁴ “The first two Liberal premises,” Packenham explains, “make the United States excessively optimistic or utopian; the third Liberal premise often makes us counterrevolutionary or reactionary; and the fourth assumption inclines us toward a special kind of pretentiousness or arrogance.”¹⁵

Many scholars associate Hartz with U.S. domestic politics, ignoring his argument that Liberal absolutism fosters a desire within the United States to spread Liberalism beyond its borders. Hartz attributed U.S. Liberal absolutism to John Locke’s influence on the country’s founders. With regard to U.S. foreign policy, however, the roots of this absolutism lie elsewhere. Unlike later Liberal thinkers, Locke was less doctrinaire about the imperative to spread Liberalism around the world.¹⁶ As Nathan Tarcov shows, Locke believed that Liberal rights “are most properly secured by each people’s establishing or altering its own government.”¹⁷ Lockean Liberalism, therefore, does not explain the excesses evident in contemporary U.S. foreign policy.

THE KANTIAN ROOTS OF LIBERAL ILLIBERALISM

It was rather Immanuel Kant, author of the essay “Perpetual Peace,” who has had the greatest influence on U.S. foreign policy, primarily through the theory of the “democratic peace.”¹⁸ Although his essay was penned at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant’s influence really took hold at the end of the nineteenth century, eventually becoming the philosophical rationale for efforts to

¹⁵. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, p. 173.
promote peace through the spread of democracy under the auspices of international institutions such as Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations.19

Kant’s objective was to establish a system of perpetual peace that ended war without the need for an overarching world government.20 For such a system to function effectively, all countries would need the same republican domestic political order. Kant’s “first definitive article of perpetual peace” states that “the civil constitution of every nation should be republican.”21 He reasoned that political systems in which individuals who are likely to bear the direct costs of wars also have a say in whether it is waged are less likely to engage in them.22 Kenneth Waltz describes Kant’s solution as “the ‘power’ to enforce law [, which] is . . . derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection.”23

Subsequent Liberals, according to Leo Strauss, learned from Kant “that the prosperous, free, and just society in a single country or in only a few countries is not possible in the long run: to make the world safe for Western democracies, one must make the whole globe democratic, each country in itself as well as the society of nations. Good order in one country presupposes good order in


all countries and among all countries.” Pierre Hassner argues that this link-

age accounts for the paradoxical nature of Kant’s “political philosophy [, which] seems more than ever to be compounded of an abstract morality not of this world and an amoral politics too much of it.” The abstract morality is Kant’s categorical imperative that states have a duty to leave the international state of nature, and bring other states out of it as well, through the spread of representative government domestically and internationally. Kant’s politics are amoral, however, because he countenances illiberal means such as coercive regime change through outside intervention and global hegemony to actualize this Liberal dream of perpetual peace.

Unlike earlier social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Locke, Kant regarded the international state of nature as so perilous that its dangers could be ameliorated only through the radical transformation of countries’ domestic orders and the international system. Given this, he concluded that leaving the system was an “unmitigated duty.” Kant accorded to republican states the right to end the international state of war by forcing other states to embrace republicanism. He explained, “For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand that others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each.” Because non-republican states, and those that do not join what Kant referred to as the “republican league,” threaten to perpetuate the unacceptable international state of nature, intervention to change these regimes or the use of coercion to force states to join the league is not inconsistent with his system. Here, Kant makes a dramatic break from classical international law—particularly the work of Hugo Grotius—with its unqualified commitment to state sovereignty.

At first glance, this right to demand that other states leave the state of nature seems to contradict Kant’s proscription, in his fifth preliminary article, of interference in the domestic politics of other countries. For Liberals, state sover-

eignty ultimately derives from the rights of individuals in the state of nature. When individuals surrender their natural liberty to the commonwealth through the social contract, it then inheres in the state.\textsuperscript{31} Intervention in the affairs of such a representative state violates the individual rights of its citizens.\textsuperscript{32}

If a state is not truly representative, however, it does not enjoy the same right of nonintervention.\textsuperscript{33} Kant framed this in the context of an “unjust enemy,” which he defined as “one whose publicly expressed Will, either in word or deed, betrays a maxim which, if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of peace among the nations impossible, and would necessarily perpetuate the state of nature.”\textsuperscript{34} In other words, an unjust enemy is a state that fails to embrace republicanism. “There can be talk of international right only on the assumption that a state of law-governedness exists,” Kant maintained, “for in the state of nature, in the absence of law-governedness, only private right can exist.”\textsuperscript{35} The larger principle here is that absent an international social contract, states enjoy no international rights.

Kant even allowed that a republican hegemon could act as the catalyst for the establishment of the republican league: “For if good fortune should so dispose matters that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace), it will provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to guarantee a state of peace among nations.”\textsuperscript{36} By inspiring other states to embrace republicanism at home and abroad, this hegemon was to be more than just a “beacon of hope” or a “shining city on a hill.” Indeed, by viewing the presence of non-Liberal states as threatening, Kantian Liberalism can serve as the philosophical justification for intervention and hegemony.

