

# Modular Verification of Web Services Using Efficient Symbolic Encoding and Summarization

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## 1 Introduction

- Motivation
- An Overview of Our Approach

## 2 Technical Details

- Summarization
- Assertion Checking

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# Motivation

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- Need **formal** mechanisms to ensure that web services behave properly




# Motivation

- Increasing interest in web-based business management involving inter-organizational interactions and critical transactions
- Web services provide mechanisms implementing such applications
- Need **formal** mechanisms to ensure that web services behave properly
- We propose an **automatic** verification tool featuring efficient **symbolic** encoding and **modular** verification using summarization




# Web Services

- Interoperable Machine to Machine software
- Some Industry Standards: Business Process Execution Language (BPEL), Web Service Description Language (WSDL)



# BPEL Web Services

A distributed system with both multi-threading (internal) and message-passing (external).



$\Delta \nabla$  : fork/join structure (shared variables)

$\longleftrightarrow$  : synchronous/asynchronous communication (messages)






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
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# BPEL Web Services

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- *flow* activities  $\Rightarrow$  fork/join structure
- *invoke, receive, reply* activities  $\Rightarrow$  asynchronous/synchronous communications




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# Monolithic Analysis


- Consider all of them as **one** composite service by adding a outer fork/join structure
- Need to consider **all interleavings** among threads
- Suffer from **state explosion problem**



# Modular Verification


From processes to summaries.

- Interference among processes is limited to the values of messages
- Summarize processes on messages




# Modular Verification

- Modular Analysis: check one process within which interactions among other processes are patched by their summaries




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- From  $P_1 \times \dots \times P_n$  to  $P_1 + \dots + P_n$




# Modular Verification

- Modular Analysis: check one process within which interactions among other processes are patched by their summaries
- From  $P_1 \times \dots \times P_n$  to  $P_1 + \dots + P_n$
- No precision loss with respect to assertion checking within processes



# Our Framework






## Summarization: A Simple Example

Consider the following two concurrent processes.

- $P_A$  invokes  $P_B$
- An assertion within  $P_A$  at node 4



# Summarize Process Behavior

A relation among input and output messages



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- Compute the **forward fixpoint** of reachable states




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- Compute the **forward fixpoint** of reachable states
- Project the fixpoint to **input and output** messages (using existential quantifier elimination)



# Summarize Process Behavior: A Simple Example




The summary of  $P_B$  is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (m_1 > 0 \wedge m_2 = 1) \vee \\
 & (m_1 = 0 \wedge m_2 = 0) \vee \\
 & (m_1 < 0 \wedge m_2 = -1)
 \end{aligned}$$



## Compose Summaries: A Simple Example


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## Compose Summaries: A Simple Example

- Compose summaries by conjoining the summaries of other processes with the receive activities
- One can prove  $P_A$ 's assertion modularly



## Modularity of Processes

*An assertion can be proven via modular analysis if and only if it can be proven via monolithic analysis.*

- $T$ : transition relation,  $I$ : initial states,  $X$ : variables
- $reach(T, I)$  returns the fixpoint of reachable states
- The insight comes from the property:

$$reach(T, I(C) \wedge I(X)) \equiv I(C) \wedge reach(T, I(X))$$

if  $C \subseteq X$  are **parameterized constants** (not defined in  $T$ ).



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
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- From the receiver's perspective, a message is a parameterized constant
- One can summarize the receiver's behavior ( $reach(T, I(X))$ ) without knowing the states of its input messages ( $I(C)$ )
- One can compute the **precise** reachable states of the receiver's **output** messages ( $reach(T, I(C) \wedge I(X))$ ) by conjoining
  - the states of the receiver's **input** messages ( $I(C)$ ) and
  - the receiver's **summary** ( $reach(T, I(X))$ )




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- The state of  $m_1$  is initialized upon sending and is imposed implicitly after sending




## Modularity of Processes: A Simple Example

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## Modularity of Processes: A Simple Example

- The state of  $m_1$  is initialized upon sending and is imposed implicitly after sending
- The summary of  $P_B$  (the relation among  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ ) is conjoined upon receiving
- $P_A$  gets the precise reachable states of  $m_2$  ( $m_2 = 1$ ).





# Restrictions

- We assume that each channel is associated with precisely one send activity and one receive activity
- The examples we analyzed do not violate this condition
- For the specifications which violate this condition:
  - Rename channels if multiple send/receive pairs use the same channel
  - If there is a send or receive activity within a loop, unwind the loop a fixed number of times



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- Use *frontier*, the **new states** reachable from the previous iteration, to detect violation and convergency



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- $I$ : initial states,  $T$ : transition relation,  $Err$ : risk states (violate assertions)
- $F^0 = I$  and  $F^i = post(T, F^{i-1}) \setminus F^{i-1}$




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- $F^0 = I$  and  $F^i = post(T, F^{i-1}) \setminus F^{i-1}$
- Assertion violated at the  $i^{th}$  iteration when  $F^i \cap Err \neq \emptyset$




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- When the CPG is acyclic,
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  - No **back edges**
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- When the CPG is not acyclic,
  - Compute  $S_{back}$ , the states associated with the source nodes of the back edges (**much smaller** than the universe)
  - At each iteration, compute  $R_{back}$ , the set of reached states fall in  $S_{back}$
  - Terminate when  $F^i \setminus R_{back}$  is empty





# The Assertion Checking Algorithm

$\text{Reach\_frontier}(T, I, Err, S_{back})$

- $F = I;$
- $R_{back} = I \cap S_{back};$

*false* - assertion violated. *true* - assertion proven.



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## Experiment: Loan Approval

	Monolithic Verification	Modular Verification			
	All	Approval	Assessor	Approver	Customer
Result	P	P	S	S	S
Time (s)	1227.2	124.5	0.1	0.1	0.1
Memory (MB)	810	490	289	290	290
ITRs	32	16	10	10	5

- Customer invokes Approval which invokes Assessor and Approver
- Result: NA-did not terminate, P-passed assertion checks, S-summarized
- ITRs: the number of iterations of the fixpoint computation



## Experiment: Travel Agency

	Monolithic Verification	Modular Verification			
	All	VTA	Hotel	Flight	User
Result	NA	P	S	S	S
Time (s)	18947	814	13.5	13.4	34.6
Memory (MB)	1663	363	273	363	284
ITRs	57	55	23	22	30

- User invokes VTA which invokes Hotel and Flight
- Result: NA-did not terminate, P-passed assertion checks, S-summarized
- ITRs: the number of iterations of the fixpoint computation





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- We propose modular verification for message-passing processes to achieve scalability
- We propose an efficient symbolic encoding and reachability analysis to facilitate our approach
- We have implemented a prototype tool that can automatically analyze web services specified in BPEL+WSDL



## Related Work

- BPEL Verification:
  - Safety property [Foster et al. ICWS04] [Lohmannet et al. BPM06]
  - LTL property [Fu et al. WWW04] [Nakajima ENTCS06]
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- Compositional Reasoning:
  - LTSA [Cobleigh et al. TACAS03]
  - Magic/Comfort [Chaki et al. FMSD04] [Sharygina et al. CAV05]



Thank you. Any Questions?

