radiant jewel sits in excrement, it is better than a piece of shiny glass in a golden bowl. Even if someone who rides the good vehicle is stained by karma and defilements, no followers of the other vehicle can surpass him, just as the sun, even when it is covered by clouds, cannot be surpassed by a firefly in a cloudless sky.

This has been "The Introduction to Reality According to the Śrāvakas," the fourth chapter of The Flame of Reason, the commentary on The Heart of the Middle Way.

Now, here begins the fifth chapter, the introduction to the analysis of reality according to the Yogācāras.¹

**Introduction**

5.1 Other scholars, who are proud of their own approach, say that the Yogācāras have given the correct explanation of the introduction to the ambrosia of reality.²

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¹ The term yogācāra can be used in a generic sense to refer to a "practitioner of discipline." Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Bodhisattva path as a form of yoga ("discipline") and to the Bodhisattva as a yogin ("practitioner of discipline"), as in the commentary on MHI 3:292. In this respect, he follows the terminology of the Perfection of Wisdom literature as found, for example, in Ratnagotravajra-yoga 10.9; 22.10, 13; and 26.3. The Bodhisattva practice is referred to as yoga in other Mahāyāna works, such as Aryadeva's Catubhājikā, whose long title in the Tibetan is Tañ-çyur in Bodhisattva-yoga-caryā-kāra-caturdhātuka-kārikā ("A Text on the Practice of the Bodhisattva Discipline in Four Hundred Verses"). The title of Aryadeva's text is discussed in Lang 1986 and Ruegg 1981: 52-53. For examples of this usage in the work of Candrakīrti, see May 1959: 229. In this chapter of the Tarkajñādā, however, Bhāviveka uses the term yogācāra to refer not just to a generic "practitioner of discipline" but to the adherent of a rival Mahāyāna tradition, just as he uses the term Śrāvaka to refer to the member of a rival non-Mahāyāna tradition. The commentary on verse 5.1 identifies the Yogācāras as "Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth." It is likely that Bhāviveka's use of the term yogācāra in this chapter comes from the title of the Yogācārabhūmi, the text that defines this rival tradition's scholarly identity. For further discussion of this point, see Part I of this book.

² Verse 5.1 uses a number of different technical terms that play a key role in Bhāviveka's argument.

In the commentary on 5.1, Bhāviveka explains that the word "scholar" (dhīra) refers to a "Mahāyāna master (bhūpā)." The Tibetan translators give the term an ironic twist when they translate it as mukhas par slom ("those who consider themselves scholars"). For further discussion of the term dhīra, see the note on the introduction to verse 4.3.

Verse 5.1 introduces the argument with the Yogācāras as a dispute about the correct "approach" (nīti or naya). In verse 5.7, Bhāviveka specifies that this approach has to do with the Perfection of Wisdom. Haribhadra makes a similar point when he refers to the Abhisamayālakāra as a clarification of the "approach" (naya) of the Perfection of Wisdom.
The noble Nāgārjuna, whose awakening was predicted by the Tathāgata and who

(3 A.A. 1). The word "approach" is used again in relation to the Yogācāras in verses 5.46, 88, and 99. On the significance of this term as a device to classify the differences between different philosophical views, see Part 1 of this book.

As the beginning of the MHK, Bhāviveka explains that the purpose of the text is to introduce the ambrosia of reality (putukṣma-tattvārtikā) (verse 1.4). Here in verse 5.1, the Yogācāras claim that they give the correct "introduction to the ambrosia of reality." Bhāviveka uses the term "ambrosia" (āmṛta) to refer to both the subject and the object of a cognition of reality. In MHK 1.14 he explains that "the ambrosia of reality" is "the ambrosia that consists of the understanding of reality as object" (putukṣma-tattvārtikā). In 3.354 he refers not to the ambrosia of reality, but to the "ambrosia of reality (putukṣma-tattvārtikā)." This usage is consistent with his understanding of the term "ultimate" (paramārtha) as referring not just to an object of cognition, but to cognition itself. Compare also MHK 3.136 ('When a scholar understands that things do not have the self that is imagined in our own and in others' doctrinal systems, he drinks the ambrosia of the knowledge of reality'); MMK 18.11 (where the term refers to the Buddha's teaching); Lokottaravāda 23 and Ārya-gautama 56 (Lindner 1928a: 58-59, 136-37). In a note on "Perfumed Amṛta and the Sacred Meal," Lamotte (1976: 201-14) distinguishes Buddhist views of ambrosia from their Hindu counterparts by pointing out in particular that Buddhists āmṛta comes from above rather than being exalted from below.

The Tibetan translation interprets avatāra ("introduction") as "lead, guide, or insert" (gud bya ba phrīs in verse 1.4 and commentary) or "enter" (sngon pa in verse 5.1 and commentary), also indicating that one is led "into ambrosia" (byed rtsi or byed rtsi la). This usage reflects the beginning of Vasubandhu's commentary on MMK 1.6 (quoted in MMK 3.4), where Vasubandhu explains that his verse gives "the means to enter the definition of reality" (svalokanirupavyutpadyo). It is likely, however, that Bhāviveka is using the term avatāra to refer not only to an "introduction" or "entrance" into ambrosia but also to a "crossing over" or "descent" (ava-tāra) of ambrosia, reflecting the Hindu concept of the "descent" or "incarnation" of God. As V. V. Gokhale (1972: 40-45) has shown in his discussion of MHK chapter 7, Bhāviveka makes rich use of imagery drawn from Hindu tradition, often with ironic intent. To interpret the word avatāra here "as descent" would be consistent with Bhāviveka's representation of the Bodhisattva path as an ascent of the "mountain of wisdom" (prajñāmāriṣa in MHK 3.296) or the descent of the "stream of knowledge" (prasāda-kālā in MHK 3.12) followed by the "descent" of compassion toward the beings who suffer below, as in MMK 3.296: "[The Bodhisattva] climbs the mountain of wisdom and is free from grief but looks with compassion on ordinary people who suffer and are burned by grief." To help suffering beings, this Bodhisattva "sends forth rivers with the lovely water of pure merit from the mountain of the perfections" (MHK 3.300). Understood in this way, the avatāra of the title would represent the "descent" of a river of compassion from the mountain of wisdom. But this descent does not leave readers or practitioners standing motionless at the bottom of the mountain; it gives them the ability to climb and "enter" the "ambrosia of reality" that is "as clear as the autumn sky" (MHK 3.300). Bhāviveka pictures his work as a "descent" of ambrosia, consisting of the knowledge of reality, which then allows Bodhisattvas to "ascend" and "enter" the knowledge of reality for themselves. For further discussion of Bhāviveka's use of this spatial metaphor, see Eckerk 1992: chs. 1-2, and Part 1 of this book.

In the commentary on Mahāyāna-sūtra 6.3, Candrakirti cites two scriptural sources for the "prediction" (prabhāsana) of Nāgārjuna. A passage in the Lokottaravāda Sūtra predicts that

...
5.2 [The Yogacāra]s think that the ultimate is the object of cognitions of existence and [absence], because it is the existence of the absence of duality or because it is the absence of duality. This is their opinion.

The formula “existence of an absence” (abhāvabhāva) defies easy translation. The key to the formula, of course, lies in the symmetry of the two terms: “absence” (abhāva) is the negation of “existence” (bhāva). To follow the middle path is to avoid falling into either of these two extremes. To say that ultimate reality is only an “absence” (abhāva) would involve the extreme of improper denial (apaṇḍita); to say that the ultimate is only an “existence” (bhāva) would involve the extreme of improper reification (samādopa). The symmetry of these words might be preserved by translating abhāva as “absence” and bhāva as “presence.” Other possibilities might be “nonexistence” and “existence.” To say “entity of nonexistence,” however, gains nothing in clarity, and bhāva has a more specific meaning in Indian epistemology than a general concept of nonexistence.

In Bhāviveka’s intellectual setting, the word refers to the absence of a particular thing in a particular place, like the absence of a pot on a table. According to some schools of Indian thought, an absence can function as an object of cognition in its own right. Even if a school denies this possibility, it still has to offer its own theory of how the cognition of an absence can be constructed out of the cognition of existing entities. To say that ultimate reality can be cognized as an absence seems obscure, but it is consistent with accepted Sanskrit terminology. For a thorough discussion of the concept of “absence” in Indian epistemology, see Maréchal 1968: 52ff.

Assuming that abhāva is translated as “absence,” what should be done with the term bhāva? Bhāva can refer to the “presence” of an object like a pot on a table; it can refer to the “existence” or “reality” of the object; or it can refer to the object itself as a real “entity.” In Bhāviveka’s text these meanings blend into one another. It is plausible to translate abhāvabhāva bhāva in 5.3 as “presence of an absence.” But as the argument develops, Bhāviveka treats the word bhāva as referring to an “existing thing” or “real entity.” To preserve the possibility of this semantic shift from “presence” through “existence” to “entity,” I have chosen to use the word “existence,” the middle term on the spectrum. An attentive reader should watch for places where the word “existence” seems closer in meaning to “presence” and other places where it comes closer to naming a real “entity.” When Bhāviveka uses the word to refer to an “entity,” he is preparing to accuse the Yogacāras of falling into the extreme of “improper reification” (samādopa), the extreme that the doctrine of emptiness is meant most explicitly to avoid.

In the commentary on 5.2, Bhāviveka explains dūyasubhāvanaa sabbhāvanāa (“the existence of the absence of duality”) as “the constant existence and the absence of the duality of subject and object.” It is likely that the phrase “constant existence” (Tib. rgyas nu yul pa nyid) represents the Nāgārjuna sabbhāvanā, corresponding to the sabbhāvanā of the verse, but it also calls to mind the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of “constant” or “absolute” (sthitā) absence, as in Annabhūttas’s Tarkaśaṅkhyā, section 9. The concept of constant or absolute absence is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Śūtras of Kaṇāda. On this type of absence, see Potter 1977: 146 and 219.

5 A comparable list of the “synonyms” (pāryāya) of the ultimate is found in MA 1.14: “In brief, the synonyms of emptiness are truthness, reality-limit, signlessness, the ultimate, and the Dharma essence” (tathābābhaś ālimittaparamārthatā dharmadharā cāryaḥ pāryāyaḥ tāyātyāhā tānānānā). Compare Bodhichittavivānaa 71 (Lindner 1982a: 207).

6 Bhāviveka introduces the ultimate (paramārtha) as cognition, or as consciousness (cittamāna) itself, by quoting the last pāda of verse 5.3 (“it is also the realization of this object”). Verse 5.4 then quotes MA 1.6. Vasubandhu explains the verse as follows: “From apprehension of ideation-only (vijñānapātānātra) comes no-apprehension of objects (artha). From no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of ideation-only.” Bhāviveka follows Vasubandhu with only small changes in terminology: “From apprehension of mind-only (cittamāna), comes no-apprehension of objects (ciñṇa). . . . From no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject.” Since the topic of this verse is consciousness, Bhāviveka uses his commentary to introduce the Yogacāra concept of store-consciousness (dhyānyāñña). As Paul Usherstreet points out in his translation of this chapter, Bhāviveka’s account of the store-consciousness follows the structure of the Trimūrti but expands and elaborates it in distinctive ways. Bhāviveka begins with a list of the major features of the store-consciousness, then gives an account of the three transformations (parināma) of consciousness (following Trimūrti 1.19 and 26-10).
and neutral seeds. It is associated with three transformations: maturation (vipaka), cogitation (manana), and ideation (vijñapti).

In this [store consciousness], things that arise are connected (āl Ignate) as results. It also is called the "appropriating consciousness" (ādānasaññā). It is associated with contact, mental activity, feeling, thinking, and ideas, all of which are neutral. It is not an object of ordinary knowledge in the form "This belongs to that" or "This is there," so it is indistinct (asaññā). It is of two kinds: initiating (aṅkepa) and resulting (phalabhiśnūrya). "Initiating" is initiated by consciousness, and "resulting" is brought about as a result of the maturation (vipaka) [of karmic influences]. The stream of the store-consciousness flows like the stream of a river, which is made up of different bits of water. As long as there is samsāra, it is accompanied by meritorious (punya), unmeritorious (apunya), and neutral (niñyaya) traces (udāna). In accordance with the traces of

Aspects of Bhāviveka’s terminology can also be traced to other Yogacāra works, particularly Asanga’s Mahaṃsa-samgoha (MS). Useful explanation of the three transformations can be found in the commentaries on the Trīśūla, including Śīla-ratna’s Trīśūla-bhāsya and Xuanzang’s Viśuddhimagga-vatthudīhi (Siddhi). Schmithausen’s study of the Śālā-vipāka (1987) provides an authoritative guide to these sources.

Bhāviveka begins with a formula that echoes the first line of Asanga’s account of the store-consciousness in MS chapter 1. Asanga himself begins by quoting a well-known verse from the Mahāyāna-dharmapāla Sūtra, in which the store-consciousness is described as a “beginningless” container of the seeds of rebirth. Bhāviveka quotes the sūtra directly in the commentary on verse 5.46 below. It also is quoted in the Trīśūla-bhāsya (37) and Siddhi (159). For other occurrences of this quotation, see also Eckel 1985: 55.

The claim that the store consciousness embraces (pari-grah) object (ālambana) and image (ākāra) indiscriminately (aparicchāna) derives from Trīśūla 3a, “[The store consciousness] has an indistinct (asaññata eva aparicchāna) awareness (ābhasa) of appropriation (āpāda) and location (āśāhā).” Schīramatī introduces this verse by saying: “If the store consciousness is distinguished (vyaptikā) from the active consciousnesses, then one should state its object (ālambana) or its form (ākāra), since there can be no consciousness without an object or form. We do not think that this [store consciousness] has no object or form. But its object and form are not indistinct (aparicchāna).” Why? Because the store consciousness proceeds in two ways, internally as the awareness (āpāda) of appropriation (āpāda) and externally as the awareness of a container (bhāsa) whose form is indistinct. Here internal appropriation consists of the traces of attachment (abhinivesa) to imagined identity, the sense organs with their support (adhibhūta), and the mental constituents of personality. Schmithausen (1987: 104-5) gives a thorough account of the problems involved in the interpretation of this passage, including the problem of Śīla-ratna’s own inconsistencies. See also Siddhi 124-42.

Bhāviveka discusses the view that store consciousness acquires potentialities (akāśa) that lead to the perception of objects in verses 5.22d, 19, and 42.

The defiled mind (kṣaṭyamañña) is discussed in Trīśūla 6 as part of the category of cognition (manana), the second transformation (parinama) of consciousness. Bhāviveka discusses it more fully in his account of cognition below.

11 Śīla-ratna discusses the process by which store consciousness produces different levels of rebirth in his commentary on Trīśūla 19. The levels are caused by meritorious (punya), unmeritorious (apunya), and neutral (niñyaya) seeds. Bhāviveka discusses karmic traces in the same terms just a few lines later.

12 The three transformations (parināma) of consciousness are introduced in Trīśūla 12-13a: “Consciousness has three transformations: maturation, the one called cogitation, and ideation concerning objects.”

13 Bhāviveka’s account of “maturation” (vipāka), the first transformation, begins with the first of Asanga’s two explanations of Śālā as “connection” in MS 1:13-14. Asanga says: “Why is this called store-consciousness (ālaya-vipāka)? Because in it all arising, defiled dharmas are connected (āl Ignate) as results, and in them it is connected as cause.” Śīla-ratna develops this point in the commentary on Trīśūla 12c: “It is Śālā because it is the location (āśā) of the seeds of all defiled dharmas. Śālā and āśā are synonyms. Or all dharmas are tied (āl Ignate) or connected (upakāyadān) here as effects (kāryākhitāvato). Or the Śālā can be tied or connected with all dharmas as cause.” This account of the term Śālā corresponds to the first definition in Siddhi 96. On the diversity of explanations in other Yogacāra sources, see Schmithausen 1987: 273-76.

Bhāviveka follows the order of Asanga’s text by moving from Śālā-vipāka to ādānasaññā (“appropriating consciousness”). Compare MS 1:14-15: “It is called appropriating consciousness. The scriptural source is the Siddhi-niṣcayin Sūtra: ‘The appropriating consciousness is profound and subtle, like a flood, it flows with all seeds. I did not reveal it to fools, lest they imagine it to be a self. Why is it called appropriating consciousness? Because it is the cause of material sense organs and the place for the appropriation of all bodies.’” For further discussion of this category, see Schmithausen 1987: 40ff.

Bhāviveka’s account of “maturation” goes on to consider Trīśūla 3:5a: “It has an indistinct (asaññata) awareness (ābhasa) of appropriation (āpāda) and location (āśā), and it is always associated with contact, mental activity, feeling, thinking, and ideas. The feeling (vedanā) in it is neutral (āpikā), it is unobstructed (aunarda) and indeterminate (anyākṣa). The same is true for contact (ucca), and so forth. It flows (varta) like the flood of a river (grootva aid). It ceases (vijñapti) when one is an Arhat.” Bhāviveka’s elaboration of the Trīśūla is reflected in Śīla-ratna’s commentary on these verses and on verse 19, where Śīla-ratna (following Vasubandhu) explains the mechanism for the maturation of karma. On maturation as the first transformation of consciousness, see also Siddhi 97-224.
karma and with the traces of the duality of subject and object that are present in it, it produces the appropriate maturation, such as the bodies of gods and human beings. The stream of appropriating consciousness comes to an end when one attains the status of an Arhat, because [at that time] all the seeds of defilements are eliminated. This is called maturation (upādāna) and is the first transformation (parināma).

[The store consciousness] also is called alaya-vijñāna because sentient beings cling (alpayante) to it as a self.14 That is, they perceive it as being itself and the things that belong to their selves. It always is accompanied by the four defilements (kleśa) — delusion about the self (atamnāna), false view of the self (ātmaneṣṭ, pride in the self (ātmanāna), and love of the self (ātmanabhi) — and by contact, mental activity, and so forth, which arise at the same level (kṣāna). But an Arhat has no defiled mind, because he has removed all defilements. This is called cogitation (manana) and is the second transformation.

It also is called store-consciousness because it contains the potential to produce all the active consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) and is associated with mental phenomena (caitta) such as desire (chanda) and conviction (adhimokṣa).15 It also is called the root-consciousness (pravṛttl-vijñāna) and is associated with mental phenomena (caitta) such as desire (chanda) and conviction (adhimokṣa).15

14 Bhāviveka’s explanation of the term alaya as “clinging” corresponds to the third explanation in Śādā 96. Here his account of “cogitation” (manana), the second transformation of consciousness, follows Trīśūla 2:8a: “(bhū) Based on this [uddārśiniya] store-consciousness, there occurs (pravaratā) the consciousness that is called mind (manana). It has this [store-consciousness] as its object (ālambana), and it consists of cogitation (mananānāma).” (6) It is always accompanied by the four defilements (kleśa), which are obstructed (niyoruḥ) but indeterminate (vyagāraḥ) — namely false view of the self, delusion about the self, pride in the self, and love of the self — which arise at the same level. (7b4) But it is not [accompanied by them] when one is an Arhat, in the attainment of cessation (niruddhasamāpatti), or on the supermundane path (lokottaramegāra). (8a) This is the second transformation. On the second transformation of consciousness, see also Śādā 225-88.

15 Bhāviveka’s account of the term alaya as the container of the potentiality for active consciousness corresponds to the second explanation of the term in MS 1:13, alaya-vijñāna as cause. His explanation of “ideation” (vijñapti), the third transformation of consciousness, follows Trīśūla 2:9 and 15-19. (8b) The third [transformation of consciousness] is the apprehension (vipakīlaḥ) of the six kinds of objects (viśaya). It is wholesome (lokūdāla), unwholesome, and neither. (9) It is associated with pervasive (vajra-vātra), specific (vinīyukta), and beneficial mental phenomena (caitta), also with defilements (kleśa), secondary defilements (upakleśa), and three kinds of feeling (vedana). . . . (15) The sense consciousnesses arise in the root consciousness (mātaviṣayānā), according to their conditions, either simultaneously or not, like waves in water. (16) Mental consciousness (manovijñāna) coincides (sambhūtā) with it except among unconscious (asamjñātā) [gods], in two forms of attainment (samajñātā), in sleep (mōdātā), and in a fainting spell (mukhāntarā), where one becomes unconscious (acchānta). (17) This transformation of consciousness is conceptual (nīkāpa). Nothing is conceptualized (nīkupāra) by it. Therefore everything is ideation-only (vijñaptimātra). (18) The [store] consciousness is the seed of everything. It is transformed in certain ways, and, through a process of mutual influence, certain concepts (nīkāpa) arise. (19) When the previous result (upādāna) is exhausted (kṣyeṣa), the karmic trace (vāsanā), along with the trace of the grasping of subject and object, produces another result (upādāna). On ideation as the third transformation of consciousness, see Śādā 289-415.

The Yogācārās

sciousness (mātaviṣayānā). When conditions such as the eye, material form, light, space, and mental activity coincide, the six forms of active consciousness arise from it. The store-consciousness is like an ocean in which waves are stirred up by the movements of such things as the wind and crocodiles. It is neither identical to active consciousness nor different from it, like the ocean and the waves. For [the gods] who are unconscious (asamjñātā) or for those who have attained a state of unconsciousness (asamjñātā), in the attainment of cessation (niruddhasamāpatti), in sleep, in drunkenness, or in a fainting spell, there is no reason for any apprehension of objects. This third transformation is called ideation (vijñapti).

According to the Yogācāra, the mind (citta) is transformed and appears in the form (ākāra) of the self-image (nābāhā), or object (grāhā), and the object-image (niśrāhā), or object (grāhā). There are no external objects (nābāhā). Therefore, from the apprehension of mind-only (cittamātra), comes no-apprehension of objects (vijñāna). If there are no objects (grāhā), there also can be no subject (grāhā). Therefore, from no-apprehension of objects, comes no-apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject.

As long as one does not take one’s stand in the store-consciousness, which is the true nature of the mind (acittatadbhūtā) and is called “ideation,” but takes one’s stand instead in apprehension, one does not eliminate the seeds of grasping, does not remove the seeds of the perception of marks (nimitta), and, as a result, does not abandon the two [kinds of] traces (vāsanā). But when one no longer apprehends objects (ālambana) such as material form as different from the mind, stands in the true nature of the mind (acittatadbhūtā), with this change of basis (āśrayapratisiṣṭā), all obstacles (stotrayā) are removed. A person then controls all dharmas and attains non-conceptuality (nīkāpasamāpattā).