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36. Ibid., p. 117.
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THE PARADOX OF LIBERALISM

Kant’s imperative to remake the world order is evident in the work of Liberalism’s greatest twentieth-century exponent—John Rawls—who justifies the spread of Liberalism not only for defensive reasons, but also because of the politically obligatory nature of Liberal tenets. Building on Kant, Rawls posits that Liberal states are obliged “to leave the state of nature and to submit [them]selves along with others to the rule of a reasonable and a just law.”37 Liberal societies may even employ military force to achieve this end. Rawls’s article “The Law of Peoples” epitomizes the paradox at the heart of post-Kantian Liberalism. In it, Rawls suggests that Liberalism is in principle tolerant of non-Liberal regimes, but in practice the only non-Liberal regimes that Liberal societies can tolerate are those that embrace Liberal values, such as the protection of individual human rights.38 Over the years, the recognition that Liberalism more generally can have such illiberal consequences has gained increasing currency. Ira Katznelson observes, “Liberalism’s ordinary functioning can . . . advance and thus bond with nonliberal and illiberal impulses of various kinds.”39

If Liberalism affects state behavior, two patterns should be evident in the international system: the absence of war among Liberal states but many wars between Liberal and non-Liberal states.40 In contrast, if only structural realist factors matter, the incidence of war should be unrelated to regime type. But if my argument is correct, Liberal states should wage many wars with non-Liberal states, though largely against weaker ones, in an effort to spread Liberal values. Over the past 200 years, there have been few wars among Liberal democratic states. Still, scholars have raised serious questions about the causal logic and empirical evidence adduced by proponents of the “democratic peace.”41 The evidence from wars between Liberal and non-

38. Ibid., pp. 37, 46–47. Specifically, Rawls, like Kant, posits two conflicting principles—nonintervention and universal respect for human rights—but he ultimately favors the latter.
Liberal regimes is mixed. On the one hand, Liberal states do not seem more pacific than other types of regimes. On the other hand, their “imprudent vehemence,” in David Hume’s words, seems mostly directed toward weaker actors in the developing world, as my argument about the role of hegemony would suggest. Melvin Small and J. David Singer calculate that Liberal states waged 65 percent of non-major power wars (which almost always are against weaker states) between 1871 and 1965. Steve Chan’s more comprehensive data set shows a similar pattern, with Liberal states starting 100 percent of these wars of choice.

One way Liberalism can lead to illiberalism is through the suggestion that virtue and self-interest can be reconciled in altruistic imperialism. The virtuous side of Liberal imperialism is found in the idea of a “benign hegemony,” which can bring the benefits of progress to benighted regions of the world. Bush’s first national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, for example, compared the war on terrorism to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In a major speech during the Kosovo crisis in April 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair flattered Americans by stating that U.S. “allies are always both relieved and gratified by [the United States’] continuing readiness to

shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole superpower status.”47 In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser, Robert Cooper, published an opinion piece praising U.S. hegemony.48 Liberal imperialism’s self-interest is reflected in the notion that Liberalism cannot survive in a non-Liberal world. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it, “In order that one such state should exist in the European World, it would be necessary that similar institutions should be simultaneously introduced in all the other nations.”49 U.S. Liberalism fully internalized this notion. As President Wilson explained in his war message of April 2, 1917, “Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people.” Wilson also argued that to keep the postwar peace, the League of Nations could “never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.”50 In a 1974 lecture on President Wilson, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan echoed this reasoning, arguing that “democracy in one country was not enough simply because it would not last.”51

THE UNITED STATES’ LIBERAL ILLIBERALISM

Historically, the international behavior of the United States has been shaped by Liberalism.52 In Tony Smith’s words, “The most consistent tradition in American foreign policy . . . has been the belief that the nation’s security is best protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide.”53 In the United States,

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49. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 238.
political figures as diverse as John Quincy Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John F. Kennedy, James Madison, Thomas Paine, Ronald Reagan, Franklin Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson all shared the Liberal tradition.\(^{54}\) Indeed, non-Liberal politicians and thinkers (e.g., Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger) have been the exception. As neoconservative pundit Robert Kagan notes, “Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe’s old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilization and a liberal world order.”\(^ {55}\)

What has varied since its founding is how the United States has sought to achieve this objective. Sometimes it has taken active measures to “make the world safe for democracy,” in Woodrow Wilson’s famous phrase. At other times it has eschewed going abroad “in search of monsters,” as John Quincy Adams put it, in favor of inspiring democracy around the world from “the shining city on the hill.” What explains which approach the United States is likely to choose?

Jonathan Monten argues that U.S. Liberalism has two main strands: exemplarism and vindicationism. Exemplarists are content to spread democracy and other Liberal values by example; vindicationists are committed to doing so through an activist foreign policy. Monten accounts for the choice of which strand to pursue based on the relative power of the United States (i.e., the United States embraces vindicationism when it is powerful enough to do so) and changes in the ideological content of U.S. Liberalism.\(^ {56}\) The second half of this argument, however, confounds what Monten wants to explain (i.e., the specifics of U.S. foreign policy) with what causes it (e.g., the types of Liberalism).

Moreover, evidence from both the British and U.S. cases strongly suggests that Liberalism, at least since the writings of Kant, manifests consistent expansionist “urges.”\(^ {57}\) In both cases, Liberalism was a constant; it was the rel-


ative power positions of Britain and the United States that changed their foreign policies. Britain was able to build a Liberal empire in the nineteenth century because it was a global hegemon. The United States did the same in the twentieth century for similar reasons. If Monten is correct that power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, it should be possible to identify powerful Liberal states that eschew hegemony. I can think of no such instances. Conversely, there are numerous instances of non-Liberal great powers, from ancient Sparta through Bismarck’s newly unified Germany, that frequently resisted the hegemonic impulse.58 Ironically, as post-Bismarck Germany liberalized, it engaged increasingly in imperialist pursuits.59

President Wilson’s different approaches to fostering democracy in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere illustrate that the extent of hegemony determines how the U.S. Liberal tradition manifests itself. Wilson chose to act “mainly through international agreements and organizations” in his dealings with Europe where, despite the ravages of World War I, the United States was not yet hegemonic.60 This approach epitomizes for most people the notion of “Wilsonianism.” They forget, however, that Wilson took a very different stance in the Western Hemisphere, where he was not averse to acting unilaterally and forcefully to “teach Latin Americans to elect good men.” Wilson used the U.S. military on at least seven occasions to intervene in Latin American and Caribbean countries to effect regime change (Cuba, 1917; Dominican Republic, 1916–24; Haiti 1914, 1915–17, 1918–19, 1920–24; and Mexico, 1916–17).61

Bush, Neoconservativism, and the Liberal Tradition

President George W. Bush and the neoconservatives who were so influential in shaping his foreign policy also embraced significant aspects of the United States’ Liberal tradition.62 Some observers have even noted continuity between

