CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF REALITY ACCORDING TO THE ŚRĀVAKAS

Now, here begins the fourth chapter, the analysis of reality according to the Śrāvakas.² The purpose is to prove that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching.

INTRODUCTION

Reality is experienced (anukhāta) by profound knowledge of the supreme Dharma as it has previously been defined.

4.1 Those who have low aspirations cannot understand this difficult approach. Shaken by baseless fear, they make the following claims.³

This approach (nīti)⁴ is the aforementioned quest for the knowledge of reality⁵ (tattvajñāna). This approach is difficult for those who do not know the means to remove the obstacles to knowledge (jñeyavaranā)⁶ and cannot understand it. They

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1 The title of this chapter appears two different ways. In the opening line, it is called “the analysis of reality according to the Śrāvakas.” At the end of the chapter, it is called “the introduction to reality according to the Śrāvakas.” I have combined these two versions of the title to reflect the title of the Yogācāra chapter. The term translated as “analysis” (viniścayya) occurs frequently in the titles of Indian philosophical texts. Bhāviveka is likely to have associated it with important Yogācāra works, such as the Tattvajñānakāra (Asanga’s last commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra) and the Vinaya-pāramitāvatīra of the Yogācārāmiśra. For further discussion of the meaning of this term, see Schmithausen 1990b.

2 The terminology in this verse and in the accompanying commentary reflects conventional Mahāyāna accounts of the shortcomings of the Śrāvakas. Compare, for example, MSA 1.18: “If someone who has inferior aspirations, has a very low status, and is surrounded by inferior friends does not aspire to the Dharma that is broad, deep, and well taught, it is established [as superior]” (hitādhimukteḥ svabhāvadhūtar hirānat substantānam prācāpyate ya taddālayaḥ prābhāvītyā sva dharmo dharmavādāt yadi nāsati sākhyam iti).

3 Bhāviveka’s criticism of the Śrāvakas and Yogācāras focuses on errors in their “approach” (nīti or nītya). For a discussion of this term in Bhāviveka’s account of Buddhist philosophical differences, see Part 1 of this book.

4 “The quest for the knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna) is the title of MHK chapter 3. On the obstacles to knowledge (jñeyavaranā), see note 29 below.
cannot understand the approach or the path of the Mahāyāna, which is called a vehicle because it is used to travel or reach a destination. Why? Because they are deficient in the faculties (indriyas), namely faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom. The vision in which there is no apprehension (anupakalpita-darśana) is not a basis for fear, but they think of it as a frightening nihilistic view (ucchedavāda). It is as if they were afraid of empty space. They do not see anything without being afraid, and their minds tremble in the grip of the demon of realism. It is as if they were drawing inferences about the sun from the light of a firefly, or about the ocean from the mark of a cow’s hoofprint. These adherents of the Śrāvakayāna® have no aspiration (āśirvadaka) for the [vehicle] that is deep and broad. They think and they argue that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching.

6 On the five faculties, see Gethin 2001: ch. 4.
7 Bhāviveka equates the Buddha’s non-conceptual awareness with awareness in which there is no “apprehension” (upakalpa or upakāla). Bhāviveka’s most thorough account of the practice of no-apprehension is found in verses 4.20-22. See note 133 below.
8 The term translated as “baseless” (ābhūta) can mean “out of place” or “unsuitable.” More literally, it can mean “no place” or “no standing.” The simplest way to translate the compound ābhūta-vāca (“baseless fear”) is as an unsuitable, unnecessary, or useless fear. But the compound also can be interpreted as referring to a fear of “no place” or “no standing.” These meanings play an important role in the account of the Bodhisattva practice in the first chapter of The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines: “When one speaks of a ‘Bodhisattva,’ what dharma does the word ‘Bodhisattva’ denote? I do not, O Blessed One, see (vamaprasādāya) that dharma ‘Bodhisattva,’ nor a dharma called ‘perfect wisdom.’ Since I neither find (ānudayam), nor apprehend (ānupalakṣaṇāya), nor see (vamamātpayāya) a dharma ‘Bodhisattva,’ nor a ‘perfect wisdom,’ what Bodhisattva shall I instruct and admonish in what perfect wisdom? And yet, O Blessed One, if, when this is pointed out, a Bodhisattva’s heart does not become cowed, nor stolid, does not despair nor despise, if he does not turn away or become dejected, does not tremble, it is not frightened (atrautāya) or terrified (vamantāyata).” It is just this Bodhisattva, this great being who should be instructed in perfect wisdom!” (Comze 1973b: 83-84). Several lines later Subhuti relates the Bodhisattva’s fearlessness to the discipline of no-standing (ābhūta-sāga): “A Bodhisattva who does not become afraid when this deep and perfect wisdom is being taught should be recognized as not lacking in perfect wisdom, as standing at the irreversible stage of a Bodhisattva, standing firmly, with the discipline of no standing (ābhūta-sāga) (translation adapted from Comze 1973b: 85). For other uses of the term ābhūta in the Perfection of Wisdom literature, see Comze 1973, s.v. ābhūta and ābhūta-yoga. Compare also Bhāviveka’s use of the term eṣṭita (no foundation) in his account of the Dharmakara Bodhisattva in the MVK 2.278 and his account of nirvāna-without-foundation (eṣṭita-nirvāṇa) in the MDS 1.20-21, 2.92-93.
9 Mahāyāna slaughtered the light of the firefly and the water in the cow’s hoofprint, as in chapter 3 of the Vamsakariniśtrinīlīla Sūtra and the Aṣṭa Abhakataśīlakarana Sūtra (Ogawa no. 760/32), translated in Chang 1983: 117-21. The comparison is also found in the Abhidhāna (Strong 1983: 190).
10 Tī. nyam thun kyis thig pa pha/ Skt. āśriyakāyaṁ or āśriyakāyaṁika.
11 Compare Nāgārjuna’s Ratnakāla 4.79: “Those who are dejected and unaccomplished criticize the Mahāyāna because it is deep and broad. They do this out of ignorance and cause harm to themselves and others.”
12 The word “Teacher” (ācārya) refers to the Buddha.
13 Verse 4.2 states the first formal syllogism of the chapter.
14 In spite of its apparent simplicity, this verse presents a number of problems. The first has to do with the meaning of the word “locus” (śāraya). Always can refer to the place where the Buddha’s non-conceptual cognition is located or to the object that is named by the term “non-conceptual.” The first option is the simplest grammatically, but the second option removes some of the awkwardness of the commentary. Following the second option yields the following translation: “If the Buddha is a non-conceptual cognition, then a body cannot be called (‘Buddha’), because it is a body, like the body of a cowherd.” The second problem has to do with the reason in the syllogism: “because it is a body.” The Tibetan translation (du can yin phyis) reflects a reading of tarrasattvā (because it has a body) rather than tarrasatvā (because it is a body). A literal reading of the Tibetan translation of the verse yields the following thesis: “The Teacher’s non-conceptual cognition does not have a body as its locus.” The problem with this is that it produces an impossible example. It makes no sense to say that a cowherd does not have a body. The example is possible only if the Teacher’s body is the subject of the inference: “The Teacher’s body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition . . . like the body of a cowherd.” If this is the thesis, then the reason must be “because it is a body” (tarrasattva) rather than “because it has a body” (tarrasatvā). The Tibetan translation must be an error on the part of the translator or copyist.
15 The particle kila (translated as “so they say”) normally has an emphatic meaning, but here it is used ironically to distance Bhāviveka from the words of the opponent, as in Spieker 1886: 312. The word is used the same way in 5.2.
16 According to Kula 6.28ff, all of the sixteen moments of thought are part of the dharmasamādhi (path of vision), with the exception of the sixteenth, which is part of the brahmapāramitā (path of practice). Bhāviveka lists the sixteen moments in the commentary on verse 4.27. Oenheimer discusses these moments in his analysis of the Abhisamayalamkāra (1932a: 22, 39). Although Bhāviveka says that this numbering system does not contradict the teaching of other schools, others would not agree. For a different account of the moments leading to awakening, see Skilling 2006: 113-14.
fold path, because it is awakening, like a the awakening of a student.\footnote{The word "student" (śīla) is a synonym for "Śrāvakā."}

According to tradition,\footnote{Interpret lung gi rgya pa as agama-nikāya ("body of tradition") rather than agama-yukti ("argument of tradition").} the noble eightfold path, which consists of right vision, right thinking, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, is the means to attain perfect Buddhahood. Therefore, the Buddhas' awakening is achieved or experienced (anuśāsita) by this path. Awakening is achieved by the discrimination (pravīyāya) of all dharmas. This is the nature of awakening, and because this is the nature of awakening, awakening must be achieved by this path and no other, like the awakening of a Śrāvaka. A Buddha's awakening is achieved by the eightfold path, like the awakening of a Śrāvaka.\footnote{Compare MN III.7:13 (Gospel-Majjhimāsutta).}

Someone may ask: If [Śrāvakas and Buddhhas] have the same path, why is the Śrāvakas' awareness one-sided and dependent on others, while the Buddhist is omniscient (sarva-bhātāna) and independent of others?\footnote{The Śrāvakas have just argued that the Mahāyāna teaches a different path. Here the adherent of the Mahāyāna seems to ask the Śrāvakas to explain how their view of the path accounts for the difference between Śrāvakas and Buddhhas. The Tibetan text contains an additional negative particle: "If [Śrāvakas and Buddhhas] do not have the same path, why is the Śrāvakas' awareness one-sided...?" The passage makes better sense if this particle is dropped. The Subhakaraniya discusses the same issue in verses 399-41, in response to the following objection: "If it is said that there is no path to awakening other than the Trisatikā, which begins with the Sūtras, then, if there is no difference in the path, there should be no difference in the results achieved by Buddhhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas.* (Jains 1977: 202). See also Traité I.599. Bhāviveka gives his own position in verses 4.20cd-22: Bodhisattvas practice the same path, but practice it differently.}

[Reply]

\footnote{The wisdom of all sentient beings, apart from the Tathāgata, does not amount to even a sixteenth part of the wisdom of Śāriputra.}

4.4 A Teacher can be omniscient because of the excellence of his faculties, just as we think that someone can have different analytical insights, even though there is no difference in the path.

The Blessed One's five faculties\footnote{Similarly, the Śrāvakas are extremely sharp, the Śrāvakas' are dull, and the Pratyekabuddhas' are in between. This is why the Blessed One has the omniscience of a Self-Existent One (svayamabha), while Śrāvakas and others do not. (We see that Śrāvakas have different faculties, even though their path is the same. For example, it says:}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{The word"student" (śīla) is a synonym for "Śrāvaka."}
\item \textit{Interpret lung gi rgya pa as agama-nikāya ("body of tradition") rather than agama-yukti ("argument of tradition").}
\item \textit{Compare MN III.7:13 (Gospel-Majjhimāsutta).}
\item The Śrāvakas have just argued that the Mahāyāna teaches a different path. Here the adherent of the Mahāyāna seems to ask the Śrāvakas to explain how their view of the path accounts for the difference between Śrāvakas and Buddhhas. The Tibetan text contains an additional negative particle: "If [Śrāvakas and Buddhhas] do not have the same path, why is the Śrāvakas' awareness one-sided...?" The passage makes better sense if this particle is dropped. The Subhakaraniya discusses the same issue in verses 399-41, in response to the following objection: "If it is said that there is no path to awakening other than the Trisatikā, which begins with the Sūtras, then, if there is no difference in the path, there should be no difference in the results achieved by Buddhhas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Śrāvakas.* (Jains 1977: 202). See also Traité I.599. Bhāviveka gives his own position in verses 4.20cd-22: Bodhisattvas practice the same path, but practice it differently.}
\item Literally, "the faculties (indriya) that begin with faith."}
\end{itemize}
Pratyekabuddhas have five aspects. What are they? It is said:

Those who are in the Pratyekabuddha stage (bhūmi) have five aspects: lineage (gotra), path (mārga), achievement (samudāyagama), way of life (sāhāra), and behavior (karita). The lineage of Pratyekabuddhas has three characteristics. First, it can happen naturally that a Pratyekabuddha has little passion and is not inclined toward society, or he can have little compassion and not be inclined to serve the interests of sentient beings, or he can have excessive pride, want to have no teacher, and become awakened alone. There are three kinds of paths. Some worship Buddhas for a hundred eons, resolve to attain solitary awakening, and reach fulfillment. Others worship Buddhas, but attain only partial fulfillment. Others, who [resolve] to become [Pratyeka-] buddhas, attain the results [of asceticism], but do not become Arhants. These three [paths] are the causes of [three] achievements. With these [paths], Pratyekabuddhas attain Arhantship without a Buddha and without a teacher. A Pratyekabuddha who achieves the first [achievement] is compared to the horn of a rhinoceros. Others achieve [achievements] that constitute conditional Pratyekabuddhahood. The first has a solitary way of life and aspires to profound insight. The other two live in groups. [All] control their bodies, and so forth, beg for food, and remain silent to help those who are less fortunate.

There are differences in their awareness, but not in their path. The Buddha’s [awareness] should be seen in the same way.

26 Compare AN 1 23 24 (Saddhanga Vagga): idhimantānam yad idam mahā bhajatānaṃ, dibhā-cakkhaṅkānam yad idam miruddhaḥ, dharmakālacakānam yad idam pujitaṁ mānastipuṭte. Ānanda is not mentioned in this passage.

Pratyekabuddhas' account of the “aspects” of the pratyekabuddhahiti in the same name edited by Wayman (1960) and translated by Kloppenburg (1974: 126-29). Many of the obscure and elliptical phrases in Bhāviveka’s verses can be filled in from this text, but difficulties remain. The last pada, for example, may refer to the idea that Pratyekabuddhas teach with their body, but without words, but the verse can be interpreted quite differently.


Now, the adherents of the Mahāyāna may say: There are two kinds of obstacles (dvārayuta): the obstacles that consist of defilements (kleśa-vyaya), such as passion, and the obstacles to knowledge (jñayā-nya), such as material form (tāpa). Of these, the [eightfold] path removes only the obstacles that consist of defilements, not the obstacles to knowledge. As it is said:

The diversity of the world is not desire; the passion of the human imagination is desire. The diversity of the world may remain, but those who are wise control their desire for it.

Similarly,

O desire, I know your root; you arise from imagination. I will no longer imagine you, and you will then no longer exist for me.

This means that someone who is free from imagination is free from defilements. Śrāvakas and others are subject to the traces (naśita) of defilements that are produced from time immemorial by the obstacles that consist of defilements. The Blessed One has completely uprooted the entire network of defilements, along with their traces, by long practice of the vision (darṣana) of emptiness. So [the Blessed One] is said to be distinctive, in that he has the means (upāya) to remove the obstacles to knowledge.

This [assertion] is not correct. Why?

4.5 [We think that obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path, because they are mental obstacles, like obstacles that consist of defilements.

29 Bhāviveka’s account of the obstacles that consist of defilements (kleśa-vyaya) and the obstacles to knowledge (jñayā-nya) follows chapter 2 (saṃyogaparichcheda) of the Madhyamakavāgīśa, attributed to Maitreya. In his commentary on MMK 18.4.5, Bhāviveka says: “The liberation of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas results from a vision of the selflessness (nāma-dharmaghrā) of persons (pudgala). [The liberation] of those who follow the Buddha’s way is attained by removing both the obstacles that consist of defilements and the obstacles to knowledge” (Eckel 1980: 214-15). For further discussion of these obstacles, see the commentary on verses 4.26-29 below. See also BBh 62; Schermer-Schau 1991: 104; and May 1959: 141.

30 Udhāravarga 2.7: na te kāmā yāti cātī sukhi lokā inakalparatāḥ purunāya kāmāḥ / ca bhūte cātī na cātī tathā sarva lokā atihātāḥ dhīre vijnāyate eko. The Sanskrit text is found in the commentary on MEIK 3.24b (Isha 1980: 80) and in the commentary on Keśa 3.3.

31 Udhāravarga 2.7: kāmā jñāne mūlaṃ saṃkalpaḥ kāmā jñāne / na sattvā saṃkalpaṣe yātame na bhav位置. The Sanskrit text is found in the commentary by Bernhard 1965: 114. This verse is quoted in Candraśīkā’s commentary on MMK 18.5.

32 Bhāviveka gives a clear explanation of this syllogism in the commentary.
Removal of obstacles to knowledge is brought about by the same path, because they are mental obstacles, like the obstacles that consist of knowledge.

He responds to this argument in verses 4.25-27. In the commentary on verse 4.5, he explains that the word "obstacle" is qualified by the term "mental" to avoid confusion with "external" obstacles. An external obstacle is a physical object like a blanket. A blanket covers or obstructs one's vision of a bed, but it is not the kind of obstacle that is removed by practicing the path.

There is a problem in the Tibetan text of this line: zhes bya ba'i should be the end of one sentence and nyon mamo pa'i srub pa the beginning of another. It is likely that something has been left out.

In other words ("Tib. snyan dus kongs pa yin no / Skt. irdy abhiprayo or irdy cinty") is a common way for a commentator to paraphrase the meaning of a verse. See Tsho and Boose 25.

The argument in verse 4.6 seems to mean that the adherent of the Mahāyāna has to admit that there is only one path, because the Mahāyāna is a vehicle, not a path. In other words, there may be many vehicles, but these vehicles follow only one road. Bhāviveka turns the same point against the Śrāvakas in verses 4.20cd-22, when he says that the Mahāyāna follows the same path but uses a different "approach" (nāyā). In his discussion of the Saddharma-pundarīka and Aṣṭasāhasrikā-sūtras later in the chapter, he treats yinā and nāyā as equivalent terms. (See notes 242-44.) In the commentary that follows verse 4.6, Bhāviveka supplies an unusually long sentence to fill out the meaning of the verse. Since the Tibetan zhes bya ba la ni (Skt. ini) occurs at the end of the sentence, it is possible that only the last clause ("and apart from this path...") is intended.

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtras and so forth, or because it teaches a different path, like the Vedānta view.

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. Why? Because it is not included in the Sūtras, Abhidharma, and Vinaya. Everything that was taught by the Buddha appears in the Sūtras, Abhidharma, and Vinaya, and not even the word "Mahāyāna" is mentioned in the Sūtras, Abhidharma, and Vinaya. Therefore, the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, like the Vedānta view. Vedānta is the conclusion (caturādi) or end of the Vedas. It says that one [removes] imperfections and attains liberation by bathing at pilgrimage places on [rivers] such as the Ganges, by fasting, and by reciting mantras in three ways (traidhāntika). The adherents of the Mahāyāna also bathe in the four
The argument is formulated as follows: The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching, because it is not included in the eighteen schools, like the Vedānta view.

How did the divisions of the eighteen schools (nīkāya) come to be? [I] have heard about them in my lineage (guruparamparā) as follows.

A Sārvaśītāvāda Account

One hundred and sixty years after the parinirvāṇa of the Blessed One, the Buddha, in the reign of the king named Dharmāśoka in the city called Kusunapura, there was a great schism (Tib. dbyes chen pa / Skt. mahābhābha) in the Saṅgha as a result of various disputes (Tib. rtod pa / Skt. svātā). The first division was into two schools: the Mahāsāṅghika and the Śrāvāna.

Eventually the Mahāsāṅghika school divided into eight: (1) the Mahāstāṃghikas, (2) the Ekaśvāhārīkas, (3) the Lokottaravādins, (4) the Bahusrutiyas, (5) the Prajñavādins, (6) the Caṅkikas, (7) the Pṛvāsikas, and (8) the Aparāśikās.

Eventually the Śrāvāna divided into ten: (1) the Śrāvānas who are also called Haimavatas, (2) the Sārvaśītāvādin who are called Vibhajjavādins and the Kīrtuvādins whom some call Murumakas, (3) the Vatsputriyas, (4) the Dharmottarīyas, (5) the Bhadrāyānīyas, (6) the Śāṁcīrīyas whom some call Avantakas and others Kaurukulas, (7) the Mahāsāṅghikas, (8) the Dharmaguptakas, (9) those called Suvastakas whom some call Kāśyapīyas, and (10) the Uttarīyas whom some call Sankrāntivādins. These are the divisions of the eighteen schools.