No one attains ideation-only (vijñaptimātra), or the insight (jñāna) of the Tathāgatas in which there is no concept of any object, without understanding the three identities.17

16 The last paragraph in Bhāviveka’s commentary on verse 5.4 follows the account of the “change of basis” (āśrayapratisiṣṭā) in Trīśūla 26-30. (26) As long as consciousness does not stand in ideation-only, the propensity for two kinds of grasping does not cease. . . . (28) But when consciousness does not apprehend objects, it stands in consciousness-only, because that [consciousness] is not grasped [as a subject] if there is no object. (29) This no-apprehension, in which there is no subject, is supermundane insight. The change of basis is of two kinds depending on the obstacles that are removed. (30) This is the pure element that is inconceivable, virtuous, permanent, and pleasurable. It is the liberation body and also the [body] called Dharma that belongs to a Great Sage.” On the much-discussed parallel between Trīśūla 29 and Lankāvatāra Sūtra 16.3, see Schmithals 1992: 392-97.

17 The commentary on the three identities in verse 5.5 returns to the account of the three identities in Trīśūla 20-25. (20) Anything that is conceptualized by any concept is imagined identity and does not exist. (21) But the concept (nīkāpa) itself is dependent [identity] and arises from causes. Absolute [identity] is the constant absence of the former in the latter.
For this reason, it is said:

5.5 Those who see reality see absolute identity when they do not apprehend imagined [identity] and do not grasp dependent [identity].

The three identities—imagined (parikalpita), dependent (paratantra), and absolute (parinirvampanna)—are included in the store-consciousness.

Of these [three identities], imagined identity (parikalpitaviveka) consists of anything—from material form to awakening—that is conceptualized (vikalpa) by any concept (vikalpa) that distinguishes between subject and object. [Imagined things] do not exist in this way [as they are imagined], because they are imagined (kalpita) by improper reification (samadho). The imagination of what is unreal (abhautaparikalpa) consists of mind (citta) and mental phenomena (citta) in the triple world (trativadibhava), and is divided into the categories that begin with the wholesome (kuśala). It is dependent (paratantra) identity because it arises from (utpadyate) and is controlled (paratariantaye) by something else. Or it is dependent (paratantra) because it has control over the arising of other things. It also is dependent identity because it is the basis (dharma) on which imagined [identity] is imagined and absolute [identity] is achieved.

Absolute identity (parinirvampannaviveka) is the absence (vibhata) of imagined subject and object in dependent identity. This [absolute identity] is neither identical to nor different from dependent [identity]. If it were different, the Dharma nature (dharman) would be different. If it were identical, the Dharma nature would be defined (samkheleśamakā) and could not be the cause of purification (vyavahāra).

[Question] If there are three identities (viveka), in what way are they empty (nihsvabhava)?

[Reply] Imagined [identity] is empty of characteristic (laksanaviveka) that is, it is empty of any characteristic of its own (svalaksanatva)—so it should not be apprehended. Dependent [identity] is empty of arising (utpadanahsvabhava)—that is, it does not arise by itself (svavrtta)—so it should not be grasped. Absolute [identity] is the ultimate reality (paramārtha) of imagined dharma, and it is emptiness (nihsvabhavatva). Absolute [identity] is the object (artha) or sphere of activity (goce) of the ultimate (paramārtha), or the knowledge of the noble ones (aryajñāna). It is empty in the sense that it is the emptiness that constitutes the ultimate (paramārthanirvahvadhatu). Those who see reality (tattvavadin), or who know the ultimate (paramārtha), see absolute identity as the equality (samatva) of subject and object. This is because supermundane insight (alaukkajñāna) arises without any concepts.

For Śrāvakas, the change of basis (śārayopāyatti) is defined as the liberation body (vimuktiśrava), because they free themselves from passions (āsra), and remove the obstacles that consist of defilements (kṣetrasvarṇa). For Tathāgatas, it is the Dharma Body, because they are free from all the traces (tattva) of karma and of subject and object and have removed all obstacles to knowledge (śāpyasthāna). Objection: If imagined identity is the object (dharma) of mundane knowledge and absolute identity is realized directly (prayatnāvedaya) as the object (dharma) of a sage’s (muni) supermundane knowledge, what kind of knowledge has dependent identity as its object, and how do one know that it exists?

Reply. 

19 Verse 5.6 also appears in the Prajñāprāpti and receives extensive commentary from Bhāviveka’s commentator Avalokitavara (Eckel 1995: 52). It is likely that Bhāviveka had in mind Yogacāra arguments like the one made by Asanga in the Tattvārthasūtra chapter of the Bodhisattvabhumi (31). “If the aggregates exist, the designation (prajñapāta) ‘person’ is possible. If they do not exist, the designation ‘person’ is not possible, in the absence of a real thing (nirvāṭaka). Similarly, if the dharmas of the aggregates exist as real things (vastumātra), it is possible to designate the dharmas of the aggregates metaphorically. If they do not exist, it is not possible to designate them metaphorically. In that case, the designation would not refer to a real thing, and there cannot be any designation without some basis (adhihāsikā). Some people who hear the difficult and profound Mahāyāna sūtras that deal with emptiness and convey a hidden meaning (abhiiyūhyā) do not discern the correct meaning. They develop false concepts, have unreasonable views (drṣṭi) based only on logic (tarka), and say: ‘All this reality is nothing but a designation. Whoever sees in this way sees correctly.’ For these people there is no real thing to serve as the basis of designation. If so, there could not be any designation at all. How can reality be nothing but a designation? By saying this, they deny
5.6 [We] think that dependent identity exists, because designations have causes, because otherwise neither would not exist, and because one apprehends defilements.

It is possible to infer that dependent identity exists, because designations (prajñāpti) about the existence of mind and mental phenomena appear to have erroneous causes (nimītta). [We] also think that dependent identity exists, because otherwise—if dependent identity did not exist—it would follow that imagined and absolute [identity], or designations and their causes, would not exist, because both depend on dependent [identity], and because, if dependent identity did not exist, one would apprehend no defilements. Defilements are apprehended, because they depend on mind and mental phenomena, and because their removal is liberation.

[Dependent identity] is the object (vijaya) of supernmundane (alaukika), non-conceptual (miśrīvākṣa) knowledge and is perceived (dṛṣṭa) when absolute identity is perceived (ākāśatāta). This is because dependent [identity] is realized by pure, mundane, subsequent knowledge (prātīlabhatah tadbhalaṃkāraṇa).

5.7 This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is [the means] to attain omniscience, and the one that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not.20

(apparāda) both designation and reality. Someone who denies designation and reality should be known as the worst kind nihilist (nāsika). Those who are wise and practice a religious life should not speak or share living quarters with this kind of nihilist. [Such a nihilist] causes himself to fall, and those who agree with him in the false views fall as well.” Bhāviveka discusses this argument in more detail in verses 5.82–84 below.

Hoornaert points out that the word “both” in the phrase “because both depend on dependent [identity]” allows several different interpretations. Two interpretations are given here: “both” imagined and absolute identity and “both” designations and their cause. Bhāviveka refutes the second interpretation explicitly in verse 5.84 below. The first is refuted implicitly by his critique of the three identities. A third possibility is that “both” refers to defilement and purification, as in Bhāviveka’s parallel argument in the Prajñāpāramitā (Eckel 1985: 54–56). Bhāviveka outlines his own view of defilement and purification in verse 5.81 below.

On this argument compare MAV 1.21 (“If it were not defiled, no beings would be liberated. If it were not purified, effort would be in vain.”) A fourth possibility is that the word “both” refers to the duality of subject and object (Eckel 1985: 53).

As Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāra position, arguments for the existence of dependent identity lead directly to an attack on unnamed “nihilists” (nāsika). In verse 5.7, Bhāviveka shows that he understands this attack to be directed against the Madhyamikas.

In verse 5.7, the Yogācāras make an exclusive claim for the validity of their own argument. A comparable claim can be found in verses 27-29 of Dignāga’s Prājñāpāramitāśāstra (“Epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom”): “The teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom is based on three [identities]: imagined, dependent, and absolute. The words ‘do not exist’ rule out everything that is imagined. Examples such as illusion (maśā) teach dependent [identity]. The fourfold purification teaches absolute [identity]. The Buddha has no other

20 teaching in the Perfection of Wisdom.” Verse 5.7 clearly shows that Bhāviveka thought the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka was provoked by the Yogācāra interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom. For more discussion of this point, see Part 1 of this book.

A Sanskrit version of Bhāviveka’s first quotation from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra is found in Kinmar 1971: 160-59: evan dharmena dharmān abhijñayandam parisayatam parisayatam prajñāparam prajñāparamaḥ prajñavākṣa tattvamātāḥ. The Tibetan version in the Yatukonda differs somewhat from Kinmar’s Sanskrit. “He realizes that is supplied on the basis of the Sanskrit; otherwise the translation follows the Tibetan. For a translation of Kinmar’s Sanskrit, see Conze 1975: 265. The next two quotations (cittam tad acintam and yad acintam tad aciyam) appear widely in the text of the sūtra.

21 Verse 5.8 echoes the opening version of Dignāga’s Prāmāṇavākṣya (“To the one who is the personification of authority, pramāṇaśūnya), who seeks the welfare of the world, the teacher, the Suṣṭa, the protector, I pay homage.” Hattori explains: “Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of tradition. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid. This critical attitude he inherited from the Buddha, who used to exhort His disciples not to accept any of His words merely out of reverence but to examine them carefully, just as
All the teachings of the Buddhas (sugata) are authoritative (pramāṇa) for us, because people examine the purity of gold by burning it in fire, cutting it, and testing it with a touchstone” (Hatsumi 1966: 73).

According to Dignāga, there are only two reliable epistemological authorities or means of knowledge (pramāṇa): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Dignāga considers āgama (tradition) or sabda (verbal testimony) to be a form of verbal knowledge and treats it as part of anumāna: “Verbal testimony is not a different pramāṇa from anumāna” (Pramavanasmāsa 5.1).

Here Bhāviveka seems to differ from Dignāga by treating the teaching of a Buddha as a pramāṇa. To say that a Buddha’s teaching is “authoritative” (pramāṇa) and that a Buddha is “reliable” (āgama) follows the definition of sabda-pramāṇa in Nigam Saṅgīta 2.1.5c: “Verbal testimony (Āgama) makes possible the comprehension of an object, because the teaching of someone who is reliable has force.” In Tarkasamgraha 59, Anamātha Saṅgīta states “Āgama as ‘the teaching of someone who is reliable (āgama)’.”

But the appearance of this verse is somewhat deceiving. Bhāviveka follows Dignāga more closely than the verse suggests. In MHK 9.16-17, a Mimāṃsaka objects to the Buddha’s authority by saying: “The Buddha’s teachings are not authoritative (pramāṇa), because they are created, like those of someone else, and the Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a human being, like someone else. The Buddha’s teachings are not authoritative, because they criticize the three Vedas, like the view of a Jain ascetic.”

In MHK 9.19-20ab, Bhāviveka responds by saying that the authority of the Buddha’s teaching can only be established by rational analysis (yukti). “If tradition (āgama) is tradition because its transmission (sabdamāṇa) is unbroken, then everything has to be tradition. Why not hold onto the truth (tattvā)? A statement is tradition if it can stand up to rational analysis.”

Bhāviveka often cites traditional sources for his views, and he clearly expects his view of reality to be consistent with tradition, but in the end, he believes that tradition can only be correctly understood when it is examined by reason. For an example of Bhāviveka’s use of āgama and yukti together, see 5.113 below, where Bhāviveka describes “reality” (tattvā) as “consistent with reason and tradition” (yuktyaśabdamānta). Shotoro Iida has discussed Bhāviveka’s approach to tradition and inference in Iida 1986.

In Iida and elsewhere in the MHK and TJ, Bhāviveka uses the verbs prati-pād and prati-i to combine a sense of motion along a path with a sense of understanding. As Frank Edgerton points out in his definition of prati-pād (BHMSD), these two meanings sometimes come together to mean “behavior, practice, or performance.” In MHK 4.3 the verb prati-i has both marga (“path”) and bodha (“awakening”) as its objects: “The Buddhas’ great awakening is arrived at (prati-pāda) by someone who has followed (prati-i) the path that begins with right views.” In 5.107, prati-pād has tattvā (“reality”) as its object: “Reality is not understood (prati-pāda) as an object of inference.” In MHK 9.19 a deficiency in understanding (prati-pāda) is associated with an inability to lead others on the right path: “Because the Hindu gods are deficient in understanding (prati-pād), they cannot lead anyone to peace. They are like someone who has fallen off a cliff and leads others along the same path.” Compare also MHK 2.1, where the Buddhist ascetic “practices the right path” (prati-rāmaṇ prati-pādaṇa prati-pādaṇa), and MHK 2.11 where the same ascetic worships the Buddha with the “flowers of understanding” (pratipāda-puṣpa). The combination of motion with understanding is a common feature of Sanskrit verbs to “go,” as in the common words abhiṣek, abhiseka, abhiseka-puṣpa, abhiseka-abhiseka, abhiseka-prati-pāda, abhiseka-prati-pāda, abhiseka-prati-pāda-abhiseka, abhiseka-abhiseka-abhiseka-abhiseka, etc. The Buddhist translators use sambhava par par byad (“complete,” “accomplish,” or “achieve”) for pratipāda in 5.8 and sgrub tu gshes pa (“enter into completion”) for pratipāda in 5.9.

The Yogacāras

5.9 But the opponent, whose mind is confused and misled by other traditions, does not. For this reason, one should follow a rational approach so that he will understand.

Other traditions (āgama) are traditions that differ from this tradition. To be confused by them is to doubt whether this (tradition) is correct. To be misled is to wander into another doctrinal systems (śāstra) and, without relying on this one, to be misled about whether it is correct. Those who have minds such as this have minds that are confused and misled by other traditions. These opponents state refutations and claim victory. They do not understand that this is authoritative (pramāṇa). Therefore, a debater ( śīla) should follow a rational (yukti) approach (naye), which has faultless theses (pāka), reasons (hetu), and examples (dṛṣṭānta) and ends by avoiding the refutations (dronāśāna) of the opponents, so that they will understand.

The Ultimate as an Object of Cognition

The superimposition (kalpanā-pratāpana) and improper denial (aparādo) that you stated earlier cannot stand up to reason.24

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23 This verse is a continuation of 5.8: “Clearly a good person understands, but the opponent does not.” The phrase “confused and misled by other traditions” appears again in the commentary on 5.108, where Bhāviveka explains that “other traditions” consist of “363 doctrines.” These are discussed in Part 1 of this book.

At the end of the commentary on 5.9, Bhāviveka gives a summary of his logical method. Generally it involves two separate components: a criticism of the opponent’s syllogisms (with their “theses, reasons, and examples”) and a defence of the syllogisms that support his own position. For further commentary on Bhāviveka’s logical method, see Part 1 of this book and Lindner 1986: 62: “In order to silence the opponent for good we should give a hetvādāśaya asādāśaya svadāśaya parivartana-parivartana.” When Bhāviveka says that he ends by avoiding the opponents’ refutations, he means that he is not mentioning all the details of his method, since he has already done this in MHK 3.26ff.

24 Once Bhāviveka has said that he intends to follow a “rational” (yukti) approach, he turns to the substance of the Yogācāra position. Verses 5.10-11 respond to the Yogācāra claim (stated in the first pada of 5.2) that the ultimate (paramārtha) is “the existence of the absence of duality (dvāryabhāsasya saddhānā).” Bhāviveka argues that the two parts of the definition are contradictory: if the ultimate is an absence (abhāsa), it cannot exist (abhāsa), and if it exists (bhāsa), it cannot be an absence (abhāsa). This argument, like the one that follows, has the form of a pravacana: Bhāviveka takes the opponent’s assertion and reduces it to an absurd conclusion.

The term kalpanā (translated as “superimposition”) in the introduction to 5.10 should be taken as a synonym of samāvāsa ("improper reification"), one of the two extremes avoided by
5.10 The existence of the absence of duality is clearly unreasonable, because it is contradictory. You should not imagine that this [absence] exists unless the absence of a flower in the sky also exists.

First, if the absence (abhāta) of duality exists (bhāta), how can it be an absence? If it is an absence (abhāta), it cannot exist (bhāta). The existence of the absence of duality is unreasonable, because it is a contradiction in terms. If [you] say that this absence exists because it is always present in the form of the absence of duality, then the absence of a flower in the sky must also exist. You should not imagine that the absence of duality exists, unless you think that the absence of a flower in the sky exists.

[Objection] If you think this, our approach is. 26

Anything that is conceptualized by any conceptual thought is imagined identity and does not exist. But conceptual thought is dependent [identity] and arises from causes. Absolute [identity] is the constant absence of the former in the latter.

Absolute identity is the constant absence of the former, which is imagined identity, or the imagined [duality of] subject and object, in the latter, which is dependent identity. With respect to imagined and dependent [identities], it is an absence (abhāta). With respect to absolute [identity], it exists (bhāta). In this case, there is no difference between absence and existence: the two are indistinguishable. For this reason, there is no contradiction.

Assuming that this is the opponents’ intention, [we] reply:

5.11 If [the opponents] think there is no difference between reality (tattva) and the absence of imagined [identity], this is not an answer, because there is the same [contradiction] when the definition is applied to the thing that is being defined.

The middle path. The other extreme is aparikṣa (“improper denial”). Bhāviveka argues that the Yogācāra definition of ultimate reality as “existence” (adbhāta) and “absence” (abhāta) falls into both extremes. To say that ultimate reality exists “superimposes” reality on something that is ultimately unreal, and to say that it is an absence “denies” the reality of something that is conventionally real. On aparikṣa as a denial of external objects, see verse 5.19 below.

25 A “flower in the sky” (bhānapuṣpa), like the hair of a tortoise or the son of a barren woman, is a common example of something that does not exist.

26 To explain the Yogācāra position in the commentary on 5.10, Bhāviveka quotes Trisūkā 20:21: yenā yena viśeṣaṇa yad uṣṭā viśeṣāt eṣā tvakṣaṇaḥ / paripākṣa ca rūpāḥ uṣṭābhāta na sa viśeṣaḥ // paripākṣaṇaḥ samudghātaḥ uṣṭā ca viśeṣāḥ {{pyājyaḥ}} / {{pyājyaḥ}} samudghātaḥ ca paripākṣaṇaḥ // A portion of Trisūkā 20 was quoted earlier in the commentary on verse 5.5. Hoornemann follows Yamasuchi in pointing out that the terminology of the Yogācāra objection (particularly the claim that absence and existence are indistinguishable) is similar to verses 18-21 of the Trisūkā (La Vallée Poussin 1932-33b: 155).

Even if there is no difference between absolute [identity] and the absence of imagined and dependent [identities], there is the same contradiction. When the definition is applied to the thing that is being defined—that is, when reality is defined as the existence of the absence of duality—the absence of duality cannot be an absence if it exists, and it cannot exist if it is an absence. For this reason, the opponents’ answer is unsatisfactory.

Furthermore, 27

5.12 If [the opponent] thinks the nature of [reality] does not cease to be [an absence], then it cannot exist, if it does not cease to be [an absence].

If the opponents say that it is the nature (bhāta) or identity (sabhāta) of reality not to cease to be the absence of duality—in other words, if it is simply the absence of duality—then [we] say: Do not imagine that it exists, if it does not cease to be [an absence].

Therefore, 28

5.13 If so, the Buddhas’ knowledge would have an absence as its object, and this [object] would not be the selflessness of dharmas, because the cognition of an absence has a cognitive mark (nimittā).

According to the doctrinal approach (ṣidhihītanaya) of the Mahāyāna, the Buddhas’ knowledge is considered free from the extremes of existence and absence. It is a contradiction of tradition if you think that it has an absence as its object (alambana).

[Objection] It is not a contradiction. Why? You also think that selflessness (nair-tāṇaya) is the selflessness of imagined dharmas, and [this selflessness] is an object.

27 After he has pointed out the contradiction between “existence” (bhāta) and “absence” (abhāta), Bhāviveka considers the possibility that the ultimate is simply an absence. This possibility corresponds to the second pūda of verse 5.2: “or because it is the absence of duality (abhāta va doṣaparyya). The interpretation of verse 5.12 turns on a change in the meaning of the term bhāta. In verses 5.10-11, Bhāviveka has treated bhāta as meaning “existence” or “existing entity.” Here he treats it as a synonym of sabhāta or svarūpa (“nature” or “identity”). To say that reality (tattva) is abhāta-asya bhāta means, according to this interpretation, that it has the identity of being an absence. This line of interpretation corresponds to the first part of MAV 1.13, as explained by Vasubandhu’s commentary: “The absence (abhāta) of the duality of subject and object and the existence (bhāta) of that absence is the definition (vikāraṇa) of emptiness. This means that emptiness is defined as having the identity of an absence (abhātanabhāta).”

28 In verses 5.13-14, Bhāviveka takes up the claim in 5.2c, that the ultimate is the object of a cognition of existence and so forth (saddhābhuddhiṇaya), and in 5.3c, that the ultimate is the object of a non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpa-paṃsatāḥ). On the meaning of the terms grāhyāḥ, viṣayaḥ, and alambanam, see the notes on verse 5.4.

29 The commentary on verse 5.13 treats satyavāda (“Conc. who sees reality”) as buddha.
(Reply: We think that the selflessness of dharmas is free from all cognitive marks. If something is an absence and functions as the object of a cognition of an absence, it cannot be the selflessness of dharmas. The word "self" refers to identity (svabhāva), and selflessness means that there is no identity (nīsvarbhāva), whether it is the identity of something that exists (bhūtaevabhāva) or the identity of an absence (abhūtavabhāva).

The opponents think that concepts (vikalpa) are called bondage, and freedom from concepts is liberation.

5.14ab If [the opponents] think that a cognition whose object (ālaṃbana) is an absence has no concept.

If [the opponents] say: All dharmas have the same taste, which is [the taste of] absence (ābhūtavabhāva). A cognition whose object (ālaṃbana) is an absence (ābhūta) would be conceptual if it had a concept of anything, but it has no concept, so it is correct.

The Master* replies:

5.14cd Then a non-conceptual cognition of material form! must be correct.

If non-conceptual cognitions are correct, then mundane (laukika) cognitions that arise from causes such as material form and are free from the concepts that consist of discrimination (nīśīptana) and memory (anumāna) must also be taken as correct.

Object: The only truly correct cognition (buddhi) is one that is free from the concept of subject and object. Even a non-conceptual cognition of material form is false, because it has the image (ābhūta) of an object (grāhyā), like the cognition of a double moon.

30 On Bhāviveka's use of the word "master" (Tib. slob dpam / Skt. ācārya) to refer to the author of the verses, see the discussion of Bhāviveka as author in Part I of this book.