60. Smith, America’s Mission, p. 62.
Bush and Woodrow Wilson. In 2003 Lawrence Kaplan wrote, “Bush is becoming the most Wilsonian president since Wilson himself.”63 The link between Liberalism and the neoconservative movement is even stronger than Irving Kristol’s quip that he and his colleagues were simply “Liberals who got mugged!” As Ronald Steele concludes, “Liberals and neoconservatives may both be correct in considering themselves to be Wilsonians. In truth, they are more alike than they admit in their ideological ambitions and their moral justifications. . . . In practice the difference between interventionist Liberals and the interventionist neoconservatives is more a matter of degree than of principle.”64 One difference between them, though, concerns the role of international institutions. Neoconservatives are far more unilateralist than Liberals, who believe that the United States ought to conduct its foreign policy in a multilateral framework under the auspices of international institutions.65 Still, neoconservatives and Liberals have enough in common to place the former squarely within the U.S. Liberal tradition.66

During its two terms, the Bush administration embraced all four of the Liberal tradition’s key premises. Consider first the Liberal tradition’s premise that development is a relatively smooth process. The belief that economic development was a benefit that most of the world could enjoy was a staple of the liberal Charles River Development community in late 1950s and early 1960s.67 The Bush administration shared this optimism, though it preferred to rely more on markets and economic incentives than on state guidance and foreign aid to foster economic development.68

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Like past presidents, Bush was also confident that political development—particularly the spread and consolidation of democracy—could take place nearly anywhere.69 “Do not bet against freedom,” he advised Americans when discussing the prospects for peace in the Middle East.70 On Iraq, Bush argued, “There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq—with its proud heritage, abundant resources, and skilled and educated people—is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.”71 As for Afghanistan, Vice President Dick Cheney boasted to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that “the fact of the matter is, the town [Washington, D.C.] has got a lot of people in it who are armchair quarterbacks, or who like to comment on the passing scene. But those who have predicted the demise of our efforts since 9/11, as we fought the war on terror, as we’ve liberated 50 million people in Iraq and Afghanistan, did not know what they were talking about. And I would submit to you today that we’ll succeed in Iraq just like we did in Afghanistan. We’ll stand up a new government under an Iraqi draft constitution, we’ll defeat the insurgency. And in fact, it will be an enormous success story that will have a huge impact, not just in Iraq but throughout the region.”72

On the second premise that “all good things go together,” the Bush administration also seemed squarely in sync with the Liberal tradition. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Liberals were optimistic that as third world countries became more economically developed, they would also become more politically stable.73 More recently, the Bush administration argued that “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.”74 As the president told Bob

70. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East,” remarks by the president at the University of South Carolina’s commencement address, Columbia, South Carolina, May 9, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/print/20030509-11.html.
73. For a critique of this widely embraced assumption, see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 6.
Woodward, “I believe the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn as the responsibility is to protecting the American people, because the two go hand-in-hand.”75 Bush held up his administration’s efforts to democratize Iraq as a prime example of how two good things (democracy and U.S. security) go together: “A free, democratic, peaceful Iraq will not threaten America or our friends with illegal weapons. A free Iraq will not be a training ground for terrorists, or a funnel of money to terrorists, or provide weapons to terrorists who would be willing to use them to strike our country or allies. A free Iraq will not destabilize the Middle East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful example to the entire region and lead other nations to choose freedom. And as the pursuits of freedom replace hatred and resentment and terror in the Middle East, the American people will be more secure.”76 “Democracy is a universal idea,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz maintained, but “letting people rule themselves happens to be something that serves Americans and America’s interest” as well.77

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations embraced the democratic peace as their rationale for believing that the spread of democracy would both bolster U.S. security as well as advance American ideals. Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy proclaimed, “The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world... the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”78 In his 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush confirmed, “Our aim is a democratic peace.”79 Later that year, National Security Adviser Rice asserted, “President Bush’s foreign policy is a bold new vision that draws inspiration from the ideas that have guided American foreign policy at its best: That democracies must never lack the will or the means to meet and defeat freedom’s enemies, that America’s power and purpose must be used to defend freedom, and that the spread of democracy leads to lasting peace.”80

80. Office of the Press Secretary, “National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses War
The third premise—that radicalism and revolution are bad things that the United States needs to combat—was the subject of a speech by President Wilson in March 1913 in the midst of the Mexican Revolution. In the speech, he explained his decision not to work with the revolutionary government of Francisco Madero: “Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold . . . that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval.”

More recently, the Bush administration took the view that the “the gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.” As Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy warned, “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.”

In Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s view, the root of the United States’ problem in the Islamic world was its increasing radicalism. Rather than the United States changing its policies in the region or accommodating itself to Islamic fundamentalism, he contended, “the Muslim world needs to take back its religion—it’s been hijacked by a small minority.”

The fourth premise—that fostering democracy is more important than maintaining stability—led President Jimmy Carter to push U.S. allies to respect human rights and hold elections during the Cold War, even when doing so undermined their continued hold on power. This same thinking was appar-
ent in the Bush administration’s handling of events in Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Nothing captures the notion that democracy is more important than order better than Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s dismissal of the widespread looting and disorder in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces in April 2003: “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They’re also free to live their lives and do wonderful things.” Later, in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, he compared the anarchy in Baghdad to the disorder in the United States shortly after its revolution. Indeed, if the Bush administration cared only about establishing a pro-U.S. regime in Iraq, it would have been content to replace Saddam Hussein with a friendly dictator rather than pushing for an elected government with all the turmoil that effort has caused. But as Wolfowitz declared before the war, “We’re not interested in replacing one dictator with another.” One of the most ill advised decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority was to disband Iraq’s army and undertake a large-scale purge of all former Baath Party members working in the civilian government—a decision that was motivated by the belief that democracy was more important than order.