Here, the great (tridhā) community (sangha) is the Mahāsāṅghika. The same who claim to be this [great community] are Mahāsāṅghikas. Some make the conventional claim (svarūpāni), "The Blessed Ones, the Buddha, comprehend all dharmas with a single thought and realize all dharmas with a single moment of wisdom," so they are called Ekaśvāhārīkas. Those who say, "Because the Blessed Ones, the Buddha, have passed

44 Bhāviveka’s account of the divisions of the eighteen schools (nīkāya-bhālavyābhijñāna) appears as a separate text in the Tibetan canon (Orani no. 5640). Bareau (1955 and 1956) has translated the text in French and provided a thorough comparative analysis. For a more recent analysis of traditions concerning the eighteen schools, see Nattier and Prebisch 1977 and Cousins 1992.

45 According to Taranātha, Bhāviveka incorporates three different traditions about the divisions of the Saṅgha. Bareau (1955: 20-21) explains that the first of these traditions is that of Kamāri Sarvāstivāda origin and gives "une mauvaise lecture" of the table found in the account of the eighteen schools attributed to Vasumitra (transcribed by Bareau 1954). Cousins (1992: 28) explains that the basis of this work to the Sarvāstivāda master Vasumitra is absent in the earliest Chinese translation and should be considered questionable. Cousins refers to the author instead as “Pseudo-Vasumitra.” A probable date for this work is the third or fourth centuries CE.

46 On the Vibhajjavādins, see Cousins 2001.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

beyond the world of all ordinary dharmas, a Tathāgata has no ordinary dharmas," are called Lokottaravādins. Those who follow the Master Bāhūrūta are the Bāhūrūtivādins. Those who say that conditioned states (samskṛta) are suffering in the sense that they refer to one another (anyonyaprajñāpati) are the Prajñāpativādins. Those who live on a mountain with a shrine are the Caiktikas. Those who live on the eastern and western mountains are, respectively, the Pūrvaśailas and the Aparāśailas.

Those who claim to belong to the noble (ārya) lineage of the elders (ārhaṇa) are the Śrāvakas. These [Śrāvakas] are called Haimavatas if they live in the Himalayas. Those who hold the doctrine (sādā) that everything exists, including the past, future, and present, are Sarvāstivādins. Some of these [Sarvāstivādins] are called Vihāryavādins because they hold a doctrine that is based on the following distinction: "Past karma exists when its result has not yet arisen, but [karma] whose result has already been experienced and future [karma] do not exist." Of these [Vihāryavādins], the ones who hold the doctrine that "anything that has already arisen, that is arising, or that will arise has a cause" are Hṛṣṭavādins. Of these, some are called Muraṇṭakas because they live on Mt. Muraṇṭa. A woman who belongs to the Vatsagotra is Vatsi, and a boy born to her is Vatsiputra. The Vatsiputryās' teacher belongs to this gotra. The Dharmottaravīs follow the teaching of Master Dharmottara. The Bhāḍravāyās are students of a good vehicle (bhadravāya). Those who teach the approach of Master Sammata are the Sāṃkritiyas. Of these, some are called Avantaka because they gather in the city of Avanti, and some are called Kaurukulla, because they live on Mount Kurukulla. The Maññāṣakas govern according to the teaching of the sound of the word "happiness of the earth" (maññāṣaka), and teach a large group of sentient beings that rebirth does not take place. The Dharmaguptakas claim to be [students] of Master Dharmagupta. The Suvarṇakulas cause the rain of the pious to fall, supreme Dharmā to fall. They also are the Kāṣayaśīs because they claim to be [students] of Master Kāśyapa. In a similar way, the Uttarīs claim to be [students] of Uttarā. Of these, hold the doctrine that "the person (pudgala) transmigrates from this world to the next." These are Sāṃkritiyās.

Of these [eighteen schools], the eight that were mentioned first, beginning with the Mahāsāṃghikas, along with the Śrāvakas, Sarvāstivādins, Maññāṣakas, Dharmottaravīs, and Kāṣayaśīs who were mentioned later, hold the doctrine of non-self (anatmanavāda). They say that the self (atman) and whatever belongs to the self (ātmya), as imagined by non-Buddhists (tirthikas), are empty, and no dharmas have any self. The remaining five schools, beginning with the Vatsiputryās, hold the doctrine of the person (pudgala) and say: "The person cannot be specified as identical to or different from the aggregates

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A MAHĀSAṃGHika ACCOUNT

Others say that the basis of the divisions is explained as before, but that there are three fundamental divisions: the Śrāvakas, the Mahāsāṃghikas, and the Vihāryavādins. Of these, the Śrāvakas come in two forms: the schools of the Sarvāstivādins and the Vītsiputryās. The Sarvāstivādins come in two forms: Sarvāstivādins and Saṃghāstikas. The Vītsiputryās come in four forms: Saṃmāṇes, Dharmottaravīs, Bhāḍravāyās, and Saṃghāstikas. In this way, there are six kinds of Śrāvakas. There are eight kinds of Mahāsāṃghikas. These are called Mahāsāṃghikas, Pūrvaśaila, Aparāśaila, Raṣṭigyās, Haimavatas, Caiktikas, Siddhārthaṇikas, and Kaukukottikas. These are the divisions of the Mahāsāṃghikas. There are four kinds of Vihāryavādins: Mahāśāckas, Kāṣayās, Dharmaguptakas, and Taṁrasārīs. These are the eighteen divisions of the schools of the noble ones.

A Saṃmāṇiya ACCOUNT

Still others say, "One hundred and thirty-seven years after the parinirvāna of the Blessed One, in the city of Pātaliputra, the kings Nanda and Mahāpadima convened a group of noble ones, who were unattached and had become cool. Then, when the community (sangha) consisting of the noble Mahākāśyapa, Mahāloka, Mahārāja, Durva, and so forth, who were Arhants and had attained analytical knowledge (pratisamveda), were residing there, the evil Māra, who is the opposite of everything good, took the robes of a monk. Displaying a variety of supernatural powers (uddhi), he used five points to cause a great schism in the community." Learned elders (ārhaṇa) named Nāga and...
enter their mothers' sides as great elephants and come forth by themselves, but they have no idea of desire. By their own free will, they take birth in unpleasant realms (durugati) and bring sentient beings to maturity. They understand the four truths with a single cognition (jñāna). The six forms of consciousness are passionate (sāṇāgā) and dispassionate (vīrāgā). The eyes see material forms. Arhats are provided for by others, are ignorant, have doubts, are caused to investigate (or understand) by others, and pronounce [the word] "suffering" as the cause of the path. One can speak while in an attainment (samāpatti). There is a removal of impurity (adui). Someone who has realized (aabhikṣa) restraint (samyāna) is said to have removed all bondage (samyojana). Arhats do not have mundane (lokikā) correct views (samyogṛṣṭas). Since the mind is luminous by nature (prakṛtiprabhāsāvad), one cannot say whether dispositions (anuṣaya) are a cause to the mind or not. A disposition is one thing and possession (parasvasthāna) is another. The past and future do not exist. A stream-winner (ītu-āppana) attains meditation (āyāna). These are the claims of the Ekāvāhārikas.

The divisions of the Kaukutikas are called the Bahusrutiyaśas and the Prajñāvatānavas. Of these, the Bahusrutiyaśas make the following basic claims: There is no analysis (niścaya) on the path to deliverance (nairjñāna). The truth of suffering, conventional truth, and the noble truths are truths. One enters the perfect fixed course (vyāāmāśōkṛtim) by seeing the suffering of conditioned states (saṃsāra-adikākṣa), but not by seeing the suffering of dukkhaadikākṣa or the suffering that is due to change (viparitānadhikṣa).

58 Vasumitra reports a similar claim (Bareau 1956: 174). As a general assertion it would be unremarkable, as would the following assertion about the eyes seeing material forms. It is likely that it refers to the Bodhisattva' process of liberation and is related to the discussion in Vācāravatī 3.3 (and in Kāla 6.77-78) about the removal of desire at the moment of liberation.

59 An earlier version of these five points was discussed in the preceding paragraph. The first four points here are either identical or close enough to be considered identical to the points mentioned earlier. The major difference comes in point five. According to Cousins' (1992) analysis of the five points, the Vācāravatī offers two versions of the fifth point: someone can speak in a state of attainment (saṃsāragosana) and the cryptic formula dukkhaadikākṣa maggaṇipana. In this paragraph, Bārā uses both of these points, but in reverse order. Cousins interprets the second (dukkhaadikākṣa maggaṇipana) to mean pronouncing [the word] 'suffering' is the cause of the path.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

The Saṃgha is supramundane (lokottara). Arhants are provided for by others. There is a correct way of recitation. There is a correct entrance into concentration (samādhi). These are the claims of the Bahuśrutiyas.

The Prajñāpāramitās make the following claims: There is suffering, that is not an aggregate. There are sense media (āyatana) that are incomplete. The conditioned states refer to one another. Suffering is ultimate. Mental phenomena are not the path. There is no premature death. The person (purusa) does not act. All suffering comes from karma. These are the basic claims of the Prajñāpāramitās.

From a division of the Kaukkutikas come the Saṃghavas who are called Cātikas. A wanderer by the name of Maḥādeva was initiated (pravrajita) and lived on Mt. Caiyā. He maintained the [five] points of the Mahāsāṃghikas and established the school of the Cātikas.

These are the six divisions of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

There are two kinds of Saṃghavas who are called the previous (pūrva) Saṃghavas and the Haimavatas. The previous Saṃghavas make the following basic claims: Arhants are not provided for by others. The rest of the five points are equally false. There is a person (padgala). There is an intermediate state (antarbhava). An Arhat attains parinirvāna. The past and future exist. Nirvāna has a purpose (or meaning). These are the basic claims of the previous Saṃghavas.

The Haimavatas make the following basic claims: Bodhisattvas are not called ordinary (pratyayana). Even outsiders have the five super-knowledges (abhijñā). The person (padgala) is said to be different from the aggregates, because the person continues after the achievement of nirvāna, when the aggregates have ceased. One can speak in a state of concentration. One removes suffering by means of the path. These are the basic claims of the Haimavatas.

There are two kinds of former (Tib. dang po) Saṃghavas: the Saṃvatīvādins and the

62 This is the first of the “five points” mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs. Bareau (1955: 82) indicates that the Bahuśrutiyas affirm all five of these points.

63 This and the following point is unclear.

64 The “five points” of Maḥādeva were mentioned previously in the introductory paragraph of the Sāṃmitiya account and in the paragraph on the Ekāvyādikas.

65 As the following sentence indicates, this can be taken as the negation of the first of the “five points” of Maḥādeva.

66 Bareau (1955: 110 and 1956: 171) points out that the Saṃghavas never held this position; this claim should be interpreted as an attempt by the Sāṃmitiyas to validate the fundamental teaching of their own school.

67 Bareau (1955: 110) notes that Bhāviveka reverses the thesis recorded in Vasumitra and Visvadeva. He does the same with the following assertion about “outsiders.” He also lists a Sāṃmitiya view about the persistence of the padgala after parinirvāna. As Bareau notes, this makes his account of the Haimavatas questionable.

68 Even both P and D to lam gyis.

Vatśiputtiyas. The Sarvāstivādins make the following basic claims: Everything is comprised of two categories: conditioned (sattvika) and unconditioned (pañcavīra). What is the point of this statement? There is no person (padgala). As it is said:

The body is born without a self, without an agent, and without a knower. You, great Saṃgha, should listen to this teaching about how to enter the stream of saṃsāra.

These are the basic claims of the Sarvāstivādins.

They make the following additional basic claims: Everything is included in name and form (niyartam). The past and future exist. A stream-winner is said to fall back (aparipāriabhūta). Conditioned things have three characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The four noble truths are realized gradually (Tib. rin gyis / Skt. krama). One enters the fixed way (nyāmaubhāvatā) by means of emptiness (śūnyatā), wishlessness (apravihāra), and signlessness (anumitva). One enters the result (phala) of a stream-winner in fifteen moments. A stream-winner attains meditation (dhyāna). Even an Arhat is capable of falling back. Even ordinary people remove passion (rāga) and malice (vyāpāda). Even outsiders have the five super-knowledges (abhijñā). Even the gods practice celibacy (brahmavārya). All sūtras are interpretable in meaning (neyārtha). One enters the fixed way from the realm of desire (kāmākhāta). There is a mundane (laukika) correct view (sanyatigraha). The five groups of consciousness are neither passionate nor dispassionate. These are basic claims of the Sarvāstivādins.

Another division of the Sarvāstivādins is the Vihāryavādins. The Vihāryavādins are divided into the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Dharmaguptakas, the Tārārātiyas, and the Kṣaṇapiyas.

The Mahāsāṃghikas make the following basic claims: The past and future do not exist. Present conditioned states do not exist. When one has seen the truth of suffering, one has seen the four [noble] truths. Dispositions (āsaddhā) are one thing and behavior (paryavasthā) another. There is no intermediate state (antarbhāvata). There is celibacy (brahmavārya) even in the realm of the gods. Even Arhants accumulate merit. The five groups of consciousness are both passionate and dispassionate. There is a
PART 2: TRANSLATION

person (padgala) who is samatārin, and so forth. A stream-winner attains meditation (bhūmā). Even ordinary people (pratigyanā) remove passion and malice. The Buddha is included in the Samgha. [Gifts to] the Samgha produce a great result, but [gifts to] the Buddha do not produce a similar result. The Buddha and the Śrāvakas have the same liberation (vimukti). The person is invisible. No mind (citta) or mental phenomena (caita), and nothing that arises, transmigrate from this world to the next. All conditioned (samkirtta) dharmas are momentary. Karma arises as the expansion of conditioned states (samsāra). Conditioned states do not continue. Karma conforms to the mind, but there is no karma of body and speech. There is nothing that cannot be destroyed. Worship of a shrine (caitya) is fruitless. Dispositions are always present. One enters the fixed way by seeing conditioned dharmas. These are the basic claims of the Mahāsāṅkas.

The Dhammaputtaśas make the following basic claims: The Buddha is not included in the realm of the Samgha. [Gifts to] the Buddha produce a great result, but [gifts to] the Samgha do not. There is celibacy (brahmacarya) even in the realm of the gods. There are munīde (laukika) dharmas. These are the basic claims of the Dhammaputtaśas.

The Kāśyapayas make the following basic claims: [Karmic] results and resulting dharmas (vipakādharmas) exist as future dharmas. There is not complete awareness (paryjñāja) of any removal (prahāna), and there is not complete awareness of no removal. In addition, all of the positions of the Dhammaputtaśas are basic claims of the Kāśyapayas.

The Tāmraśāyīs make the following basic claim: The person does not exist. The Samkrāntikas are particular Sarvāstivādin masters who expound the teaching of Utara. They make the following basic claims: The five aggregates (skandhas) transmigrate from the world to the next. There is no cessation of aggregates apart from the path. There are aggregates with fundamental transgressions (mahāpattā). The person is not apprehended as ultimate. Everything is impermanent. These are the basic claims of the Samkrāntikas. The fundamental claims of the Sarvāstivādin come in these seven forms.

The Vātsipitūryas make the following basic claims: That which can be appropriated (upādaya) and that which is appropriated (upādana) are nominal (prajñāpati). There is no dharma that transmigrates from this world to the next. The person transmigrates in dependence upon (upādaya) the five aggregates. There are conditioned (samkirtta) dharmas that are momentary and non-momentary. The person cannot be said to be identical or different from the aggregates on which it depends (upādanaśakanda). Nirvāṇa cannot be said to be identical or different from all dharmas. Nirvāṇa cannot be said to exist or not exist. The five groups of consciousness (vipākamokṣa) are neither passionate nor dispassionate. These are the basic claims of the Vātsipitūryas.

There are two kinds of Vātsipitūryas: the Mahāgiriyas and the Sāṃmityas. The Sāṃmityas make the following basic claim: That which is going to exist and that which does exist, that which is going to cease and that which does cease, that which is going to arise and that which does arise, that which is going to die and that which does die, that which is going to act and that which does act, that which is going to be destroyed and that which is destroyed, that which is going to be conscious and that which is conscious exist. This is the basic claim of the Sāṃmityas.

There are two kinds of Mahāgiriyas: the Dharmottarīyas and the Bhadrāyānīyas. The Dharmottarīyas make the following basic claims: In birth there is ignorance and birth, and in cessation there is ignorance and cessation. The [teachings] of the Bhadrāyānīyas are the same.

Some say that the Sannagārikas are a division of the Mahāgiriyas. Others say that they are a division of the Sāṃmityas.

These are the four divisions of the Vātsipitūryas. These are the eighteen schools that followed the masters, and these are their basic concepts. There are many more internal sub-divisions that could be mentioned. What are they?

The distinctive doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin are divided into four categories: the transformation of entities (bhūtavatana), the transformation of characteristics (laksana), the transformation of states (avastha), and mutual (anyonya) transformation. The first of these, the transformation of entities, is attributed to Bhadanta

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77 Baceau notes that the Tibetan translator has misunderstood the original Sanskrit samatārin (Pali samādhi). Compare Vasumitra's report on the Mahāsāṅkas, and also Puggalaśāri 1.16: Kāsita ca puggala samatāsa. Yassa puggalaṃ apādena uttvarama dvanripisudāna ca hoti jīviyo puriyojanan ca āyaṃ vuccati puggala samatāsa (Baceau 1954: 260). A person who is samatāsa is a "non-returner" (anāgāmin) (Baceau 1955: 184).

78 This interpretation is confirmed by Vasumitra (Baceau 1955: 185). The reason is that the Buddha is included in the Samgha.

79 Baceau, Wallace, and Teramoto have different interpretations of this sentence. See Baceau 1956: 181.


81 The Mahāsāṅkas make the opposite claim in the preceding section.

82 Although the Tibetan in unclear, Baceau points out that this is a statement of the Kāśyapayas' basic principle: past karma whose result has not yet come to fruition exists, while other aspects of the past do not exist (1955: 202). Baceau takes the first part of the sentence as a dvandva compound and translates it as "la maturation (vipakā) et les chocs de maturation (vipakādharman)."

83 The translation follows Baceau (1955: 202). The Tibetan says only: "There is no complete awareness of removal (parag la yongs su nas shes pa yung yod do)." Vasumitra gives a more complete explanation.

84 The next four paragraphs show that the word "transformation" is meant to apply to all four of these categories. See Kāsa 5.25 for an account of these four positions.
Dharmatīta. He says: “When time passes, dharmas are transformed into other entities, but they are not transformed into other substances. When a golden pot is broken and fashioned into something else, it is transformed into a different shape, but it is not transformed into a different substance. When milk is transformed into curds, it has a different flavor, strength, and result but not a different color. Similarly, when dharmas pass from the past into the present, the entities of the past cease to be, but the substances do not. Similarly, when dharmas pass from the present into the future, the entities of the present cease to be, but the substances do not.”

The doctrine of transformation of characteristics (lakṣaṇa) is attributed to Bhadanta Ghosaka. He says: “When time passes, dharmas that have the characteristic of being past take on (lit. do not lack) the characteristics of being present and future, and dharmas that have the characteristic of being future develop the characteristics of being present and past. For example, when a man desires a particular woman, he develops a desire for others.”

The doctrine of the transformation of state (asava) is attributed to Bhadanta Vasumitra. He says: “When time passes, dharmas that are said to become one thing or another change state but are not transformed into another substance. For example, when one counts a single post, it is called ‘one.’ When it belongs to a series of a hundred, it is called ‘hundred.’ When one counts a thousand, it is called ‘thousand.”

The doctrine of mutual transformation is attributed to Bhadanta Buddhadeva. When time passes, the transformation of one dharna into another depends on [whether it is viewed] before or after it occurs. For example, the same woman can be called mother or daughter.

These four teachers are called Sarvāstivādins because they agree in saying that everything exists.

Similarly, some say that there are seven conditions (pratītya): the causal (hetu), the objective (dhamma), the immediate (samantara), the dominant (adhipatīya), the active (kāriṇa), the nutrient (āhāra), and the supportive (āśraya). Similarly, some say that there are four mental states (citta) that understand (citta-buddhi) the four (māyā) truths. Others say that cognitions (jānāna) of dharmatā and subsequent cognitions (saṃvajjānāna) make eight kinds of cognition, but discriminative cognition (pratisamkhyānā) is not [one of them]. Others say that there are twelve, while others think that there are sixteen. Similarly, some say that there is no consciousness (citta) in unconscious sleep, but there is in the remaining states (saṃpravikto).

When there is a cessation (nirvāṇa) of ideas (sanyāsa) and feelings (vedana), there is a negation (pratiretadlo) of ideas and feelings. The remainder are as above. Someone

who feels aversion toward doubt [achieves] attainment (samāpatti) in meditation (dhyāna) without analysis. In a similar way, someone who feels aversion toward pleasure [achieves] attainment in meditation (dhyāna) without pleasure, and someone who feels aversion toward ideas and feelings [achieves] the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) through the ideas and feelings.