31 "Material form" is used to translate the term rūpa, the object of visual perception. Kāla 1.10 explains that rūpa is characterized by color (vāpa) and shape (vāśātvā). The word "form" will be reserved to translate the word akāra, the mental representation of an object.

32 According to the Sarvāstivāda, there are three kinds of concepts (vikalpa): concepts about the thing itself (vāsātvā), concepts that consist of discrimination (nīśīptanā), and concepts that consist of memory (anumāna). A non-conceptual perceptual cognition is considered free from the last two kinds of concept, but not free from the first. On this aspect of the Sarvāstivāda theory of perception, see Kāla 1.33a and Cox 1988: 36-37.

33 In the introduction to verse 5.15, the opponent presents the first formal syllogism of the chapter.

Even a non-conceptual cognition of material form is false, because it has an image (ābhūta) of an object (grāhyā), like the cognition of a double moon.

5.15 If [the opponent] thinks that a cognition of material form is incorrect because it has the image of an object, the reason is mistaken, and the thesis fails.

Mistaken (vṛtyāhidyata) means contradicted (vṛtyāhidyata). A cognition of material form cannot have any other nature than to have the image of an object. To infer that "having the image of an object" (vṛtyāhidyata) excludes "correctness" is contradicted, because it proves the opposite of the nature of the subject. Here the thesis is that a cognition of material form is false. But how can a cognition of material form be false in this context? Perception (pratyakṣa), tradition (āgama), and common sense (ākhaṇa) all contradict the falsehood of a cognition of material form. For this reason, the inference is contradicted.

The same fault applies to the claim that "those who see reality only see absolute identity."

5.16 If the Teacher's awakening has [absolute] identity as its object (ālaṃbana), it must be a conceptual cognition, it must have an object, and it must not be non-conceptual.

If the Teacher's awakening, or the Tathāgata's knowledge (jñāna), has [absolute] identity as its object—that is, if it has as its object the absolute identity that is known directly

The subject of the thesis is literally "a non-conceptual cognition of material form and so forth" (vṛtyāhidyata). In his discussion of the syllogism, Bhāviveka abbreviates it to "a non-conceptual cognition of material form." For the sake of simplicity, this abbreviation is followed here as well.

In verse 5.15 and in the following commentary, Bhāviveka argues that the reason (bha) in this syllogism is "contradicted" (vṛtyāhidyata) because it proves the opposite of the subject (dharmin) of the thesis. If a cognition is genuinely a cognition of material form, it must be correct. To infer otherwise would contradict the nature of the subject. Bhāviveka presents his own position about the cognition of external objects in verses 5.33-36.

34 Verse 5.16 applies the "same fault" to the opponent's thesis: "Those who see reality only see absolute identity." This thesis was part of the Yājñavalkya objection in verse 5.5 and was expanded in the commentary that followed. The fault is that the inference is "contradicted" in one or both of the senses mentioned in the commentary on verse 5.15. To infer that the Buddha's vision of reality (or "the Teacher's awakening" in the text of verse 5.16) sees absolute identity (or "has absolute identity as its object") is contradicted by the nature of the subject, because the Buddha's vision cannot have an object or see anything at all. To say that a Buddha sees absolute identity as an object is also contradicted by several points of tradition that both Bhāviveka and the opponent accept. Verse 5.16 is quoted in the commentary on verse 5.81, and the point of the verse is discussed at length in verses 5.35-111.
by the Tathāgata and is not accessible to words—it must be conceptual. But awakening is not considered conceptual. If it has absolute identity as its object, it must have an object, and it is impossible to argue that it has no object. But awakening is not considered to have an object. And if [awakening] conceives of reality as emptiness (niḥsṛṣṭabhaṅga), it must not be a non-conceptual cognition. This is the construction of the verse.

THE ULTIMATE AS CONSCIOUSNESS

The next verse responds to the thesis: "It is like this: the three worlds are mind-only (citramātra), and external objects (bāhyārtha) do not exist." 35

5.17 It is not true that apprehending mind-only implies that one does not grasp material form and so forth. This thesis is contradicted by a point that has already been accepted and also by common sense.

It is contradicted by a point that has already been accepted, because it contradicts the traditional statement, "the arising of visual consciousness depends on the eye and material form." It also is contradicted by common sense, because it is contradicted by the ordinary view that visual consciousness does not arise unless it has material form as an object (artha).

Objection: [We] observe that consciousness arises even without objects (artha) such as material form, because it arises with the image (abhava) of such objects, just as the cognition of material form arises in a dream. 36

35 In the introduction to verse 5.17 Bhāviveka moves from the ultimate as an object of cognition to the ultimate as cognition itself. This leads inevitably to the Yogacāra doctrine of "mind-only" (citramātra). The discussion of mind-only began in verse 5.4 with the quotation of MĀV 1.6: "From apprehension comes no-apprehension, from no-apprehension comes no-apprehension." Vasubandhu's commentary expands this verse as follows: "From apprehension of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra) comes no-apprehension of objects (artha); from no-apprehension of objects (artha) comes no-apprehension of consciousness-only. This is the way to enter the non-existence (pātatiṣākṣa) of the object and subject (graphicsvahaka)."

Bhāviveka traces the doctrine of mind-only to the Databhīmikā Sūtra (32): "The three worlds are mind-only (citramāstra idam yad idam traiḥbhūtanam)." He discusses this quotation at greater length in the commentary on verse 5.28.

The traditional statement (āgama) "The arising of visual consciousness depends on the eye and material forms" (aksayānubhāya rūpānubhāya ca kṣaturjñānam), is quoted in chapter 9 of the Kaśyapa (465). A similar quotation is found a few lines earlier (aksayānubhāya ca kṣaturjñānam samvastī ca kṣaturbhāya rūpānubhāya ca). In his translation, La Vallée Poussine identifies the source of the second quotation as the Sanamukha Sūtra. While this source represents a Vaiśākha point of view, the quotation lends itself naturally to a Saṅgāṃika interpretation.

36 When Bhāviveka challenges the Yogacāra thesis that there are no external objects (bāhyārtha), the objector is required to give a syllogism to support it. The syllogism takes the following form:

A cognition of material form and so forth has no object (citā artha), because it arises with that kind of image (vastabhā₂dāya), like the cognition of material form and so forth in a dream.

The source of this argument is the first verse of the Vīmaṭīkā. With commentary, this verse reads: "In the Mahāyāna, the three worlds are defined as ideation-only (vijñaptimātra), because the śāstra say: 'O Jina, the three worlds are mind-only.' Mind (citā), the mental organ (āna), consciousness (vijñāna), and ideation (vijñapti) are synonyms. Here 'mind' is intended to include its associations. 'Only' is a negation of objects (artha). [Verse 1] This is ideation-only, because it has the image of unreal objects (sudānkṣariḥkṣāvahā), like the vision of unreal networks of hair and so forth, when someone has an eye disease."

The first verse of the Vīmaṭīkā helps clarify an important point in Bhāviveka's argument: when he says "that kind of image" (vastabhā₂dāya), he means "an image of unreal objects" (asamatābhā₂dāya). To find the source of Bhāviveka's example of the dream, we need to look only as far as Vīmaṭīkā 3, where the example is used to respond to an opponent's objection to Vīmaṭīkā 1. Compare also Vīmaṭīkā 16a: "Perceptual cognition is like a dream and so forth."

The opponent's syllogism is valid only if it has an example that is accepted by the other party to the argument (who in this case is Bhāviveka). Bhāviveka criticizes the example by claiming that dreams are based on real, external objects and therefore do not illustrate the point that sense cognitions lack external objects. This means that the opponent's inference is "deficient" (yāna) with regard to the example. In other words, it lacks the "inferred property." Sthiramati criticizes an argument like Bhāviveka's in MĀV 1.25-26.

In verse 5.19, Lindner reads vissaya ṣaya nondāna ("an improper denial of real things") rather than vissaya apadāna ("an improper denial of objects"). This reading is consistent with the terminology of verse 5.6, but the Tibetan translation of verse 5.19 and its commentary require the word vissaya.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

[Objection] It can be explained as follows: The nature of consciousness is twofold: it has a self-image and an object-image, because it continues to be itself while it also arises as something else, like a crystal. A crystal naturally is clear, but it can appear blue if something that has a blue color is placed nearby. Similarly, the mind has its own image, but when it evolves into the form (ākāra) of an object, it also takes on the image (ākāra) of the object.

[Reply] The point to be proved is incompatible with the example. Why?

5.21 [We] do not think that the mind has a double image like a crystal, because it arises in the form of the other [i.e., the object]. The moment (kṣaṇa) of crystal that arises when [an object] is placed nearby is not the same as the moment from which it arises.

It is true that a crystal loses its natural clarity and becomes blue when something blue is placed nearby. But the previous moment of clear crystal ceases; it does not change into blue.

5.22a [We] think that, when one [moment of crystal] ceases, another arises, so it is wrong to think that one is the other.

The moment of clear crystal ceases and the [moment of] blue [crystal] arises because something [blue] is placed nearby. To think that [the blue moment] is clear is wrong.

 Bhāviveka argues that the example of a crystal does not support the point to be inferred (vādyatvadharma). Bhāviveka admits that a crystal can appear clear at one moment and blue at another, but he does not admit that it has “a double nature.” In verses 5.21-22a, he argues that the clear moment of crystal ceases as the blue moment arises. For a similar argument about the momentariness (kuññikāra) of a crystal, see Madhyakāra 1976: 91.

The commentary on verse 5.22b carries the argument against the “double nature” of consciousness further by scrutinizing the Yogācāra example of the crystal. The first argument has to do with the “self-image” (ākāra) of consciousness: Bhāviveka says that a crystal may appear “exactly as it did before” (lit. “with precisely its former nature”) when there is no colored object nearby, but consciousness cannot be grasped or objectified (grāhyatā) in the same way. Even when the “aspect of the object” (ādhyatmyākāra) is removed, consciousness cannot be grasped as an object in its own right. This argument is consistent with a common Madhyamaka criticism of the self-reflexive aspect of consciousness: consciousness cannot grasp itself, just as a sword cannot cut itself and fire cannot burn itself. Compare, for example, Candrakirti’s Madisonabodhi 6.72. For a similar argument against “self-origination” in later Madhyamaka literature, see Eckel 1987: 72-75. Compare also MHK 591.

The second argument in the paragraph has to do with the “object-image” (ākāra) of consciousness. Bhāviveka argues that a crystal only seems colored because a colored object has been placed nearby. If consciousness assumes the image of an object, it cannot be due simply to the evolution of consciousness itself. Otherwise consciousness would become the object, and the object would become consciousness.

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205b Verse 5.20 gives another Yogācāra syllogism to explain how the mind can take on the image of an object (ākāra) and still continue to be itself. Bhāviveka responds in verse 5.21 and continues the discussion through the end of verse 5.26.

The nature of consciousness is twofold: it has a self-image (ākāra) and an object-image (ākāra), because it continues to be itself while it also appears as something else, like a piece of crystal.

This formulation of the Yogācāra position on the two “images” (ākāra) of consciousness follows Dignāga’s explanation in the commentary on PS 1.9a: “Consciousness arises with two images: the image of itself and the image of the object (avayābhāsan hi jñānam upayaśe avayābhaṁ avyāyābhāsāṁ ca), discussed in Hattori 1968: 28 and 101. Dignāga takes up the same point in AP 6a, but not in the same words: “The material form of the given object of cognition appears as if it were external to the object (yad asya tviṣṭapān eva eva bhāvate avayābhaṁ / samvādā avayābhaṁ).” The Sanskrit text of this verse is quoted by Tola and Drangmeit in AP 107.

The example of the crystal does not appear in Dignāga, but it fits his point nicely. In Sāndhinyavacana 6.8-9, dependent identity (parameśvarasvabhāsa) is compared to a crystal and imagined identity (parikalpiṣvabhāsa) to the crystal’s color. Sthiramati mentions the same comparison (MVT 21) but rejects it as inappropriate.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

(The mind) does not have a double nature. Why? A crystal appears exactly as it did before when no [colored object] is placed nearby. But, while the crystal can be [grasped] when there is no [colored object] nearby, consciousness can never be grasped when it lacks the form of the object (vijñāyaṅkāra). And even if consciousness (vijñāna) does not experience its own self-image (svabhāva), it is unreasonable for it to appear as an object-image (svabhāva) through the influence of the object-form (vijñāyaṅkāra). In the example, it is possible for a crystal to take on the appearance of [a colored object] when [the crystal] is next to it and is colored by it. But the crystal does not become the thing that is nearby, and the thing that is nearby does not become the crystal. If they did, the crystal would be identical to the colored object, and the colored object would be identical to the crystal. Similarly, consciousness may, in certain conditions, take on the image of a nearby object, but there is no way for consciousness to become material form and material form to become consciousness. If there were, earth would become conscious and consciousness would become as unconscious as earth. This is why it is unreasonable for consciousness to have two images like a crystal, because [the example] contradicts the claim that [consciousness] is both the subject and the object.

Objection: To produce a result that is consistent with itself, the image of the object (vijñāyaṅkāra) gradually (kramaṇa) transfers potential (lakṣaṇa) into the continuum of consciousness. Sometimes it remains merely the potential of the form of that [object]. At other times, when the potential comes to fruition, consciousness takes on the image of the object. It is impossible to say whether consciousness is identical to or different from these two—namely, the potential (lakṣaṇa) and the image of the object (vijñāyaṅkāra). Consciousness appears as both the potential and the object.

Reply:42

5.22d (Consciousness) does not have a double image, because it is not different from its potential, just as [it is not different from] the object-image.

Here the position is that consciousness does not have a double image. The reason is "because it is not different from its potential (lakṣaṇa)." The example is "just as [it is not different from] consciousness itself as object-image." [The opponent] may say that the self-image of consciousness is different [from the object-image], but when it arises, consciousness arises only with the image of the object. This is because the object-form (vijñāyaṅkāra) appears distinct and because the object-image is not erroneous. When [the object-image] ceases, it implants (sphāna) a potential in the continuum of consciousness, and this [potential] has the ability to generate the object-image of consciousness. When this ceases and comes to fruition, another object-image of consciousness arises. But no potential is implanted to generate the self-image of consciousness. Why imagine that the self-image appears as the object-image of consciousness?

Objection: Consciousness has two images, because [these two images] are accompanying factors (sabakāra), like material form and its reflection.43 When something occurs together with something else, it is its accompanying factor. That is, it occurs at the same time. When an accompanying factor occurs, the thing that it accompanies also occurs, just as a reflection occurs at the same time as the material form [of which it is a reflection]. Here, the self-image (svabhāva) [of consciousness] is like the material form, and the object-image (vijñāyaṅkāra) is like the reflection.

Reply:

5.23 [We] do not think that the mind has images of itself and something else like a reflection, because its accompanying factor (sabakāra) is an imitation (anukāra).44 Thus [the mind] does not have a double image.

[Mind] may contain an accompanying factor (sabakāra) that is an imitation (anukāra),

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42 The introduction to verse 5.23 states another formal syllogism to support the claim that consciousness has two images:

Consciousness has two images, because [these two images] are accompanying factors (sabakāra), like material form and its reflection.

On the term sabakāra ("accompanying factor"), see the commentary on AP 7c: "If internal form (antarāyāyāra) is the only object (jāmānāyārayāra), in what way does the arising of visual consciousness depend on the eye? The senses and the potential of the senses are accompanying factors (sabakāra). [We] infer from their results that the senses are potentials. They do not, however, evolve from the elements."

43 The commentary seems to interpret anukāra as "unreal resemblance" or "imitation." For an example of this use of the term, see Vaiśeṣika 1.6 and 88. It would be more correct with Bhāviveka's earlier argument about the sequence of moments in the appearance of a crystal, however, to interpret anukāra as "subsequent factor," suggesting that by the time the reflection arises in a mirror the moment of "material form" that caused it has already ceased. If so, a better translation of the verse would be: "[We] do not think that the mind has images of itself and something else like a reflection, because the accompanying factor (sabakāra) is actually a subsequent factor (anukāra)."
but this does not prove that it has a double image, because a reflection is not a real thing, and a cognition of it is erroneous.

Objection: Consciousness definitely has a double image, because it is both a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and a result (phala). A means of knowledge is the means by

44 In the introduction to verse 5.24, the opponent formulates another argument for the double image (dhyāhāra) of consciousness:

Consciousness definitely has a double image, because it is both a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and a result (phala).

This time the argument is based on the distinction between the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the result (phala). The opponent says that a single act of knowing must have two distinguishable images in order to contain both of these components. In verses 5.25-26, Bhāviveka gives a different explanation. He argues that an act of knowing (jñāna) functions as the means of knowledge while it is in the process of arising (jñayānā) and bearing (abhijñā) the image of the object (visayākhyata). The cessation (nirvṛtti) of this act of knowing then constitutes the result.

The source of the opponent’s argument seems to be Dignāga, although the argument does not represent Dignāga’s primary position, and Bhāviveka seems to develop it in ways that Dignāga does not anticipate. In PS I.86, Dignāga equates the pratistha (means of knowledge) with the pramāṇa (result of knowledge). “The means of knowledge is the result, because it is understood to include the act [of knowledge] (vyaparyo-pratisthataḥ).” In the commentary on this verse, Dignāga says: “Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the result of knowledge (pramāṇaccheda) differs from the means of knowledge (pramāṇa).” This passage is found in Hartshorne 1968: 28 and 97. The position presented by Bhāviveka is closer to Dignāga’s alternative position in PS I.94, but it is not identical: “Or self-cognition is here the result” (svayamvyavasāya prakārama). The commentary explains: “A cognition arises with a double image, the self-image and the object-image. Of these two images, self-cognition is the result (phala).”

Here the opponent says that the “means of knowledge” is the “self-image of consciousness” (tukkāsthāvatāra). Clearly this does not follow Dignāga’s position in PS I.94 that self-cognition (svayamvyavasāya) is the result of knowledge, but it is based on the same distinction.

The opponent goes on to say that the “means of knowledge” is “the means by which an inference occurs.” This is not the phrase that we would expect. It would be more consistent with the context to say that the “means of knowledge” is the means by which knowledge occurs (anena pramāṇaḥ) rather than the means by which an inference occurs (anena anumāṇaḥ). Yamaguchi emends the text by adding the word “perception” (pratyakṣa), to read “the means by which perception and inference occur.” However, it is possible that the text is corrupt.

This argument about the means and result of knowledge corresponds to the second of three arguments for the doctrine of mind-only in chapter 4 of the MRP (Lindner 1980b: 193; 1986c: 248-50). Several sentences in the objection and reply are repeated verbatim. The last sentence of the objection (“... it cannot be both the means of knowledge and the result”) raises a textual question about the relationship between the TJ and the MRP. The text of TJ ends the objection with ‘śānta pār dhārā’ (“it cannot be”). This is omitted in the MRP but is essential to the meaning of the objection. The objector is arguing that it is impossible to have both pramāṇa and phala if consciousness appears only as “object-aspect” (as Bhāviveka has just been arguing in the preceding section of TJ). The MRP does not have the advantage of the preceding section of the TJ to make the meaning clear. It is possible that this crucial

which an inference occurs, and it is the self-image of consciousness. The result (phala) is the knowledge of the object, and it is the object-image. If consciousness only occurs as the object-image, it cannot be both the means of knowledge and the result. (Reply:)

5.24 If [the opponent] thinks that [the mind] has a double image because it has a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and a result (phala), [we do not] agree, because they are established another way.

[We do not agree, because the means and result of knowledge are established another way—that is, without a double image. What is the other way to establish the means and result of knowledge?]

5.25 [We] think that the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is the cognition that knows the object of knowledge (pramāṇa), when [this cognition] is arising (jñayānā) and bearing the image of the object. 45

At the time when a cognition is in the process of arising, bearing the form (abhiṣṭa) that is called consciousness as object-image, it causes the cognition of the object-form. Therefore, [we] think that the means of knowledge is this cognition while it is arising.

5.26ab [We] think that the conclusion (nirvṛtti) of this cognition is the result (phala), because [the object] has been seen when this conclusion occurs.

When the cognition has concluded (nirvṛtti), the object has been seen, so the conclusion of the cognition is the result. Therefore, [we] think that the means of knowledge

44 The translation of verse 5.25 follows the Tibetan of the verse and commentary. The Sanskrit of the verse would be more easily translated: “[We] think that the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is the object of knowledge (pramāṇa) by a cognition (jñāna) at the time when [that cognition] arises (jñayānā) and bears the image of the object.” It seems unlikely, however, that Bhāviveka is arguing that the pramāṇa constitutes the pramāṇa.

45 The Tibetan translator of verse 5.26ab translates nirvṛtti (“conclusion”) in two different ways: as skyē pa (the past form of the verb skyē ba, “to be born or arise”) and as grāb pa (the past form of the verb grāb ba, to “be accomplished, established, or fulfilled”). Bhāviveka clearly means that a moment of cognition achieves its result (phala) when that moment of cognition has finished and has accomplished its effect.

In the commentary, the Tibetan translation (skyē pa des mong po grāb pa) suggests that the result of the cognition is the conclusion (or accomplishment) of the object by the cognition rather than the conclusion of the cognition itself. To support the translation offered
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and the result are both related to the cognition of the object-image, just as an axe, by being raised and lowered on a tree, causes an act of cutting and two pieces to be cut.\textsuperscript{47}

5.26cd This is because [the conclusion of a cognition] is the apprehension as such of an inexpressible particular (anirdéśyantarūpa).

Perceptual cognition (pratyaśajñāna) apprehends only the particular characteristic of a thing (vastuntāthavānapratyakṣa) and is free from discrimination (nirūpana) and memory (anumāna). Material form and so forth are inexpressible (anirdéśyantarūpa) in that they cannot be described as being blue and so forth.\textsuperscript{48} They are apprehended as such, that is, they are directly realized (vrasmanandya), without being [expressible]. Therefore, because the means of knowledge and the result belong only to a single cognition of an object-image (vijñāyabhāśa), the reason is unaccepted,\textsuperscript{49} and there is no reason to think that consciousness has a double image.

The next verse refutes another of the opponents' ideas.

5.27 If [the opponents] want to say that external objects (bābyārtha) have the nature of mind (cittaratvabhāva), because they are objects of cognition, like an immediately preceding [condition] (samanantarā). . . .\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} The axe in Bhāviveka's example corresponds to the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the cut pieces correspond to the result (phala). According to Hartre (1968: 90), the Nyāya commentator Vatsyāyana defines pramāṇa, pramāṇa, pramāṇa, and pramāṇa in such a way that pramāṇa (the cognition itself) is considered the pramāṇa-phala. Kumārila compares the pramāṇa to an axe and the pramāṇa-phala to the cutting (śītā) of a tree. Kumārila argues that this distinction between means and result is a matter of common knowledge (Ślokavārttika 4.74–75). Bhāviveka's position comes closest to Kumārila's.