President Bush applied this same rationale to other areas of the world, maintaining, for example, that democracy was more important than stability in the occupied territories. And in 2005 Secretary of State Rice argued for the application of this approach to the entire Middle East: “For too long the West, and indeed the United States, assumed that it could turn a blind eye to what the Arab intellectuals called the freedom deficit in the Middle East and that that would be all right. We did that for almost 60 years. And we were doing it in the name of stability, but of course we got neither stability nor democratic change; and instead, it is our belief that we instead got a kind of malignancy underneath which produced al-Qaida and the extremist philosophies and that the only way to fight those extremist ideologies is to spread freedom.” Bush and Rice were so committed to the notion that spreading democracy is more important than maintaining stability that they were unwilling to heed calls to

88. Quoted in Ricks, *Fiasco*, p. 96.
cancel the Palestinian Authority elections in the spring of 2006, even after many experts warned that the Islamic fundamentalist party Hamas was likely to win them, posing a serious threat to stability both inside and outside the occupied territories.91 The same sentiments led Rice to dismiss the summer 2006 border war between democratic Israel and democratic Lebanon as merely the “birth pangs of a new Middle East.”92

In sum, the Bush administration and its neoconservative allies embraced all four of the Liberal tradition’s premises. Paradoxically, these premises also helped to produce many of the Bush administration’s illiberal policies.

Links between the Liberal Tradition and Illiberal Policies

Looking through the lens of Liberalism, both the Bush administration and American liberals saw the threats facing the United States as dire. Liberalism also led them to reject containment and other policies premised upon living with the threat in favor of extirpating it once and for all. It is this latter premise that fostered illiberal policies such as the pursuit of hegemony, preventive war, the restriction of civil liberties, and even the use of torture.

TERRORISM THROUGH A LIBERAL LENS

The United States’ Liberal tradition both overstates the threat that non-Liberal currents pose to the nation’s security and understates the challenges associated with trying to spread Liberalism beyond its borders. Following the September 11 attacks, President Bush argued that the United States’ enemies “want to destroy what we stand for and how we live.”93 America’s Liberal tradition casts its enemies in the global war on terrorism as outlaws operating beyond the pale of civilization. In his view, “[they] seek to impose Taliban-like rule, country by country.”94 Bush further asserted that al-Qaida targeted “our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare.”95 In his 2002 National Security Strategy, the president reflected, “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to

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endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less that it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. Many liberals agreed. The Princeton Project on National Security, a group of academics and former policymakers, worried that “the world seems a more menacing place than ever.”

Another consequence of the U.S. Liberal tradition is the suggestion that the threat from terrorists or rogue states cannot be contained or managed, but instead must be eliminated. The Liberal tradition offers two strategies for eradicating this threat. First, enemies of the United States must be annihilated. “Today, we face brutal and determined enemies—men who celebrate murder, incite suicide, and thirst for absolute power,” President Bush claimed. “These enemies,” he continued, “will not be stopped by negotiation, or concessions, or appeals to reason.” Vice President Cheney echoed these sentiments: “Such a group [as al-Qaida] cannot be held back by deterrence, nor reasoned with through diplomacy. For this reason, the war against terror will not end in a treaty. There will be no summit meeting, no negotiations with terrorists. This conflict can only end in their complete and utter destruction.” Even moderate figures in the Bush administration, such as former Secretary of State Colin Powell, argued, “Any organization that is tainted by terrorist elements in it or a philosophy of terrorism, we can’t work with. And that has to be eliminated.”

The second strategy, building on long-standing Liberal arguments that democracies do not go to war with each other, is spreading democracy around the world. President Bush thus made it “the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” He laid out his reasoning in his second inaugural address: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in

96. Ibid., p. i.
97. Ikenberry and Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty under Law, p. 11.
98. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses War on Terror at Naval Academy Commencement.”
101. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Sworn-In to Second Term.”
all the world.” Bush employed this logic in a February 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute characterizing the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the first step in the eventual transformation of the Middle East: “Acting against the danger will also contribute greatly to the long-term safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America’s interests in security, and America’s belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.”

Given Liberalism’s dire view of the threat posed by non-Liberal currents and its radical prescriptions for how to deal with these threats, it is not surprising that illiberal policies would be the result. There are at least two reasons to think that the Liberal tradition played a role in fostering the Bush administration’s illiberal policies. First, these policies were also supported by many liberals, suggesting there was broad consensus behind them. Second, the administration’s rationales followed the same Liberal reasoning, indicating that this view of the world shaped U.S. policy.

LIBERAL IDEAS, ILLIBERAL PRACTICE

The Bush administration was not the first to pursue U.S. hegemony. President Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy claimed the United States had “a special responsibility” for providing global leadership. Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeline Albright, subsequently ruffled feathers in Europe and elsewhere when she argued that the United States should lead the international community because “we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.” Liberal pundits such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman and scholar Michael Mandelbaum also lauded U.S. hegemony. So when in 2002 National Security Adviser Rice characterized the United States as the “world’s guardian,” she was not departing dramatically from the position of the Clinton administration and its liberal supporters.

102. Ibid.
103. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses the Future of Iraq.”
107. Office of the Press Secretary, “National Security Advisor Speaks at Texas A&M,” remarks by
More recently, Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama argued that “America is the last, best hope of Earth.” Other liberals, including the principals of the Princeton Project on National Security, continue to sing the praises of U.S. leadership, even though they argue that it ought to be exercised through multilateral institutions in cooperation with other Liberal democracies.108

The intellectual foundation for the establishment of U.S. hegemony was laid before Bush came to office. As David Halberstam and others argued, the humanitarian crises of the 1990s provided the impetus, or at least the rationale, for a more assertive U.S. role around the world.109 But this new liberal activism has a downside. As David Rieff put it, “The human rights movement, whether wittingly or unwittingly, has increasingly become a force for the recolonization of the world, in the name of human rights.”110 Ironically, Liberalism has become yet another potent “myth of empire.”