Also, some say that the attainment of the distinction between the object (vijaya) and the mind (citta) is nirvāna. Others say that the absence of the aggregates is nirvāna, but their presence is not. Some say that nirvāna is indeterminate in nature.

Similarly, others say that the immeasurables (asamāna) are the limbs of awakening (bodhiyantena). Some say that there are three great results (phala): the result that is [obtained] by the mind of someone else (paratikāta), the great result, and the result that is immeasurable. Similarly, whatever goes to a certain realm (gati) because of defilements (kāla), accompanied [by these defilements], is karma. Similarly, removal does not go to these realms. Some take the position that one goes first because of one’s previous karma. Others take the position that it is because of habitual (sattvabhāvita) karma.

Some say that it is because of practice (bhāvanā) of five kinds, that is, the practice of the previous four plus a particular condition. Some say that past attachment (upādāna) burns the fire of karma. Others say that it is present karma [that is burned].

Some say that intention (cetasā) is karma, because, by virtue of the five impediments (nironnāna), it is inconsistent with everything that is proper. Some think that the form realm has four colors. Some think that it has one color.

Similarly, others say that there is a person different from the aggregates. They also say that not only the aggregates exist, but the person is conceived as appropriating the aggregates of appropriation (upādānakāndha). This is because the absence of appropriation is nirvāna. When one has investigated the four noble truths in order, one achieves understanding (abhiṣamaya). In the intermediate state there is no inconsistent (vijaya) mind (citta). One enters the fixed way with the limbs of awakening (bodhiyantena) that apprehend suffering. One attains the result of becoming a stream-winner with thirteen thoughts (citta) that are based on attention (manasikāra) concerning the impermanence.

87 This paragraph would be better translated by making human beings the agents of the verb: “To go to a particular realm [of rebirth] because of defilements is karma. When one removes [these defilements], one is not reborn. Some say that the first place one goes is caused by one’s earliest karma. Others say that the first place one goes is caused by one’s habitual karma, etc.”

88 The previous four are karma, the removal of karma, previous karma, and habitual karma.

89 “...ayant bien accompli par les cinq sortes, en fait une distinction entre les quatre antérieurs (gāruṣa) et la condition (pratītya)” (Bureau).

90 As Bureau notes, the Tibetan is unclear. I have followed Bureau’s conjecture about the meaning. On the five nirvānas see BHSD.

91 DN reads khamt kha bar (“four realms”) for kha dog kha (“four colors”).

92 Bureau translates “inconsistent” (Tib. mi stikten pa’i Skt. vipakṣa) as “inadéquate.”
of the conditioned states that are included in the realm of desire. When one is situated in this dhārma [i.e., in the stage of a stream-winner], one does not fall back. One also has begun in this way.49 Even an Arhat can fall back. There is an intermediate realm. The past and future exist. Nirvāṇa is the only goal (artha) of wholesome (kṣālā) dhārmas. The cessation of the aggregates is liberation from time. Even the gods practice celibacy (brahmācariya). One enters the fixed way from the realm of desire. Even ordinary people remove passion and hatred. The five groups of consciousness are neither passionate nor dispassionate, because they are non-conceptual. The sixth is both passionate and dispassionate. An Arhat apprehends the defiled (sātrasāva) and the undefiled (nimātrasāva) with form (rupa) and mind (citta) that are defiled (sātrasāva). One does not go to another place with the mind, but one can apprehend a distant place while remaining here. There is no form in the formless realm (arupadhatu). Even an Arhat can fall back.49 There can be an untimely death. A human being engages in action. There is ordinary, correct vision. Even outsiders have the five superknowledges (abhijñā). Arhats are not provided for by others, are not ignorant, do not have doubts, are not caused to investigate (or comprehend) by others, and do not engage in speech.47 This is because they have generated the faculties (indriya), powers (bala), and limbs of awakening (bodhiyāga).

The Śrāvakas of the Blessed One are not born in Uttarakuru,48 in the heaven of Māra (nirākārya), or as an unconscious (asamājīna) being.49 A stream-winner does not attain meditation (dhyāna).49 All sūtras are definitive in meaning (nītātika). There are dispositions (anuṣṭava) that are not associated (aviprayukta) [with the mind]49 and dispositions that are mental phenomena (citta). The conditioned (samtikta) dhārmas are momentary and not momentary. When appropriation ceases, karma is burned.

93 Another obscure sentence. The de bhin du at the beginning might indicate that it begins another topic.

94 Read bhiṣa.

95 Repetition of a sentence that appears earlier in the paragraph.

96 This point and the four that follow negate the “five points” of Mahādeva mentioned earlier. The first four points are clear; the fifth is more problematic. As before, it seems likely that the formula “do not engage in speech” means that Arhats do not proceed on the path by pronouncing the word “suffering.”

97 “In a state of concentration” can be supplied from the discussion of the Vyūhārākas.

98 Uttarakuru (or Kuru) is one of the four continents (dvipa) in Kāla 3.55.

99 Interprets khaud rīs as nāmākārya (gods who belong to the heaven of Māra). Lamotte (1972: 100) explains that Māra is the head of the sixth and last class of the gods of the desire realm (bhūmadhatu). See also “Teirī 335-46 and DPPN 2.613 (s.v. “Māra”).

100 Kāla 2.41 and commentary explain that the beings who are unconscious (asamājītha) are the Bṛhatphala gods. According to the commentary on Kāla 3.1, the Bṛhatphalas reside in the fourth bhūta of the form realm (tīrṣṭadhatu).

101 This and the following sentence negate two of the “additional basic claims” from which large portions of the preceding paragraph are drawn.

102 On the dhārmas that are not associated with the mind (cittanuprayukta), see Kāla 2.35. The dispositions are discussed at the beginning of Kāla 5.
that someone whose obsessions (paryavasthāna) need to be removed commits deadly sins (śāmantāyā), it is not because of something else. By collecting into four the dispositions (ānālaya) that are removed by vision (darśana), one has collected all. These cut off all wholesome roots (kulaśānta) but the ones that are removed by practice (bhāvānta) do not. As long as one resides entirely in practice, one is not hurt by anyone else, nor is one hurt by effort; and when one's time has run out, one dies. All Arhants die by separating but do not die by transmigrating. As it is said, "One dies by separating from the body, because an Arhat separates from the last body." Body here means the body with the senses (indriyakāya). That which is going to exist, that which does exist, that which is going to cease, that which does cease, that which is going to arise, that which does arise, that which is going to die, that which does die, that which is going to act, that which does act, that which is going to be destroyed, that which is destroyed, that which is going to move, that which does move, that which is going to be conscious, and that which is conscious exist.109 They are included in three groups of sentient beings, but they are not all dhāranas.110 All feelings come from karma. All karma that has to be removed by previous practice (bhāvānta) matures by means of karma. This is the end of the explanation of the divisions in the eighteen schools.

If the Mahāyāna were included in any of these scholastic divisions (vikāryabheda), it would be considered the Buddha's teaching, but, because it is not even mentioned in the teachings (pravacana) of these schools, the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. It is not included in the eighteen schools because it was not collected by the compilers of the root collection111 at the time of the Buddha's paraṇirvāṇa and was not collected by compilers later, after the schism.

MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS

To teach that the Tathāgata is eternal contradicts the statement that everything is impermanent. To say that there is "pervasion by the essence of the Tathāgata" (tathāgatagatagrabha) and that there is an "appropriating consciousness" (upādānāvijñāna) does not avoid the concept of a self (ātmanikra). To say that the Buddha has not attained nirvāṇa is to say that there is no peace. These three claims contradict three seals of the Dharma.112 [The Mahāyāna] predicts [the awakening] of great Śrāvakas and insults

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108 The anusayas removed by vision [of the four noble truths] are discussed in Kosa 5.4. Those that are removed by practice are discussed in Kosa 5.5. Unfortunately these two sentences remain obscure.
109 A repetition of the formula used earlier in the account of the Sāṃśīrītiyās.
110 This sentence is unclear.
111 [Tib. rin chos bogs dag par stod par byed pa / Skt. mālāśantaśīkāra.]
112 The seals of the Dharma (dharmanumāda), like the dharma-sūtraśāiras, are summaries of the Dharma. They appear in lists of three (as here) or four, including three "characteristics"

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Arhants. It also pays homage to householders and exalts Bodhisattvas over Buddhas. The vows (pratihāra) of Bodhisattvas like Gaganagāra are just words.113 To say that Śākyamuni is a manifestation (pirmudāna) denies the entire teaching (upadeśa). To say that [the Buddha] is always in a state of concentration (sanātana) is unreasonable. Many [Mahāyāna] sūtras teach useless mantras. To say that even great evil can be uprooted denies that karma has a result. The Vaipulya has a different teaching.114 And [the Mahāyāna] is not mentioned in the divisions in the dream of Kṛṣṇa.115 For all these

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113 The name Gaganagāra ("Space-Treasury") occurs in a list of Bodhisattvas in MVY 700 and at the beginning of the Viśnulekhitimārdana Sūtra. (For other occurrences, see LM 1976: 2.) Why Gaganagāra would be singled out in this critique of the Bodhisattva vow is unclear, especially when other, better-known Bodhisattva vows might have served just as well. The answer to this question seems to lie in the story of Gaganagāra as told in The Questions of Gaganagāra Sūtra (Ārya Gaganagāralapprokaprakāśa Sūtra, Osani no. 81). In response to Gaganagāra, the Buddha explains how a series of categories, beginning with generosity (śīleśa), are similar to space (sattva gac瀚am). When the Buddha finishes his explanation, a Bodhisattva named Mūry-du Spob-pa asks Gaganagāra to explain the meaning of his name: "Does it mean that space (gac瀚am) is your treasury (garṭa)?" Gaganagāra replies: "Yes, space is my treasury." Then the Buddha asks Gaganagāra to show the distinctive characteristic (uṭṭa) of 'Space-Treasury': Gaganagāra tells Mūry-du Spob-pa to ask for whatever he wants, and it will showered him from space. The text goes on to explain that these gifts come from Gaganagāra's sustaining power (ādhisāthana) and from the sustaining power of his vows (prasādānāvībhāga). (De-Jeg Pa, folio 284a.2.) A later passage explains that Gaganagāra's vows (prasādānā) are inexhaustable, just as space is inexhaustible (Pǎ, folio 288b.7), and goes on to say that space is "just words" (meng cem nang mi nam mtho'i 'r the la kha dog 'bya ba kyung med tibs stod dang yid dam 'ong sras lcags yin ming gi sngon ces bu ston pa'i'i). (Pǎ, folio 288a.1-2.) Here the opponent's argument seems to play on the idea that Gaganagāra's vows, like space, are "just words."

114 In the second chapter of the VY (158-60), Vasubandhu explains that a monk who knows the Dharma (dharma-nirvāṇa) knows the twelve divisions [Tib. yon lag / Skt. anuṣṭāṇa] of the Buddha's teaching. These divisions are śūtra, geya, vyākaraṇa, gāthā, udāna, niṣedha, adanda, iṣṭvāntaka, jātaka, vaipulya, udiśuddhārtha, and upadeśa. Vasubandhu equates the Vaipulya with the Mahāyāna and explains that the Mahāyāna is "a teaching (Tib. long phug pa / Skt. upadeśa) according to which Bodhisattvas use ten perfections to reach ten stages (khātā) and attain Buddhahood, as the location of ten powers (daṭṭhabhāgāvāra)." Later in the text (175-76), Vasubandhu formulates the opponent's objection as a claim about the nature of the Vaipulya: "Similarly, the claim that the vaipulya-āṅga is the Mahāyāna contradicts tradition (āgama)." Bhāviveka's position is similar to Vasubandhu's and is subject to the same objection. Skilling (1997b: 31-42) points out that this position is also found in the Tārāṣṭra (34). See LM 1988: 140-47 on the place of the vaipulya-āṅga in the nine and twelve stages of the Buddhist canon.

115 King Kṛṣṇa (Pali Kikī) is a legendary king of Benares who lived at the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa. The ten dreams of King Kṛṣṇa are mentioned in the commentary on Kosa 3.13 in the context of a discussion in the intermediate existence (antarabhāva). Vasubandhu says that the form of the soul is similar to the form it will assume in the next life. This claim provokes another question: If so, why did the Bodhisattva's mother dream that the Bodhisattva entered her womb in the form of a white elephant? Vasubandhu explains that
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reasons, the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. It clearly was [taught] by Māra to mislead foolish and ignorant people.114 There are many other [points] that have not been mentioned.

The Mahāyāna view (darśana) also completely contradicts perception and so forth. 4.9 If a cognition apprehends something like material form and also is aware of itself, it must exist. So someone who holds the doctrine of no-arising also contradicts perception.117

her dream was only a sign of the future, like the dreams of King Krkn. Yafomitra's commentary on Kāt 3.13 tells the story of the dreams, based, he says, on the Vinayas: "King Krkn saw ten dreams: an elephant goes out through a window and is caught by the tail; a well flows in front of someone who is thirsty; someone trades barley for pearls; sandalwood is scatted like wood; thieves steal flowers and fruit from trees in a park; a young elephant frightens older elephants; a monkey is smeared with something unclean and defiles others; a monkey is consecrated as a king; eighteen people tug on a small piece of cloth; a large group of people disagree with one another and start to quarrel, and so forth." When King Krkn tells these dreams to the Buddha Kāsypa, Kāsypa explains that they are signs of a conflict that will arise at the time of the Buddha Śakyamuni: "In the future there will be a Tathāgata named Śakyamuni. When his Śrāvakas have been scattered, after leaving the company of their own people and relations and going forth into monastic life, they will consider monasteries to be their homes and will become attached, like an elephant who goes out through a window and is caught by the tail." Here in the Tj, the objector is referring to the last two of Krkn's dreams. Kāsypa explains: "The dream of the cloth shows that [Śakyamuni's] teaching will be divided into eighteen parts, but the cloth of liberation will not be torn. The dream about the quarrel shows that his Śrāvakas will fall into disputes with one another because of their adherence to schools (niṣkāmaśāstra)." For further references to the dreams of King Krkn, see Lessing and Wayman 1968: 66-69, E. Obermiller 1936-1939: vol. 2, p. 98. La Vallée Poussin has a helpful summary of earlier scholarship on the dreams in the notes on his translation of Kāt 3.13.

116 On the accusation that the Mahāyāna is the teaching of Māra, see Jaini 2002. Compare also the Raivaita. "These are not what was spoken by the Buddha, but rather they are one's own personal fabrications, or they are created by Māra to cause havoc. Therefore they will mislead many beings" (translated in Silk 1994: 382-83).

117 The commentary on 4.9 explains that the two predicates in the first half of the verse ("apprehends something like material form" and "is aware of itself") are meant to serve as reasons for two separate flaws in the doctrine of non-arising (epitvādhipatikā). If a cognition has an object, then the denial of external objects contradicts perception (pratyakṣa). If a cognition is aware of itself (svamaparikāya), then the claim that cognition does not arise contradicts common sense (pratiruddha). The word api in the first line sets "aware of itself" apart as a separate point in addition to "apprehends something like material form." The function of the api in the second line is less clear. It seems to indicate only that "the contradiction of perception" is not the only problem with the assertion of no-arising. If this is its purpose, the word api would have been a better choice, but it is not supported by the commentary. It is difficult to account for the use of gned to translate jñātate. It would make more sense to read yed to conform to the last line of the commentary.

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A cognition that apprehends something like material form is one that apprehends objects (vipakṣa) such as material form. Conceptual cognitions of objects (vipakṣavyāpādānā) are defined as conceptual cognitions that are consistent with the thing itself (bhūvartkāra).118 (To say that a cognition is aware of) itself means that it is experienced in its own continuum (sanātana). The word "also" (api) means that all sentient beings have this knowledge. If a cognition has an object, then the idea that [objects] do not arise is unreasonable and contradicts perception (pratyakṣa). The claim that [objects] do not arise also contradicts common sense (pratiruddha), because it contradicts something that everyone knows.

4.10 If he says that he does not contradict perception and common sense, because he uses the qualification "In reality things do not arise,"

If he says: Māhyamikas make statements such as the following: "[Cognition] is not in the eye, it is not in form, and it is not between them or in both of them. Wherever it might be present, it neither exists nor does not exist,"119 So no cognition (jñāna) is apprehended. For this reason, it is impossible for us ultimately to contradict either perception (pratyakṣa) or common sense (lokapratiruddha), because there is no perception and ordinary people (loka) are deluded by a veil of ignorance.

To show that he is a clown (jñātikāya), [we] reply:

4.11 Then this faulty argument would be correct: "It is ultimately correct to have sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another [woman]."120

"It is ultimately correct to have sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden" is the point to be proved (udhyāya). "Because she is a woman" is the reason (hetu). Anyone who is a woman is appropriate for sexual relations. What is the example? Like another woman; that is, like one's own wife. Some may say that this point contradicts ordinary experience (leukikā) and tradition (āgama), but there is no fault, because this point is qualified by the word "ultimately." But this is unreasonable. It is as if a wicked person said that, when desire drives someone to approach a woman, all women are equally capable of relieving desire. When you improperly deny (uparuddha) all things, it is like saying that there is nothing wrong with that statement.

118 On conceptual cognition in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see the notes on 5.14.

119 The source of this verse is unclear. It is not found in MMK 3 (vakarūdhvikriyopapātā), in Āryadeva's Catubājakas 13 (on the sense faculties and their objects), or in Bhāviveka's analysis of vision in MHK 3.46ff.

120 This verse should be read together with the reference to Persian (pārthikā or māga) religion in the next verse. Apparently a common charge against Persian religion was that it advocated forbidden sex (agamyākhyāna). See Lindner 1988 and van der Kuijff 2006.
4.12 If he says that the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then that is not true. Otherwise, the teaching of Yonaka Deva would be true, and that is not acceptable.\footnote{121}

In the Mahayana, the statements, "Suffering, arising, cessation, and the path do not exist," and, "Even someone who understands the four noble truths does not attain nirvana," are accepted as the words of the Teacher. If the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then explain what else is true? If someone says that the teaching of the Mahayana is true, this is unreasonable, because it differs from the vision of the [four noble] truths, like the teaching of Yonaka Deva. According to this [teaching], the following is true: "One is liberated from transmigration by killing an ant with a golden needle in a golden pot. The one who kills this ant is thought to gain the result of liberation. Killing cows, and so forth, and having sex with one's parent are causes of heaven and so forth."\footnote{121}

Furthermore, the Mahayana opponent misinterprets the traditional statement, "The triple world is mind-only," and denies the existence of the external sense-media (babhyayana) and so forth.\footnote{121} So the teaching of the Mahayana again is wrong, for the following reason:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [121] The commentary makes the logical structure of this verse more clear. The objector has in mind the following syllogism: "The statement that the four noble truths are not true is not true, because it is different from the four noble truths, like the teaching of Yonaka Deva." If a statement that contradicts the four noble truths could be true, then the teaching of Yonaka Deva could also be true, and that is not a point that the Mahayana accepts. The phrase "the particle that" (which corresponds to the Sanskrit particle it), refers to the Mahayana opponent who holds the doctrine of no-arising (aparisthata) in verse 4.10, as is clear from the commentary. For a full discussion of the reference to Yonaka Deva in this verse see Lindner 1988.
  \item [122] Van der Kuip (2006: 198) points out that the elements of this ritual are discussed in Avalokitesvara's commentary on Bhaviveka's Pratyabhijna as a ritual.
  \item [123] The Yogacara view of the apprehension (and no-apprehension) of mind-only is discussed in 3.4 and commentary. "Based on the apprehension (pratityabhijna) of mind-only (citamatra), there arises no apprehension of objects (stipta). If there are no objects (gritishtiti), there also can be no apprehension of objects (stipta). Therefore, based on no-apprehension of objects, there arises no apprehension of the six forms of consciousness that constitute the subject." Bhaviveka's response begins in 3.17.
\end{itemize}
Here the quotation marks indicate that [the verse] introduces the response (uttarapaksa). The opponent is an adherent of the Sravakayana. "The approach that was explained earlier" refers to verses such as "Earth and so forth do not have the nature of elements." According to this approach, his approach, which is the approach of the Tripiṭaka, has gone wrong. "Cannot tolerate" means "cannot bear." His statements are his claims of refutation. "Are unreasonable" means that they will be refuted by the response that follows. This is the meaning of the verse.