\textsuperscript{48} On the Sarvāstivāda view of perceptual cognition as free from discrimination (nirūpana) and memory (anumāna), see note 32 on the commentary on verse 5.14cd.

\textsuperscript{49} Bhāviveka's explanation of 5.26cd shows some similarity to Dharmāgātha's definition of perception. According to Dharmāgātha (PS 1.2–3), perception has the particular (svakālanakṣa) as its object, in contrast to inference (anumāna), whose object is the universal (aḥamāṇa). He also considers perception to be free from conceptual construction (kālānupādha). Conceptual construction has to do with the real or potential connection of particulars with words (PS 1.34). In PS chapter 5, Dharmāgātha says: "The object of the senses (indrāyogavāra) is a material form that is inexpressible (anirdēśyajñāya) and directly realized (vrasmanandya)." Bhāviveka's commentary does not explain the meaning of vrasmanandya, but it is reasonable to assume that he means the particular is understood in and of itself, without reference to any other thing. In the commentary that follows verse 5.26cd, Bhāviveka explains the term by relating it to the term "inexpressible": to know something as it is to know it as inexpressible.

\textsuperscript{50} When Bhāviveka says that "the reason is unaccepted," he is referring to the reason ("because it has a means of knowledge and a result") in 5.24.

\textsuperscript{51} Verse 5.27 takes up another argument for mind-only. This time "external objects" (bābyārtha)

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Here the subject is external objects. The property to be proved is "have the nature of mind." The reason is "because they are objects of cognition." The example is "like an immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyakṣa)." The term "immediately preceding condition" refers to similar mind and mental phenomena that have just ceased and serve as the condition for the arising of mind and mental phenomena that are different from themselves. If [the opponents] say that an external object has the nature of mind, because it is an object of cognition, this [immediately preceding condition], which has the nature of mind because it is an object of cognition,

5.28ab the reason is inconclusive with regard to individual mental phenomena.

First, the fact that an external object is an object of cognition may mean that an external object has the nature of mind, like an immediately preceding condition, or it may mean that it does not have the nature of mind, like individual mental phenomena, such as feeling (vedanā), which do not have the nature of mind. In this respect the reason is inconclusive.

Or [the opponents] may think that this [thesis that external objects have the nature function as the subject.]

External objects have the nature of mind (cittaratvabhiṣa), because they are objects of cognition (vastuntahānapratyakṣa), like an immediately preceding [condition] (svakālanakṣa). This is the third of three arguments for mind-only in MRP (Lindner 1968b: 193). The Sanskrit speaks of "external object" in the singular, but the intention is to speak of all external objects, not just one. This is more accurately expressed in English by using the plural. An "immediately preceding condition" (samanantarapratyakṣa) is defined in the commentary on Koka 1.6.4a as "previous mind and mental phenomena which have already arisen and are not separated by other mind and mental phenomena" (samanantarapratyakṣa pārvika citrakāṣāt avyayamaya). This means that an immediately preceding condition can be either the mind itself (citta) or a mental phenomenon (vaidīta). If it is the mind, the opponent's example is valid. If it is a mental phenomenon, considered individually, as an entity in its own right, the example does not hold, since mental phenomena have the nature of mental phenomena, not the nature of mind. Bhāviveka makes this point in verse 5.28ab, where he says the example is "inconclusive" (svakālaśīrṣa) with respect to individual mental phenomena.

Following Yamasuchi, Hoornstra explains that this verse should be read in relation to the argument in verse 5.45–49, where Bhāviveka takes the position that the word "mind" (citta) refers to a collection (amūha) of mental phenomena, beginning with feelings (vedanāḥ). Bhāviveka's position about the nature of mind is identified with the Sātrāṅkikas. For a discussion of the sources of this position, see Cox 1988: 42. Here, in verses 5.27–5.28ab, Bhāviveka is arguing that the opponents contradict their own position about the difference between mind and mental phenomena, not the position that he holds himself.
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of mind) is established by the traditional statement: “It is like this: the three worlds are mind-only.” But this [argument] is unreasonable, because [the opponents] do not fully understand the meaning of the tradition. Why?

5.28cd Because the traditional teaching of mind-only is meant to deny that there is an agent (kartri) and a subject of experience (vîksrot).

Buddhais and Bodhisattvas teach mind-only to deny the agent and subject of experience that others, namely heretics (gîrîhika), imagine to be different from consciousness. [This teaching] is not meant to deny external objects. Why? In the Daśabhûmikâ Sûtra it says:

“In the sixth Bodhisattva stage, a Bodhisattva thoroughly considers dependent origination and thinks: “The mass of suffering arises from the twelve items that begin with ignorance, it has no agent or subject of experience, and it reproduces itself as the tree of suffering.”

In verse 5.28cd and commentary, Bhaviveka gives his own interpretation of the concept of “mind-only” in the Daśabhûmikâ Sûtra. He argues that the term is not meant to deny the existence of external objects, but to deny that there is any “agent” (kartri) or “subject of experience” (vîksrot). He makes a similar point in response to the Sûvakas’ objections in 4.70-71. In strictly logical terms, Bhaviveka’s interpretation of the sûtra should be read as part of his response to the opponent’s syllogism in verse 5.27. “External objects have the nature of mind, because…” In the introduction to verse 5.28cd, the opponent argues that the quotation from the Daśabhûmikâ Sûtra supports the thesis in this syllogism.

Bhaviveka’s quotations from the Daśabhûmikâ Sûtra occur in identical form in the MRP (Lindner 1986b: 192), and in a similar form in Pratîyâpâda 25 (Eckel 1988b: 64). Apparently Bhaviveka is paraphrasing the sûtra rather than quoting directly, since his quotations do not correspond directly to the Sanskrit text of the sûtra as edited by Rahder and re-edited by Vaidya.

The parts of the quotation can be assembled from Vaidya’s edition (12-13). “A Bodhisattva thoroughly considers dependent origination” (pratityasamutpâda pratyabhijñata nisâla-pratiloma) “and thinks” (vijñatam bhavati) “the mass of suffering reproduces itself as the tree of suffering with no agent or subject of experience” (saṃsâra-karmanvadavahâri). “The three worlds are mind-only” (cittam atram idam yat idam vâdhanam). The short form of the quotation is also found in the introduction to Vaiśeṣika’s Vîmukthakarita in cittamatraṃ bhî jñânapratâ ya tata vâdhanâkram.

The most significant difference between this passage and the same passage in the MRP is the reference in the MRP to “provisional meaning” (netrayâtha), a concept that does not play a significant role in the Pratîyâpâda or Vaiśeṣika. The Bhaviveka who is known to us in these texts does not think of the Yogâcâra understanding of mind-only as a position to be “interpreted” or “led to” (neya) another meaning: he thinks of it as aimed to be avoided (as in verse 5.34 below). Compare Madhyamakavatâda 6.84-87, where Candrakirti follows Bhaviveka’s interpretation of the Daśabhûmikâ but argues that other scriptural passages on mind-only should be treated as having “provisional meaning” (netrayâtha).

5.29 And, if [the opponent] argues that consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects, this does not rule out objects, because there is an object that is not conceptualized.

In his quotation from the Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra, Bhaviveka again seems to be paraphrasing the text rather than quoting directly. With the exception of the last sentence, the Sanskrit of Bhaviveka’s quotation can be pieced together from Ida 196b: 237-38: tibhir maityreṇa dharman bhodhisattvâna vâśpokhandrâpsâtpâfâsâm anagnosyata. yat u tata idam parikalpitam viprâpan, idam vikalpitam viprâpan, idam dharma-ârtiperâpan iṣi. kartam parikalpitam viprâpan idam iri nâma-samjñâna-mârtha-prajñâpāpa-vatvânam nîsâya vîsphârthovatayyâ parikalpita idam parikalpitam viprâpan. idam advayam, kartam vikalpitam viprâpan? vikalpityayî abhikarantatatra tata idam nîma-samjñâna-mârtha-prajñâpâpa-vatvânam viprâpan iri iṣi idam vikalpita mây Mi. . . . idam vikalpita sadharmayam na tu vatsabhistvatvayam. kartam dharma-ârtiperâpan yat tata parikalpitaparâpan tasya vikalpitarîypayayî nityam nishâbhâvattayâ dharma-samjñâna-vatayayi bhaktakor tatra dharma-ârtiperâpan ten naiva advayam na sadharmayam. . . .

Hoernaeart questions whether Bhaviveka would actually accept the reason in verse 5.29
Consciousness may be empty of objects that are conceptualized (vikalpītārtha), but the material form that is the Dharma nature and is directly perceived by the Tathāgata exists. Therefore, there is an object that is not conceptualized, an object that is not expressed in words. If this object exists, consciousness cannot be completely empty of objects.

Furthermore,

5.30ab If it is uncertain whether dream-consciousness has [an object] that is not conceptualized.

When the opponent argues that "The three realms are mind-only, because [consciousness] is empty of objects such as material form, like dream-consciousness and so forth," the reason is inconclusive. Even in a dream there may be part of the cognition ("because there is an object that is not conceptualized") and suggests that the reason should be identified only as the opponent's position. Bhāviveka is certainly using terminology drawn from the opponent's interpretation of the "Maitreya Chapter," but there is no reason to think that Bhāviveka intends this to affirm the ultimate existence of objects. As he indicates in his commentary on verse 5.15, he accepts the cognition of material form conventionally. Even the ultimate (paramārtha) can be understood as an object conventionally.

[C]ang-skya Rol 'pa rdo rje seems to have understood the point correctly when he said: "The meaning of this scriptural passage is to prove that cognition has the image of emptiness as an improperly reified (Skt. semāvipāta) object, not to prove that cognition has the image of an object. Thus there exists an object that has the form that is the nature of things and is directly known by the Tathāgata. Therefore, since it is not a negation of objects that are not improperly reified, omniscient consciousness is not empty of objects different from itself. To explain this, [Bhāviveka] says: [in verse 5.29] 'And, if the opponent argues that consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects, this does not rule out objects, because there is an object that is not conceptualized.'"

[C]ang-skya explains: "I do not think that this passage means that the object just described, namely the material form that is the nature of things and is directly known by the Tathāgata, truly exists (Tib. bden par byed) and exists as an entity that is not improperly reified. For this teacher accepts external objects, but does not accept true objects. The statement in the commentary that 'the form that is the Dharma nature exists' asserts that there is an object that is different from cognition. It does not assert that the Dharma nature is an external object or accept that it truly exists. And the statement in the commentary, 'an object exists that is not expressed in words,' means that there is an object whose nature is improperly reified. It should not be taken to refer to an inexpressible entity as held by the idealists.' This explanation is found in Cang-skya Rol 'pa rdo rje 1970: 341-42. The text is translated in Lopez 1987: 313. The translation given here is my own.

The functional logic of verse 5.29 becomes clear when Bhāviveka gives the opponent's syllogism in the commentary on verse 5.30ab.

The three worlds are mind-only,
because consciousness is empty of objects (arthā) such as form,
like dream-consciousness and so forth.

This syllogism restates the thesis in verse 5.27 ("external objects have the nature of mind"), that is not conceptualized. Thus [the example] "like dream-consciousness and so forth" can mean either that consciousness is empty of an object that is conceptualized, such as the "person" (padgala), or that it is not empty of an object that is not conceptualized, namely, the object whose part is cognized.

5.30cd If the [opponent] thinks that [dream-consciousness] has no object, this is not [true] because the example is not accepted.

[The opponent] cites dream [-consciousness] as the example for [the argument that the three realms are mind-only] "because [consciousness] is empty of conceptualized objects." But this [example] only rules out conceptualized objects; it does not rule out the remaining objects that are not conceptualized. Thus [the example] does not prove mind-only. It is wrong to think that [dream-consciousness] has no object (ālamāna), because [we] accept that the example has partial possession of [the property] to be inferred. Dream-consciousness does have an object (ālamāna), because it grasps as an object (arthā) the material form that is the Dharma nature. In other words, a dream cannot function as an accurate example to show the unreality of objects.

Objection:

with a new reason, based on the quotation from the "Maitreya Chapter": "because consciousness is empty of conceptualized objects (vikalpītārtha)." Bhāviveka responds to this new syllogism by attacking the example ("like dream-consciousness"). He says that some dream objects may be unreal, but some are not. On Bhāviveka's understanding of the origin of dream-objects, see the commentary on verse 5.19. This means that the reason is inconclusive.

The opponent's syllogism corresponds to the first of three arguments in favor of mind-only in the MRP. It is not clear why the author of the MRP moved this argument to the top of the list. Since verses 5.18-19 discussed the example of dreams, it is possible that the author of the MRP wanted to group all the arguments about dream-consciousness together to expand the point in 5.18-19.

In verse 5.31 Bhāviveka turns to a discussion of Yogācāra arguments against the existence of external objects. The objector begins with a praśāya (redaction ad absurdum): If there were objects (niṣaya) of cognition, they would have to be either single atoms or collections (samādhi) of atoms, and neither option is acceptable. The objector then goes on in verses 5.32-33 to formulate separate syllogisms in support of these two assertions.

The material form of a single atom is not the object of a cognition of form, because it does not have the appearance of that object (stādabhūteya), like the material form of the eye.

The form of many atoms is not the object of the mind,
Because it is not a real thing (dvayartha),
like a double moon (dvandaraste). These arguments can be understood as a further defence of the reason in the syllogism in
5.31 If there is an object (visaya) of cognition (dhi), it is either a single atom or a collection (sannātha), but when these are examined rationally, neither is reasonable.

verses 5.29-30:

The three worlds are mind-only, because consciousness is empty of objects (artha) such as form, like dream-consciousness and so forth.

Bhāviveka has attacked the example by saying that dream-consciousness is based in part on real objects. The opponent responds by saying that if consciousness were not empty of objects (or if it actually had real objects), this would lead to unacceptable consequences. Bhāviveka starts by attacking the Yogācāra syllogisms in verses 5.32-33, then he gives his own account of the existence of external objects.

The Yogācāra arguments in 5.32-33 have roots in Viśeśastikī 11: "Why should it be understood that the Blessed One's teaching about the existence (astice) of external objects (ādiṣṭhīyastha) was delivered with a hidden meaning (abhāpya) and was intended to mean that the particular objects (visayya) of ideas of material form do not exist? [Verse 11] The object is not a single thing, it is not many atoms, and it is not a collection (sāmānā). Hence the thing cannot be established. What does this mean? The external object (ādiṣṭhīyastha) that serves as the particular object of ideas of form might be a single thing, like a form of a composite whole (jaya) as imagined by the Viśeśastikas, it might be many atoms, or it might be a collection of atoms. In the first case, a single thing cannot be an object (visaya), because the form of the whole is not grasped as different from the parts. It cannot be many atoms, because the atoms are not grasped individually. And a collection cannot be an object, because no atom can be individually established.

A more immediate source for the arguments in verses 5.32-33 can be found in the opening verses of Dīgācāra's AP. Those who think that the object (sāmānā) of sense cognition is an external object (ādikārtha) think either that it is an atom, because that atom is the cause [of the cognition], or that it is a collection [of atoms], because the cognition has the appearance of that [collection]. Of these two options, first, [verse 1]: 'If an atom (ādikārtha) were the cause of a sense cognition, it could not be its object (visaya), because it does not have the appearance of that object, like the eye (kṣetra). An object (visaya) is defined as [the thing] whose actual identity [Tib. rang nor nag bo rgyal / Skt. svatva] is grasped by a cognition, when [a cognition] arises with the aspect (ākāra) of that [thing]. Atoms may be the cause of that cognition, but they do not have the appearance of those [objects], like the sense organs. Therefore, atoms are not the object (sāmānā). A cognition may have the appearance of a collection (sāmānā), but [verse 2]: 'The object that appears as that collection must be something else [other than a collection]. An object (artha) can be considered an object (sāmānā) if it produces the appearance (ākāra) of itself and is the condition (pratīṣṭha) for the production of that appearance. But a collection does not function in this way, [verse 2b], because it is not a real thing, like a double moon.' A person whose senses are damaged may see a double moon. But, while there may be the appearance (ākāra) of this [double moon], it is not the object (visaya). A collection is not an object (sāmānā), because it is not a real thing; that is, it is an illusion (māyā). [Verse 2cd] 'Thus neither kind of external object can be an object (visaya) of the mind.' Because something is missing [in both cases], no external object (artha), whether it is called an atom or a collection (sāmānā), can be an object (sāmānā).

5.32 Of these two options, the material form of a single atom is not the object (geara) of a cognition of material form, because it does not have the appearance of that [object], just as the material form of the eye is not the object.

Here, an atom (satu) is the most subtle unit of material form. The word "single" means "alone." The material form of a single atom is the subject. "Not the object of a cognition of material form" is its property. The combination of the subject and the property is the thesis. "Because it does not have the appearance of that [object]" is the reason. This reason is explained as follows: "the appearance of that" means "the appearance of the object (visaya-sarūpa)." To say that [an atom] does not have that appearance means that it does not appear in a cognition of that [object]. In other words, it is not the object. "Just as the material form of the eye is not the object" is the example. The word "eye" refers to the five senses. [The sense organs] are objects and have subtle color and shape, but they do not appear as that [object]. Thus an atom is not the object of a cognition of material form, just as [sense organs] are not objects of a cognition of material form.

5.33 Similarly, [the opponents] think that the material form of many atoms is not the object (geara) of the mind (cit), because it is not a real thing (adharmatvāt), like a double moon.

The opponents think that the material form of many atoms, or a collection (sāmānā) [of atoms], is not the object of the mind. Why? Because it is not a real thing (adharmatvāt). This is because only the material form of a single atom is considered a real thing, and collections, like an army or a forest, are not real things. They may appear to be the objects of the mind, but they are not. They are like the double moon that is mistakenly perceived by someone who suffers from an eye disease.

Reply:

In verses 5.34-38, Bhāviveka argues that the object of perceptual cognition is a "combination" (Skt. samācara / Tib. 'dus pa) of atoms rather than a "collection" (Skt. sāmānā / Tib. 'dus pa). (The Tibetan 'dus pa can also translate the Sanskrit sūntaka, as in Triṃśikā 11, and sūntakata.) Bhāviveka explains this distinction in the commentary on verse 5.38: "What is the difference between a combination (samācara) and a collection (sāmānā)? Homogeneous (ujjātayā, lit. in the same continuum) atoms that are located in the same place are called a combination. A collection is a collection of such things as elephants and horses or bāhrāw
and khadya trees that are referred to by the terms 'army' or 'forest.' They are not in the same category, and are [located] in different places.

Bhāviveka's distinction between a combination and a collection is similar to a position attributed to the Vaibhāṣika author Saṅghahūdra (4th-5th centuries). Collett Cox (1988: 74) explains that Saṅghahūdra responded to criticism to the Saṅgrahinī author Śrīkāta (330-410) by arguing that atoms form a combination (samcitā) rather than a collection (saṃghātā), and that this combination makes direct perception possible. For an account of this Vaibhāṣika position, see the commentary on Kāla 1.106c: "Sometimes a visual cognition of that form is caused by a single substance (dvipaśa), when it is limited to that form (prakāri). Sometimes it is caused by many substances, when it is not limited as, for example, when one sees, from a distance, a multicolored army (śrīvaśya) or a heap (samatha) of jewels. The same is true of auditory cognitions and so forth. . . . Objection: In that case, the object (vijaya) of the five kinds of sense cognition is a whole (sāmata), because the object (ālambara) is a composition (samātā), and the object (vijaya) is not a particular (sāmāyaparā)." [Reply]: This is wrong, because [we] think that [sense cognitions] have particulars (sāmāyaparā) as their objects (vijaya) in the sense that the particulars are cognizable supports (āyatana) rather than implications of substances (dvipaśa).

The distinction between a combination and a collection appears in the commentary on Kāla 1.35d: "Which dhatus are combined (samcitā) and which are not combined? The ten that have material form are combined. The dhatus that consist of the five senses and their five objects (vijaya) are combined. The rest are not combined, because they are collections (saṃghātā) of atoms." Bhāviveka's position can be traced elsewhere in Buddhist philosophy, as, for example, in Haribhadra's discussion (1968: 119) of PS 2: 7. Thus, when the atoms, which are represented in a cognition, are homogeneous ones, there appears in the cognition as the totality of their representations the form of an object, as in the case of the cognition of blue. But when the collection of heterogeneous atoms is taken to be the object, the form that appears in a cognition is not the sum total of representations of atoms but is the product of kalpana as, for instance, the 'cognition of a jar.' According to Haribhadra, this view is discussed in the Dvaddasa-Niṇṇāsokarā of Mallāvādin and is ascribed to Vāghātra and Saṅghahūdra. Haribhadra (1968: 160) points out that Saṅghahūdra's position is discussed in Tattvānanda's and Vāghātra's works: "When there is a succession of similar moments, there is the illusion of continuity, so also, when one grasps [atoms] that are homogeneous (samātā) and not separated [in space], there is the illusion of a gross form (ūbhaya)."

Sthiratmanas (510-70) discusses and rejects the distinction between a combination and a collection in his commentary on 1.3.1: 1. Why [do we think that consciousness (vijaya) arises with an object-form (pratibhyā) without any external object (bhārya)]? An external object (bhārya) can be considered the dūṣpārya-pratibhyā of consciousness if it produces a cognition of its own appearance (vijayenaśvāśāparīśūnyetan), or if it is merely a cause, because that would lead to the conclusion (prasaṅga) rather than apprasyādhi that any individual samanametra-pratibhyā [is an ālambara]. [Some say that the five kinds of sense cognition have combinations as their objects, because they have the form of that combination. But a combination (samcitā) is nothing more than a collection (saṃghātā) of parts, because there is no cognition of the form of the combination (saṃghātā) apart from the whole (vijnānabodha apartha). Therefore, cognition arises with the aspect of a combination (samanametra), without any external object (bhārya).] And combined (samcitā) atoms are not the object (ālambara) of that cognition, because these atoms do not have the form of that object (vijaya). For atoms that are in a combined state (samcitāvasthāyan) have no additional factor (ātmanān) other than what they have when they are in an uncombined

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5.34 If the opponent argues that the material form of uncombined [atoms] is not an object of the mind, he proves something that we already accept.