The Bush administration vigorously pushed for preventive war in Iraq. As the president argued at West Point, “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”111 At the Naval Academy, he reiterated, “The best way to protect our citizens is to stay on the offensive.”112 The National Security Strategy justified this stance on the grounds that “given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.”113


111. Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point.”

112. Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, “President Discusses War on Terror at Naval Academy Commencement.”

As historian Marc Trachtenberg documents, preventive war thinking, including the suggestion of launching a preventive war against Iraq, preceded the Bush presidency. In September 1991, for example, Democratic Senator Al Gore urged the George H.W. Bush administration to finish the job after the Persian Gulf War, reasoning that “we can no more look forward to a constructive long-term relationship with Saddam Hussein than we could hope to housebreak a cobra.” Friedman and former Clinton staffer-turned-liberal-pundit George Stephanopoulos (invoking the authority of liberal philosopher Michael Walzer) thought that the threat from Saddam had become so grave by 1997 that he ought to be assassinated. The 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which declared “that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government,” passed 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives and was adopted by unanimous consent in the Senate. “So can a liberal support this president in this war?” Leon Wieseltier asked rhetorically before the start of the 2003 Iraq War. His answer: “Liberalism is not a philosophy of innocence, and it should make tyrants quake, not smile.”

In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, support in the United States for the war was bipartisan, largely because it was justified within the Liberal tradition. More than 70 percent of respondents in a March 2003 poll, including many liberals, approved of the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq. Given this level of public support, it is not surprising that the Senate vote to authorize President Bush to use force against Iraq in October 2002 was 77 to 23, and the House vote was 296 to 123. The lopsided votes underscore that liberals in Congress also found this rationale convincing. As Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton admitted, “I was one who supported giving President Bush the authority, if necessary, to use force against Saddam Hussein. I believe that was the right vote. I have had many disputes and disagreements with

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the administration over how that authority has been used, but I stand by the vote to provide that authority because I think it was a necessary step in order to maximize the outcome that did occur in the Security Council with the unanimous vote to send in inspectors. And I also knew that our forces would be successful.”

Support for the Bush administration before the war muted many liberals’ subsequent criticisms. Even as it became clear that the war was unnecessary and that the United States was increasingly unlikely to succeed in democratizing Iraq, most Democrats focused their criticism on the administration’s tactics, not on its larger objectives. Typical was Democratic Senator Joseph Biden’s assertion that the problem was that Bush “took us to war essentially alone . . . before it was necessary . . . on the heels of the largest and most lopsided tax cut in history . . . with half the troops we needed to succeed,” not that he took us to war in the first place. Likewise, the editorial page of the New York Times, as late as October 2006, continued to lament the “needlessly hurried and unilateral” nature of the invasion, while still arguing that “America should stay and try to clean up the mess it had made.” The Princeton Project on National Security criticized the Bush administration’s unilateral approach, but still applauded it for at least “strik[ing] a blow for liberty with the toppling of Saddam Hussein.”

Indeed, few liberals spoke out against the Iraq War early on. For every Eric Alterman, Todd Gitlin, or Arthur Schlesinger, who opposed the war, greater numbers of liberals—including Madeline Albright, Samuel Berger, Paul Berman, Peter Bienart (along with most of the editorial masthead of the New Republic), Bill Clinton, Thomas Friedman, Jeffrey Goldberg, Richard Holbrooke, Michael Ignatieff, George Packer, David Remnick, and Jacob Weisberg—supported it. The handful of liberal voices who opposed the war on principle before March of 2003 were out of government and largely rele-

123. Ikenberry and Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty under Law, pp. 37, 63.
gated to less influential venues such as the Nation or the New York Review of Books, rather than leading liberal outlets such as the New York Times or the Washington Post.

The support for the war among a substantial number of prominent liberal voices caused many others to remain mute. The reason was that many liberals sympathized with the Bush administration’s objectives, even if they deplored the means employed to achieve them. As Tony Judt put it, “Today, America’s liberal armchair warriors are the ‘useful idiots’ of the Bush administration’s illiberal foreign policy.”

Liberals not only supported the Bush administration’s illiberal policies abroad, but also found common cause with them at home. For example, the Bush administration placed significant restrictions on civil liberties, unapologetically justifying such actions as a response to the exigencies of waging the war on terrorism. In replying to questions during testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001 regarding the consequences of the war on terrorism on liberty at home, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated, “We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To . . . those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.” Ashcroft’s view was not as far removed from the mainstream as one might think. Harvard University law professor and noted civil libertarian Alan Dershowitz also believed that “the new paradigm—terrorist groups capable of wreaking havoc of the kind that only states could previously inflict, but without the accountability of states—requires civil libertarians to rethink our exclusive focus on state action.”

Social theorist Jürgen Habermas summarized the paradox of contemporary U.S. Liberalism as it wages the war on terrorism, “No freedom for the enemies of freedom.”


Indeed, it was the Liberal tradition’s domestic consequences that primarily concerned Hartz when he wrote in the 1950s, which is not surprising given that Soviet military power limited U.S. options abroad. He feared that U.S. Liberalism would try to expunge non-Liberal currents from the society. The “red scare” after World War I and McCarthyism during the early Cold War were the most obvious manifestations of that impulse. For Hartz, the paradox of U.S. Liberalism was its intolerance—verging on hysteria—in the face of non-Liberal ideas and institutions. The wellspring of this Liberal absolutism, in Hartz’s view, is the presumption that “its norms are self-evident.”¹³⁰ There is no legitimate reason not to accept them. So if an individual does dissent from the tenets of Liberalism, it can only be evidence of moral defect or malign intent. Well before the White House “plumbers” scandal during Richard Nixon’s administration, John F. Kennedy and members of his administration were so infuriated by leaks to New York Times defense correspondent Hanson Baldwin that the president authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct illegal surveillance of him. As the recent release of the “family jewels”—a compilation of documents detailing CIA malfeasance assembled for then-Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger—make clear, this was hardly an isolated event.¹³¹