The opponent's objection implies the following argument: The Teacher has non-conceptual cognition (aurusikalpa), because he apprehends the four noble truths, just as Pratyekabuddhas and so forth have [non-conceptual] cognition. We reply as follows:

4.16 [We] think that the Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual, because his cognition apprehends no-self, just as it has the no-self of persons as its object.

"According to the approach explained earlier, there is a misstep (vipada) in [the opponent's] own approach." The word vipada ("misstep") could be translated as "misfortune," "disaster," or even "death," but its root meaning comes from the verb pad (to "fall" or "go"). With the prefix vi-, it means to go astray. Monier-Williams defines vi-pad as its verbal form: "to go wrongly, fall,miscarry, come to nought, perish, die."

126 Verses 4.16-19 respond to the Sravaka's first objection in verse 4.2:

The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition, because it is a body, like the body of a cowherd.

Rather than criticize this syllogism directly, Bhaviveka takes up the assumption that lies behind it:

The Teacher has non-conceptual cognition, because he apprehends the four noble truths, just as Pratyekabuddhas and so forth have [non-conceptual] cognition.

This syllogism reads more clearly if "cognition" is taken as the subject:

The Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual, because it apprehends the four noble truths, like the cognition of Pratyekabuddhas and so forth.

In verse 4.16, Bhaviveka gives a syllogism of his own:

The Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual, because his cognition apprehends no-self, like [a cognition] that has the no-self of persons as its object.

The Blessed One has no concept of a person, because he understands that persons have no self, and he has no concept of a dharma, because he understands that dharmas have no self. Since everything is either a person or a dharma, what can he conceptualize that would affect his non-conceptuality?

4.17ab The [opponent's] argument is refuted, because it does not avoid contradiction. This argument refutes the [opponent's] previous argument by contradicting it.

4.17cd When it denies the arising of functional cognitions and so forth.

Functional (prajapyata) cognitions are subsequent to supermundane (lokottara) non-conceptual (aurusikalpa) cognitions. These are called pure mundane cognitions (budhahrukkajñānā), and Madhyamikas think that these [cognitions] arise. The opponents imagine that, according to our view, none of the Buddha's actions exist, beginning with the Blessed One's forty-year teaching of the Dharma. They also [imagine] that we deny the arising of functional cognitions. This is incorrect, because it superimposes [the opponents' own interpretation] on [a position] that is not at fault.

But when it comes to supermundane cognition, we use reason to prove that it is incorrect to argue that [supermundane cognition] is conceptual. This is proved in the following way:

4.18 Since there is no object of cognition, awakening is understood as the no-arising of cognition with regard to this [no-object], because this [no-arising] is consistent with the reality (tattva) of the object.

127 The relationship between verses 4.17ab and 4.16 is unclear. Since 4.17ab is missing in the Tibetan, the verses and the commentary, it is possible that it was originally part of the commentary and was added incorrectly to the Sanskrit text of the verses.

128 On functional (prajapyata) cognitions, see Ras 2.53 and 72.

129 Verse 4.18 follows Bhaviveka's definition of the Buddha in MNK 3.266-67: "No object of knowledge exists at all, so the Buddha who know reality say that the reality that has no equal is [the object] about which not even a non-conceptual cognition arises. The no-arising of cognition, which is called 'Buddha' because it is the understanding of this [reality], is the primary [Buddha], because it is the understanding that is no-understanding, and because it dispels the sleep of concepts." Behind the complexity of these clauses, Bhaviveka is making a simple point: in the primary or literal (amokhyā) sense, a Buddha is the no-arising (anudaya) of cognition (abhidharma). Why is it no-arising? Because there ultimately is nothing for any cognition to know.

While the obvious way to read 4.18 is as a reflection of the definition in 3.266-67, the Tibetan translation introduces a different interpretation: instead of anudaya (no-arising), it assumes anudaya (arising that is consistent) and takes the relative pronoun yan as if it were
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4.19 [We] think that the Buddha's cognition is free from concepts of identity (svabhāva) and so forth. If [you] are denying that this [cognition] has a locus, [you] are proving [our] point.¹⁰⁶

Non-conceptual awakening has no concept (vikalpa) of the identity of a thing as itself or as something else, the discrimination (nirūpaṇa) of this identity, or the recollection (anumāna) of this identity.¹¹⁰ It also is perceptual in nature (pratyakṣa-darśana). [We] think that this [non-conceptual awakening] is the Teacher. If [you] are proving that this [non-conceptual awakening] does not have the manifestation body (nirvāṇa-kūţa) called Śākyamuni as its locus (ārya), [you] prove [our] point, because its locus is the enjoyment body (sambhogakūţa) that resides in Akanittha.

Objection: In that case, how can it be called peaceful (sānta), empty (sānya), nondual (ākāya), and so forth?

Reply:

"the one of whom a cognition arises that is consistent with this [object] is known as the non-conceptual awakened one." This introduces a person into Bhāviveka's verse and relieves the starkness of his language, but it is inconsistent with the form used elsewhere in the text. It is preferable to read anumāna and identify the primary or literal Buddha simply as non-arising. Near the end of the commentary on this verse, the phrase "whose identity is unestablished" uses the word svabhāva, a word that can be used to translate the Yogacāra concept of absolute (pariṇāpema) identity. It is more likely that the word is being used here in a non-technical sense, since the Yogacāra meaning would add an unnecessarily controversial note to this already complex passage. Bhāviveka directly addresses the opponent's thesis in verse 4.2: "The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition." He agrees that Śākyamuni's body is not the locus. For him Śākyamuni is simply a "manifestation body" (nirvāṇakūţa). He thinks that the locus of awakening is the "enjoyment body" (sambhogakūţa) in Akanittha heaven. This point is discussed in more detail in the commentary on MHK 3.268 (Eckel 1992: 159-60).

¹¹² Words such as "pure" (suddha), "inherently luminous" (pratyakṣa-darśana), and the one who alleviates poverty and sickness are applied with one's own concepts, as in the case of a wishing-jewel.

Objection: According to the teaching, full perfect awakening (saṁyak-sambodhi) is attained by the eightfold path (lit. the path that begins with right vision).¹¹³

Reply: This is true, but one attains full, perfect awakening by practicing this path with the approach of no-apprehension (anupālambha) and without habitual attachment to things (nastubhibhāgita). What is the practice of no-apprehension?

4.20cd-21 Someone who practices the path that begins with right vision as no vision, no thought, no speech, no action, no livelihood, no effort, no mindfulness, and no concentration, ...¹¹⁴

Right vision is no vision, because no dharmas are established in their own right. Right thought is no thought, because past thoughts have ceased, future thoughts have not yet occurred, and present thoughts do not continue. Right speech is no speech, because it is impossible to apprehend as speech the place, action, and effort, separately or together, of individual syllables. Right action is no action, because the body, senses, and mind have no self, and, because the sentient being who engages in good action ceases as soon as it arises, there ultimately is nothing to receive the action. Right livelihood

132 Compare MHK 3.282: "Words such as 'Buddha' are superimposed in a way that corresponds to the Buddha's understanding (pratyakṣa), but ultimately the Buddha is considered indecipherable because he cannot be conceptualized in any way" (Eckel 1992: 165).
133 In verses 4.20-21, Bhāviveka responds to the Śrāvāka's objection in verse 4.3.
134 The word for "mind" in Pali is citta, in Skt. citrā. The same term is translated as "composite cognition" in the commentary on 5.90ab.
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is no livelihood, because the body’s primordial attachment to possessions causes the body to grow and accumulate things like food and clothing. The idea that these are beneficial is superimposed on the aggregates, as on a ball of foam, a bubble, a mirage, a plantain tree, or an illusion." The body is inanimate, unconscious, and inactive, like grass or trees, and the mind is like an illusion, so they do not engage in right effort even for a moment. In reality there is no right effort, but striving for wholesome qualities (kusala-dharma) can be referred to as right effort conventionally (samyak-karma). Ultimately there is no experience of sense-consciousness (indriya-saṁvedana), so what can mindfulness, which is a mental consciousness (mano-saṁvedana) that arises subsequent to [sense consciousness], conform to? If there is nothing to be mindful of, there is no act of mindfulness that can be called “mindfulness.” However, it is possible to say in a relative sense (samyak-saṁvid) that non-forgetfulness is right mindfulness. Since past consciousness (citta) has ceased, future consciousness has not yet arisen, and present consciousness is about to cease, there is not even a moment of consciousness to be concentrated. There is no sequential apprehension of objects, so no-concentration is referred to conventionally as concentration.137

A Bodhisattva who has practiced this [path]

4.22 achieves the awakening of a Buddha. Since this is our position, either there is nothing to prove something that we have already accepted, or one should investigate the practice.

When [the opponents] say that awakening is achieved by the eightfold path, they prove something that has already been accepted. If the opponents do not accept this, one should focus on the eightfold path and investigate whether it is reasonable to practice it as we have described it.

Objection: When someone follows this path, is it reasonable to practice it this way?

And in what way is it reasonable?

Reply: It is held to be true if it follows inference and does not contradict tradition.

Objection: Following your inference contradicts tradition.

Reply: 4.23 For scholars who follow inference, reality does not contradict tradition, and they think of practice in exactly the same way.138

The introduction to “Seeking the Knowledge of Reality,” defines reality as peaceful, empty, non-dual, not dependent on anything else, no-apprehension, and so forth. This does not contradict tradition or reason. We have established it, and it is reality. The reason (yukti) for this practice (bhāvanā) will be explained shortly. Its traditional sources (āgama) are as follows:

It is said:140 “O Mahāyāna, whoever sees all dharmas as equal, non-dual, and incapable of being dichotomized has the right view. O Mahāyāna, whoever sees all dharmas without seeing and without thought, concept, or imagination has right thought. Whoever sees all dharmas without speaking and understands the equality of no speech has right speech. Whoever sees all dharmas without action and who does not apprehend any agent has right action. Whoever does not increase or decrease any dharmas and who stays in the equality of no livelihood has right livelihood. Whoever does not initiate any dharma, does not undertake anything, and does not attempt to subdue anyone else has right effort. Whoever is free from the path in which one is mindful of all dharmas and thus has no mindfulness has right mindfulness. O Mahāyāna, whoever sees all dharmas as naturally concentrated, does not apprehend the disturbance of any effort and has right concentration. This is the way to see the noble eightfold path. Anyone who has this correct view of the path is said to have crossed over, to have gone beyond, to have reached dry land, to have attained peace, to have attained fearlessness, to be undefiled, to be an Arahant, an ascetic, and a brahmin.”

Likewise, in The Perfection of Wisdom it says: “One should practice the right view based on isolation, non-attachment, and cessation with the approach of no-apprehension.”

Someone may say that this practice of no vision is a different path, but this should not be said. It should be said that [awakening] is achieved by the same path. Why? The right way to practice the eightfold path is as an antidote to remove unwholesome dharmas, such as wrong views, that are not conducive to liberation. In the Aṣṭa-Akṣayavatātisatyavādī Sūtra it says:141 “What is right vision? Right vision does not come from seeing a noble one as having the self, the being, the life, the motion, the soul, the person, the cessation, the permanence, the existence, the non-existence, the wholesome [dharma], the unwholesome [dharma], the indeterminate [dharma], the rebirth, and the nirvāṇa of a supermundane noble one. What is right thought? Right thought is not as the predicate. I have reversed the order to make clear that this is Bhāviveka's definition of reality.

139 This definition mirrors the definition in MHK 1.1-2. Compare also MHK 3.245-46, 266ff. On Bhāviveka’s understanding of inference and tradition, see Part I of this book.

140 The source is the Aṣṭa-Akṣayavatātisatyavādī Sūtra (phags pa chos thams cad 'byung ba med par dbang pa chos bya ba bstan pa chen po ma, Tōkoku no. 180, Ma, folios 267a-96a). This quotation is located in folios 278a to 278b. Bhāviveka abbreviates the conclusion; otherwise, he follows the text closely. Some fragments of the corresponding Sanskrit text, along with an edition of the Tibetan, have been published in Brāvīg 2000: 139ff.

to think thoughts that are passionate, hateful, or ignorant and to think thoughts that stem from moral conduct, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and the vision in which there is knowledge of liberation. Therefore, one carries out the practice of no vision, and so forth, in order to remove habitual attachment to real things. By doing this, one removes the stream (samāna) of defilements, along with their traces (uśāna), with a single, correct moment of a Self Existent One’s realization (abhisamayā) of the reality of all dharmas. If traces have to do with the existence and continued presence of objects of cognition (jīvya), then, on what basis can a trace arise when one does not apprehend any object of cognition? This is the sequence (krama) of practice in the Mahāyāna.

[The next verse] explains that one attains reality by practicing the aforementioned path with this kind of vision.

4.24ab ‘To understand this is to be Buddha. Anything else is mother’s candy.

Dt 16a It is reasonable to say that a Buddha has understood reality by practicing this traditional teaching in a way that is consistent with reason, because such a person has correct knowledge. If an argument about reality is consistent only with tradition and contradicts reason, it is like the sweet medicine that mothers give to little children. It cannot stand up to analysis. To trick little children into taking their medicine, some women give them hard pieces covered with sugar, saying: “Here, eat this candy.” Thinking that their mothers would not deceive them, these children put the pieces in their mouths, bite down hard, and break their teeth. In the same way, some people do not properly understand that the Sugata’s teaching is like the prescription of a great physician: it uses conventional language (saṃketa) and has a hidden intention (abhiprāya). They take the statement, “This is the Sage’s teaching,” literally, and they teach this habit (abhimāna) to others. Scholars think of these people like children who take sweet medicine from their mothers. They should not follow tradition alone; they should engage in rational inference.

The reason (yukti) is as follows: Noble Śrāvakas have a realization (abhisamayā)

that consists of the vision only of dharmas. Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding (parijñāna) of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). They [accomplish this] by practicing the aforementioned path as if it were a real thing. A Blessed One achieves awakening by perfecting (sampatti) no-apprehension. This does not happen unless concepts of real things are completely uprooted. Therefore, it is the practice of no-apprehension that causes the noble path to function in a distinctive way to bring about perfect awakening. But [the path] is not limited to one group or another.

4.24cd This is a decisive response to the claim that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching.

An argument that produces certainty and causes someone to understand the point at hand is a decisive response (sīrṣaya). What is it? The Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, because it does not contradict tradition that is consistent with reason. If it contradicts inference, it would not be the Buddha’s teaching, like the doctrine of nihilism (vākena). The Mahāyāna is not contradicted by reason. The reason will be explained later. Therefore, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna. Furthermore,

4.25 The aforementioned path is not sufficient to attain the Buddha’s awakening, because its awakening has to do with the aspects of suffering and so forth, like the path of the Pratyekabuddhas.

Without the practice of no-vision and so forth should be supplied. The aspects of suffering and so forth are as follows. Suffering has four aspects: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and no-self. The aspects of arising, cessation, and the path are described in the sūtras in a similar way. Or one can think of the twelve aspects as suffering, arising, cessation, the path, which is to be understood, that which is to be removed, that which is to be realized, that which is to be practiced, the act of understanding, the act of removal, the act of realization, and the act of practice. The Pratyekabuddha path is similar. Since the Blessed One does not apprehend these twelve aspects, he understands their equality.

4.26 Either the opponent’s position is contradicted by inference or the example is impossible. This [path] does not remove those [obstacles].

Verses 4.25-26 respond to the objection in verses 4.4-5. The key syllogism was stated in verse 4.5:

Obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path, because they are mental obstacles, like the obstacles that consist of defilements.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

 partes the obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path. However, the obstacles to knowledge cannot be removed without the distinctive practice of no-apprehension. Even the Blessed One does not remove the obstacles to knowledge with this path, because he removes them with another distinctive form of practice. If it were possible to remove the obstacles to knowledge on this path, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas would remove both obstacles, along with their traces, but this is impossible. Therefore, the obstacles to knowledge are only removed by the distinctive practice of the path as described in the Mahāyāna.

Furthermore,

4.27 The cognitions of no-arising and cessation are not ultimately true, because they are conceptual, like an erroneous cognition. What is awakening really about?

The cognitions that the aggregates do not arise and that defilements cease occur when a person completes the sixteen moments of thought, namely conviction (äcäya) in the cognition of dharma with regard to suffering, cognition of dharma with regard to suffering, perseverance in the subsequent cognition of suffering, the subsequent cognition of suffering, and the same [perseverance in the cognition of dharma], cognition of dharma in subsequent cognition, and [subsequent] cognition with regard to arising, cessation and the path. Since this was taught by the Blessed One, the opponent thinks that awakening is the cognitions of cessation and no-arising, but this is not consistent with reason. To refute it, we say that these [cognitions] are not ultimately true. Why? Because they are conceptual, like an erroneous cognition. The cognitions of cessation and no-arising are like an erroneous cognition, that is, they apprehend a false [object], so they cannot be correct awareness.

4.28ab This also responds to the reason in which the Mahāyāna is called a different vehicle.

4.28cd How can an Arhat attain nirvāṇa if he still has obstacles?

There are two obstacles: the obstacles that consist of defilements (kāleśvaraṇa) and the obstacles to knowledge (jñeyaṃvaraṇa). There are two types of obstacles that consist of defilements: those that cause bondage (bandhaṇa) and those that consist of traces (uśhā). The obstacles to knowledge cause bondage. Of these [obstacles], the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas remove only the defilements that cause bondage, not the defilements that consist of traces. They also do not remove the second kind of obstacle, the obstacle to knowledge. Therefore, it is wrong to say that an Arhat attains nirvāṇa, because he still has obstacles, like a stream-winner (srotasāpattana). This proves that Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have to remove traces and accumulate the requisites of awakening (buddhi-suhṛtā) to become Buddhas.

If so, there are two kinds of ignorance: defiled (ācāret) and undefiled (akṣetra). Of these, defiled ignorance is made up of pride in the self, ignorance of the self, desire for the self, and so forth. Undefiled ignorance is made up of traces, as is said in Vararuci’s Teaching of the Deeds of the Buddha: 149

There are two kinds of ignorance: mundane (laśaka) and noble (ārya).

147 On the sixteen moments, see note 15.
148 In verse 4.6 the opponent argued: Even in the Mahāyāna, the same path leads to omniscience, because the Mahāyāna is a different vehicle, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna. The commentary on 4.28ab explains that the author responds with a syllogism of his own:

The path of the Śrāvakayāna does not cause perfect awakening, because it lacks the practice of no-apprehension and cannot remove obstacles to knowledge, like the Pratyekabuddhayāna.

The challenge here is to relate the syllogism in the commentary to the condensed language of the verse. Bhāviveka seems to be saying that the opponent has used “other-vehicleless” as his reason (bhāvyatukastakṣetra) to prove that the path of the Śrāvakayāna leads to omniscience. Bhāviveka argues that this path cannot produce omniscience because it lacks the necessary practice of no-apprehension. The Sanskrit is puzzling. The noun akṣetra is normally feminine (ācārya). If we accept the reading ācārya, then it should be an adjective agreeing with gatasaṃsāraḥ. If we change ācārya (ācāryaḥ before sandhi) to ācāryaḥ, then sandhi will reduce the length of the verse by one syllable. The best option is to treat gatasaṃsāraḥ (“response”) as the noun and -ācārya as the adjective. The literal translation of the verse would then be: “by this same [argument] there is a response that speaks of other-vehicle-lessness as the reason.”

149 Vararuci’s Teaching of the Deeds of the Buddha (Tib. bston gyi rgyas kyi mdzad pa lha ston pa / Skt. buddhavīraṇyaśīrādeṣa) is quoted again later in this chapter in Bhāviveka’s discussion of the claim that “The Mahāyāna predicts the awakening of great Śrāvakas and insults Arhats.” The name Vararuci appears in several forms in Tibetan: mongs k ’dod (as here), dba’ra c (later in this chapter), and mongs kred (MVB 3496, in a list of “previous teachers” that includes Bhāvaya and Panini). Tāranātha transmits two different legends about a figure named Vararuci. One has to do with a brāhmaṇa who lived on the northern frontier during the reign of king Mahāpātana and was involved in the transmission of the Vīhatta (Tāranātha: 85-87). Another has to do with a brāhmaṇa who lived in Magadhā and traveled to other regions of India, including the south where he taught Sanskrit grammar to king Udayana (Tāranātha: 111-15). Sanskrit traditions about Vararuci’s life and works are even less conclusive, as noted by Losang Norbu Shastri (2001). The title Deeds of the Buddha does not appear in any of the known lists of Vararuci’s works.
The mundane produces karmic formations; the noble goes beyond. When a student is in a state of cessation, with a concentrated mind, he has no grasping and is no longer reborn. When he is not in a state of cessation, he is deluded by noble ignorance. He is said to be liberated when his consciousness is free from grasping. But how can someone who is deluded be liberated if he is deluded? His consciousness is hidden in dharmas as sense media (gatana). He is not reborn, but he has not reached final awakening. Compared to the Buddha’s Dharma Body, his nirvāṇa is passive. True nirvāṇa is the Dharma Body of the Buddha. The Buddha realizes this and continues by his sustaining power.