5.35 If the opponents argue about the material form of a combination (samcitā), [we] do not accept the reason, because a cognition arises with the appearance of that [combination] when [atoms] are combined with the material forms of others.8

state. Someone else thinks: individual atoms are not perceptible (atmānirdvīpaśā), but many [atoms] that are connected to one another (prastāpapariṇāma) are perceptible (atmānirdvīpaśā). But these [individual] atoms have no additional factor when they are connected, other than what they have when they are unconnected, so they either are perceptible individually or they are not perceptible at all. If atoms are the object (vijaya) of cognition when they are connected to one another (prastāpapariṇāma), there can be no distinction between the cognitions of a pot and a wall (kāraṇa), because atoms do not have the form (aatākāra) of that [pot or wall]. And a cognition with one image (atmānirdvīpaśā) cannot have an object (vijaya) that has another form (atmānirdvīpaśā), because that would lead to an unacceptable conclusion (atmānirdvīpaśā) of: Bhāvrabāra takes up the point in Pramāṇavijñāna 2.194-96: Objection: [If the object of the senses is a combination (samcitā) or a collection (saṃghātā), it must be a whole (ālambara), and a sense cognition of it must be a cognition of a whole (samāyaparānibuddhi) and must be accompanied by a concept. But the atoms that arise from connections with other atoms are called combinations (samcitā) and also are the cause (saṃcitā) of the arising of cognition. The particular characteristics (tattvā) of these atoms do not exist without the other atoms. Since the cognition is not limited to a single (atmānirdvīpaśā), it is said to have as its object (samāyaparānibuddhi).]

In 5.35, Bhāviveka states his own position about the existence of external objects: from the relative point of view (samāyamād), a combination (samcitā) of homogeneous (saṃcitī) atoms functions as the object (vijaya) of cognition.

In the commentary on 5.35, when Bhāviveka says [we think that atoms are real (stūpyā) as collections (ātmanirdvīpaśā) / Tān. duc pa of eight things (attānacana)] he is echoing a position reported in Kāla 2.224b: "An atom (parādugrāha) is composed of eight things (parādugraha). [Comm.] Here 'atom' means the most subtile collection (saṃghātā) of material form." The eight things are the four gross elements (mahābhūtas), plus material form, smell, taste, and tangibility. Bhāviveka does not attempt to change the term saṃghātā ("collection") to conform to his use of the term samcitā ("Combination"). Perhaps he intends to conclude this stage in his argument by saying that a pot, which he earlier called a combination (samcitā), finally is nothing more than a collection (saṃghātā). It seems more likely, however, that he is simply following the inconsistent usage of his own sources.

The term "homogeneous" (Tib. rigs mtha pa / Skt. saṃghātā) in the commentary on 5.35 is used in 5.62 to mean "of the same genus or type." On this use of the term ātma, see PS 1.3d (nāmājāyādyāyādāyā), PS 5.2H, and Pāṇḍya, ch. 3 (jñānaveyā). The Nyāya tradition developed a distinction between two types of "universal" (saṃmāyānaya: the ātta and
PART 2: Translation

If [the opponent] takes the material form of a combination of homogeneous (tusiñjātīya) atoms as the subject, and gives "not a real thing (adratvātva)" as the reason, one of us does not accept (sattvatarāsiddha) the reason. Why? [We] accept that [a combination of homogeneous atoms] is the object (visaya) when [atoms] are combined or associated with the material forms of other, homogeneous atoms. A cognition arises with the appearance (abhidha) of that [combination], that is, with the form (ākāra) of a combination of atoms. We think that a combination of similar atoms, such as a pot, is real (dravya) in a relative sense (ātsarga). This also is true of atoms themselves, because [we] think that atoms are real (dravya) as collections (Skt. samghāta / Tib. 'das pa) of eight things (asta-dravyakha). Pots and so forth are real in a similar way, even though they are collections. [We] do not accept that [atoms] are real by themselves.

5.36 [We] think that this [combination] is the object (ālambana), because it causes a cognition that has the image of that [combination], like [an object of] passion. Therefore, the thesis is refuted by inference.99

[We] think that the material form of a combination of homogeneous atoms is the object (ālambana). Why? A combination of atoms is the cause of a cognition that has the appearance of that combination. If it causes the cognition of the appearance of [the object], this combination is the object (ālambana). For example, desire is defined as desire for an object (visaya), and this desire is directed toward an object (ālambana), such as a woman, that is a combination of [aggregates] such as material form. Therefore, your thesis,

the upādiśi. Matilal calls the jātī a "real universal" and the upādiśi a "nominal universal." He explains that the word jātī comes close to the meaning of "natural kind" (Matilal 1986: 402).

99. Verse 5.36 applies Bhāviveka's position about external objects to the concept of the ālambana ("object"). According to Dignāga, the object (ālambana) has to fulfill two conditions: it must be the cause of a cognition, and it must possess the same form (abhidha) as the cognition. Here Bhāviveka focuses on the first of these two conditions and says that his "combination" is capable of causing a cognition. Compare Dignāga's commentary on AP 1.1: "An object (visaya) is defined as [the thing] whose actual identity (Tib. rgyas gi nga bo rgyad / Skt. svārāpya) a cognition grasps, i.e. if the cognition arises with the form (ākāra) of that [thing]." Compare also Śārṅgadeva's commentary on Trisūkākha 1.4: "An external object (babhūrtva) is considered the ālambana-pratyaya of consciousness if it produces a cognition of its own image (svabhāvajñānajñānakaran na)." Both sources are discussed at more length in the notes on verse 5.31.

Bhāviveka concludes his discussion of external objects in verse 5.36 with a reference to tradition (ajīma): "The location and objects of the five forms of consciousness are combinations." Dignāga quotes a similar line in the commentary on FS 1.4.4d, as does Śārṅgadeva in the commentary on Trisūkākha 1.1: "The five kinds of sense cognition as combinations as their objects (samcitālambanāh pāṇḍavaṣa dhānāsinkhā). In the Pratijnadhāpāda, Bhāviveka quotes Kāla 1.15d (samcitā dañā rāpinā) to make the same point (Edel 1985: 66). The word "location" (ātmya) in this quotation refers to the five sense organs, as in Kāla 1.9c.

THE YOGĀÇĀRAS

"The form of a combination is not the object (ālambana)," is contradicted by inference. It also is contradicted by the traditional (ajīma) statement, "The location and objects of the five forms of consciousness are combinations."

Object: A cognition arises without an object, because it arises from the seeds (bīja) of the appearance of consciousness itself (svabhāvajñāna), like mental cognition.

Reply:

5.37 If [you] argue that cognition has no object (ālambana), because it arises from its own seeds, like mental cognition, then surely your [cognition] must have an object, because [mental cognition] has a non-conceptual [object].60

Even in mental cognition, there is a part that has the appearance (abhidha) of the non-conceptual object (artha) of [the cognition] itself, so your cognition must have an object (ālambana).

Furthermore,

5.38 Or the inference that [cognition] has no object excludes the possibility that it can be a cognition. [And we] do not maintain the thesis that a collection (saṃsa) is the object of cognition, so denying this [thesis] does not refute [us].61

60. Verse 5.37 returns to the argument that began with the syllogism in 5.29:

The three worlds are mind-only,

because consciousness is empty of objects such as material form,

like dream-consciousness and so forth.

Previous analysis of this syllogism focused on the reason: "consciousness is empty of objects." In verses 5.31-36, the Yogācāra objector defended this reason by using a praṇanage: "If consciousness were not empty of objects, then . . ." Here the objector states an independent syllogism in support of the same point:

A cognition arises without any object,

because it arises from the seeds of the appearance of consciousness itself,

like mental cognition.

Dignāga treats the object of cognition as a manifestation of the mind in AP 6, as discussed in the notes on verse 5.28 above. On the seeds of consciousness, see the notes on verse 5.41.

To say that "the thesis fails, because it contradicts the nature of the subject" can be taken as a "contradiction in terms" (prasūntavādā).61

61. The second half of verse 5.38 restates Bhāviveka's response to the Yogācāra prasūnta in verses 5.31-36, using terminology that refers directly to the arguments in AP 1-2 and Trisūkākha 1 (discussed in the notes on verse 5.31). This shows that Bhāviveka considered the syllogism in
If a cognition is defined as something that cognizes an object (ālambana), then the inference that [a cognition] has no object rules out the possibility that this cognition is a cognition, because it proves that what you considered to be a cognition is not a cognition. Therefore, [your] thesis fails, because it contradicts the nature of the subject (dharman).

You may say that a collection (samūḥa) is not an object (ālambana), but we do not hold the thesis that a collection is an object. What kind of thesis do we hold? Our thesis is that a combination (samcitā) of atoms is an object. So, when you deny that a collection is an object, this does not harm us. What is the difference between a combination (samcitā) and a collection (samūḥa)? Homogeneous [saññītiya, lit. in the same continuum] atoms that are located in the same place are called a combination. A collection is a collection of such things as elephants and horses or hariṣu and khādira trees that are referred to by the terms "army" or "forest." They are not in the same continuum and are located in different places.

[Object:] In the treatise [entitled] The Investigation of the Object (Alambanaparikṣā), I [Dignāga] have firmly established the following position:

5.39ab Even without external objects, the potential (ākṣi) and the material form of the object (viśaya) cause each other,

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D210b

5.39ab Even without external objects, the potential (ākṣi) and the material form of the object (viśaya) cause each other,

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5.39d Then what do you think causes their cessation?

This point should be analyzed in the following way: If external objects (bāhyatva) exist, it is reasonable for there to be supermundane (alakāyika) non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) insight (jñāna) when a yogin who seeks to purify consciousness of the image of objects (viśaya) understands that objects are empty and brings both the subject and the object to an end. But if you say that there are no such objects, how can [a yogin] bring [the subject and the object] to an end by entering (pravāda) the absence of external objects and then [entering] the absence of subject and the object? There is no way for there to be supermundane, non-conceptual [insight]. If [you] say that objects (viśaya) do not exist, there is no way (upāya) for there to be a path of supermundane [insight]. If consciousness consists of potentials and the forms of objects (viśayatattvād) and continues from time immemorial, explain how it can ever come to an end.

If you think:

5.40ab Non-conceptual cognition should not be abandoned, because it is noble and because it is free from concepts.

[You] may think: The concepts of subject and object that cause the activity of samsāra should be abandoned, but non-conceptual thought itself should not be abandoned, because it is noble and because it is free from concepts. That is, [non-conceptual thought] arises and does not cease.

Reply:

5.40cd As long as [consciousness] arises and the seeds⁶³ of [consciousness] are not destroyed, how can there there be any liberation?

If [you] think that samsāra is due to the activity of the seeds of consciousness, and if [you] also think that liberation comes from the destruction of [the seeds of consciousness], how can there be any liberation as long as consciousness arises, whether it has concepts or not. If you say that there is only the mind, you can have no liberation.

[You] may think that when conceptual thought arises, there is bondage, and when non-conceptual thought arises, there is liberation. Why? For the following reason:

5.41 The image of the world (vīraṇādhā) is born when an idea (samjñā) be-

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63 On the "seeds" (vija) of consciousness, see the note on verse 5.41.
The image (abhāsa) whose form (ākāra) is the world (svātva), or objects (vishaya) such as material form, is born when there is consciousness (vijñāna) of the duality of subject and object. What is the image of the world that has this form? It is the transformation (parināma) of consciousness into the object-form (vijnānakāra). This arises along with the self-image (svabhāsa) of consciousness, from its own seeds—that is, from the image (abhāsa) or form (ākāra) of the object (vishaya).

5.42ab This [world] is dissolved (layo) through a transfer (arpas) of potentiality (akoti) with respect to itself and with respect to the other.64

This [verse] should be interpreted as follows: When the active consciousnesses (pravritti-vijñāna) cease or are dissolved, they enter the root consciousness (mārśvājñāna), where they continue through a transfer of their own potentiality (svašaktārpaṇa). This [world] is dissolved when it ceases with respect to itself—that is, with respect to the cognition of the subjective part (śrūṣṭa) of consciousness—and with respect to the other—that is, with respect to consciousness that has the image of the object (vijnānakāra).

[Reply] This may be true on a naïve level, but there is a problem.

5.43 When someone understands that a dualistic, illusory, fragmented, disturbed, and selfless [mind] is non-dualistic, imperishable, true, immortal, and the ultimate state, then [subject and object] are equally absent and concepts cease. Therefore, liberation (moksa) is not different [from samsāra], when it is understood by non-conceptual cognition.

"Dualistic" refers to [a mind that stands in the duality of subject and object. This [mind] is understood as illusory, fragmented, disturbed, and selfless. It is "illusory" in the sense that it is generated by false conceptuality. It is "fragmented" in the sense that it is subject to decline. It is "disturbed" in the sense that it is affected by the process of arising, ceasing, and so forth. It is "selfless" because the self that is imagined by heretics (ātma) does not exist and because it is empty (svaśaktāh). "Non-dualistic" refers to a non-dualistic mind (citta) that stands in its own true nature, when cognitions of material form and so forth no longer appear as external to the mind. This [non-dualistic mind] is understood as imperishable, true, immortal, and the ultimate state. "Imperishable" means that it is not subject to decline. "True" means that it is not false. "Immortal" means that it is free from birth, death, and so forth. "The ultimate state" means that it is the final resting place. To "understand" is to understand dualistic and non-dualistic [mind] in this way.

"Then [subject and object] are equally absent" means that, from a non-dualistic point of view, subject and object are just as absent in the state of samsāra as they are in the state of liberation. When it says "concepts cease," it means that concepts cease.

64 The process described in this verse closely parallels Vaisesika 9: "The Sage said that, when a vijnāna becomes active (pravrtti) with a particular appearance (abhāsa) from one of its own particular seeds (svabhāsa), then they are two of its sense media (ātmasvāndhāna)." The commentary explains: "When a vijnāna has the appearance of material form, it arises from its own seed (svabhāsa), after [the seed] has undergone a specific transformation. The blessed One said that the seed is the eye-medium (tattvāptiya) and the appearance [as form] is the form-medium (vāpyāptiya) of that vijnāna." If we follow the structure of Vaisesika 9, śamihita ("idea") is parallel to vijnāna and functions as the logical subject of the verse. "World-appearance" (svaśaktāh) is parallel to "material-form-appearance" (vijñānakāra) in the commentary on Vaisesika 9. The translation then reads: "The world-image of an idea is born when [the idea] is active dualistically, because that [idea], which has the image of the world, arises from that as its own seeds." The only remaining challenge is to identify the meaning of "that." This problem is solved by the commentary, which explains that "that" is the self-image (svabhāsa) of consciousness.

5.44 As the commentary on the next verse makes clear, the word "world" (svātva) is treated as a synonym of the five forms of active consciousness (pravrtti-vijñāna). On this usage, see AM 46 and 48: "From what does the world (svātva) arise, and into what is it dissolved? [It arises] from its trace-seeds (swatikāra) located in the store-consciousness..." The world is known as the active forms of consciousness. Although it is not different from the store-consciousness, it is dissolved into that [store-consciousness] again.

65 The subject of verse 5.42 is the "world" (svātva) mentioned in 5.31. On the "transfer of potentiality" (väpāpāraṇa), see AP 7b, as discussed in the commentary and notes on verse 5.22.
because duality is equally absent. Someone who "understands by non-conceptual cognition" is a yogin who understands absolute identity (parinirpanavasthāva) perceptually (pratyakṣajñānena), that is, with a cognition that is not accessible to language and is not conceptual.

It is a mistake to say that for this [yogin] "liberation is not different" [from samsāra]. If this [liberated cognition] is the same as the previous [cognition], which arises and has an object, liberated [cognition] is different from the previous conceptual cognition, and there is no difference between bondage and liberation.

Furthermore,

5.45 To prove that there is mind-only, you have to accept that there is no difference between mind (citra) and mental phenomena (saṅkṣipta), or you have to accept that there is not ideation-only (vijñaptimātra).

If you think that there is mind-only, then, to prove that there is nothing but mind, [you] have to accept that there is no difference between the mind and mental phenomena, which are distinguished by having different objects (samākaraṇa) and forms (ākāra). Otherwise, if you think that mental phenomena are different from the mind, you no longer accept ideation-only (vijñaptimātra), because there are many mental phenomena.

5.46 Or if [you] think that the word "mind" refers to the collection (samākaraṇa) of feeling and so forth, [you] agree with [your] opponent and abandon your own approach.

If you accept that the term (prajñāpti) "mind" refers to a collection of mental phenomena that begin with feeling (vedānā), thinking (cetāna), contact (sparśa), and mental activity (manasikāra), like a bundle of reeds, a collection of such things as earth, water, fire, and wind, or the material form, smell, taste, and touch that make up something like a pot, then you agree with your opponent, the Mādhyamika (madhyamavādī), and abandon your own approach. This is because [your approach is to] accept that the five consciousnesses only arise from the store-consciousness, with the appropriate conditions, and that mental phenomena are transformations [of the mind].

[Objection] If the word "mind" refers to the collection of feeling and so forth, then the mind is not substantially real (dravyasat) and there is no basis (āsraya) for defilement (samkleśa) and purification (punyadāna). Feeling and so forth are different, but it is possible for them to be the basis of defilement or purification if [the mind] is substantially real in each of them, as is said in the following [sūtra]:

An element that has no beginning contains all seeds. Because it exists, all states [of rebirth exist], as well as the attainment of nirvāṇa.

Reply:

5.47 [You] may think that the mind is substantially real because there is defilement and purification, but this is not a refutation, because [we] accept that they come from the arising of mental phenomena in a certain way.

We think that when mental activities (manasikāra) are defiled by primary and secondary defilements and are connected to the mind, there is bondage, and when freedom from defilements and wisdom (prajñā) are connected to the mind, there is liberation. So mental phenomena are just words for various states of mind. [Mental phenomena] are substantially real (dravyasat) only in relation to the mind, and mind and mental phenomena cannot exist apart from one another.

Therefore, since mental phenomena (vedānād) arise in the form (ākāra) of bondage and liberation, [we] accept that [bondage and liberation] arise from collections and exist as collections of mind and mental phenomena. Your concept of the reality of the mind, therefore, does not refute us.

[Objection] If the mind is a collection and not substantially real, how can it give

68 This Yogācāra position is found in Tīrīṭkāra 15: "The five consciousnesses arise in the root consciousness, with the appropriate conditions, either simultaneously or not, like waves in water." In the commentary on Tīrīṭkāra 15, Śrīmatāra explains that "root consciousness" is another name for "store-consciousness." Bhāviveka has already discussed these issues in his commentary on verse 5.4. He quotes Tīrīṭkāra 15 directly in his commentary on verse 5.49.

70 The objection that introduces verse 5.47 states the argument in verse 5.6: "Otherwise [if dependent identity did not exist], neither [feeling nor purification] would exist." The opponent quotes a verse about "beginningless element (ākāra) that contains all seeds." A different version of this verse, with the word dhāma substituted for kāla, is quoted in MS (1:12), Tīrīṭkākabhāga (37), and Śrīdī (158): "annuttakā vādbhāva tatrāvasthā prakāśana / tammar sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvānādhigamena pi vā. It also is quoted in the Prajñāprāda (Eckel 1985: 55).
5.48 Just as a stream of leaves and flowers comes from a powerful lotus root, the different streams of [rebirth] come from the mind, even though it is not substantially real.

The word śalaka refers to the root of a blue lotus. Even though the root is not connected to anything else, it has enough power to cover a large lake with a stream of leaves and flowers. In a similar way, the different streams of the saṃsāra of sentient beings, with their realms (dhyāna) and levels (gati), come from the mind, even though it is not substantially real.

These different streams

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5.49ab Do not arise if there is an antidote; but they do arise if there is a cause.

The antidote is the noble eightfold path. When that arises, the streams [of rebirth] do not arise. If the cause [of the streams of rebirth], namely the impurities (āsrava), is present, they do arise.

Furthermore, you say: “The five [consciousnesses] arise in the root consciousness, with the appropriate conditions.” But, even without any root consciousness, the five consciousnesses do not arise when there is an antidote (pratipakṣa) that counteracts these conditions (pratītya) in the collection that comprises the mind. They do arise, however, when there are conditions such as material form, light, space, and mental activity.

5.49cd Here [we] do not accept the idea that diversity comes [from the mind], because [the mind] is not a real thing.

We do not accept that diversity—namely maturation, cogitation, and ideation—comes from the transformation of consciousness, as you think. Why? Because the mind is not a real thing. [We] do not think that particular states of mind justify this designation.

Furthermore,

71 Hoernle notes that Yamaguchi is pointing out that the term “particular states of mind (prītiyānāthaśāstra)” represents Bhāviveka’s own Sautrāntika-based view of the mind. To say that these states of mind do not justify “this designation” means that the Yogācāra categories cannot be justified on the basis of the Yogācāra’s own position. On the three transformations of consciousness, see the commentary on verse 5.4.

5.50 There is no liberation for someone who apprehends this [mind], but there is for someone for whom cognition ceases; he is not like someone who holds the doctrine of a self in either a relative or a real sense.

To “apprehend this” is to think that there is only the appearance of the mind itself. “No liberation” means from the stream of rebirth. “Cognition ceases” means that cognition definitely ceases for someone who understands that things have no absolute identity and does not imagine a store-consciousness. This is why we say that the mind is a collection, rather than a real thing. [We] are not like someone who says that there is a self, in either a relative (sanyāsa) or an ultimate (paramārthanā) sense. In contrast, you have these problems when you say that there is mind-only. You say: “From apprehension comes no-apprehension; from no-apprehension comes no-apprehension,” but we do not think that one should practice no-apprehension (upalabdhi) indirectly.

How [should one practice it]? 21

5.51 “Material form and so forth are empty, because they do not arise in their own right, are not real things, and are destroyed, like an illusion.” By practicing in this way, one is free from attachment.

External objects such as material form only arise from the appearance of causes and conditions, and they are empty. Because they do not exist apart from the combination of causes and conditions, they do not arise in their own right; because they are collections, they are not real; and because they do not continue very long, they are destroyed. Illusion is the example. By practicing no-apprehension in this way, one becomes free.
from attachment. But external objects are not completely non-existent. Furthermore,

5.52 If material form and so forth are real, then, when someone understands them correctly, the apprehension of their unreality eliminates them. But what is accomplished if they are not real?

For example, when someone thinks that an illusion is a real man, then understands that this [real man] is an illusion and does not exist in his own right, it is possible to eliminate the cognition of the man. But it is not possible [to eliminate the cognition of] a rabbit's horn that does not exist from the start. Similarly, if material form and so forth are real—that is, if one thinks, with a relative cognition (asaṃyujñāna), that form and so forth exist in their own right—then, someone who understands them correctly, as not existing in their own right, can understand that they are not real and decisively eliminate the error. What do you accomplish if you teach ordinary people, who do not yet understand reality, that material form and so forth do not exist as external objects from the start?