The most disturbing manifestation of U.S. illiberalism was the Bush administration’s willingness to flout international norms governing the laws of war, particularly the treatment of prisoners captured in the war on terrorism, including condoning or even employing torture in the course of their interrogations. In a February 2002 memorandum, President Bush argued, “The war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm—ushered in not by us but by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of war.”¹³² The direction of this new thinking was made clear in congressional testimony by Cofer Black, head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center: “There was before 9/11, and there was after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves came off.”¹³³

Many liberals endorsed the use of torture against some Taliban and al-Qaida prisoners. For instance, Democratic Senator John Rockefeller admitted that in the case of at least one high-ranking al-Qaida prisoner, “‘I wouldn’t rule it out. I wouldn’t take anything off the table where he is concerned, because this is the man who has killed hundreds and hundreds of Americans over the past ten years.’”\(^{134}\) Similarly, New York Democratic Senator Charles Schumer observed, “There are very few people in this room or in America who would say that torture should never, ever be used, particularly if thousands of lives are at stake.”\(^{135}\)

Well before the September 2001 attacks, some liberals had begun to argue that under certain circumstances torture was acceptable. They justified it using one of two rationales. The first concerned the “ticking bomb” scenario in which the authorities confront the problem of how to extract time-sensitive information from a recalcitrant prisoner with knowledge that could save many lives.\(^{136}\) In such a case, many accepted the Liberal utilitarian argument that the evil of torture is outweighed by the potential loss of life if the authorities do not obtain information quickly. As Dershowitz rationalized, “The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture seems overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent victims to die.”\(^{137}\) Walzer has long made the point that the responsible politician will of necessity have “dirty hands,” because he or she will frequently confront situations such as the “ticking bomb” scenario in which immoral acts such as torture will have to be undertaken for the greater good.\(^{138}\)

A second argument for condoning torture was offered by both liberals and the Bush administration: terrorists are so evil that they have placed themselves “beyond the pale” of civilization and thereby forfeit the protections due to its law-abiding citizens. It was this line of thinking that animated former Justice...
Department official John Yoo in his brief to the White House advancing the proposition that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to prisoners taken in Afghanistan. “Why is it so hard for people to understand that there is a category of behavior not covered by the legal system?” he asked. “What were pirates? They weren’t fighting on behalf of any nation. What were slave traders? Historically, there were people so bad that they were not given protection of the laws. There were no specific provisions for their trial, or imprisonment. If you were an illegal combatant, you didn’t deserve the protection of the laws of war.”

Employing similar reasoning, Dershowitz wrote, “We must... place [terrorists] beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. . . . We must hunt them down and punish them and incapacitate them, without regard for the possible substantive justice of their cause.” University of Chicago divinity professor Jean Bethke Elshtain also accepted this logic, “There are moments when this rule [against torture] may be overridden.” Walzer likewise argued, “The only political response to ideological fanatics and suicidal holy warriors is implacable opposition.”

Responses to Possible Objections

Showing that the Bush administration justified its policies using Liberal rationales and highlighting the support for these policies by many liberals are not, by themselves, sufficient to indict Liberalism for the United States’ illiberal behavior, unless it is possible to discount alternative explanations. In this section I discuss five reasonable, but ultimately unpersuasive, objections to my argument that contemporary U.S. illiberalism is rooted in its Liberal tradition.

First, some scholars argue that Liberalism has not been the dominant intellectual current in the United States as Hartz maintained. Political theorist Rogers Smith claimed that U.S. political thought in fact contains “multiple traditions.” Although Hartz may have overstated Liberalism’s dominance, it has nevertheless been the most consistent and influential ideology in U.S. his-

Moreover, Smith’s “multiple traditions” thesis overstates the differences between Liberalism and the alternatives he posits. Finally, as Packenham conceded regarding the role of the Liberal tradition in the United States’ intervention in Vietnam, it does not have to be the only factor to still be an important part of the explanation.

A second objection is that a Liberal international order may be possible without having to change the domestic regimes of all the member states. For example, neoliberal institutionalists maintain that international cooperation could emerge under the auspices of international institutions because these reduce the transaction costs of state interaction in an anarchic environment. The logic of this argument should hold irrespective of regime type. Commercial Liberals, in contrast, might assert that because international economic cooperation provides greater wealth to those who engage in it, this sort of Liberal international order could also be self-sustaining irrespective of the nature of the domestic regimes of the states involved. There are two problems with these lines of argument. To begin with, institutions rarely, if ever, cause states to act against their national interests and are therefore unlikely, by themselves, to fundamentally change the nature of international politics. Moreover, states frequently forgo cooperation that might result in absolute gains when such gains might produce unequal relative gains.

Third, some analysts might concede that the Liberal tradition colors the rhetoric of U.S. policy, but still maintain that it does not really shape the country’s behavior, which they argue is driven primarily by other considerations such as power or interest. In other words, Liberal-sounding rhetoric is akin to the

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Leninist boilerplate in speeches by Soviet leaders during the Brezhnev era. If this were the case, realists ought to find little to criticize in U.S. behavior. But over the years, the United States engaged in a significant amount of nonrealist behavior. In the 1960s, leading realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz were outspoken opponents of U.S. policy in Vietnam.\(^{151}\) More recently, realists such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt were leading critics of the Bush administration’s Iraq policies.\(^{152}\)

If Liberalism is merely rhetoric for public consumption, then what U.S. leaders say in private should differ from their public rhetoric. But studies show that the public and private rhetoric of U.S. policymakers does not diverge significantly.\(^{153}\) And although it is true that the Bush administration’s public and private rhetoric has sometimes diverged, it has often been the reverse of the conventional wisdom that Liberal rhetoric conceals realist action. In the case of the Iraq War, the Bush administration offered an interest-based rationale in public (fighting terrorism and eliminating weapons of mass destruction), while embracing an idealist rationale behind the scenes (spreading democracy and promoting human rights).\(^{154}\) Before the war, President Bush told *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward, “As we think through Iraq, we may or may not attack. I have no idea. But it will be for the objective of making the world peaceful.”\(^{155}\) Or as Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told *Vanity Fair* in May 2003, well before he needed other rationales for the war, “The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction. . . . [But there] have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people.”\(^{156}\) Nothing could better epitomize Liberal tradition thinking than statements such as these.