Noble Śrāvakas completely remove defiled ignorance by understanding the selflessness of persons. Undefiled ignorance does not obstruct this liberation, so they are said to have attained the cognitions of cessation and non-arising, even though they still have [undefiled ignorance].

4.29 If [the opponent] thinks that [a Śrāvaka’s] liberation is like a Buddha’s, because [a Śrāvaka] removes defiled ignorance, this is wrong, because neither the primary nor the manifested Buddha actually [removes defiled ignorance].

As a Bodhisattva, the Buddha removes defiled ignorance by realizing the conviction (kṣaṇi) that is based on words (ghosanγa), based on analysis (anumāna), and directed toward dharmas that do not arise (anupattikadharmas). Neither the primary [Buddha], which is the Dharma Body, nor the manifested (nirvāṇa) Buddha remove defiled ignorance. So a Buddha and [a Śrāvaka] do not have the same liberation.

Furthermore, according to the approach of the Mālyāṇa, [we] say that the Blessed One practices the path and becomes awakened in a relative sense (samyetya), but not in an ultimate sense (paranārthabāh). Accordingly,

4.30 In the Mālyāṇa, the path does not really lead to the awakening of a Buddha, because it has concepts and cognitive marks, like a path that is clearly mundane.

150 The three kinds of kṣaṇi are discussed in Lamotte 1965: 160-61. Lamotte points out that these three follow an intellectual process that mirrors the three forms of wisdom: wisdom that consists of hearing (pratisma), thinking (cināma), and practice (bhutaṃa). In this case, kṣaṇi is better translated by "conviction" than by the more common term "patience."

151 On Bhāviveka’s distinction between the primary (mukhya) and the manifested (nirvāṇa) Buddha, see Eckel 1992: 115-22.

The Śrāvakas

The path is not a cause of awakening, because it has concepts (vikalpa) and cognitive marks (nimitta) such as, “This world and the other world exist,” like the path of wholesome action that leads to rebirth as a god or human being.

4.31 Someone may say: If the path is unreal, then it cannot cause the cessation of defilements, because it is unreal, just as the cognition that a post is a man cannot cause their cessation.

The practice of the path is intended to bring about the cessation of defilements, but if it is unreal, how can it cause the cessation of defilements? The cognition that a post is a man cannot dispel doubt. This is the opponent’s objection. In other words, if the path is unreal, it cannot cause the cessation of defilements. And if the cognition that a post is a man is incorrect, it cannot cause their cessation.

We reply:

4.32 It is like the cognition that a rope is a mass of vines, which serves as an antidote to a terrified person’s mistaken idea that a rope is a snake.

Someone may mistakenly think that a rope is a snake and not know that it is a rope, then he may realize that it is a coil of vines and thus a rope. The cognition that it is a coil of vines is not [ultimately] true, but it is an antidote to the mistaken idea of a snake. Similarly, someone may have a mistaken view of the aggregates and, because of this wrong concept, become attached. Then, when he knows that he is mistaken about them

152 The opponent responds to Bhāviveka’s point about ultimate truth with a prāṇa: “If the path is unreal, then it cannot cause the cessation of defilements.” This argument is then translated into a syllogism:

The path does not cause the cessation of defilements,
because it is unreal (abhidatta),
lke a cognition that a post is a man.

This objection is common in Madhyamaka literature, as in the opening verse of the Vigrhaabhyaśāntaraṇottanta and in MMK chapter 24. The reason, abhidatta (“unreality”), is a good example of the ambiguity in Sanskrit words for existence, which can refer not only to existence but to truth. The path is nonexistent (abhaya) in the same way that a false cognition is untrue (abhiṣarga). The Tibetan translator dealt with the ambiguity by translating abhiṣarga as mney par (“antro”.

153 Bhāviveka argues that the opponent’s reason ("because it is unreal"), is inconclusive, because unreal things can have real effects. For other Madhyamaka examples of this argument, see Nagajuna’s discussion of the pot, cloth, and cloth and the magically created man in Vigrhaabhyaśāntaraṇottanta 22-23. For more discussion of the comparison of the snake and the rope, see MHK 5.55-56.
and develops the view that is the antidote, namely right vision and so forth, he knows that both [right vision and wrong vision] are wrong, because they involve concepts of real things. No-vision is right, because nothing has any identity at all. As it is said in the Tathāgataguhya Sūtra,\textsuperscript{154}

O Kāśyapa, it is as if someone were suffering from a poison of doubtful reality, cried out, "I have taken poison, I have taken poison," and beat his breast. A skilled physician might then give him another false poison, remove his idea about the doubtful poison, and free him from suffering. What do you think, Kāśyapa? If the physician had not given the man the other, false poison, would he have lived?

No, Blessed One. He suffered from unreal poison, and he was cured by another unreal poison.

The Blessed One said: Kāśyapa, I teach the Dharma in the same unreal way to foolish people who are defiled by defilements.

Does the Blessed One not teach the truth? How can the Blessed One's teaching not be true?

The Blessed One said: What do you think, O Kāśyapa? Are you liberated by [a teaching] that is true or by one that is not true?

I am liberated by [a teaching] that is not true, not by one that is true. Why?
The Blessed One said that desire, hatred, and ignorance are unreal. O Blessed One, if desire were real, [meditation on] repulsive things (asaṅkha) could not remove desire. O Blessed One, if hatred were real, friendliness (maṅgatā) could not remove hatred. O Blessed One, if ignorance were real, dependent origination could not remove ignorance. O Blessed One, it is because desire, hatred, and ignorance are unreal that meditation (bhāvanā) on repulsive things, friendliness, and dependent origination can remove them. O Blessed One, all defilements are unreal, so they are removed by unreal realizations. O Blessed One, both the defilements and the means to remove them are unreal, so one is free not only from unreal defilements, but also from unreal realizations.

4.33cd This also is an answer to [the argument that the path is real] because it is an antidote to defilements.

The opponents may say: The path is real, because it is an antidote to defilements, just as light is an antidote to darkness. This [argument] also can be answered by saying, "an unreal antidote can remove unreal defilements," and using the example of the rope, the snake, and the coiled vines. Since the reason is inconclusive, the opponent loses.

[The opponent says:] We have already proven that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching. Therefore, it is wrong to teach a Mahāyāna that has no scriptural source (anāgama), since it is nothing but dry logical reasoning.\textsuperscript{155}

To answer this claim, [we] distinguish between the objection (pūraṇapakṣa) and the response (pratipakṣa).

4.34 According to us, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha's, because it shows that there is no self and so forth, and because it displays the greatness of the three jewels, like the Śrāvakayāna.

154 The Tibetan title is de kbod gis bo pa's rdzod kyi mdo. This sūtra is sometimes mistakenly identified as the Tathāgataguhya Sūtra (Tohoku no. 258). Paul Harrison has identified it as the Tathāgataguhya Sūtra (T1 821, 17.844a17-18), for which there is no Tibetan translation.

155 In verse 4.34, Bhaviveka takes up the opponent's argument in verse 4.7:

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching,
because it is not included in the Sutrānta and so forth,
or because it teaches a different path,
like the Vedānta view (vedānta-vadana).

Bhaviveka starts with a syllogism of his own:

The Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching,
because it shows that there is no self and so forth,
and because it displays the greatness of the three jewels,
like the Śrāvakayāna.

In verse 4.35 and in the subsequent commentary, he offers more reasons why the Mahāyāna should be considered the Buddha's teaching. These function as counter-arguments (pratīturka) to contradict the opponent's thesis.
The Mahāyāna is the path known as the six perfections together with their results. It also is the texts (āstrā) that make them clear. This [Mahāyāna] is the subject (dharmin). “Is the Buddha” means that it is the Buddha’s teaching. This is the predicate (adhyāya). The combination of the subject and the predicate is the thesis. To have no self is to transcend what other hewetics (cīrīkha) imagine to be the self and so forth. The state of having no self (atmanakāsa) is no-self-ness (nairatmya). Something that has no self and so forth not only has no self but also is empty, impermanent, and so forth. To show that there is no self and so forth is to reveal it. A jewel is an object that is difficult to obtain and brings pleasure. The three jewels are the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. The greatness (mahātmya) of the three jewels is their great nature. To display the greatness of the three jewels is to proclaim it. Whatever shows that there is no self and so forth also displays the greatness of the three jewels is the Buddha’s teaching, like the Śrāvakayāna. To be like the Śrāvakayāna is to be similar to it. For this reason, the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching.

Objection: This is not the case. According to us, the three baskets (tripitaka) cause one to obtain the three jewels,154 but the Mahāyāna does not. Since we do not accept that it is the Buddha’s teaching, this argument suffers the fault of not being accepted by both parties.

Reply: Undefiled ignorance (akṣamatā) is removed by a single moment of a Self Existence’s correct knowledge, which understands all dharma. Someone who has practiced no-apprehension is free [from undefiled ignorance]. This was taught by the Buddha in the other vehicle, so it is not the case that this point is not accepted by both parties.

And the reason is not accepted, because it is contradicted by a counter-argument.

In the objection, the opponent argued that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtras and so forth, like the Vedānta view. To respond, it is necessary to establish its contradiction and thereby demonstrate that the reason—because the Mahāyāna is not included in the sūtras and so forth—is not accepted. How?

Because the teachings of the Mahāyāna, beginning with the four truths, are included in the Tripitaka (lit. Vinaya and so forth).

The teachings of the Mahāyāna, such as the truths of suffering, arising, cessation, and the path, the faculties (indriya), the strengths (bala), the limbs of awakening (bodhiyanga), the paths, the ten powers (bala), the modes of fearlessness (naiṣkṛṣādyā), the analytical awarenesses (prātisamuddhi), and the special qualities of a Buddha (avasikalabhodhārma) are taught word for word157 in the Vinaya, Sūtras, and Abhidharma. The teachings of the Mahāyāna are the same in the way they use these practices to remove defilements. They are distinctive in that only the Blessed One uses the Mahāyāna approach of no-apprehension to remove the obstacles to knowledge. Therefore, because the truths taught in the Vinaya and so forth are fully explained in the Mahāyāna, the Sūtras and so forth are consistent with the Mahāyāna. Since the Mahāyāna is included implicitly in the Sūtras and so forth, the opponent’s reason is not accepted.

Objection: Although some [teachings], such as the noble truths, are included in the Mahāyāna, the Mahāyāna contradicts the texts (āstrā) of many different schools, as we pointed out in our objection.

Reply: Your mind is stained by the traces of false attachment, and you speak without definitively grasping the meaning of Mahāyāna texts. We respond:

The Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, because it is consistent with the seals (mudrā) of the Dharma. It also is possible to argue that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, because it follows the sūtras [that teach] the noble truths, because it is the true vision that disciplines defilements, and because it is consistent with the teaching of dependent arising.

Furthermore, all eighteen schools follow their own canonical texts (lit. Sūtras and so forth) and greatly contradict one another. With its deep and broad approach of acting for the welfare of others, the Mahāyāna sometimes does not follow a particular canonical collection (śāstrādīpikā) of the Śrāvakas, but it does follow the sūtras of the Mahāyāna, because it appears in the seven hundred precepts (ākṣipadā) of a Bodhisattva and is consistent with the doctrine of emptiness. Therefore, it is consistent with the seals of the Dharma.

Another response is to say that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, because it was collected by the original compilers, such as Samantabhūta, Maitreyi, Gubhakādhipati, and Maitreyā.158 Śrāvakas did not compile our root collection, because the teachings of the Mahāyāna were beyond them.

As it is said in the Śrīmadprāṇava Sūtra.

154 Lit. in syllables (akṣara), words (vāda), and consonants (vyanāma).
155 Tārāntika lists the same four Bodhisattvas as original compilers of the Mahāyāna (trans. Champa and Chattopādhyaya: 98). The Traité (383) lists the compilers as Samantabhūta, Maitreyi, Maitreya, and Vajrapāṇi. (Gubhakādhipati is an epigraph of Vajrapāṇi.) Be-stor’s account of the compilation of the Mahāyāna mentions the tradition of the Tarkajujā along with several others (Oberman 1932: 2.102-1).
addressed the noble Ānanda and said: ‘Can you memorize the dharmas I have taught?’ In response to this question, [Ānanda] said: ‘I would need to stay in the Blessed One’s presence for at least twenty years!’ In the same [sūtra] it says: “I have memorized eighty thousand articles of Dharma (dbharmasāndha) in the presence of the Blessed One, two [thousand] came from monks.” This means that he [Ānanda] did not memorize [every article] that the Blessed One had previously taught. It would not have been reasonable for [the Blessed One] to teach them to him, because the monks had already memorized them. It also would not have been reasonable to teach each small [article] again in a period of forty years.

Someone may say that the noble Ānanda understood everything [taught by the Blessed One]. If so, Sakra, the Lord of the Gods, would not have said in the Uutta Sūtra that no monk had memorized that Dharma teaching. This should be understood to mean that Ānanda did not memorize everything. Therefore, the full teaching of the Buddha does not appear in the collection made by those who were taught by [Ānanda] and who collected [his teachings].

In the Patati Sūtra, the Blessed One said, among other things: “Patali, when the assembly was few in number, where was the Dharma teaching (dbharmaparyaya) called ‘The Thoroughbred’s Fair Colt’ taught to the community of monks? This is not extant as a sūtra.

Moreover, in the Dūkhkhasāndha Sūtra, the Blessed One said to Mahānāma the

Compare Therothāghā 1024: daśuṭaṃ buddhaṃ ghoṣe dvāḥ saḥāsāṃ bhākmatha (“I have learned eighty-two thousand from the Buddha and two thousand from a monk”). Bhikṣujiva follows a Sanskrit tradition that is attested in the Auddantasutta (242), among other sources: bhagavisva “tattvād asitvā dharmasāndhaśabhāvam aṣadātītāṃ” (Lamotte 1988: 148-49) has a thorough discussion of the traditions connected with eighty thousand and eighty-four thousand articles of Dharma.

163 VY: ‘The compilers collected what [Ānanda] said. Therefore, the complete teaching of the Buddha does not appear today.’

164 VY refers to this sūtra as the 32nd gāthā. The quotation from this sūtra refers to a text called rāja sang drāt zhaṅ phaṅ pham bse baņ drang kyi che bse kyi rnam ‘grobs, corresponding to T’s rāja sang pham po rol sgra bsa baṅ bse baṅ che kyi rnam ‘grobs (“the Dharma teaching called ‘The Thoroughbred’s Fair Colt’”). A number of Pali sutta mention the qualities of a thoroughbred (Tib. rāja sang sbe; Skt. ajīvaka ca atisāyīsa; Pali ajīvaka ca ajīvaka), such as AN II 250-51, 251-52; III 248; IV 188-90, 282-84. None mentions a text of this name.

165 VY reads: “32nd gāthā, when I taught ‘The Thoroughbred’s Fair Colt’ to the assembly of monks, you (pl) were few in number.”
said at one time: "There are no ascetics (pramaṇa) or brahmmins who know everything and see everything. There have not been in the past, nor will there be in the future. This is impossible." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Pitāma Sūtra174 it says: "The elder Ānanda said: 'When I was a newcomer to the order, the monk and elder Mañjuśrī, now known as the venerable Pūraṇa, gave a very profound Dharma talk.'” This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Gupta Sūtra175 it says: "Vāsakāra176 said: ‘At one time, the monk Gautama was staying in Nādiśka177 in a brick residence,178 and so forth. 'The Blessed One Gautama praised meditation (dhyāna) in every way.' This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Rampaka Sūtra179 the Blessed One said to a group of five monks: ‘Previously, when I had not yet gone forth and was still living at home, I thought and taught that living in a house is harmful.’180 This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra,181 it says: “The elder Ānanda said to the venerable Aniruddha: ‘In the presence of the Blessed One, I heard directly and understood directly that the Blessed Ones,182 the Buddhas, attain (samaññama) the fourth meditative

Udaya. On the Udayi Sūtra (Bhar kaś mād), see previous discussion of SN IV 224.

174 Compare SN III 105-6: Puṇṇa nāma abhūta ṣaṁyanta matanāṣṭaṃ abhākṣaṇa nāvānaṇāma satyaḥ pūrṇapakāro hato, sa anuśin ināna uddhena udayanti. Idānaṃ pana me dhyāyam punaṣṭa matenāṣṭaṃ saḥdharmasamudayaṃ satvoḥ dharmo abhimuceto. PTS translation: “The venerable Ānanda thus spoke: Pūṇna, friends, the venerable son of Manjūśrī, was very helpful to us when we were novices. With this instruction he instructed us.” On the venerable Pūraṇa, see DN III 222-23.

175 TJ reads shas paścā medio (Gupta Sūtra). VY reads sa tāhi medio. Compare MN III 13 (Cupakamoggalāna Sutta). Ekamakkhaṃ kha ānanda, samayam ca bhavanat gacchatu viharatva mañāṇama kṣaṭāgāvasthitayā. Aha kha abhā bhānādē, ye na mañāṇaṃ kāryakṣāgraṇaṃ, ye na bhavantam gotennam, tenasāropannipatam. Tatra ca pana ca bhavanat gacchatu atkaraṇābhāṣyam jhātanāyanam kathayā. Tathā ceta ta bhavanaṃ gacchatu abhi jhānāvat ca sākhāvat pana ca bhavanat gacchatu jhānāvat samapatti. PTS translation: “At one time, good Ānanda, the revered Gotama was staying near Vesīlī in the Great Wood in the hall of the Gabled House. Then I, good Ānanda, approached the revered Gotama in the Great Wood in the hall of the Gabled House. While he was there the revered Gotama in many a figure talked a talk on meditation. A meditator was the revered Gotama and he was disposed to meditation; and the revered Gotama praised every (form of) meditation.”

176 TJ reads lo bhanda; VY reads dēyā namā. Both are equivalents of the name Vāsakāra (Pali Vassakara).

177 The place names in this passage can be clarified by comparing the Pali Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN II 91) with the Sanskrit Mahāparinirṇāṇa Sūtra (abbreviated MPS II 162).

178 For "brick residence," TJ reads gu ṭāvi kes hoi guam sūn, VY reads "dāma sat ca gā yam naa; the Sanskrit MPS reads svājīvabхūtaḥ, the Pali reads gājīvabхūtaḥ.

179 TJ reads ram paścā medio; VY reads chu atgha medio. Compare MN I 160-219 (Ariyapariyesana Sutta), which starts in the hermitage of the brahmin Ramakka.

180 For "hostile," TJ reads good pa and VY reads yam yem. Both are equivalent to samādhi.

181 MPS III 936-97 (sect. 42, 14-17). The parallel passage in Ānanda is found in DN II 156.

182 Compare MPS III 396: samādhiṃ ma tyāgam aniraṇḍhā bhavatvā 'nātikā kriyāt somaṇkham udghatitam.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

state (dhīyāna) and achieve immovable peace, then as Soers[183] they enter parinivāna." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Rājatrapāla Sūtra[184] the noble Rājatrapāla said: "Great king, the Blessed One who sees and understands correctly, the Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyaksamuddhatu, spoke of four ways of becoming weary [with samsāra]. . . ." The last of these is: "Great king, this world is a slave of instable desire." This is not extant as a sūtra.

In the Gati Sūtra it says: "Anāthaipindaka[185] said: 'In the presence of the Blessed One I heard directly and understood correctly that, when a certain person creates a grove and dedicates it, he is reborn among the gods in heaven. . . ." This passage concludes by saying: "There is a statement of praise and there is a reason to praise generosity."[186] This is not extant as a sūtra.

Other sūtras can be understood in the same way. In the Tuṣṇidha Sūtra,[187] it says: "As was said earlier in the Buddha’s teaching to Manudgālayana, you, Manudgālayana, should practice a noble silence; you should not be careless." And in the Sīkhāvutta Sūtra[188] it says: "In this noble state you should not be careless." The sūtras that contain these statements are not extant.

Also, many sūtras that exist today, such as the Mahāparinibbāna Sūtra, contain variant readings. From this it is clear that these and many other sūtras do not now appear as the Buddha's extensive teaching in the Sārvakāya.