Similarly,

5.53 If dualistic concepts belong only to the mind and mental phenomena, they ought to continue after material form and so forth are negated.

You think that concepts of the subject-object duality belong to mind and mental phenomena, and you do not think that they are connected to external objects such as material form. If so, dualistic concepts will not stop functioning when you negate external objects such as material form. Why? [Dualistic concepts] will continue, because there has been no change; they are just as independent of external objects such as material form afterwards as they were before.

Object: To remove dualistic concepts that are not connected with external objects such as material form, we use another argument (paryayava) to show that external objects are defined as a part of consciousness. Then, when non-conceptual cognition arises, the subject and object aspects of consciousness are eliminated, and both the object and the cognition of that [object] cease.

Reply:

5.54 If you think that you adopt another argument to negate this one, it would be better to avoid the mud altogether than to wash it away.\(^{74}\)

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74 Bhāviveka also uses "the maxim of washing away mud" (vrikṣasvādānayanā) in the parallel passage in Prajñāprādīpa 25 (Eckel 1985: 70).

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If you sincerely think that external objects do not exist, why do you imagine that they are part of consciousness? If you think that you begin by defining them as part of consciousness, then use another argument, different from [the argument] that they are part of consciousness, to negate them, it would be better to avoid the mud altogether than to wash it away. The example provides an analogy. If a fool leaves a clean road and enters a muddy river, others would ask him, "Why did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?" If he says, "So that I can wash the mud away," the others would say: "You fool! If you are determined to wash it away, you should avoid the mud from the very beginning."

IMAGINED IDENTITY

You say that imagined identity (parikalpaśnityābhavata) is empty of characteristic (laksana-nirbhāvata).\(^{75}\) If you argue that imagined identity is empty of characteristic, because it is imagined, like the snake that is imagined in place of a rope, we reply:

5.55 [We do not accept [the argument] that imagined [identity] does not exist, because it is imagined, like the snake. [The reason] is inconclusive with regard to the rope, and [the thesis] is contradicted by common sense.

[The reason] is inconclusive in the following way: either imagined identity does not

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75 From verse 5.55 to the end of the chapter, Bhāviveka discusses the Yogacāra system of "three identities" (trīyābhāvata), beginning with "imagined identity" (parikalpaśnityābhavata). The structure of the argument follows Bhāviveka's critique of the Yogacāra in Prajñāprādīpa chapter 25 but includes several important new elements, not the least of which is his discussion of Dignāga's apoha theory and the concept of universals (aṃśatra) in verses 5.60-66.

Bhāviveka's argument begins with a Yogacāra syllogism that is intended to support the claim that "imagined identity" (parikalpaśnityābhavata) is "empty of characteristic" (laksana-nirbhāvata). This claim comes from the Yogacāra position explained in the commentary on verse 5.5 and based on the emptiness of the three identities as explained in Trīṣṭika 23-25 and other sources. (See the notes on verse 5.5.) The Yogacāra syllogism takes the following form:

Imagined identity is empty of characteristic, because it is imagined, like the snake that is imagined in place of a rope.

Bhāviveka points out two faults in this syllogism. First, the reason is "inconclusive" (aṃśata) because, according to his analysis, it can be used to prove either that something exists or that it does not exist. Second, the thesis is "contradicted by common sense" (laksana-vīruttata) because it is generally accepted that at least one variety of imagined identity exists, namely a rope. For a Yogacāra analysis of the example of the snake and the rope, see MS 2: 163.
exist, because it is imagined, like the snake, or it exists, because it is an object of conceptual thought, like the rope. To say that the rope also does not exist is contradicted by common sense, because there is general agreement that a rope exists, made by hands and human effort from water, fiber, and other materials.

To further strengthen this point, [we] say:

5.56ab [Imagined identity] is not completely illusory, because [we] see that this [example] has more than one part.

Imagined identity is not completely illusory, as the opponents think. Why? Because [we] observe that the example, "like the perception that a rope is a snake," has more than one part. First someone thinks that a rope is a snake, then, after investigating its accuracy, realizes that it is a rope and not a snake. When the correct cognition of the rope arises, the snake part [of the cognition] is eliminated, and the rope part is seen. There are thus two parts in the example, an illusory part and a correct part, and it is not exclusively [an example of] illusion. This means that imagined identity, which is the topic under discussion, is not exclusively illusory.

If you think that imagined identity is completely illusory, there is another big fault:66

66 In verse 5.56cd Bhāviveka returns to an argument mentioned briefly in verse 5.19: If the opponent denies that "imagined" (kalpita) things have any reality at all, he engages in an "improper denial" (apavada) of relative truth (samvartitaya). In verse 5.59, Bhāviveka argues that the Yogācāra understanding of "absolute identity" (parinirvānasamudaya) constitutes an "improper reification" (samatropo). On the relationship of samatropo and apavada in Bhāviveka's thought, see Part 1 of this book, also Eckel 1985: 15-54 and the sources quoted in the notes on verses 5.10-11.

The commentary on verse 5.56c states a possible Yogācāra response. We may deny the reality of imagined objects, but we do not deny the reality of "real things" (stutā) that are not accessible to words (Tib. sgen gi bzhin / Skt. svarārtha) and are directly known (srotasvakyā). This response recalls Dignāga's definition of the object of perception in PS 1.5d: "The object of the senses is a material form that is directly known and inexpressible (sasūnasvādayam aniriṣṭayā rāpaṃ indrāyaśeśathā)." Bhāviveka responds by saying that this "inexpressible object" is not consistent with the understanding that relative truth is expressible in words. The connection between relative truth (samvartitaya) and language has strong traditional roots. The Questions of King Milinda, for example, discuss the name "Nāgasena" in a way that mirrors Bhāviveka's understanding of relative truth. The monk Nāgasena explains that his name is a "designation" (sankistance), a "conception term" (samatā, "conventional term" (parāśārī), "conventional usages" (vohāra, and a "mere name" (nāma-samstutam). Later in the same passage he calls it a "conventional term" (samatā). The terms "conventional usage" (Pali vohāra, Skt. vyavahāra) and "conventional term" (Pali samstut, Skt. samvartit) are widely used in Mahāyāna literature to name conventional or relative truth. For a Mahāyāna example, see Prasangapattā 49: "All conventional usages, such as words and the objects of knowledge, are called ordinary relative truth" (arav eva[k]hāna bhāvanā-yā jñānādyā pravastu bhavā "ṣo lokasvartitayam ity ucaya.

5.56cd By negating all objects, you make an improper denial of real things.

If you affirm the existence of something that is not accessible to words and is only known directly, you contradict the definition of relative truth (samvartitaya). In the text (śūtra), it says that it is impossible to understand the ultimate without a dharma that is relative.

Objection: External objects (khyātaya) do not exist, but defilements (samkheya) come from concepts (kalpana) of the cognitive marks (nimitta) of objects (artha) based on names and conventions.77

Reply:

5.57b It is not true that defilements come from the application of words to objects, even when these objects do not exist.

Why?

5.57cd Because [we] observe that animals have defilements even though they are not conscious of language.

[We] observe that animals, such as deer and birds, have many defilements, such as desire, hatred, and ignorance, even though they are not conscious of the various components of language. Therefore, [we] know that external objects such as material form, on which defilements are based, must exist.

Objection: When a cognition of material form arises, it also has a concept that the object (pāra) actually exists. Its arising depends on words that refer to material form, and it does not arise without such reference. Thus [objects] such as material form are empty. "Material form" and so forth are merely words.78

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Bhāviveka's quotation from the "text" (śūtra) seems to be a reference to MMK 24.10: "It is impossible to teach the ultimate without relying on conventional usage" (samatvam anirṣṭayā paramārtho na deloṣṭo). This verse is widely quoted and echoed in Mahāyāna literature, as in MMK 3.12: "It is impossible to climb the tower of reality without the steps of correct relative truth." Jacques May (1959: 229) lists other examples.

77 In the introduction to verse 5.57, the opponent responds to Bhāviveka's argument by returning to the status of external objects. The opponent argues that defilements (samkheya) come from the application of words to external objects, even though there are no external objects to which words refer. Bhāviveka responds by giving a counter-example: Animals have defilements (and presumably are conscious of objects) even though they are not conscious of language.

78 The logic of the text unfolds in verses 5.58-59 as it did when the opponent made an assertion about mind-only in verse 5.17. When Bhāviveka has contradicted the opponent's assertion, the opponent is forced to support it with a formal syllogism. The syllogism is stated in the introduction to verse 5.58 and defined more clearly in the verse itself.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

Reply:

5.58 It will not do to imagine that material form is empty of the identity of material form, because the cognition of material form depends on the words that refer to material form.

Why? [We] observe that animals cognize such things as food without being conscious of language.

Furthermore,

5.59 Material form itself is the object of a cognition in which there is an image of a thing that is distinguished from non-material-form, and since this material form exists, it cannot be empty.

It is unreasonable for "material form" to be merely a word and for material form to be completely empty. Why? Material form itself is the object (gojara) of a cognition in which there is an image of a thing that is distinguished from non-material-form. Here "non-material-form" (arūpa) is something different from material form, such as sound, smell, taste, and touch. To be different from material form is to be something that is not material form, namely, an object of one of the other senses. [These objects] are received (apāṭṭa), not received, and so forth. To be distinguished is to be distinguished from whatever is not material form, that is, to have different defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The thing (cetā) that is distinguished from non-material-form is an object of the sense of sight, that is, something with color and shape. The "image" (ākāra) of that object is an image in which there is a form (ākāra) of that object. Cognition (matt) is cognition of that image. The "object" (gojara) is material form. Material form is called an "object" (gojara) because it is accessible to the senses. This material form appears in perceptual cognition, is inexpressible, and is real in a relative sense (paranāyita). Since this exists, how can it be reasonable to say that [material form] is merely a word (abhipāpa) and completely empty?

Objection: Words refer to universals (ātmānta). These [universals] are words, and they are empty of these [objects].

Reply:

5.60 If words refer to universals, and universals are completely non-existent, then it is impossible for them to be empty of the objects to which they refer.

79 In the introduction to verse 5.60, the opponent claims that "the object to which words refer" (abhipāpa) is a universal (ātmānta), and universals do not exist. The commentary on this verse identifies the opponent's position with Dignāga's view of universals as "exclusion-by-the-other" (aryaprapancha). The concept of universals then occupies Bhāviveka's attention until verse 5.68.

The Tibetan translators consistently translate arupā as "exclusion by the other," although this is only one of several interpretations of the word in Indian tradition. Ratnakirti presents these alternatives: "This is excluded from the other (idāna anyanmad upahetya), the other is excluded from this (arum vānayad upahetvā), or the other is excluded in this (gautim vānayad upahetvā)." (Kajiyama 1966: 123). "Exclusion by the other" corresponds to the first of Ratnakirti's alternatives. Another set of possibilities is found in Šāntarakṣita's Tattvaśnuvyutkha verses 1007-11. In the commentary on 1007-10b and again on 1011, Kāmalsāla explains that the term arupā consists primarily (mukhyo) to "the object-image" (aryapratibimbaha) that is "excluded from other appearances" (pratibhāvikartha...upahetvā). In the case of the word "cow," this means that the idea "cow" is excluded by the idea of other things, like horses, that are "non-cow." It is not a "cow" that excludes "non-cow," but "non-cow" that excludes "cow." Bhāviveka follows this interpretation in verse 5.66 below, where he treats arupā as a property of the "other" (i.e., of the "non-cow") rather than of the thing (i.e., the "cow") itself. The Tibetan translation of arupā as "exclusion by the other" is clearly not the translators' innovation. It is Bhāviveka's own interpretation of the term, an interpretation that was shared by subsequent thinkers. For more extensive discussion of Dignāga's theory of apāra, see Matilid 1986: 427-452; Hayes 1988; Hattori 2000; and Dunne 1999: 132-54.

80 Bhāviveka opens his argument with a prasaṅga. If words refer only to universals, and universals do not exist, then words refer to nothing at all, and the opponent literally has nothing to talk about. This is true in the case of the word "emptiness" (ātmānta), since "emptiness" is a universal.

Bhāviveka's argument will be familiar to readers of Nāgārjuna's Vīryavṛtottaritānti. In that text, Nāgārjuna's opponent argues that if everything is empty, as Nāgārjuna claims, then words have no meaning and Nāgārjuna's own arguments have no effect. Nāgārjuna responds by saying that, while his words do not ultimately refer to real things, they can have as much conventional (or relative) effect on their listeners as a magician's trick has on its audience. Like Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka is speaking about the "relative" (ātmānta) meaning of words, not about their ultimate meaning. (He made this clear in the commentary on verse 5.35, when he said that the cognition of material form as a "combination of similar atoms" is true in only a relative sense.) From the relative point of view, Bhāviveka is comfortable...
According to you, words refer to universals (cāmāna), and universals are like the universal "cow," which is the exclusion of cow by other things, such as horses, that are not cows. (You also think that) universals, which are defined as exclusion-by-the-other (anupāda), do not exist and are not real things (vastra). If [universals] are not real things, what do words refer to? If they do not refer to anything, it is impossible to say that these [universals] are empty of the objects to which they refer.

Objection: Then what kind of universals do words refer to?21

Reply:

5.61 A word refers to a thing that possesses a universal, because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [thing] exists, it is reasonable for a word to refer to it.

A word refers to a thing (vastra) that possesses a universal (cāmānava). To possess a universal is to possess a universal such as material-compactness (rupaka) that is independent of attributes (vāśīpa) such as blue. This [thing] that possesses the universal material-compactness places with Naṇḍīrana’s opponent and accusing Dignaga of the same mistake that Naṇḍīrana’s opponent attributed to Naṇḍīrana himself. This is because Bhāvaviveka is convinced that Dignaga engages in an “improper denial” (upanada) of relative truths when he denies that words refer to real objects in a relative sense.

81 In the introduction to verse 5.61, the opponent challenges Bhāvaviveka to present his own theory about the meaning of words. This challenge is posed as a question about universals. What kind of universals do words refer to? Bhāvaviveka responds by defining the object as a “thing that possesses a universal” (cāmānaya vastra). His answer takes the form of a syllogism that would be translated literally as follows:

A thing (vastra) that possesses a universal (cāmānaya) is the referent of a word, because it causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing].

Bhāvaviveka argues that this “thing that possesses a universal,” is the referent, because this thing is capable of producing a cognition of itself. It is grammatically possible that the reason, “because it is the cause of a cognition in which there is an image of that” (tadābhamatiṣṭhitataḥ), means that the cognition contains an image of the universal. But the word “that” in this compound has been used previously to refer to the subject of the sentence. Here the subject is the thing (vastra) itself. Compare, for example, verse 5.36: “this combination is the object (gāmbhara), because it causes a cognition that has the image of that combination” (tadābhāmatiṣṭhitataḥ). The terminology reflects the argument in AP 1-2 and in Śūrañjivita’s commentary on Trīśatika 1, as discussed in the note on verse 5.31.

Bhāvaviveka’s position is similar to that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, who argue that it is possible to perceive an object in a determinate way (vāvikāle) so that the particular and universal are conjoined. It also is similar to a position rejected in PS 5.4, where Dignāga says that words cannot refer to “the one that possesses that” (kuntad). In other words, they cannot refer to “the thing that possesses a universal.” See Hayes 1988: 255; Hattori 2000: 143-46.

5.62 It is clear that a universal is emptiness of that which is dissimilar (aśīryena janayatam), because it is the cause of the occurrence of a similar cog-
universal is an object (pisāya) of cognition, it can be conceptualized (kalpya). And, since words can be applied to anything that can definitely be grasped by the mind, [we] think that it can be designated by words (sūrya). "Cowness" is not different from the dêwlap and so forth. Then what is it? It is not different from the thing itself (bhāva-vādāvādā).

Furthermore:

5.64 [A universal] is one, because it is undivided; it occurs in many places, because it is not a substance; and it is not destroyed when those [substances] are destroyed. Therefore, it is wrong not to think that it can be cognized in another [substance].

"Emptiness of what is dissimilar" is one (ekā), because it is undivided, that is, because it is common to many individual instances (dhāraṇa). It occurs in many places (ānuksattta), because it is not a substance (darsana), that is, because it is included in all substances. It is not destroyed when substances are destroyed, because it is found in all substances in the past, present, and future. Therefore, it is wrong not to think that it can be cognized in another substance when the substance [in which it occurs] is destroyed. Why? [We] definitely think that it can be cognized elsewhere.

[Objection] If it is one, how can the same universal occur in many places?

Reply:

5.65 Not-blue and not-blue-lotus have a different form, so they are not mutu-

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83 In verse 5.61, Bhāviveka gives a syllogism to explain how a universal is "grasped" (grābhyā). The process is similar to the cognition of an absence (abhāva) as explained in Mokṣikāraṇagupta’s Tūkabhāṣā. (See the note on verse 5.62.)

[A universal] is not grasped without grasping its locus (ādṣaya), because it is grasped when that [locus] is grasped, like a number.
Part 2: Translation

Exclusion by one thing (anyāpāda) cannot be the universal of another, be-cause it is a property of the former, like particulars. This [exclusion-by-the-other] is not a specific cognition of such things as a dewlap, because an absence cannot have particulars.

Exclusion by one thing [or exclusion-by-the-other] is an act of differentiation in which something that is other performs the act of exclusion. For example, horses and so forth, which are other [than a cow], exclude "cowness." This [act of exclusion] cannot be the universal of another [that is, of the cow]. Why? Because it is a property of the former [that is, of horses and so forth]. What is the example? Like particulars (vītya). For example, the particulars of a cow, such as horns, which are other [than the particulars of a horse], exclude the particulars of a horse, such as a mane, but they are not the universal of those [other particulars]. Similarly, while horses and so forth are not cows, are other [than cows], and exclude cowness, they cannot be the universal "cowness." This exclusion-by-the-other is not a specific cognition of such things as dewlap, tail, hump, and hoof. Why? Because the exclusion of something is an absence, and an absence cannot have particulars.

Because this [exclusion-by-the-other] is an absence,

5.67ab If this [exclusion-by-the-other] is grasped without grasping the thing itself, it is wrong to think that it is this [thing itself] that is conceptualized and designated by words.

If [you] say that a universal, which is exclusion-by-the-other, is the thing itself (bhāvastubhāva) and do not say that it is an absence (abhāva), then it is reasonable for this [thing itself] to be conceptualized (kārya) by the mind and designated (vācyā) by words. But if you think that exclusion-by-the-other is grasped without grasping the thing itself, and also that it is an act of exclusion carried out by something other than the thing itself,

In the introduction to verse 5.61, the opponent asked Bhāviveka to explain what he thinks words refer to. In verse 5.63, Bhāviveka said that the "locus" (ārya) of the universal is conceptualized (kaśāya) and designated by words (vācyā). Here in verse 5.67, he argues that, if "exclusion-by-the-other" is not the thing itself, then the thing itself is not what is conceptualized and designated by words.

In the second half of the verse, Bhāviveka considers the possibility that "exclusion-by-the-other," while different from the thing itself, makes it possible for the thing itself to be conceptualized and designated. He responds to this suggestion by saying that it would then be the thing itself that is conceptualized and designated, rather than the universal, which is "exclusion-by-the-other." The only way to solve this problem is to assert, as Bhāviveka does in verse 5.63, that the universal is not different from the thing itself.

When Bhāviveka says "the thesis in your inference is not accepted," he has in mind an inference in which Dhīnavga argues that it is "exclusion-by-the-other" that is conceptualized and designated, because..." This inference is never explicitly stated in the commentary, although this clearly is Dhīnavga's point.
then it is wrong to think that it is this [thing itself] that is conceptualized and designated. It is difficult to prove these two points.

Someone may say that the thing itself is conceptualized and designated by means of exclusion-by-the-other.

In reply [we] say:

5.67cd If this [exclusion-by-the-other] causes something else to be designated, then it is not this [exclusion-by-the-other] that is designated and [conceptualized].

If exclusion-by-the-other causes the thing that has the universal (samānyadvedvadatta) to be simultaneously grasped, then it is the thing itself that is conceptualized and designated; it is not the universal, or exclusion-by-the-other, that is conceptualized and designated. For this reason, the thesis in your inference is not accepted.

Furthermore,

5.68 If the thing itself is different from that [exclusion-by-the-other], then it is not inexpressible. For this reason, this statement of the Yogācāra approach is not reasonable.87

If exclusion-by-the-other is different from the thing itself, then, as different from the thing itself, one can have a different idea of it and give it a different name. If so, exclusion-by-the-other cannot be inexpressible. Therefore, when we have rationally investigated this statement of the Yogācāra approach—namely the idea that exclusion-by-the-other (anyāpada) is a universal (samānyata)—we find that it is not established. So the points

87 Bhāviveka seems to be arguing that, if the thing itself is designated by means of a universal or “exclusion-by-the-other” and also different from that universal, then it cannot be considered inexpressible (anabhilāpya), as it is in PS 5.42 (rāg bhūtin ‘ga’ yong brig mi bya).

The commentary on the first half of this verse puzzled Hoornaert and Yamaguchi, as it should. It is one of the rare cases where the Tibetan text of the commentary seems to misunderstand the verse. As we have it, the commentary says that it is unreasonable for “exclusion-by-the-other” to be inexpressible. This argument would not concern Dignāga, since he thinks that “exclusion-by-the-other” is expressible; it is just the “thing itself” that is inexpressible. The commentary is so clear in this misunderstanding that it is difficult to attribute the error to a copyist. Perhaps the misunderstanding belongs to the translators, or perhaps this passage suggests that the commentary belongs to someone other than the author who wrote the verses.

The final sentence in the commentary makes clever use of the word “imagined” (kalpita) to point out that the idea of “imagined identity” in the Yogācāra system is wrong. Perhaps the author is aware of the distinction found in Candrakirti (on MA 6.26) and in Jñānagarbha (Eckel 1987: 123) between two kinds of incorrect relative truth: one that consists of false cognition and another that is “imagined” in a doctrinal system.

that the Yogācāras imagine in their doctrinal system (jīdhihanta) are not reasonable, that is, they are not consistent with reason.

DEPENDENT IDENTITY

Objection: Our approach is not unreasonable, because it does not contradict reason. Why? We think that things are empty (nihsvabhava), because they are empty of the identity (ātman) attributed by words (abhilāpa).88 The identity attributed by words does not arise, and because it does not arise, it does not cease. Anything that is referred to by words (abhilāpaśadvastu) does not exist at all in the way that it is described, because it is a mere convention (sanyāsavatāra). If the object (gecara) of a word were a real thing, then the word “fire” would burn the mouth. So [we] accept the existence of dependent [things], because “imagined things do not exist, but dependent [things] do exist.”