\(^{154}\) For evidence that weapons of mass destruction and links to al-Qaida were “being fixed around the policy” of regime change in Iraq apparently decided on other grounds, see the so-called Downing Street memorandum, quoted in Mark Danner, “The Secret Way of War,” *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 52, No. 10 (June 9, 2005), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18034.


One might concede that the Liberal tradition is broadly influential in U.S. society, especially among the intellectual elite (including neoconservatives in and out of the Bush administration) but point out that the architects of the administration’s foreign policy—Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld—were hardly Liberals. In fact, some European commentators characterize them as realists.\textsuperscript{157} There are two questionable assertions here. First, Bush and other senior members of his administration were vociferous critics of realism, so it seems odd to suggest that Cheney and Rumsfeld were really crypto-realists.\textsuperscript{158} Second, this criticism assumes that Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld had well-articulated worldviews that they imposed on the rest of the administration. The evidence does not support this assumption. Before the 2000 election, Bush confessed to Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, “I don’t have the foggiest idea about what I think about foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{159} Rumsfeld served in the Nixon and Ford administrations during the détente era and implemented U.S. policies anathema to neoconservatives, and in the Reagan administration he was the U.S. envoy to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As Secretary of Defense in the George H.W. Bush administration, Cheney reluctantly supported the decision not to intervene in Iraq during the Shiite uprising in 1991, a decision that many neoconservatives deplored.\textsuperscript{160} As he later explained, “I felt there was a real danger here that you would get bogged down in a long drawn-out conflict, that this was a dangerous, difficult part of the world.”\textsuperscript{161} Both Cheney and Rumsfeld eventually signed on to the neoconservative Project for a New American Century’s statement of principles.\textsuperscript{162} Instead of defining the Bush administration’s overarching foreign policy philosophy, both men embraced and implemented the neoconservative agenda established by others.

Fourth, some might object that the United States’ illiberal policies at home and abroad were simply the logical responses to the September 11 attacks and

\textsuperscript{161} Quoted in Ricks, \textit{Fiasco}, p. 6.
the exigencies of waging the war on terrorism. As I have shown, however, the Liberal tradition exercised its illiberal influence on U.S. foreign policy well before those attacks. And illiberal policies such as pursuing hegemony, engaging in preventive war, imposing restrictions on civil liberties, and practicing torture are by no means the best weapons for waging the war against al-Qaida. Moreover, if the Bush administration’s primary rationale for waging preventive war was to deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes with ties to terrorists, then states such as Iran, North Korea, and even Pakistan should have been higher priorities than Iraq, given their more advanced capabilities and better-documented ties to terrorists. That they were not higher priorities for the Bush administration suggests that the threat of weapons of mass destruction and ties to international terrorism were less salient concerns than the administration’s longer-term desire to implant a pro-U.S. democratic regime in Iraq that would lead to the political transformation of neighboring authoritarian regimes, solving a number of the United States’ problems in the Middle East all at once. As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor put it, “For the Bush Administration, Iraq was an inviting target for preemption not because it was an immediate threat but because it was thought to be a prospective menace that was incapable of successfully defending itself against a U.S. invasion. For an administration that was determined to change the strategic equation in the Middle East and make Saddam an object lesson to other proliferators, Iraq was not a danger to avoid but a strategic opportunity.” Such a strategy of regional transformation flows logically from the Liberal tradition’s premises that the spread of democracy is a panacea and its absence a threat.

Fifth, some critics might point to deviations from the Liberal tradition’s agenda to argue that it does not really influence U.S. foreign policy. During the 1990s, for example, Samantha Power and others held up the United States’ failure to intervene in Rwanda as evidence of a hollow commitment to human
rights. In doing so, however, such critics ignored the plethora of other U.S.-
led humanitarian interventions of the period, including Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo,
and Somalia. Others might impugn the Bush administration’s commitment to
spreading democracy in the Middle East by pointing out that although the
United States may have toppled a dictatorship in Iraq, it maintains close rela-
tions with nondemocratic regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia. But this would ignore the expectation of many proponents of the inva-
sion of Iraq in the Bush administration, particularly Deputy Secretary of
Defense Wolfowitz, that the overthrow of Hussein and the establishment of
a democratic regime in Iraq would pressure other regimes in the region to
democratize.

In sum, the weakness of alternative explanations for U.S. illiberalism in-
creases confidence in the argument that Liberalism itself is the culprit. Given
this, it is necessary to look beyond Liberalism to find sound intellectual under-
pinnings for U.S. foreign policy.

Conclusion: Realism as a Check on Liberal Excess

For Hartz, the United States’ problem is not Liberalism per se, but rather
Liberalism unchecked by an ideological alternative. “It is not to disparage lib-
eralism,” he maintained, “to say that a knowledge of it and nothing else can
produce an absolute temper of mind that in the end is self-defeating.” In
Hartz’s view, the United States’ Liberal tradition is so deep-seated and all-
encompassing that there can be little real debate about the objectives of U.S.
policies (e.g., spreading democracy), but instead merely quibbles about how to
achieve them. Thus, a real challenge to the Liberal tradition can come only
from an alternative political ideology. Some scholars recommend one that is
based on the philosophy of Edmund Burke. Such a worldview would recog-
nize the limits of the United States’ ability to engineer the political, social, and
economic systems of other countries. It would be sensitive to the unintended
consequences of economic and political development. It would reject “one-
size-fits-all” arguments such as the universality of democracy. It would appre-

165. Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2935969.stm.
168. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Global-
izing World,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 7–8; Samuel P. Huntington,
“Conservatism as an Ideology,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (June 1957),
pp. 456–461; and Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, p. 21.
ciate that all good things do not always go together, and that states frequently have to make trade-offs between their interests and their values.\footnote{169}

Changing America’s Liberal domestic political culture is likely to be extremely difficult. In a Hartzian vein, I suggest instead that the United States needs a foreign policy based on realism, a decidedly non-Liberal way of looking at the world, to provide a check on some of its excesses abroad and at home as it wages the war on terrorism.