It also is clear that sūtras collected by the compilers of the root collection,[189] who were Āchāryas such as Mahākāśyapa, have now been lost, because there are different recensions of these sūtras in the Āgamas of different schools (nikāyas), and because sūtras collected in different Āgamas contain different topics (pādārthas).[180] [We also see other sūtras that were not included in these Āgamas and do not contradict them, whose names are Garbhāvākārta (mngol du 'jug pa),[181] Nandita (gsar 'nang bzhed gpos ba con), and Ayubyarteya (tshe 'dul thab thong pa).[182] If this is the case and even the compilers are confused, how can anyone be confident that these are the complete[183] teaching of the Buddha? We hear that up to a hundred [texts] can come from hearing a single [text] passed on by a lineage of transmission.[184]

Furthermore, if the teachings in the Mahāyāna are different, why would other compilers have collected them? If [teachings] are contradictory, they must have different compilers. This is why the noble Sāṃsāritas do not accept sūtras that deal with no-self such as the Paramahatthakārta[185] Sūtra.[186] Schools such as the Mahāsākyas do not accept [sūtras] that deal with the intermediate realm (antarabāhu) such as the Sāntapābha Sūtra. Similarly, in the Vinaya, according to the Vāstuputeriyas, one is prohibited from eating such things as mollases at the wrong time, while, according to the Sārvaśāṅgikas, it appears that one can eat and enjoy them. A sūtra of these [Vāstuputeriyas] extols the existence of the self, while the Sārvaśāṅgikas reject it.

Similarly, some say that there is no self, while others say that there is a person. Some think that all conditioned states are momentary, while some think that they last for two

180 The translation of this sentence follows VY, where the syntax is much clearer.
181 The Garbhāvākārta Sūtra has a complex textual history. A Garbhāvākārta Sūtra is quoted in the commentary on Koṣa 1.35. Two independent versions of a sūtra with this name are found in the Ratnakūta; another version is included in the Mahāarhatvāsikā Vinaya. J. W. de Jong (1977) has commented on the textual issues connected with this sūtra.
182 The Ayubyarteya Sūtra is edited in Matsumura 1989. This sūtra exists in Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation but not in Pali. There is no indication that it was part of a particular Agama. Apparently such sūtras circulated independently in Buddhist Circles but were not part of specific canonical collections.
183 Follow VY; TJs reads "extensive.
184 This sentence concludes Bhāviveka’s quotation of the VY. At the end of this version of this argument, Vasubandhu returns to the point about whether the Mahāyāna contains the Buddha’s definitive meaning (sattavādha). "Therefore one cannot definitively grasp (gros pung guarg bar mi byed) that there is no definitive meaning in the Mahāyāna, simply because a sūtra with definitive meaning does not now appear (or simply because one does not now see such a sūtra)."
185 Vasubandhu quotes the objectionable passage in his discussion of the padgula-vāda in the end of the Abhidharmakokalavājā (Koṣa: 406): "ni hi bhaṅka "si tari karmāti pinpajo bhūsata tu naga-labhṣata ("O monk, there is a karma and there is a result, but no agent to be found.")
186 Shayane Clarke has identified a passage that discusses this point in the Mahāarhatvāsikā Vinaya: "Then the Blessed One said to the monk: 'whether it is the right time or not, or whether one is sick or not, one can enjoy mūtanakas without having to repent?" de na ta bsem lha 'bras pa'i bzhod pa de le ba las rgyan snang stong dus sem ma yin pa'ams na bsem ni na las ba las ram las snyad par bya ste 'di la 'gyod par ni mi bya' ba (de-de 'Dul ba, Ga, folio 16b).
PART 2: TRANSLATION

moments, and others think that this earth lasts until the end of a kalpa. Some think that nirvāṇa is substantially real (dravyasat), while others think that it is only a name (nīmaṇanāt). Some think that there is an intermediate realm (antarābhūta), while others do not. Some think that the Blessed One's understanding occurs in a single moment, while others think that it takes sixteen moments. Therefore, since the teachings of the separate schools (mikṣyas) contradict one another in these ways, they are different, and it is difficult to establish their authority (Tib. gsugs lag nyid / Skt. vāśtravāni). So [the opponent is arguing that] the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching simply because it was collected by different compilers.

THE ETERNAL TATHĀGATA

Furthermore, the claim that Tathāgata is eternal (nitya) means that the Tathāgata's understanding (abhisamayā) is eternal, and that the Tathāgata is identical to this understanding. It does not mean, however, that [the Tathāgata] does not change. Someone who wants to understand [this point] in more detail, should consult the Lākāvatāra Sūtra. The word "eternal" can refer to something that functions as a continuum (samastha) but is dissolved at every moment, like a river that constantly flows or a fire that constantly burns. Thus [the teaching that the Buddha is eternal] does not contradict the statement that all conditioned states are impermanent (anitya).

PERVASION BY THE TATHĀGATAGARBHA

To say that there is "pervasion by [the essence of] the Tathāgata" means that [the Tathāgata's] knowledge encompasses all objects of cognition, not that he is omnipresent like Viśnu. To say that [sentient beings] have the essence of the Tathāgata means that emptiness (tāṇīyā), signlessness (animittā), wishlessness (aprasādī), and so forth, are present in the continuum of all sentient beings, but this [essence of the Tathāgata] is not like an all-pervasive, eternal, inner soul (parāya). As it is said: "All dharmas are empty, signless, and wishless, and emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness are the Tathāgata." Furthermore, the appropriating consciousness (ādiśaṅjñāna) causes the

chbb and flow26 of samsāra. Since it flows like the stream of a great river, it clearly is active, but it is active as a continuum of moments. It is not like a self (ātman), so this does not contradict the seal of the Dharma that consists of non-self.

THE BUDDHA DOES NOT ATTAIN COMPLETE NIRVĀṆA

[The Mahāyāna] says that the Buddha does not attain complete nirvāṇa," but he certainly has removed the obstacles that consist of defilements and the obstacles to knowledge. For the sake of beings who need to be disciplined (vinayakṣaṇa), he is born naturally. For some he continues to burn, but wherever there is no one who needs to be disciplined, he displays extinction (nirvāṇa). In some states of existence, he is like a fire without fuel. In others he displays the acts of a Buddha, including nirvāṇa, whenever he wishes. But he has not definitively attained complete nirvāṇa. This is because he made a vow (prasiddhāna) to carry the entire realm of sentient beings to completion. Even though he has not attained nirvāṇa, he displays nirvāṇa so that those who need to be disciplined will feel disgust [with samsāra]. There is either a literal (parāya) nirvāṇa or a nirvāṇa that is located neither in samsāra nor in peace (sāṃtī). This is why it says:

I do not attain nirvāṇa as an existing thing, as an action, or as a dis-

200 Other possibilities might be "rising and falling" or "starting and stopping." The Tibetan 'jug pa dang lnga pa might represent the Sanskrit pravartana and nivartana. Note, however, that 'jug pa is translated as "active" in the next sentence.
201 The word translated as "does not attain complete nirvāṇa" (Tib. mnyon rgyun rgyang mi 'la / Skt. na parinirvāṇa) is the verbal form of the word parinirvāṇa. Another translation might be "pass completely away" or "become completely extinct.
202 Literally "his birth is attained through the nature of things" (Tib. chos nyid kyi tshab pa'i skye bsa'i / Skt. dharmanādattādhyājana) is the word translated as "natural," see BIISD (s.v. dharmatā). The compound dharmanā-adattādhyājana occurs twice in Haribhadra's AAA (77, 162) in discussions of the gatra of Śrīvākasa and Pratyekabuddhas. Compare also the account of great Śrīvākasa after the predication of the Tathāgata in the next section of this chapter.
203 Literally "wherever there is no field of beings who need to be disciplined." The meaning is clarified by a comparable passage in Haribhadra's AAA (167): "If there is no one in a particular world system who needs to be disciplined by the display of a Buddha's form, he displays a form (nirvṛtti) to benefit those who need to be disciplined by the display of nirvāṇa.
204 Here Bhāviveka's words play on the contrast between the burning of a fire and nirvāṇa as the extinction of a flame.
205 The same terminology occurs in a slightly different form in the Dālākāvatāra Sūtra (11): "He carries out these great vows with ten completions. What are these ten? The completion of the realm of sentient beings..." (tan ca mahāpattihānā hīnā bhūta dālākāvatārā kāramāt dalākāhītā yad ukyate nattadhāvānāhāyāh).
Therefore, [we] accept a nirvāṇa that is free from concepts, and [our view of] nirvāṇa does not contradict [the seal of the Dharma that consists of] peace.

The Mahāyāna Predicts the Awakening of Śrāvakas and Insults Arihants

It is wrong [to say] that the prediction (vyākaraṇa) of great Śrāvakas is not the Buddha’s teaching. Predictions are made about the lineages (geśa) of Śrāvakas. One lineage of sentient beings has sharp faculties (indriya) and the skill-in-means (upāyakusūla) to achieve the welfare of others. They seek to achieve a distinctive, superior goal. Because they seek this excellent goal, they become excellent, like Bodhisattvas. Another lineage of sentient beings have dull faculties and seek their own welfare. Since they meditate on the selflessness of persons, their goal is inferior and they attain inferior distinction, like Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Some lineages of sentient beings seek a distinctive goal, but attain an inferior one. For example, the Pratyekabuddhas who live in isolation have collected the requisites (sattabhāra) of awakening for a hundred eons (kalpa), but then, for some reason, turn back from great awakening. Some lineages of sentient beings have sharp faculties but seek to distinguish themselves in an inferior way, do not have skill-in-means, and start to remove defilements. When the Tathāgata sees that they are suitable for great awakening, he makes a prediction. Then they remove karma and defilements and are born naturally.209 When they have collected the distinctive requisites of

206 This verse is almost identical to Lankatūrīsūtra 2.177 (2.179 in Suzuki’s translation): nibhām nirvāṇo bhūteen kṛṣṇya laksanena ca / ukalapajñātanāṃ nitye niśrito abham // Instead of “when the consciousness that causes concepts ceases (uкалапабхутащй пинёты)” in the third piśa, Bhāviveka reads “when concepts of subject and object cease (yajñābhaya- uкалe пинёты).” In the Lankatūrīsūtra this verse is accompanied by an explanation: “Once again, Mahāmati, there are four kinds of nirvāṇa. What are the four? The nirvāṇa that is the absence of an entity (bhūtaavyabhūtaścaryā), the nirvāṇa that is the absence of diversity of characteristics (sūcalakṣyabhūtaścaryābhūtaścaryā), the nirvāṇa that is the understanding of the absence of particular characteristics (pañcaāyabhūtaścaryābhūtaścaryā), and the nirvāṇa that cuts off the stream of the particular and universal characteristics of the aggregates (vādābhayaścaryābhūtaścaryābhūtaścaryā). These four kinds of nirvāṇa are associated with the heretics (sīrṣhākha), not with the Sakyas. According to my teaching, O Mahāmati, nirvāṇa is the cessation (vyāvahāra) of the mental awareness (pravrajyīsā) that causes concepts (uкалapakā).” (Lindtner 1992: 239) discusses this passage in an article on the relationship between the Lankatūrīsūtra and early Mahāyāna. A more extensive discussion of heretical views of nirvāṇa can be found in Lankatūrīsūtra 3.69-78.

207 On the Pratyekabuddhas who live in isolation (lit. “like a rhinoceros”), see Kota 3.94d and commentary.

208 Read skel pa (as in sabbha or bhavey) rather than lokal pa.

209 On bhāmonti-pratilabhā-jñāna, see note 202.

great awakening, they achieve a distinctive awareness (adhibhūmā), like great Śrāvakas such as Śāriputra. This has been explained in the Daladharmakāra Sūtra.210 Or they remove the obstacles that consist of defilements, then remove the obstacles to knowledge. When they have been completely purified in this way, they attain omniscience.

It is not reasonable to say that this [awarness] is like a sprout, which does not arise when its seed has been burned. We do not think that it arises like a sprout, in the same way that defilements arise.211 However, in order to remove the undefined obstacles to knowledge, the Blessed Ones, the Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas (the students) by admonishing them. They start at a level of pure aspiration (adhibhūmatā), then engage in a Bodhisattva practice that seems defiled; but it should be seen as a Bodhisattva practice that is not defiled.212

It is said that [a Bodhisattva] in the seventh stage (bhūmi) neither has defilements nor does not have defilements. The explanation is that [this Bodhisattva] is undefiled in the sense that his defilements are not active, and is not undefiled in the sense that he has not fulfilled the desire to have a Tathāgata’s knowledge (jñāna).213 During the second immeasurable eon (asamkhya-kalpa) in the eighth perfect stage (bhūmi), [the Bodhisattva] becomes absolutely perfect due to all the actions that arise from his practice. The moment he perfects the [final] activity that still has defilements, the Bodhisattva obtains a position in the profound and isolated Bodhisattva state (avihīna).214

When he, like an Arihant who has achieved nirvāṇa-āsāmpattī, abides in conviction with regard to dharmas that do not arise (anupattikādhamkāra),215 then, if the Buddhhas,
the Blessed Ones, do not cause him to arise [from **nirodhasamāpatti**], he passes away right there. These are the words of the [Dāsabhūmika] Sūtra. [A Bodhisattva who has] conviction with regard to dharmas that do not arise has abandoned the obstacles that consist of defilements, becomes cool like an Arhat, and obtains the ten mysteries (vistāras), which begin with mastery over life-span (āyukta-vistāra) and are free from samsāra. When he has these mysteries, he intensively cultivates the four bases of power (śuddhāpāda) and defeats the four Māras. Concerned only about the welfare of sentient beings, he abides in unlimited kindness. With a body like a wishing jewel (saṅtāmanī), a healing post, or a wishing tree (kalpataru), he accomplishes whatever any sentient being desires, like **mig dug can**.

This point is made in *The Perfection of Wisdom*:* Those gods who have not generated the mind of supreme awakening but who have sharp faculties, and so forth, should generate the mind of supreme awakening. Those [Arhats] who have entered a fixed state (samyak-saṁyak-vyāpti) cannot generate the mind of supreme awakening. Why? Because they are confined by the stream of samsāra. But I rejoice if a solitary practitioner or someone who belongs to an inferior lineage generates the mind of supreme awakening.* Those who belong to the superior lineage are considered superior to those who are below them, even if they abandon defilements without any skill-in-means. Why? Their qualities (dharmas) are more noble, transcendent, and excellent than the qualities of the Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas], because they apprehend the dharmas of omniscience. Therefore, it is reasonable for the Buddha to make a prediction about [the awakening of] Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas].

Alternatively,

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217 As in BCA 9.36, where the Buddha is compared to someone who consecrates a post. The post continues to cure snake bite even after the person is gone.
218 The meaning of the term **mig dug can** is unclear: A possible solution may lie in *Avadānātaka*, ch. 51 (*yema-saṃput)*, where a black snake known as *dṛṣṭiṇāb* (“one who has poison in his glance”) lives in a garden and protects a cherished property. If so, **mig dug can** could be emended to **mig ying can**, as in MVY 5223, which lists **mig ying pa** as an equivalent of *dṛṣṭiṇāb*. Another, less likely possibility might be a Bodhisattva or deity who has six eyes (**mig drug can**).
220 The Tibetan translates this term incorrectly as *skyon mdag pa la bzhi pa rgyur pa* ("entered into a faultless state"). On the correct interpretation of this term, see Natter 2003: 221.
221 Evidently the quotation ends at this point, although the Tibetan translation treats it as if it continues.
Bodhisattva who is close to omniscience and in full possession of power enters his mother's womb and is born, while the entire universe is illuminated by extraordinary radiance, yet [the Bodhisattva] has not mastered the powers of learning (fruto), concentration (samādhi), and attainment (samapatti) and has not abandoned defiled activities. It is not reasonable to say that defilements cause such [a Bodhisattva] to seek rebirth in the realm of desire (kama-labhā) under the blessed One. Though he was born, the Bodhisattva took seven steps without being supported by anyone, surveyed the four directions, and said, "This is my last birth!" then, when he had grown up physically and his senses had matured, enjoyed the pleasures of love and was heedless.

It also is not reasonable that [the Bodhisattva], who naturally remembered many past lives, lived a holy life (brahmajīva) under the blessed One Kāśyapa, and practiced the path to awakening, could have arrived here, after living among the six kinds of gods in Tusita, not known that he and others were subject to old age, sickness, and death, sought out the path to awakening from those who were heretics (tirthikas), thought that the path lay in the practice of self-mortification, and suffered the pain of asceticism.

There also are cases in which [a Bodhisattva] does not remember past lives. It is not reasonable for a text to say that [a Bodhisattva] collects the requisites of merit (punyatāmasabhara) for many cons and attains immense powers of recollection (smṛtri) and intellect (māna), then loses his memory when he enters the womb and is born. Nor is it reasonable to claim that a Bodhisattva in his final birth generates meditation (bhāvanā) and effortless attainment (kṣptomamipati), then falls back. If he does not fall back, it is not reasonable for him to seek to become pure by practicing austerities, to engage in sense pleasures and clings to the realm of sense desire, or that he overestimates rites and observances (jātivatuṣṭaṃ parārthadṛṣṭi).

What if a Bodhisattva deliberately displays all [the actions] that have just been described as a means to discipline sentient beings? [The Bodhisattva] still does all these things as manifestations (nirmanā). In that case, it is not reasonable for him to take birth by chance (āgantuca). And, if that is not reasonable, one should not say that he devotes himself to desire and merity, or that he devotes himself to self-mortification.

Someone may say: If all this is a manifestation, why was the practice of austerities the result of karma? Why did [the Blessed One] say, "When I previously was the brahmin Uttara," I said about the perfectly awakened one Kāśyapa: 'How can a bald ascetic be awakened? Awakening is very difficult to attain.' As a result of these words, I practiced austerities for six years."

Now these extremely murky arguments must be clarified. How can a faithful person be satisfied in the presence of someone who thinks like this? It is said that when the householder Anāthapiṇḍada heard the word "Buddha," which he had not heard before, his hair stood on end, he felt great happiness and pleasure, and he wanted very much to see him. It also is said that the young brahmin Uttara insulted a Buddha, but became a Buddha himself in his third birth thereafter.

The word nirvāṇa also is celebrated everywhere, and the conqueror of Mara's hosts, the Tathāgata, became victorious over the four Máras with the sound of a great bell. He completely defeated the Lord of Death and in so doing brought harm to his deadly enemy. After performing an action that made his body appear great and small in size, the Blessed One spoke as if his body were the same size as other men, as if he were under the power of the Lord of Death and were an ordinary person. He said: "Ānanda, this Jambudvīpa is delightful. This rī lam gyi ri is delightful. Every desire and every..."

230 VV begins with a shorter version of this sentence: "If all this is a manifestation, why does he perform difficult practices (do de thams cad sprul pa yon na ci thig byes tha ba spod pa na?)"
231 'I jv bram za bta ma zhe bya bar gyar pa do nas na, VV reads bram za khye sna ma gnas skabs na. In the Pali version of this story, the Buddha identifies himself as "Jotipāla (Skt. Jotipalā) the brahmin boy." The story is found in MN II 45-54 (Ghaṭikāraka Saṅgaha). In the Sanskrit version, preserved in the Gilgit manuscript of the Saṃyāsanaṇeya (Griwol 1978b: 143f.), he is identified as Uttara, as he is in the Vinayaputra (Ichinger 1982: 102f.).
232 This sentence is identified in VV.
233 This is a common account of Anāthapiṇḍada's first encounter with the Buddha. Compare Saṃyāsanaṇeya (Griwol 1978b: 14): anāthapiṇḍada yathā gṛhapate buddha ity aṣṭapravāmi ghaṃ hṛdaya vaśvatam kṣamaṇukāyā yah āśritaḥ, sa abhaya-muktiṃ tathā gṛhapate dharma anubhavai. ka esa gṛhapate buddha nāma?
234 This sentence concludes the apparent quotation from VV that began with the sentence "There are many other unreasonable claims."
235 In Ibniz 539-46, the four Máras are identified as the kīlo-māra, skanda-māra, mṛtyu-māra, and devaputra-māra. This is the last in the anthropomorphic evil one. See also BEID and DDPN (i.e., "Māra").
236 This piece is part of the narrative in the Māhāparinibbāṇa Saṅgaha (DN II 128-29), as is the story of the Buddha's request for water. The phrase rī lam gyi ri, however, is not found in the extant versions. The parallel passage in Sanskrit occurs in MPS II 264-68. A story about
variety of pleasant, beautiful, and agreeable thing is now at hand." This statement is well known. [The Buddha] said that he was tired of painful sensations when he was sick, and he said that the monks should not stay in his presence. He also expressed displeasure when he said that Ananda took too long fetching water. At this, about a thousand Āryans grew weak with grief and lamentation, their sighing darkened them; and they covered their faces. They emitted various sounds of distress, and they wept. A group of about a hundred thousand ordinary monks wept, and the endless community of monks discarded their... 19 A group of about a thousand laymen (appāsīka) and laywomen (upāsīka) threw away their upper garments and ornaments; their heads and bodies were covered with sweat; and their faces were wet with tears. They pulled their hair, threw away their tophorns, wept pitifully, and wailed with miserable faces. A hundred thousand gods threw away their ornaments, garlands, body ornaments, diadems, bracelets, garments, and head-ornaments. They lifted their arms and swung them like sticks, and they grieved at the thought that they had no protector. The wind of impermanence struck them like a wind that strikes the flickering flame of a lamp, and death left them in the belly of the crocodile of impermanence. All these statements contradict [the opponent's argument].