88 Verses 5.69-70 open the discussion of “dependent identity” (paratantrasvabhāva), the second of the three identities. In verse 5.6, Bhāviveka gave a Yogācāra argument for the existence of dependent identity:

Dependent identity exists,
because designations (prajñāpāram) have causes,
because otherwise neither [imagined nor absolute identity] would exist,
and because one apprehends delusions.

We would normally expect Bhāviveka to build his discussion of dependent identity around these three reasons. These reasons are discussed, however, in Prajñāpāramitā 25 (Eckel 1985: 52-59). Rather than repeat these arguments, Bhāviveka starts with a Yogācāra syllogism about the emptiness of dependent identity:

Things are empty,
because they are empty of the identity attributed by words.

According to Kang-hsuan, this reason presupposes “ultimately existing things” as its subject (Lozeng 1987: 102; Tibetan in Lozeng 1982: 331), yielding the following syllogism:

Ultimately existing things are empty,
because they are empty of the identity attributed by words.

The last sentence in Bhāviveka’s introduction to the Yogācāra position (in the commentary that precedes verses 5.69-70) ties this argument to a quotation from Lokottarā Sahāra 2.189 that asserts the existence of dependent identity: “Imagined things do not exist, but dependent [things] do exist” (siddhisti vai kalpita bhūvat paravantara ev cidhaste). Other occurrences of this verse are noted in Lindner 1982a: 155.

At the end of verse 5.70, the objector says that dharmas are not a “thing” (nauta). This means that a dharma (which Kang-hsuan identifies as an “ultimately existing entity”) is not the “thing” (nauta) that serves as the referent of a word (abhilāpa in verses 5.60, 61, 68 and 69) in verses 5.61, 63, 67) in Bhāviveka’s discussion of imagined identity.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

Reply:

5.69-70 [The opponents] raise many objections, such as the following: Things are empty, because they are empty of the identity (ātman) attributed by words, and, because these [things] do not arise in that way, they do not arise or cease. Anything that is referred to by a word does not exist in the way it is described, so dharmas are not things [that can be referred to by words].

5.71 If [the opponents] are saying that dependent [identity] exists in a relative sense, they are proving something that [we] accept. If [they are saying that it exists] in a real sense, there is no example and the reason is contradicted. 89

If [the opponents] are arguing that everything is relative (samavyā), they are proving something that [we] accept (vaidhāsādhbhavato), because we also think that everything [is real] from the point of view of relative truth (samyuktāsvayyameva). If they are arguing that things exist ultimately (paramartha), there is no example for the argument that dependent [identity] exists ultimately, because this also is empty (nīṣvabhūtā). And the reason, "because they are empty of the identity attributed [to them] by words," is contradicted. The argument that [things] are empty of the identity attributed [to them] by words proves that things exist that can be referred to by words and thus are not empty. In other words, [the reason] proves that the subject (dharma) is the opposite [of what is intended].

Objection: According to us, dependent identity is empty of arising (atparatviniśvabhūtā), because it does not arise from itself, like an illusion (māyā). And, because it is empty in this way, the reason [in the preceding argument] is not contradicted. 90

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89 Verse 5.71 discusses the existence of dependent identity by asking the basic Madhyamaka question: Does it exist conventionally or ultimately? If the Yogācāras say that it exists conventionally, there is no disagreement. If they say that it exists ultimately, there are problems. To say that the syllogism has no example means that the opponent cannot point to anything that "ultimately exists" and also is "empty." (For Madhyamikas, "emptiness" means precisely the lack of "ultimate existence." To say that the reason ("because they are empty of the identity attributed by words") is "contradicted" means that the reason implies that things exist in a way that cannot be expressed by words. For Madhyamikas, this means that they are not empty.

90 Verse 5.72 is introduced by another Yogācāra syllogism:

Dependent identity is empty of arising (atparatviniśvabhūtā), because it does not arise from itself (sadbhāva), like an illusion (māyā).

This argument follows a syllogism in Dharmakīrti's commentary on Trimśatā 24-25a: "This..."
D219a

5.73cd Because he denies that it ultimately arises with its own identity.

The Sage said that whatever arises from conditions ultimately does not arise, because no such thing can be found (upalabhya) apart from a combination of causes and conditions. As is said (in the Anavatapta-pada-pasamkramana Sūtra), "Anything that is born from conditions is not born and does not arise in its own right. Anything that depends on conditions is said to be empty. Anyone who knows emptiness is a prudent person."

Furthermore,

5.74 Since dharmas are not real, it is not contradictory, in a relative sense, for them to be the particular and universal objects of different cognitions and words.92

It is precisely because dharmas are not real that it is consistent, in a relative sense, for them to be the particular objects (svakṣaṇakarana) of different cognitions, such as "blue" and "material form," and the universal objects (samsīnyakṣaṇakarana) of different words, such as "pot" and "cloth." If they were real things, they would have only one nature, like space and so forth, and they could not be the objects of different cognitions and different words. This clearly is not the case.

On this point another tradition (āgama) is accepted by both parties.93 What is it?

5.75 Any name that is used to designate a dharma is not found in it. This is the nature of dharmas.

"Any name" means the different names and syllables that refer to particulars and universals. "A dharma" means the material form and so forth that are designated [by a name]. "Is not found in it" means that a name is not found in a dharma because dharmas are not verbal in nature (anakṣara-vākhyāta). Words from different dialects or with different etymologies can refer (abhi-lap) to the same object in different ways. For example, water can be called pāṇīya, ap, saṭila, and uṣa. If its nature were such that it could be

92 Verse 5.74 summarizes Bhāviveka's understanding of the two truths. According to his position, dharmas are ultimately unreal (abhūta), but they can still function from a relative point of view (samvydyā) as the particular (iva) objects (gaṇa) of cognitions (dhyāna) and as the universal (āsamsīna) objects (gaṇa) of words (vocāla). The first of these two points was explained in verses 5.34-36, the second in verses 5.62-68.

93 Verse 5.75 contains another appeal to the authority of tradition. This verse from the Bhavasamkramastūtra is quoted in Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi (33). Bhāviveka also quotes the verse in Vairocana-sūtra 25 (Eckel 1985: 56).
5.77ab [We] think that dependent [identity] is not grasped, because it does not arise with any identity of its own.

Why?

5.77cd If something arises ultimately, it cannot have a false appearance.

You say that dependent [identity] is not grasped, because it has no subject and object. But, if [dependent identity] arises with an identity of its own, it cannot have a false appearance. It has a false appearance precisely because it does not arise with any identity of its own.

Furthermore:

5.78 If dharmas exist as they appear, that is, if they are what they appear to be, how can they be illusory?

Things appear as objects of the senses, because they depend on causes and conditions. If dharmas exist as they appear—that is, if they are what they appear to be—how can they be illusory? An illusion may appear to a man and so forth, but it is not grasped that way, because such an illusion is empty of the identity of being a man. Thus it is unreasonable to think that dependent identity exists.

It seems very reasonable to say: "because these [things] do not arise in that way, they do not arise or cease."

The Yogācāra on the other hand says that dependent identity arises in only a relative sense (samertya), he repeats the position of the Madhyamakas. If the opponent says that dependent identity arises ultimately (paramārtha), he runs into problems like the one pointed out in verse 5.77.

5.79 [Things] do not arise or cease, are not things, and are empty, because they do not arise from themselves and because they are not substantially real (dravyasat).

Things (bhūta) arise from homogeneous causes and conditions, but they do not arise from themselves (udbhūtāna), because there is not even the slightest identity to be found apart from a combination of causes and conditions at the moment when it is in a state of continuation. Therefore, because they do not arise from themselves, they do not arise or cease, they are not things (tuṣita), and they are empty. Nevertheless, the image (bhūtabhāśa) of these things as objects (ālambana) is manifested from homogeneous causes and conditions and is a collection (samāhāra) of eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, and touch. But, like an army or forest, they are not substantially real (dravyasat). It should be understood, therefore, that they do not arise or cease, are not things, and are empty. This is the meaning of the verse.

Objection: If you [Madhyamikas] think that things do not exist, you rule out the designation (prajñāpāti) of dharmas.

Reply:

5.80ab [We] agree about awareness-only (viśījñāpimatrā), so [we] do not deny the possibility of designation (prajñāpāti).

Both of us agree that awareness-only is free from concepts of "I" and "mine." Designations (prajñāpāti) refer to external and internal dharmas. These dharmas are not substantially real but are generated by action (karma) that is produced by the consciousness arise. In other words, relative things ultimately are not things.

On the claim that an "object" is "manifested from homogeneous causes and conditions" and is "a collection (Tib. 'du pa / Skt. samāhāra) of eight substances: earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste, and touch," see the commentary on verses 5.31 and 36 and the notes on verse 5.62.

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96 Verse 5.79 (bhūta) is carried down from verse 5.69, the first verse on dependent identity. What does it mean to say that "things" (bhūta) are not "things" (tuṣita)? I am of the opinion that the word bhūta in verse 5.69 refers to "ultimately existing things." Verse 5.79 can be interpreted as meaning "ultimately existing things are not ultimately things." But I am of the opinion that the Yogācāra objection, and the sentence makes little sense. Here the speaker is Bhāviveka himself. It is likely that Bhāviveka is reverting to the logical form that serves him well in his commentary on the MMK. he is assuming "things" conventionally in order to negate them ultimately. The commentary confirms this interpretation when it says that "things" arise from causes and conditions but do not "really"
PART 2: TRANSLATION

(vijñāna) of external objects. So there is no fault in our position.

[The fault is] in your position.

5.80cd If what is removed and what does the removing are real, what do you think recognizes [suffering]?\(^99\)

If what is removed—namely, suffering and so forth—and what does the removing—namely, the combination of conditioned states (samkhāra) that practices the cultivation of the path—exist as part of consciousness—that is, as a part of dependent [identity]—then, as things in their own right, they cannot become anything else, and their basis cannot change. So, if you think that the recognition of suffering is the condition for supermundane [cognition] and has dependent identity, what do you think recognizes this [suffering]? If there is no change from a mundane to a supermundane state, where and how can [recognition] arise? This is the way to interpret [the verse].

Objection: If nothing is substantially real, as you think, how can there be liberation?

Reply:

5.81 Liberation comes from the cessation of concepts and is possible only if [things] are not substantially real. If [things] are substantially real, they cannot arise, so no other possibility can be maintained.\(^100\)

99 On Bhāviveka's statement that "external objects are generated by action (karma) that is produced by consciousness," compare the position in verse 5.48.

100 The reference to the "removal" (prabhāga or hāna) of "suffering and so forth" in verse 5.80cd and commentary picks up the third reason in verse 5.6.

Dependent identity exists, because one apprehends defilements.

The commentary explains: "If dependent identity did not exist, one would not apprehend any defilements; but they are apprehended, because defilements depend on the mind and mental phenomena, and the removal of [defilements] is liberation." On the "change of basis" (atreyasampratī) mentioned in the commentary on verse 5.80c, see the commentary on verse 5.5 and Trisūkha 29.

The Sanskrit text of verse 5.80cd reads "aversion (śīraida) and so forth" rather than "recognition (pariṇāma) and so forth," as in the commentary. "Recognition and so forth" are the four actions that are performed in relation to the four noble truths: a person "recognizes" (pariṇāma) suffering, "removes" (prabhāga) the arising of suffering, "realizes" (ākāśikāraṇa) the cessation of suffering, and "practices" (bhāsa) the path. These four actions are discussed by Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.26-27. Bhāviveka follows the argument of those verses.

101 Verse 5.81 discusses the Yogācāra concept of liberation found in the commentary on verse 5.5 and in Trisūkha 30: "This is the pure element that is inconceivable, virtuous, permanent, and pleasurable. It is the liberation body and also the [body] called Dharma that belongs to a Great Sage."

Bhāviveka's response to the Yogācāra objection is similar to Nāgārjuna's inversion of the objector's argument in MMK 24.1 and 20. The objector says: "If everything is empty, then nothing arises and nothing ceases, and there cannot be four noble truths." Nāgārjuna replies: "If everything is not empty, then nothing arises and nothing ceases, and there cannot be four noble truths."
or share living quarters with him. This is why the Blessed One said: “O monks, henceforth, you should not rely on, associate with, or accompany the worldly ones (lobhāyāta) who confidently pronounce various mantras.” You [the Madhyayamakas] are evil and will certainly be reborn in a place that people seek to avoid. By rejecting the true Dharma, you will go to a bad rebirth, and by persuading others to be attached to false views, which are like deadly crocodiles, you will cause them to fall as well.\footnote{100}

[Reply:] The Master says:

5.84c These angry words are like vomit: they show undigested pride.\footnote{101}

Your angry words show pride just as vomit shows undigested food. Here anger is compared to vomit, your words are compared to the act of vomiting, and pride is compared to undigested food. Someone who vomits shows undigested food. When you express your anger, you show your pride in exactly the same way. But you do not refute our view.

Why are we certain that these angry words show pride just as vomit shows undigested food, and that the Madhyayamaka does not suffer the same fault?

5.85 [We] think that dharmas are illusory, because they have no real identity, because they delude foolish people, and because they come into existence after not existing.\footnote{102}

\footnote{103} The commentary on 5.83ab echoes section 13 of the Kāśyapaparibhāṣa: “O Kāśyapa, there are four bad friends and bad companions for a Bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva should avoid them. What are these four? A monk who follows the Srāvakayāna and acts for his own benefit, one who follows the Pratyekabuddhayāna and has little purpose and little left to do, a worldly one (lobhāyāta) who confidently pronounces various mantras . . . ”

\footnote{104} Bhavevaka mentions the pride (abhinama) of Yogācāra “scholars” in verse 5.1. In the opening verses of the Abhayamanyalakṣaṇadhara, Haribhadra says that Vasubandhu “takes great pride in his knowledge and in his clever position about the distinction between existence and absence” (AAA 1).

Bhavevaka also refers to vomit (udgārta) in MHK 3.116: “Those who seek their own benefit and analyze things as they are do not rely on vomit-like words that reek with the illness of false views (hautrīpyāmxayendhrtayokto uddhūtakṣaṇāt ghiṣa).”

\footnote{105} Bhavevaka concludes his discussion of dependent identity with a syllogism to establish the certainty of his own position:

Dharmas are illusory, because they do not have real identity, because they cause foolish people to be deluded, and because they come into existence after not existing.

The thesis is meant to show that the Madhyayamaka position gives a proper and “certain” (ṣānta) explanation of the example in the Yogācāra syllogism in verse 5.72.
be relative, and you should not confuse it with reality. 107

If absolute identity arises, it cannot be inexpressible. This has already been refuted by [the verses] that begin with the following:

A word refers to a thing that possesses a universal, because this [thing] causes a cognition in which there is an image of this [thing]. Since this [thing] exists, it is reasonable for a word to refer to it. 108

If it were completely inexpressible, it would be relative (samuriti), and something that is relative should not be confused with reality.

Furthermore,

5.87 If [you] think that the vision of reality is [vision] of this [absolute identity], because there is no other reality, why not think that the vision of reality is [vision] of a pot, because there is not a second pot? 109

If [you] think that the vision of reality (tattva-darśana) or of ultimate emptiness (paramārtha-sāyaṇā) is [vision] of this ultimate, because there is no other or second ultimate reality, why not think that the vision of ultimate reality is [vision] of a pot, because there is no other or second pot?

Objection: Although the Dharma essence (dharmadhātu) is non-conceptual and inexpressible, [we] think that it is purified in the same way that water, gold, and space are purified. If this is pure, the mind also is [pure].

[Reply:] To refute this we say:

5.88 Do not [say] that [the Dharma essence] is defiled and purified just to hide a weakness in [your] approach, because gold and so forth are affected by conditions. 110

The Dharma nature (dharmatattva and dharmat) and "Dharma essence" (dharmadhātu) are synonyms.

111 Hoornaert takes verse 5.89 as a Yogācāra attempt to justify the claim that was made in the introduction to verse 5.88: the Dharma essence is purified in the way that space or gold is purified. He then interprets verse 5.90 as Bhāviveka's response. This interpretation is permitted by the grammatical structure of the Tibetan, but it seems unlikely. Verses 5.89-90 make the same point, namely that purity and impurity are in the eye of the beholder, and the commentary on verse 5.89 uses a common Madhyamaka example to make the same point.

The example of the person with diseased eyes (taniṃka) is cited often in Madhyamaka literature to show how the correct vision of reality (tattva-darśana) is no vision at all. Bhāviveka concludes his critical discussion of the conventional categories of reality in MKH 3.251-52 with the example of diseased eyes: "Someone who removes an eye disease and whose eyes are clear and pure, does not see spots, hairs, flies, or a double image of the moon. Similarly, someone who removes the eye disease of defilements and objects of cognition and has the clear eye of true knowledge does not see anything at all." In MKH 3.280, Bhāviveka attributes this perfected vision to Bodhiṣṭāvās in the tenth stage of the Bodhiṣṭāvā path: "Great beings see [the Buddha] like space, without seeing." For further discussion of this example in Bhāviveka's thought, see Eckel 1992: 129-52. For other examples of taniṃka and the taniṃka in Madhyamaka literature, see La Vallée Poussin 1933c: 30, May 1959: 187; and Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 168. Compare also verse 5.101 below.
5.90b The cognitive error that consists of impurity and so forth is a property of the subject, not the object.

When space appears pure or impure, the cognitive error is a property of the subject, which is a composite cognition associated with the body and sensory awareness, rather than a property of the object of cognition, which is space and so forth. Similarly, the impurity and purity of the Dharma essence is a property of the subject, which has either false cognition or true cognition. It is not a property of the Dharma essence, which is the object of cognition. So it is unreasonable for you to say that [the Dharma essence] is pure and impure.

Furthermore,

5.90c [We] think that [a cognition] that has this [Dharma essence] as its object (ālaya-svāva) is not pure, and reality cannot be treated as an object.112

It is unreasonable for a cognition that has the Dharma essence as its object to be pure, because [we] do not accept that a cognition is non-conceptual if it has this as its object. [We] do not think that the Dharma essence, or reality, can be treated as an object, because it cannot ultimately be apprehended as “Dharma essence.”

Furthermore,

5.91 If reality is substantially real, there is a flood of faults as before. [We] also do not think that a cognition of that [reality] is supermundane and non-conceptual, because it would cease.113

112 In verse 5.90c, Bhāviveka rejects the possibility that the ultimate can be an “object” (ālaya-svāva) of cognition, as he did in verses 5.13-16. The same point is discussed in Prakṛti-pratipa 25: “Knowledge in which something is apprehended (upalambha-jñāna) cannot be called non-conceptual, because it has an image (ābhasa) of an object (uśayā), even when there is no concept of [the object’s] identity, as in the case of visual cognition” (Eckel 1985: 72).

113 In verse 5.91b, the subject of the sentence is the “reality” (artha) that “could not be treated as an object” in the previous verse. Bhāviveka says that, if this “reality” is treated as something “substantially real” (dravyatva), problems ensue. To illustrate these problems, he quotes verse 5.47.5: “You may think that the mind is substantially real . . . ,” where the subject is not reality as “object” but the mind itself. In other words, reality as “object” can be treated with the same arguments that were earlier applied to claims about the reality of the mind.

In verse 5.91c, the subject shifts to a syllogism about supermundane cognition:

The cognition of that [reality] cannot be supermundane and non-conceptual, because it would cease.

Bhāviveka uses a syllogism about the Buddha’s awareness to make a point about its object (or lack thereof), as he did in verse 5.16. The terminology of the verse recalls the objection that preceded verse 5.6: “Absolute identity is realized directly and is the object of a Sage’s supermundane knowledge.”

114 Verse 5.92 echoes Bhāviveka’s definition of reality in Mohk 3.26: “No object of knowledge (jñeya) exists at all, so those who know reality say that ultimate (atulya) reality is the object about which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises.” To take “no-object” (anālaya-svāna) as the referent of “this” in the last sentence of the commentary is speculative, but it makes sense grammatically and is consistent with Bhāviveka’s strategy of equating true awakening (buddhi) with no-awakening (ahuddhi), true seeing (darsana) with no-seeing (adarsana), and so forth, in Mahāyāna Buddhism. See verses 5.2 and 85.

5.91 Verse 5.91 marks the transition from discussion of the Dharma essence as the object (jñeya or ālaya-svāva) of cognition to the discussion of absolute identity as cognition itself. For other examples of this sequence of analysis, see the notes on verses 5.2 and 85.

Sthānyavāda-jñāna (the Self-Existing One’s awareness) is a synonym of buddha-darśana (the Buddha’s awareness) in Abhidharma and Abhidharmakosā. The idea that a Buddha’s awareness consists of a single moment (ekakāra) of cognition
5.93 Omniscience cannot occur in a single moment, because a cognition cannot act on itself, like a sword-blade, and because there cannot be any self-cognition.

While there are many different objects of knowledge, there is only one Dharma nature, so it is possible for the Omniscient One to know it in a single moment without any distinction. But a moment of omniscient cognition cannot know different objects in a single moment. This is because a cognition cannot exist in such a way that it acts on itself, since that would be a contradiction. For example, a sword-blade cannot cut itself. Therefore, if a moment of knowledge ultimately exists, it needs a second moment of knowledge to cognize the first moment of knowledge.

[Objection:] If the Dharma nature does not exist at all, then it is impossible for the nature of things (bhūtanasvatātva) to be definitively grasped. If [you] deny even self-cognition, [you] cannot establish that omniscience occurs in a single moment.

[Reply:] It can be established according to our position. How?

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is recognized as an option in the bhāṣya on Kadā 6,26. In the Nikāyabhāṣa section of the 4th chapter of the Tūrkaśaṅkī, Bhāviveka associates this idea with the Ekavyāvahārikas: "Some (Mahāyāna) bhūtātātvas make the conventional claim (cetāntarāna), 'The Blessed Ones, the Buddhas comprehend all dharma-s with a single thought and realize all dharma-s with a single moment of wisdom, and thus are called Ekavyāvahārikas.'" See Bade 1953: 270. The bhūtātātva for the study of this concept in Mahāyāna literature is chapter 7 of the Abhidhammatantrikā. For a summary of recent work on this chapter, see Naughton 1991: 1-166.

Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Buddha's awakening as "a single moment of awareness (ekavyāvahāra)." For examples, see the commentary on MMH 1.6, 3.268, 3.273, and 4.23. Bhāviveka gives his own interpretation of the "single moment" in verse 5.102 below. For other occurrences of the concept in Mahāyāna literature, along with a discussion of its implications, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 176.