To begin, realists take seriously the threat from international terrorism, but they also put it in perspective. Fewer people have been killed since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in the war against al-Qaida as a percentage of the population (0.0009), than in the American Civil War (1.78), World War II (0.29), or even Vietnam (0.03). Indeed, terrorism ranks very low as a cause of death among Americans in the period from 1995 to 2005 (3,147), well behind car accidents (254,419), workplace injuries (59,730), influenza (19,415), and even complications from hernias (16,742).\footnote{170} Realists are also skeptical of the Bush administration’s claim that the United States faces a more dangerous adversary in al-Qaida than it did from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. After all, the Soviets had a huge nuclear arsenal capable of ending life on the planet as we know it, while the most reasonable worst-case scenarios today are that al-Qaida might acquire one or two crude radiological “dirty bombs.” The United States is fighting World War IV, as some neoconservatives aver, only in the very limited sense that al-Qaida is based in a number of different countries.\footnote{171} In other words, realism counsels prudent caution—not panic—in the U.S. approach to the global war on terror.\footnote{172}

Realists also have a more balanced perspective on al-Qaida’s motives than do Liberals. Rather than seeing Osama bin Laden and his allies as mindless religious fanatics bent on destroying the American way of life, realists understand that he and his followers are pursuing a limited political agenda to end the U.S. military presence in the Middle East.\footnote{173} And realists understand that al-Qaida’s tactics—particularly suicide terrorism—make strategic sense for a

\footnote{173. Robert M. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).}
weak nonstate actor that has no other choice than to wage asymmetric warfare. To be sure, realists recognize that important U.S. interests are at stake in the war on terrorism that must be defended, but they are less inclined than Liberals to regard al-Qaida as implacable and invincible.

Unlike Liberals, realists also understand that radicalism is not always a destabilizing force. Despite hair-raising rhetoric about the possibility of winning a nuclear war during the 1950s, even Mao Zedong’s China behaved rationally once it developed nuclear weapons a decade later. Today, realists understand that nationalist movements, though often radical, can help to make the international system more benign. This is because nationalism is the impetus for balancing behavior among states, which helps maintain the balance of power. In other words, realists do not harbor as great a fear of radicalism as do Liberals.

It is also not surprising that it has been the conservative realists in the U.S. military, not liberal civilian politicians, who have been most consistently committed to upholding the Geneva Conventions and maintaining the norm against torture. True, the basis of this commitment has been pragmatic (military professionals support the Geneva Conventions because they understand that they benefit U.S. troops) rather than principled. Regardless of their rationale, realists are less likely than Liberals to place their enemies beyond the pale of civilization.

Realists have also been far less enthusiastic about U.S. efforts to achieve hegemony than either liberals or the Bush administration. While some nonrealists have made principled arguments about why the world would be better off under U.S. domination, it has been realists, arguing largely on pragmatic grounds, who have most consistently urged restraint and caution. They fear that as the United States grasps for the mantle of world domination, it will generate opposition around the world, resulting in greater international tension and conflict. As Reinhold Niebuhr observed in a somewhat different

179. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909. This theme is further developed and applied in Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Il-
context, realism “ought to persuade us that political controversies are always conflicts between sinners and not between righteous men and sinners. It ought to mitigate the self-righteousness which is an inevitable concomitant of all human conflict.”180 Realists understand that the rest of the world does not see the United States as a benign hegemon despite its good intentions.181 “One reads about the world’s desire for American leadership only in the United States,” observed an anonymous British diplomat, but “everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism.”182

Finally, Liberalism vacillates between isolationism when it cannot change the world and messianism when it can. The common impulse linking these two otherwise different foreign policies, according to Hartz, is that Liberalism leads the United States “either to withdraw from ‘alien’ things or transform them: it cannot live in comfort constantly by their side.”183 Realism, in contrast, provides the United States with the basis for a consistent and sustained policy of engagement with the rest of the world based on the principle that it can pursue its national interests without having either to remake the rest of the world in its image or retreat from the international system entirely.

The centerpiece of the Bush administration’s Liberal foreign policy was the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the construction of a democratic, multiconfessional state in Iraq as the first step in the larger regional transformation of the Middle East. This effort appears to have failed.184 Not surprisingly, this demonstration of the limits of U.S. hegemony led many observers to call for a change in course. Some advocated a return to a more purely Liberal U.S. foreign policy, thinking that if the United States pursued many of the same ends as the Bush administration (regime transformation and preventive
war), but employed different means (multilateralism and international institutions), the United States would have more success. This approach assumed, however, that the failures of the Bush administration were a function of the means employed, not the unrealistic ends pursued. Others have tried to blend Liberalism with realism to craft a different foreign policy approach for the United States. But combining realism and Liberalism in foreign policy was not the solution either. Liberalism’s “imprudent vehemence” abroad is too hard to restrain given post-Kantian Liberalism’s paradoxical tendency toward illiberal excess in the face of domestic and foreign challenges. Thus, the only way to preserve Liberalism’s many virtues as the foundation of the United States’ domestic regime without suffering from Liberalism’s excesses abroad is to adopt a doctrine of “Liberalism in one country.” In other words, U.S. policymakers should apply each approach to its own sphere: Lockeanism at home and Machiavellianism in the rest of the world.

185. Ikenberry and Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty under Law, p. 12; and Starr, Freedom’s Power, pp. 205–218.