If an individual abandons from violence and is generous, he acquires two benefits (samphud): the benefit of great wealth and the benefit of a long life.226 With regard to these [two benefits], the Blessed One has become pure by completely abandoning any kind of violence, and he has made a great offering by giving away a vast number of possessions, including external objects and parts of his own body (lit. things that are external and internal). But this accumulated karma does not seem to have resulted in a body that lived very long. If this [karma] had been accumulated for three innumerable [eon], it is unreasonable for it to have had no result in forty-five years.

Can this be due to the power of the Blessed One's karma? If the Blessed One was completely fearless, it is not reasonable to say that he had anything to fear from his karma. The karma that results in a body that lives a long time—[a body] that is uninterrupted and immeasurably large and expansive—may be suppressed by some bad karma, so that it matures as the karma of a body with a short life. But only fools would say that [the Buddha's good karma] was suppressed by other [karma] and matured with...
means that the prediction (vyākaraṇa) of the Śrāvakas and [Pratyekabuddhas] is appropriate and reasonable, since they are eternal, possess the essence of the Tathāgata, and do not attain parinirvāṇa.

The Sādharmapaṇḍarika Sūtra points out throughout the text: "There is one vehicle, not two or three."\(^{243}\) The Akṣaraṃatmirdeśa Sūtra says: "The letter (vyāsana) teaches how a vehicle is defined; the meaning (arthā) is the one approach (naya) to the knowledge (jñāna) that enters the indivisible Dharma realm (dharma-dhātu)."\(^{244}\) Likewise, it says in the Sāgaramati Sūtra\(^{245}\) and others: "All vehicles are included in one vehicle." It also says in the Samadīdāraka\(^{246}\) that the difference between a Śrāvaka and a Bodhisattva is like the difference between a mustard seed and Mount Meru, between a firefly and the sun, between a fox and a lion, between a castor oil plant and a sandalwood tree. These are statements of fact; they do not insult or praise anyone. If someone says that a wishing jewel (cinītāmāni) is more radiant than a glass bead, is this an insult to the glass bead or praise for the wishing jewel? Deluded people might compare the great ocean to the water in a cow's hoofprint, but to say that the water in a cow's hoofprint is the ocean would be ridiculous. Here the followers of the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayaṇa are deficient in purpose (arthā) and in action (kriyā). They neglect the welfare of others, discipline themselves, focus on peace, and rely on a small seed of liberation. It is not an insult to say that they attain pure knowledge (āndraśrayijñāna) that is as large as the space eaten by a worm inside a mustard seed. Bodhisattvas have accumulated wholesome roots for ten million hundred thousand immeasurable cons (asamkhyeyakalpa), and they sympathize with the suffering of others. In order to liberate all sentient beings, with faithful minds, they have achieved pure knowledge as large as the entire realm of space. It is not flattering to say that they possess such infinite power. As it is said:

> Even a small seed produces a large result, so the infinite cause of a Buddha produces an infinite result.\(^{247}\)

Someone may say that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it accepts

\(^{243}\) Sādharma-paṇḍarika Sūtra 31 (ch. 2, vs. 54): ekam hi pūṣṇam dvīṣayam na vidyante.

\(^{244}\) Tibetan text in Brayvsg 1993: vol. 1, p. 115, with English translation in vol. 2, pp. 441-42. Brayvsg's text follows a different word order in the second part of the sentence. "The meaning is knowing that the entry into the indivisible Dharma realm" (bos kyi dbyings dbyod med sig chos shig pa la 'jug pa shes pa).

\(^{245}\) Ārya Sāgaramatiparipṛchchha Sūtra, Orani no. 819. The Sāgaramatiparipṛchchha is included in the Mahāsūtra Sūtra (Brayvsg 1993, vol. 3, p. xxvi).


\(^{247}\) Nāgārjuna, Ratnakūta 3.11.

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that [monks] pay homage to householders. Lokāvata\(^{248}\) and other Bodhisattvas are not householders, because they have removed all attachment, have taken the pratimoksa vow, and are bound by their Bodhisattva discipline until they sit on the throne of awakening (bodhi-maṇḍapā). Furthermore, they show the form of a householder, and so forth, as manifestations (nirvāṇa). Since they do this to ripen sentient beings, it is right to pay them homage, even though they are not householders. For example, the Sage manifested himself as a sakramurtin king to discipline King Kapphina,\(^{249}\) but he was not a householder, and it was right to pay him homage. When he was in the form of a great king, the Blessed One wore ornaments. Some say that he had no arrows, but he took a bow and arrow and, strung the bow. All of the great Śrāvakas assumed the form of ministers and wore a variety of ornaments that are not permitted for renunciants (pariśrājaka). In Śrāvasti, when the time came to discipline a brahmin named rgyu can,\(^{250}\) the Blessed One wore the crown of the four-faced form of Brahmā. To discipline a brahmin woman of the Vasiṣṭha lineage (gorna), also in Śrāvasti, the Blessed One assumed the form of a brahmin and held the corpse of a woman, saying: "This is my wife." To discipline dancers in Kosala, the Blessed One assumed the form of a dancer and beat a clay drum. To discipline Pañcaśīka the Gandharva,\(^{251}\) the Blessed One assumed the common form of a Gandharva, took a stringed instrument, and strummed it. So, even if the Blessed One and the Śrāvakas assumed the form, behavior, and mode of speech of vulgar householders, such as potters, blacksmiths, wrestlers, and hunters, all of which contradict the life of a renunciant and are prohibited in the Vinaya, they still were worthy of homage. As it is said:

> Even though he is adorned by ornaments, he practices the Dharma; he is calm, tamed, controlled, and practices the religious life.

\(^{248}\) Presumably jīg rten bzang phyug is another name for Avalokiteśvara.

\(^{249}\) On the story of King Kapphina, see Avadānaśataka 219-23. In Haribhadra's AAA, cited in Inagaki 1987: 359, King Kapphina is described as having "intense greed, anger, stupidity, and arrogance" and being as difficult to discipline as Ārya Sundarananda, Anguttamā, and Ucchīva Kakṣapa (Pali, Ucchīva Kassapa).

\(^{250}\) The Tibetan reads bram nyi can zhe bya ba ("a brahmin named rgyu can"). A possible equivalent for rgyu can is Hetuka. A monk by this name is mentioned in the Bhājaprajñāpā (Hofinger 278-82). In his previous life as a brahmin, he was converted by the Buddha Vipasyīn. The word rgyu can could also be a misreading for sgy or sgy can, MVY (2487-89) lists sgy can and sgy can as equivalents in a series of words that mean "tricky" or "deceitful."

\(^{251}\) According to DPIN, Pañcaśīka the Gandharva (Pali, Pañcaśīka the Gandhabha) was a favorite of the Buddha and played a role in several Pali suttas. A version of his story is found in the Sāgaramatiparipṛchchha Sūtra of the Mahāsūtra (vol. 3, pp. 197-224), but the story of his conversion is not mentioned. A story like the one mentioned here is found in the commentary on Satapātikātaka 62 (Bailey 80-81). The Buddha adopts the art of a musician to tame the pride of a Gandharva king named Supriya. Both Pañcaśīka and Supriya figure in a story about an encounter with the Buddha in Avadānaśataka 43-45.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

He has given up harm toward all sentient beings; he is a true brahmin, an ascetic, and a monk.\(^{252}\)

Someone may say that only a householder should pay homage to someone who has the form of a householder, and a renunciant should not. But if someone deserves homage for the excellence of his virtues, then a renunciant should pay him homage. It is not [wrong] to show signs of homage to a person who has excellent virtues, but it is extremely blameworthy to pay homage to a person who has no virtue. As it is said:

Those who have been ordained but are uncertain in every respect, who wear saffron robes but do not abandon mental faults, who carry alms bowls but are not vessels of virtues are neither householders nor monks, no matter what they imagine. The Sugas said that failed monks are like a cloud without rain, a well without water, a failed harvest, a seed without a sprout, and a picture of a lamp; they neither are nor are not [monks].

Why would anyone be proud of merely wearing the signs [of renunciation]? There is a big difference between Bodhisattvas and the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas who wear the signs of renunciation and have perfect moral conduct. It is as if one group were rich and the other poor. [Bodhisattvas] generate the mind of awakening (bodhicitta), then accumulate the wholesome roots (kusalanimitha) of the six perfections (paramitas). They are like great caravan leaders (sarvavahana) whose great vehicles carry the Mahasamgha and who share their riches with many people. They are not like the Sravakas, who by comparison seem poor and lazy, to say nothing of others who merely wear the signs [of renunciation]. This is why renunciants who are poor in virtue should definitely pay homage to virtuous householders.

It also is generally accepted in the texts of most of the eighteen schools (nikaya) that [monks] should pay homage to Bodhisattvas.\(^{253}\)

For instance, it says in the Vidyadharaipakaka of the Siddharmika Mahasamghika:

"If a monk [seeks] pure, supreme, perfect awakening, has faith in Maitreya, and pays homage to him, he has paid homage to and worshipped me, the supreme, perfectly awakened Buddha. Those for whom I am the teacher and the supreme focus of worship should pay homage to the Bodhisattva Maitreya and worship him. All four groups—monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen—should pay homage to the crown prince Maitreya." When one thousand two hundred and fifty Arhants heard the Blessed One's words, they exclaimed at once with a single voice: "Let each of us pay homage to all Bodhisattvas who have been consecrated crown prince. Let us also pay homage to those [Bodhisattvas] who reside in the shas dang laon shas."\(^{254}\)

It says in the Bodhisattvapiaka of the Purvasastra Arya Mahasamghika, who also are said to be located in las kyi yal 'khar.\(^{255}\)

Then crown prince Manjuśrī said to elder Subhūti: "Elder Subhūti, do you know, understand, or see the 84,000 preoccupations\(^{256}\) of sentient beings which the Blessed One knows? Can you teach in accordance with them?" [Subhūti] replied: "Manjuśrī, I cannot." [Manjuśrī said] "Elder, it is possible to enter and remain in a concentration in which one sees all sentient beings and sees the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings. When one has understood them, it is possible to teach the Dharma in an appropriate way. Can you enter this concentration?" [Subhūti] replied: "Manjuśrī, I cannot." Then elder Subhūti said to crown prince Manjuśrī: "Manjuśrī, is there any Bodhisattva who knows the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and can expound the Dharma in accordance with them?" Manjuśrī replied: "Elder Subhūti, please ask the Blessed One; the Blessed One will explain." The elder Subhūti then asked the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, is there anyone who can really understand the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and expound the Dharma in accordance with them?" The Blessed One replied: "Subhūti, there

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254 The meaning of la shas dang laon shas is unclear. Perhaps these are place names corresponding to the Sanskrit "decagupta" and "maragupta.

255 The following quotation has close affinities with a comparable passage in the Brahma-samajipraparipraca Sutra (Tiboku no. 160, Bar, folios 23a-100b, T'586, 15.44a and 15.50c-51a). The parallel passage begins in folio 73a, line 6. The Brahma-samajipraparipraca has the same two interlocutors (Subhūti and Manjuśrī) and reproduces many of the same narrative elements, but it expands the story considerably and addresses different questions (including the Bodhisattva's ability to teach the Dharma while maintaining a noble silence). The parallel between these two passages has important implications for the textual relationship between the Mahasamghika and the Mahayana. The history of the Brahma-samajipraparipraca (either as a single text or as a canonical collection) is complex. For a discussion of the problems, see Pagel 1999: 5-6. Unfortunately the meaning of the phrase las kyi yal 'khar is unclear. A possible Sanskrit equivalent might be "karuna-nirvana.

256 Kada 1.256a and commentary explain that 80,000 dharmas-kandas are prescribed as antidotes to 80,000 preoccupations or practices (carita) of sentient beings. The number 84,000 is attested in other sources, including sutras and Sutras of the Mahayana. For a full discussion, see Lamotte 1988: 148-49.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

is a concentration called 'all dharmas have the same nature.' in Any Bodhisattvas who obtain this concentration will correctly understand the 84,000 preoccupations of sentient beings and expound the Dharma in accordance with them. But Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot do this, no matter how much they understand." Then elder Subhūti said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas behave wonderfully. O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas are extraordinary. The range of Bodhisattvas is beyond the range of Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Bodhisattvas have powers that Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas do not have. O Blessed One, this is why one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas."

It says in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka of the Aparāśīlī Ārya Mahāsambhikas:

Then the elder Mahākāśyapa asked the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, of what is this a vision?" The Blessed One replied: "Mahākāśyapa, it is the color of the Bodhisattva Jālīnprabhā. His retinue has a golden color, and his followers have a single aspiration: they aspire to omniscience. Among them, Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas are not even mentioned, but only Buddhhas with a great congregation of Bodhisattvas." Then the elder Mahākāśyapa said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, the Bodhisattvas are marvelous. O Blessed One, the Bodhisattvas are wonderful. O Blessed One, Bodhisattvas can do things that are not possible for Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Bodhisattvas have powers that Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas do not have. O Blessed One, this is why one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas."

It says in the Vaipulyapiṭaka of the Bhadravānya Mahāsambhikas who live in the city of dpal yon can:

He asked the Blessed One: "O yogin, having obtained the powers (bala), super-knowledges (abhijñā) and faculties (indriya), you are the sun among sages (muni). With Samantabhadra and others, you have dwelt in the tenth stage (bhumi). The Dharma is permanent among the doctrines of the triple world. It surpasses all other doctrines and is beyond the range of Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. O Preacher of Dharma, please teach this Dharma to sentient beings."

257 Sarvdharmasvabhāsasamadāvajāticita is another name for the Samādhīvajāja Sūtra (Tōhoku no. 127).
258 Like the preceding quotation from the Bodhisattvapiṭaka of the Pūrvaśīlīs, this quotation also has parallels in the Bhadraśīlīcandraśīlaśīla Sūtra (Tōhoku no. 160, B, folios 53a-53b).
259 The identity of the city dpal yon can is unclear. A possibility might be Sravastis (kāśaka). The meaning of the following verses also is unclear.

The Śrāvakas

Then the venerable Maha-Maudgalyāyana said to the Blessed One: "For those who [see] the Buddha as Protector, the sight of Dharma, O Blessed One, is very far away. Even for the Bodhisattvas, it has not become a personal possession. O Blessed One, this is why we pay sincere homage to powerful Bodhisattvas. Let us bow down and pay them homage."

It says in the Jātakapiṭaka of the Haimavata Mahāsambhikas:

"Śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannotathom the secrets of the Bodhisattvas’ body, speech, and mind. Ananda, the Śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot understand even five hundred of the Bodhisattvas’ births. Śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot understand the inconceivable deeds of Avalokiteśvara. Ananda, if sentient beings just remember his name, all of them will be free from any kind of fear." 260

After the Blessed One had spoken, the venerable Ananda said to the Blessed One: "O Blessed One, he is a hero, he is fearless, and he is the essence of compassion. I bow before the great sage Avalokiteśvara."

It says in the Sūtripiṭaka of the Ārya Mahāsambhikas:

Mahākāśyapa said: "Protector of the World, when you sought a medicine for all sentient beings, you removed your eye and offered it as a gift. Homage to the one who is worthy of homage! Homage to the succession of births of the Protector, the great Sage, of whose deeds and exploits in former lives we have heard. O Sage, I joyfully praise your [deeds] when you were in Tuṣita, when you were born in the Śākya clan and became a perfect Buddha."

The preceding quotations come from the Mahāsambhikas:

Six are rooted in the Mahāsambhikas: peaceful Lokottaras and Siddharthas, those who live on the two Mountains, Bhadravānas and Haimavatas. 261

The Dhūdasatvahassabuddhāvyasā of the Ārya Śravīvāra Abhayagirīvīśī says:262

260 Compare the Pratīṣṭhānavāpī (Landner 1984b).
261 The last part of this sentence is unclear.
262 Skilling (1997: 61) cites a similar Sanskrit verse from the Śrīghantaśāramavāhāṭikā: vijñātārthaśāradhābhūtāhau lokaśāntavāyokāh śāntakāh mahāsambhikāh.
263 The title of this text follows Skilling’s tentative reconstruction (1993a: 170).
As a son of the Buddhas, a Bodhisattva should be respected by the entire world. His wisdom is as boundless as his moral conduct and liberative wisdom. He wears great armor as his protection, and he has attained inconceivable power. He has completed the ten perfections and realized the qualities of a Buddha. As a shrine for the whole world, the whole world should respect him. In wisdom, moral conduct, and concentration, no Sangha is his equal. The whole world should pay homage to him. Apart from the omniscient Buddhas, everyone in the world, including the gods, should pay homage to him.

It says in the Mahāprātiḥārya Sūtra of the Pratīṣṭhādārīn Bahuśrutiyas:

Then, when the venerable Śāriputra saw the Blessed One perform the great miracle at Śrāvasti, his mind was infused with deep faith. He put his hands together to pay homage to the Blessed One, and he praised him with these verses: “You have overcome all faults together with their traces; you have defeated all heretics without exception. With this miracle, you have delighted the minds of gods as far as Akanisṭha. As many salutations to the great Hero as there are particles of dust in the world! I pay homage to the Great Seer from the moment when he first generated the mind of awakening. Homage to anyone who generates the mind of awakening! Homage to the fully awakened Buddha! Homage to the one who turns the wheel of the Dharma! Homage to those who have become cool!”

It says in the Mahāprātiḥārya Sūtra of the Ārya Cātikās:

Then, when the venerable Pūrṇa saw the Blessed One perform the great miracle at Śrāvasti, his mind was filled with faith, and he said: “Blessed One, as a Bodhisattva you performed 100,000 miracles. Homage to you! Homage also to those births as Bodhisattvas that were the foundation for these 100,000 miracles! Homage to you, Protector, when you go away! Homage to you, Protector, when you remain! Homage to you, Protector, whenever your body moves! In all their modes of behavior, all the Buddha’s actions are medicine for all sentient beings. Homage to you who are worthy of homage!”

It says in the Mahāprātiḥārya Sūtra of the Ārya Gokulika Mahācātikās:

Then, when the venerable Kumāraśānyapa saw him perform the great miracle at Śrāvasti, his mind was filled with faith. He put the palms of his hands together to pay homage to the Blessed One, and he praised the Blessed One

in these verses: “Descending from Tushita Heaven, you entered the womb and were born. When you were born, you displayed miracles. You who are worthy of homage were honored by all. Homage to you, Great Hero and supreme Caravan Leader. O Sage without impurity, expert in the way, you have left birth behind and will not be reborn. Having crossed beyond, you have escaped the wilderness. Homage to the Bodhisattva who displays miracles!”

Mahākāśyapa said: “O Hero, I prostrate myself at your feet and pay homage to you who have no fear. O Protector, I pay homage to your birth! Homage to unsurpassed, perfect awakening and to the wheel of Dharma. Homage to the Sage who achieved nirvāṇa, to all former births, to all enshrined relics, and to all protectors!”

It says in the Pāramitāmārga of the Ārya Kāśyaptās:

Noble Śāriputra said: “O Sage, from the time when you first aspired to awakening, from that time on, I bow my head to you and pay homage, O Best of Men! You lead beings to happiness. You have attained awakening and become omniscient. Folding my hands and bowing my head, I praise you with many hundreds of salutations! When you gave your own flesh to someone who was eager to have it, you were worthy of praise. You are the Blessed One, an object of worship! With the great insight of the six superknowledges, you are the greatest of the great conquerors. Homage to you and worship!”