The argument in verse 5.93 deals with the last point in the Yogācāra objection in verse 5.7: "This approach to the Perfection of Wisdom is the means to attain omniscience, and the one that concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation is not."

Omniscience cannot occur in a single moment, because a cognition cannot act on itself and because there cannot be any self-cognition, like a sword-blade.

The word order in the Sanskrit (repeated in the Tibetan translation) suggests that the argument contains two separate reasons: "because a cognition cannot act on itself" and "because there cannot be any self-cognition." But the commentary compresses both into a single reason: "Because a cognition cannot exist in such a way that it acts on itself, since that would be a contradiction." It seems likely that Bhāviveka intended the first reason ("because a cognition cannot act on itself") to serve as justification for the second ("because there cannot be any self-cognition").

116 On the comparison of the sword-blade, see the notes on verse 5.22.

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The Yogācāras

5.94 [The Dharma nature] is grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge, because it does not arise, since its arising can be negated as before, and because it is not substantially real. It also is completely inexpressible. 117

[The Dharma nature] is grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge. In other words, it is grasped by the discipline of no-grasping. This is because it does not arise, since its arising can be negated as explained before, in the chapter on "The Quest for the Knowledge of Reality," and because it is not substantially real, since it arises in a relative sense (samyrtva) from homogeneous (ṣajjātayā) causes and conditions. It is also completely inexpressible, because it is empty. This nature (tucchatva) is ultimate (pāramārtha).

117 The structure of verse 5.94 is awkward in English because of the sequence of reasons, but Bhāviveka's meaning is clear. The subject of the verse is the Dharma nature (duḥkha-atatva), or the nature of things (bhūtanasvatātva), carried down from the commentary that states the opponent's objection. The predicate is "grasped by the noble ones' non-conceptual knowledge." Bhāviveka gives two reasons for his assertion: "because it does not arise" (ṣajjātva) and "because it is not substantially real" (udayatva). He supports the first of these reasons ("because it does not arise") with a secondary reason ("since its arising can be negated as before").

The commentary explains that the previous "negation of arising" occurred in the chapter on "The Quest for the Knowledge of Reality," the third chapter of the MMH. Bhāviveka's explicit discussion of non-arising in that chapter begins in verses 3.37-38: "This expanding network of concepts is based on the idea that things arise and forcibly confuse simple people. When we believe that things correctly with the lump of knowledge, [they] negate arising, pacify these concepts, and lay all verbal diversity (prāptavācya) to rest." The argument is summarized in MMH 3.247: "Nothing [arises] from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all; nothing exists or does not exist; and there is no other possibility." The form of the argument follows the first chapter of Nagarjuna's MMK.

Bhāviveka argues that the Buddha's awakening (buddha) ultimately is no-awakening (abhidharma), as, for example, in verses 5.102 and 106 of this chapter and in his discussion of the epistemic status of the Buddhas in 3.267-72. The same can be said of anything when it is viewed from the ultimate perspective, especially concepts and activities that are significantly related to the path toward Buddhahood. In MMH 3.290, Bhāviveka says that advanced Bodhisattvas worship the Buddhas "with the discipline of no-worship" (anupakṣyena). In the commentary on 3.297, a Bodhisattva practices "recollection" (samāpti) by means of "non-recollection" and "reflection" (manorāpya) by means of "no-reflection." He frequently reminds the reader that the "vision of reality" (śūnyatādana), which is the goal of the text, in the end is simply "no-vision" (adīśanā), as in verses 3.280-81: "Heretic beings see him the way they see space, without seeing. They have no concepts and make no effort, and their eyes are clear. They pay homage to the Blessed One without any homage, reflection, or words, and they also are worthy of sincere homage." "No-vision" is discussed in the commentary on verse 5.89. All of these negative modes of practice are based on the practice of "no-apprehension" (anupalabdhiḥ), as discussed in verses 4.20d-21 and 3.51.

Bhāviveka's claim that the knowledge of the noble ones is only possible if things do not arise and are not substantially real is similar to the idea expressed in verse 5.81 that liberation is possible only if [things] are not substantially real.
Furthermore, according to you,

5.95 If the ultimate identity is the existence of the absence of existence, how can you be free from improper reification and denial? 118

Someone who seeks to be free from the two extremes of improper reification (śamāropāna) and denial (aparśida) has to avoid the extremes of existence (bhūtasa) and absence (abhūtasa). But you think that the absolute (parinirvāna), or ultimate (paramārtha) identity, is both existence and absence. If it exists, [you] are not free from the extreme of improper reification, and if it is absent, [you] are not free from the extreme of improper denial. If [liberation] is to avoid such extremes, how can you be free?

According to us,

5.96 There is no existence, because in reality nothing arises. There is no absence, because there is no existence. [We] think that reality is non-dual, because it avoids both existence and absence.

There is no existence, because ultimately nothing arises. There is no absence, because there is no existence. If there were existence, then, by contrast, there could also be absence. But because there is no existence, there can be no absence. [We] think that reality (tattva) avoids both existence and absence, and is non-dual in this way, so this non-duality does not contradict reason.

Your position leads to another great fault.

5.97 The Teacher is not free from all objects if he objectifies Thusness, and awakening is not [an understanding of] equality if the image of reality is differentiated. 119

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If the Teacher, or the Blessed One, the Buddha, objectifies “absolute identity” or “Thusness,” he is not free from all objects, because he objectifies Thusness. This contradicts traditions (āgama) such as:

The Buddha has the characteristics of space, and space has no characteristics. Homage to you who are free from [the duality of] defining and being defined and who have no object.

The Teacher’s awakening is not [an understanding of] equality. Why? Because it distinguishes between “absolute nature” and the knowledge in which it appears. If this duality is present, how can the understanding of this duality be [an understanding of] equality?

5.98 How can there possibly be a cognition that objectifies Thusness without coming from an implanted potentiality? It would be like the cognition of a flower in the sky, which also is impossible without an implanted potentiality. 120

You are well known for thinking that the store-consciousness has no beginning and that active consciousnesses (pratyangūna), such as visual [cognition], transfer their potentiality to the store-consciousness when they arise and cease. These potentialities develop in various ways into objects, the senses, and consciousnesses, and they are active in the store consciousness as long as there is samsāra. So, for an ordinary person who does not see reality, no cognition of Thusness can ever arise. And if none can arise, none can cease. If none ceases, there is nothing to implant a potentiality that can become a cognition of Thusness through the evolution of a potentiality implanted in the store-consciousness. If no potentiality is implanted and there is no cause for a cognition of Thusness, how can such a cognition ever arise? For example, if there has never been any potentiality for the cognition of a flower in the sky, then no such potentiality can be implanted in the store-consciousness, and there cannot subsequently be any sight of a flower in the sky.

Furthermore,

5.99a You have said that reality is neither identical nor different only to conceal your own approach. 121

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On the transfer of potentiality (āgama) in the store consciousness, see verses 5.22-23, and 41-42. The Tibetan translation of the commentary on this verse indicates that the verbs for “transfer” (Tib. 'jug par byed / Skt. arpana) and “implanted” (Tib. kshing pa / Skt. abhis) are used interchangeably.

The argument in verse 5.99 refers to a claim made by the Yogācāra objectors in the commentary on verse 5.6: “When dependent identity is free from imagined subject and object, it
You think that both absolute identity and dependent identity exist, and you also have said that they are neither identical nor different. But this is only to conceal your own approach. Absolute identity, which you call reality, is not free from identity and difference.

According to the Madhyamaka approach,

5.99cd: [Reality] is not a real thing and is not apprehended, so for us [reality] can be what [you] have said.

It is precisely because [reality] is not a real thing (dravyā) that it cannot be apprehended in its own right. So for us [reality] can be what [you] have said—that is, neither identical nor different.

According to our position, the example of space and so forth also is reasonable. How?

5.100 [Reality] is like space because does not arise, has no particulars, and is unainted. It also is completely inexpressible, because it cannot be grasped by the mind in any way.

Ultimate reality (paramārtha satva) is like space in the following way. If something arises, it can be apprehended with respect to its particular aspects. But something that does not arise has no particulars, because it does not arise. It also is not stained, because it is not stained by any conceptual diversity (prapataavikalpa). For these reasons,

is absolute identity. This [absolute identity] is neither identical to nor different from dependent [identity]. If it were different, the Dharma nature would be diverse. If it were identical, [the Dharma nature] would be defiled and could not be the cause of purification."

The commentary on verse 5.99 turns on an ambiguity in the Sanskrit of the first line. Depending on the division of the words, the first line can mean: "You said that reality is neither identical nor different in order to conceal your own approach" (naikaataryayayam uktojan va tattvaan ronagyaptaah). Or it can mean: "Your reality is not free from identity and difference . . . in order to conceal your own approach" (naikaataryayayam uktojan va tattvaan ronagyaptaah). The Tibetan translator chooses the second option. The commentary, however, makes use of both interpretations and reads the first as a reason for the second. Bhāviveka clearly intended to put both readings into play, not only in the commentary on 5.99ab but in 5.99cd, where the uktojan ("said") of 5.99ab is echoed by the udittam ("said") at the verse's end.

Hoonert points out that Bhāviveka's own view of identity and difference is present in MHeK 3.11 (gogatakitarkaratvā tattva gogatigānirmala) and 4.67 (natakaatarkaratvābhūya tattvan tattvaru vitar buddhā).

122 In verse 3.100, Bhāviveka returns to the Yogācāra example that opened the section on absolute identity: "If you think that the Dharma nature is non-conceptual as space, this is unreasonable. Why? [Verse 5.85] It is not reasonable for [the Dharma nature] to be a non-conceptual entity like space." After criticizing the Yogācāra understanding of this example, Bhāviveka offers his own interpretation.

5.101 [We] think that a cognition in which the eye disease of arising is gone is supermundane (lokottara), because it is intended to rescue (attārāna) from the world (lokā) or because it goes beyond (attikrama) the world (lokā).

Arising (upādā) is [like] an eye disease (rimo). A cognition that does not [arise] is one in which the eye disease of arising is gone. [We] think that this [cognition] is supermundane. Why? Because it is intended to rescue from the world or because it goes beyond the world. As it is said: "[A cognition] is supermundane if it goes beyond the movement and agitation of the world."

Furthermore,

5.102 [A supermundane cognition] is non-conceptual, has no object, and has no mark, because it understands the equality of self and other in a single moment with no understanding.124

This [supermundane] cognition is non-conceptual, because, if it does not arise, it must be free from all concepts. It has no object, because it does not objectify anything. It has no mark, because it does not grasp the mark of any object. This cognition understands

122 In the introduction to verse 5.6, the Yogācāra objector said: "Absolute identity is realized directly and is the object of a Sage's supermundane knowledge."

124 In verse 3.102, Bhāviveka responds to the problems he pointed out in the Yogācāra position in verses 5.93-5.97. On the relationship between "no objects" (aityākhyā) and the Buddha's understanding of equality, see 5.97. On its occurrence in a single moment (lokā) see 5.93. Bhāviveka's account of "supermundane cognition" (lokottaranāma) should be compared to his account of the ultimate Buddha in 3.267-79. In 3.269-70, Bhāviveka defines the santhakādha ("the Perfectly Awakened One") as one who understands the equality of dharmas and of self and other, through the means of no understanding. In the commentary on 3.273 he identifies the Buddha's awareness as "the understanding of the equality of all dharmas in a single moment." To say that this moment of cognition has to do with "self and other" (aityākhyā), and that self and other are subject and object, responds to the Yogācāra claim, in the commentary on 5.6, that absolute identity constitutes the equality of self and object. It also corrects the error attributed to the Yogācāra in 5.93, where Bhāviveka argues that a real cognition cannot simultaneously cognize itself and its object. Here supermundane cognition can cognize both at once because it and they are of the same nature (aityākhyā): they do not arise at all.
(buddh) the equality (sama) of self, or cognition (jñāna), and other, or object (jīva), in a single moment with the approach of no understanding (abodhayamana). According to us, awakening occurs in a single moment of understanding.

To investigate the object of supermundane knowledge [we say]:

5.103 The non-arising of dharmas is called the selflessness of dharmas. There cannot be any sign of conceptual defilements with regard to this object, as [explained] previously.175

The non-arising of dharmas is called the selflessness of dharmas. There cannot be any conceptual defilements with regard to this object, as [explained] previously in the chapter on "Seeking the Knowledge of Reality." Concepts are like defilements. A sign is a mark. These [signs] are completely impossible with regard to this object.

Object: When it says in a śūtra that "the ultimate cannot be analyzed (atarkya) and is not an object of logical reasoning (tarka)," it means that [the ultimate] is an object (nitya) of perception (pratyakṣa).176 You contradict tradition when you say that

125 Compare MHK 3.245-46. "Like an illusion, it does not exist; so in reality it is not seen. It cannot be analyzed (aprakṛti) discriminated (avajñata), defined (adhyaya), or compared (adidhāra). It has no marks (varṇanirūpa), no appearance (nirbhāsa), no concepts (avijñata), and no syllables (nirukṣa). It must be understood by the mind of someone who sees. In other words, it is seen by no seeing." Else Bhāviveka gives his interpretation of the term "cannot be analyzed" (aprakṛti) in MHK 3.245c.

126 The introduction to verse 5.104 begins with a scriptural quotation about the use of "logical reasoning" (tarka) to gain knowledge about the ultimate. The same quotation appears in Prajñāpāramitā 25 (Eckel 1985: 73) with the reading brīg mu nam po ("incapable of being analyzed") rather than brīg tu med pa ("eternally nonexistent"). It also appears in the MRP (Lindner 1981: 169). The reading of the Prajñāpāramitā is correct, as it is in a similar quotation from an unidentified śūtra in Pāramāṇḍava 498: "Not long after his perfect awakening, the Blessed One thought: 'I have attained the Dharma that is profound and appears to be profound; it cannot be analyzed (Tib. brīg pa bya ba ma yin / Skt. atarka) and is inaccessible to logical reasoning (Tib. brīg ge' zheṇ yet ma yin po / Skt. stārakṣara); it is subtle and can be known only by a scholar.' " La Vallée Poussin cites parallel passages in Mahāvātisāra 3.314, the beginning of Lalitavistara 25, MN 1.167, SN 1.136, Mahāvagga 1.5.2. Compare also Lankatāvāra 2.122 and 10.28: "I teach one nature, which is free from logical ideas (tarkaśūnya). It is inaccessible (sūra) to the noble ones, divine (divya), and free from a duality of natures." This traditional teaching about the limits of tarka poses a problem for the author who chooses to call his commentary The Flame of Reason. As explained in Part 1 of this book, Bhāviveka does not shrink from the challenge. Verses 5.104-10 give his response. The Yogācāra objector poses the problem by constructing a syllogism and attributing it to Bhāviveka:

5.104 The Dharma nature of dharmas cannot be known by logical reasoning, because reality is not an object of logical reasoning and is not known by inference.

[We reply]:

5.105 Buddhists use faultless inference in a way that is consistent with tradition to completely reject many different concepts of imagined things.177

Here, the Blessed One uses faultless inferential knowledge in a way that is consistent with tradition to completely reject a multitude of different concepts about things that are imagined in Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems.

5.106 Then, without seeing, they see all objects of knowledge just as they are, with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space.178

They attain the name [Buddha] and so forth. [Their] minds are empty in the sense that they do not grasp the five kinds of objects; past, future, present, unspecified, and uncompounded. This awareness is a single moment of non-conceptual (aprakṛti), perceptual (pratyakṣa) knowledge (jñāna). The word "see" is a metaphor (upādāra); they see by the discipline of no-seeing (ādīranya-yajña).

5.107 It is impossible to understand reality as an object of inference, but infer-

The objector then claims that the thesis ("reality is an object of logical reasoning") is contradicted by tradition.

127 Later Mādhyamikas made a point of distinguishing two kinds of "incorrect relative truth" (mithyāvartanīvrtti): perceptual errors, such as the vision of the moon reflected in water, and the "imagined" (kalpita) errors of other philosophical systems, such as the Śāṅkara doctrine of the three guṇas. See Eckel 1987, 75 and notes 39-40.

128 In the commentary on MHK 3.246cd ("Someone who sees [the Dharma Body] and understands it with wisdom sees it without seeing"), Bhāviveka says that "seeing" is a metaphor (upādāra) for "no-seeing" (maitreya pa nyid mthong ba's bzhes nes nge bangs te, sDe-dge Dza, folio 16b). He uses similar language in the commentary on MHK 3.261 ("For the wise, non-conceptual cognition arises through the discipline of no-arising"): "Since no object of cognition either exists or does not exist, there is no arising even of a cognition that has no apprehension. The no-arising of this cognition is referred metaphorically as arising (sbyed bya med pa gnyen phyin pa de nyid sbyed bya bzhes nes nge bangs te, sDe-dge Dza, folio 121a).
ence rules out the opposite of the knowledge of reality.

Inferential knowledge can rule out concepts that are opposed to the conceptual knowledge of reality, but reality (tattva) cannot be understood as an object of inference.

Objection: How does inference rule out the opposite of the knowledge of reality? Reply:

5.108 Differences in other traditions (āgama) cause differences of understanding; even when there are no differences in tradition, what other method is capable of investigating these differences? 129

Other traditions are traditions that differ from one another. Their differences, which consist of 363 doctrines, give rise to differences of understanding. Those who seek agreement have no way to investigate these differences other than by inference (anumāna), which consists of theses, reasons, and examples. Why? Because

5.109 [We] do not admit that an assertion alone can rule out its opposite. How can there be non-conceptual cognition without negating its opposite?

An assertion by itself is incapable of negating any concepts. There can be no non-conceptual cognition without removing its opposite, which is conceptuality. So anyone who makes an assertion has to state a reason and an example. A point is proved by a complete, valid inference.

5.110 The Sage who saw reality taught two truths, because the understanding of reality depends on conventional usage. 130

The inference that negates concepts depends on what is called correct relative truth (tathasampraptisatya). By relying on conventional truth (upadhiabravāsya), one gradually (kramena) understands the non-conceptual and inexpressible (avacayā) ultimate (paramārtha). As it is said, "It is impossible to understand the ultimate without relying on a relative dharma."

Having established the Madhyamaka approach to reality, [we] point out the faults in the Yogācāra [approach to] reality.

5.111 A cognition that has Thusness as its object (silambhanā) is false, because it has an object (silambhanatvā), like dream-cognition and so forth. Moreover, its object cannot be reality. 131

"A cognition that has reality as its object" is the subject. Falsehood is the inferred property. The combination of subject and property is the thesis. "Because it has an object" is the reason: whatever has an object is invariably false. "Like dream-cognition" is the example. Because it is false, its object cannot be called reality. This is because [the object of a false cognition] also is false.

Furthermore,

5.112 The greatest of Sages taught a Dharma that is ungraspable, inexpressible, and not subject to cognitive activity. It must also be negated in the same way. 132

129 Compare MHK 9.19-20: "If tradition (āgama) is defined as an unbroken transmission, then everything is tradition, and it is necessary to determine which is true. If a teaching can withstand logical analysis, it is tradition; then one should investigate its meaning." On the tradition of "363 doctrines" see Part 1 of this book.

130 This verse echoes MMK 24.10: "It is impossible to teach the ultimate without relying on conventional usage, and it is impossible to attain nirvāṇa without understanding the ultimate." The same line is quoted in 5.56 above.

In the commentary on MHK 3.26, Bhāviveka distinguishes between two kinds of ultimate: "the first is effortless, supermundane (dokṣṭara), free from impurity, and free from discursive ideas (bijapropatitā). The second is accessible to effort, consistent with the pre-requisites of merit and knowledge, pure, and accessible to discursive ideas, in the sense that it can be referred to as mundane knowledge (jñānakṣaṇa)." In the commentary on verse 5.110, Bhāviveka marks the passage from the "mundane" ultimate to the "supermundane" ultimate. This distinction is discussed in Jñānavādin's Commentary (Eckel 1987: 71).

131 The syllogism in verse 5.111 takes the following form:

A cognition that has Thusness as its object is false, because it has an object, like a dream cognition.

Similar arguments appear in 5.16 and 90.

132 Compare MHK 1.1-3: "I pay sincere homage to the Teacher who spoke the truth. Out of compassion, he used syllables to teach the reality that is free from syllables, not accessible to logical reasoning, not capable of discrimination, ... beyond definition, not capable of representation, directly known, without beginning and end, blessed, non-conceptual, without image, without cognitive marks, ..., and not subject to cognitive activity (bijapropatitā)." The definition of ultimate truth as "[that] concerning which there is no cognitive activity" (stutājñānapratipaṭhitā) echoes the Aṣṭasāstagranthi's Sūtra and is quoted widely in Madhyamaka literature. The terminology figures prominently in Bhāviveka's definitions of reality in MHK 3.10-11 and 366. He quotes the sûtra itself in his commentary on MMK 18.7ab. For other examples of this quotation in Madhyamaka sources, see Pratsamnapāda 174a; Lindner 1982a: 196; and Eckel 1987: 74.

It is not clear what Bhāviveka means by "If so, it must be negated." Hoornaert interprets "it" as the Yogācāra doctrine. In this context, it is more likely that Bhāviveka is referring to any verbal expression of ultimate reality.
It cannot be grasped, because it is not an object of cognition, and it cannot be expressed, because that would contradict statements like the following: "The Dharma cannot be grasped and cannot be expressed" and "Ultimate truth is not subject to cognitive activity."

Having completed this chapter, let [me] mention the points that have now been abandoned.

5.113 Now, [we] said earlier that reality is consistent with reason and scripture. This has now been investigated rationally and remains unharmed.

The Yogācāra conception of reality has been examined and cannot withstand analysis.

5.114 Some get caught in the jungle of the aggregates and others sink in the ocean of consciousness, but the sons of the Conqueror amuse themselves without falling into the abyss of even correct extremes.\(^{133}\)

In the chapter on "Seeking the Knowledge of Reality" reason and scripture were used to explain reality as follows:

Since no object of cognition is established in any way, reality is that of which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises. Those who know reality, know that it is incomparable.\(^{134}\)

The text in which this verse is included [shows] that [our explanation of reality] remains unshaken by the arguments of Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians.

\(^{133}\) The fact that 5.114 does not appear in the Sanskrit text of MTHK and has no direct commentary suggests that it is a scribal addition. Hoornaert reports Ejima's opinion that it serves as an apt summary of chapters 4 and 5, in which the Śrāvakas are trapped in the jungle of the aggregates and the Yogācāras drown in the ocean of consciousness. If so, it makes a fitting conclusion to the chapter.

\(^{134}\) A quotation of MTHK 3.266.