It says in the Buddhavaṃsa of the Ārya Tāmrāśātīyas:

Venerable Revata said: “Great Hero, I pay homage to all your deeds! You are worthy of homage in the three realms. I pay homage to your former births!”

According to the Ārya Kaurukula Śāṃmitīyas:64

Venerable Ānanda said: “After illuminating Tushita Heaven with beautiful light,65 the Bodhisattva arrived here. Homage to Śākyamuni! Born as a prince in the Śākya clan and adorned with ornaments, he was mindful and aware. Homage to Śākyamuni! When he sat in the shade of the rose-apple tree and the sun began to set, the shadow did not leave the incomparable one. Homage to Śākyamuni!”

264 Translated by Skilling (1997).
265 On the radiance that accompanied the Bodhisattva’s descent from Tushita Heaven, see MN III 120; Lalitavistara 28; and Tusiṭṭi 1343.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

It says in the Āṣṭavargiya of the Ārya Mahiśāsakas:

Venerable Subhūti said: "When he had fully collected the requisites, he was
born in the clan of Śākya kings. He is worshipped by groups of gods and men.
Homage to the one who is worthy of homage! Seated at the foot of the Bodhi
Tree, he defeated Māra and his hosts, and became omniscient. Homage to the
one who then was worthy of homage! In the garden of the sages in Vāraṇaśi,
he understood the deathless state and set the wheel of the deathless [Dharma]
in motion. Homage to the one who is worthy of homage."

It says in the Buddhabacana of the Ārya Vībhajyavādins:

Kālodiśyin said: "To heal all beings, you sacrificed your head, along with its
precious crown. Homage to you who are the best of all!"

It says in the Dharmapada of the Ārya Dharmaguptakas:

When Dipaṃkara predicted my [future awakening], I attained the eighth
stage and the ten masteries.266 When they heard this prediction directly
from the Lord of the World, the world with its gods reverently paid homa-
ge to me. When the Buddha stepped with his feet on the locks of my
hair, the world with its gods paid homage to me as one who is worthy of
homage. Apart from the brothers who dwell on the two stages268 and the
omniscient Buddha, no one here is worthy of homage. It is said that there
is none [like him] in this world.

It says in the Adhībhūtadharma of the Ārya Sarvāstivādins:

Venerable Ānanda said: "When the Blessed One was a Bodhisattva, he
descended from Tusita Heaven and entered his mother's womb, mindful
and fully aware. O Blessed One, I consider this to be an extraordinary
and marvelous quality.268 About this, it is said: 'I pay homage to the one who
descended from Tusita Heaven and entered his mother's womb, mindful
and aware.' When the Blessed One was born as a Bodhisattva, he illuminated the

266 On Bhāviveka's account of the ten masteries (saṃyāsa) acquired by a Bodhisattva in the eighth
and ninth stages of the path, see Eccl 1992: 179–84.
267 The meaning of the phrase spausatsu gnyis gnam pa is unclear. Perhaps it is a reference to
Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.
268 Compare MN III 123 (Achariyabhūtadharmam Sutta): sato saṃpajāno Bodhisateto Tusiṭa kāyā
caturtha mūtā kuchīna okkami, idam p' ādham Bhagavato achariyaya adhībhūtadharmam bhūtre.

universe that consists of a great trichiliocosm with his radiance. O Blessed
One, I consider this to be an extraordinary and marvelous quality of the
Bodhisattva. About this, it is said: 'When he was born, he illuminated the
trichiliocosm with his radiance. Homage to the Blessed One who is like ten
million suns.' As soon as the Blessed One was born as a Bodhisattva, he took
seven steps. This too, O Blessed One, I consider to be an extraordinary and
marvelous quality of a Bodhisattva. About this, it is said: 'As soon as you were
born, you took seven steps, standing on lotus flowers. You came playfully like
a bull. Homage to Gautama.'

Thus it is established, according to the authoritative texts of the eighteen schools,
that one should pay homage to Bodhisattvas from the first generation of the mind
of awakening and thereafter. It is reasonable, therefore, to include the Mahāyāna in the
eighteen schools.

Should renunciants pay homage to all householders who have generated the mind
of awakening? Yes, they should pay homage to anyone who is said to have entered a
[Bodhisattva] stage and received a prediction, even if he is an animal, like a rabbit or a
king of geese.269 This is even more true of a human being. It is said that a monk
should pay homage to two [kinds of people]: the Buddha and senior monks. In this
context, a monk should pay homage to a Buddha in two respects: as the requisites of
merit (pujyayantiḥbuddha) and as the achievement of the requisites of knowledge (jñāna-
śraddhā). The root of both of these [requisites] is the mind of awakening. In the Ārya
Aṣṭaṃśaśāstra śāstra it says:270 "A Tathāgata's moral conduct (īla), concentration
(anādīcā), wisdom (prajñā), liberation (vimokṣa), view of the knowledge of liberation
(vimokṣaśāntadharma), and so forth, as well as [the perfections] that begin with gen-
erosity, all have the mind of awakening as their root. This is why they are imperishable
(vyāpaya)." Likewise it is said:271

If the merit of the mind of awakening took material form, it would fill
the realm of space, and there would be more left over.

Even when someone has no realization of reality but still has the solid mind of awaken-
ing that is its foundation, one should pay homage. In the first stage (bhūmi), realization
(abhisamayā) is conviction about oral teaching (ghoṣaṇaṃ) and in the sixth it is

269 A reference to the Śata and Hamsa Jātakas.
270 The Tibetan text is edited in Buxton 1993: vol. 1, p. 21; the English translation is found in
vol. 2, p. 80.
271 The Pratimāpariprėchā, quoted in Dhammapādana 1 (Tucci 1956-58: 192); bodhicittaḥ vai yat
puruṣaṃ tac ev rūpāḥ bhūved, yādī i śūnānāmaṃ vaṃbāpyaḥ bhūvayā caturvāmaṃ bhūvet.
conforming (amsolaniki); and in the eighth it is conviction about dharmas that do not arise (ānatattākādambarmakānā). With this realisation, a Bodhisattva shakes, illuminates, and travels as many as a hundred worlds with his power, lives as long as a hundred cons, enters into the past and future, and so on. Since none of these inconceivable abilities is shared by Śrāvakas, there is no Bodhisattva, from the first arising of the mind of awakening, to whom one should not pay homage. How can this be contradicted? One should pay homage to a Bodhisattva in the same way that one pays homage to a Buddha, because they belong to the same continuum, just as one pays homage to the sapling of a fig tree and to the son of a Cakravartin, as if both were fully grown.

A Buddha comes from a Bodhisattva; the Dharma comes from a perfect Buddha; and the noble Samgha comes from the Dharma. From this we have the three jewels. Someone who hates a Bodhisattva hates the three jewels. Someone who rejects the three jewels is not a monk and has not taken a vow.

Maitreya and other hymn-writers for the most part praise the greatness of the Blessed One by referring to his previous deeds. For example:

O Hero, only you know the essence of the jewel of the mind, which is the seed of perfect awakening. Others are far away from it. Should I praise you first or the great compassion that long held you in samāra, even though you knew its faults?

Also, in the Buddhānusmrtiśāvāna, it is said that one should recollect the virtues (gānas) of the previous deeds (pārvayoga) of the Tathāgata. The previous deeds begin with the first arising of the mind of awakening, and that is the Bodhisattva practice (bodhisattvacara). If someone recollects the Tathāgata by recollecting his previous deeds, how can this be homage to a Buddha, rather than to a Bodhisattva? In some sūtras of the Mahāyāna, Bodhisattvas address Śrāvakas with terms of respect such as

"honorable one" (bhudanta) and pay them homage, and Śrāvakas use terms such as "son of good family" (kulaputra) to address Bodhisattvas. This follows social conventions (lokasaṃsārī). Thus Āryas should pay homage to [Bodhisattvas] who have attained conviction (ksanti), who have attained concentrations (samādhi) such as the heroic (gūnānayo), and who are able to display Buddha-manifestations. If Bodhisattvas display manifestations of the Buddha, they do not consider homage to be directed to themselves, as was the case with Upagupta, when he spoke to Māra and Māra manifested himself as the Buddha. Someone who seeks a distinctive attainment should not speak these nasty words. They begin with hatred and lead to bad rebirths. Instead he should see the profound teaching of the Mahāyāna.

It is said that the merits that produce the marks (laksana) of the Tathāgata are equal to the grains of sand in seventy-two Ganges rivers and also equal to the merits that produce the marks of the noble Avalokiteśvara. This is said in the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, which extols Bodhisattvas with the simile of the waxing moon, because these [Bodhisattvas] the noble [Buddha] arises, because they pass beyond, because their generation of the mind of awakening makes them the primary preceptors (kalyāṇamitra), and [because] the seed of awakening is referred to as going-forth (pravrajya).

The Vows of Bodhisattvas Like Gāganaśāstra Are Just Words

Furthermore, the vows (pratībhāna) of [Bodhisattvas] like Gāganaśāstra are not just words, because [we see] that they have a result. Why do [we not see this result] now? When there is a result in the continuum of someone who has few wholesome roots (kuṭalamāla), it may be diminished, or it may be seen incorrectly, just as [some beings] see the Ganges as dry, as pus, or as fire. For example, many hundreds of thousands of hungry ghosts may be standing on the bank of the Ganges, but because of their own lack of good fortune, they see the Ganges as if it were totally dry, as pus, or as fire. In a similar way, a shower of wealth comes from the Bodhisattva vow (pratībhāna), but it

272 On the three forms of kāmi, see note 150.
273 Compare Bhāviveka’s account of the mastery of power (vīryakālita) in MIIK 3.313ff.
274 “Someone who has taken a vow” represents the Tibetan idem pa; the most common Sanskrit equivalent is samsārā.
275 Satapātikācakara 19 (samyakambodhiphāsya citaratwarda tattva tva / svam asvattvāt tophā nāma tānto / cānto apya dosayin / tva samāsārā dhyānāt cīrām dīrām). Quoted from Bailey 48 and 78.
276 Perhaps Ārya Bodhisattvīnī, or Torani no. 943. Mahāvīra 1.63 refers to a “Dharma teaching” (bhartimahesvaram) called Buddhavīrīnī.
277 On the term pārvayoga see BHS.
278 The story of Upagupta and Māra is found in the Akṣarakānta (Strong 1981: 185-99). Upagupta asks Māra to show him the form of the Buddha. Māra agrees, but only if Upagupta promises not to pay homage to him. When Māra does as Upagupta asks, Upagupta is overwhelmed by the sight that he pays homage anyway. Upagupta explains that he bows to the form of the Buddha, not to Māra himself. For further discussion of the story, see Strong 1992: ch. 5.
279 When Bhāviveka refers to the Ratnakūṭa, he has in mind the Kāyopāvajīvatā. The comparison of the Bodhisattva to the waxing moon is found in Staal-Holstein 129: tāt pradhānā hekātā nāsakānta namānabānta / svam asvattvān / svam kāma kāya / nāma bhavadeśdīyati te kalasāntasarān bodhisattva nāsakānta / su tathāgatāt tat kāyena bodhisattvavishāyā hi tathāgatāḥ tāvat saṃsāram ucyate. Compare also Traité 246-55.
280 On the Bodhisattva Gāganaśāstra, see note 113.
281 Vasubandhu uses the same comparison in Vimalakītī 3.
does not fall on sentient beings who have not accumulated wholesome roots. Either it does not fall at all, or it falls like a thunderbolt and so forth. It is as if the rising sun were sending a thousand rays of light in a cloudless sky, but people whose previous karma has made them blind cannot see even a single ray. It is as if a heap of jewels were falling from the sky, but people who have little merit because of a deficiency in their previous karma cannot enjoy any of them.

Someone may say that a Bodhisattva vow has no power, regardless of one’s previous karma. But it does have power, because its benefit to others arises from a complex of causes. For example, a sprout grows from a complex of causes, consisting of earth, water, fire, wind, and space, but if one of these conditions is missing, the sprout does not grow. Similarly, [Bodhisattvas] cultivate a great deal of renunciation, freedom from avarice, and lack of desire; they seek equanimity and perfect generosity; they do not hope for any reward and generate no desire for any result; and they are equally generous to all sentient beings. By doing so, they gain a result (vipāka) that consists of a shower of wealth, and they make [this result] manifest, but this does not happen if even one of the conditions is missing. Therefore, the vows of [Bodhisattvas] such as Gaganagañña definitely have results.

**Śākyamuni Is a Manifestation**

It is also reasonable that Śākyamuni is a manifestation (nirmāṇa), because [this manifestation] arises from the Enjoyment Body (sambhogakāya), which is based on the Dharma Body (dharma-kāya) and located in Akanisṭha. Someone may ask: If the Dharma Body and Enjoyment Body are non-conceptual, what do the Manifestation Bodies (nirmānakāyas) arise from, since these [bodies] are non-conceptual? The answer is that the Blessed One made this vow while he was a Bodhisattva: “When I have attained the non-conceptual Dharma nature, even though I make no conceptual effort, may I engage in any action, form, or voice that will discipline sentient beings.” From the root Tathāgata Body (tattva-tathāgata-kāya), by the force of this vow, the benefits to sentient beings begin with the actions of staying in Tushita and ending with nirvāṇa.

Without the Manifestation Body, it is impossible to discipline the sentient beings who need to be disciplined by displaying a billion births in Jambudvīpa, entrance into a mother’s womb, birth, being taught the arts, living in the harem, going forth, defeating Māra, awakening, turning the wheel of Dharma, and achieving parinirvāṇa.282

Even in the texts of the different schools (nikāya), there are accounts of the Buddha’s manifestations. For example, to discipline someone who was attached to hunting, the Buddha manifested the form of a hunter, and to discipline King “Lotus-Person” (padma skyes lha), he manifested the form of an old man. When Aniruddha was asked what he saw with his clairvoyance (ditīyakṣaṇa), he said: “I see the Tathāgata’s manifestations and innumerable sentient beings in the intermediate state.”283 These manifestations discipline sentient beings and are active as manifestations. Śākyamuni’s manifestations act in the same way and are not false like an illusion (māyā). While the Tathāgata Vairocana remains in a pure abode (Tib. gnas kwang ma / Skt. *buddhāstāna*), his sustaining power (adhisthāna) displays Buddha-manifestations, but these Buddha-manifestations are not different from the Buddha, because they have the same basis (āṭṭhaya), like rays that come from the sun or people whose actions are derived from a king. Even though there are many manifestations, we do not think that there are many Tathāgatas, because there is only one action.284 Therefore, this does not contradict the claim that it is impossible285 for many Buddhas to appear in a single universe (lokadābha). This statement refers to the universe that consists of a great trichiliocosm (trikāla-mahādābha), not to all universes.286

The Dharmaguptakas recite the following:

Homage to the Buddhas, the Buddhas’ Śrāvakas, and the bodies of the illustrious perfect Buddhas, to the place where the perfect Buddha was born, where he realized awakening, where he turned the wheel of Dharma, where he attained nirvāṇa without outflows. I pay homage also to the place where the Tathāgata stood, walked, and sat, and to the place where he lay down like a lion. The best of bipeds who dwell in the eastern and northern directions, the Conqueror named “Hard to Approach” (dusprasaṇa)287 spoke these verses. One who praises the Tathāgatas with these four verses will not go to a bad rebirth for ten billion eons.

Furthermore, when the elder Maudgalyāyana did not have the power (yuddhi) to lift

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283 Aniruddha, a first cousin of the Buddha, was known as “foremost among those who have clairvoyance” (agga dībhasaccakkāntā), as in AN I 23. His clairvoyance is the key to the story about him in the Visalaksatānirṇedita Sutta (Lamotte 1976: 65-68). For a more extensive account of his life, see DPBN s.v. “Aniruddha.”

284 The Tibetan term mtha’ ma is normally used to refer to a Buddha’s actions, but here it might refer to the Buddha as a single agent.

285 Literally “out of place” (Tib. mnam mgod) and “irrelevant” (Tib. skabs rgyal). On the impossibility of many Buddhas in a single universe, see MN III 109 and Ksa 3:95-96.

286 On the different universes (lokadābha) in Buddhist cosmology, see Lamotte 1976: 275-84.

287 In the Sād-dge and Peking, this Buddha is called mtha’ ma (“Hard to Rely”), but the Māyā lists no Buddha by this name. A more likely possibility is Dusprasaṇa (lha pa dka’ brtan, MVY 6574). Lamotte (1976: 111) explains that Dusprasaṇa (“Hard to Approach”) is a contemporary of Śākyamuni and lives in the Mani universe, sixty-one great chilicosms away from this universe. As a Buddha who lives at the same time as Śākyamuni, Dusprasaṇa fits the context well. One way to accommodate this change would be to emend the text from mtha’ ma to mtha’ brtan, but the next paragraph shows that the correct reading is mtha’ in the sense of “approach.” For further discussion of the Buddha Dusprasaṇa, see Nattier 1991: 23.
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a sash worn by the elder Śāriputra, the Blessed One said: "Maudgalyāyana, you have not lost your power; the monk Śāriputra can use the power of his wisdom (prajñābala) to tie the end of his sash to the throne of the Tathāgata Hard to Approach and approach him." It should be understood that the stories of the goldsmith and the carpenter show the universe with and without Buddhas.

It also is said:

The perfect Buddhas of the past and future, along with the Buddha of the present—all of whom who remove sorrow—paid respects to the Dharma in the past, do so in the present, and will do so in the future. This is the nature of the perfect Buddhas.

Therefore, those who think that there is only one Tathāgata in all universes do not understand the meaning of the teaching. It is said that there are many past Buddhas, such as Dipankara and Ratanākara, and there will be many in the future such as Simha and Puṣya. This point also is repeated in the sūtras of the Āgama. How so? "How many Tathāgatas have there been in the past? As many as there are grains of sand in the Ganges. How many will there be in the future? As many as there are grains of sand in the Ganges and so forth." Therefore, it is reasonable that many Buddhas arise in many world systems, not just one.

THE BUDDHA IS ALWAYS IN CONCENTRATION

It is said: "Even though the Tathāgata is always in concentration (samādhi), he sees,..."

288 A version of this story is found in the Bhajjajivanastra (Hofinger 181-83). Xuanzang also tells this story in the account of his visit to Śravasti. The Buddha asks Maudgalyāyana to summon Śāriputra to an assembly. Śāriputra asks him to wait. Maudgalyāyana threatens to use his power to transport both of them into the Buddha's presence. Śāriputra takes off his sash, throws it on the ground, and challenges Maudgalyāyana to lift it. When Maudgalyāyana cannot, he returns to the assembly, only to find that Śāriputra has arrived before him. The story is used to illustrate the superiority of Śāriputra's wisdom over Maudgalyāyana's supernormal power.

289 The meaning of this sentence is unclear.

290 Udānavarga 21.11-12: ye cābhijñatāt sambuddha. ... For other equivalents, see Skilling 1997: 613. Skilling's references are taken from Bernhard 1965-68. A similar verse is quoted in the padgāvaviniśaya section of the Kalabhāga (Vśākhyā 1209): ye cābhijñatāt sambuddha ye ca bodhā anuprajañāt ētāṃ ca etarha sambuddha bhavantā lokānāthā. A corresponding verse is found in Mahāvastu III. 327.

291 Ratanākara is mentioned as a Buddha in the past in the Lalitavistara, Divyottarana, and so forth. See BHSD, s.v. "Ratanākara."

292 Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. "Maitreya") mentions several different lists of future Buddhas. The Mahāvastu contains a short list in which Simha is listed as the first Buddha after Maitreya and Puṣya as the last.

The Śrāvakas

because he sees in the past, present, and future. This means that [the Buddha] acts in conformity with the world. He is in concentration, but he acts by the power of his previous vow. He performs all these actions, but he does not act in a conceptual way. He is like a gardener who sends water into various small furrows: after he has released the water in the desired directions, he sits still and does nothing. Therefore, it is not true that this claim about the Buddha's concentration is not the Buddha's teaching.

MAHĀYĀNA SUTRAS TEACH USELESS MANTRAS

Some say that the sūtras of the Mahāyāna are praised for their many benefits, but these results generally come later and have few benefits in this life. These people are deficient in faith (pratibimba) and aspiration (prajñā; they also reject what is wholesome and practice what is not. They are overcome by the power of evil habits in this life. When their faith diminishes and they give up their aspiration, it is as difficult for them to see their own benefit as it is to see the stars when the sun rises and sends out myriads of rays. Some give up the true Dharma, slander the noble ones, and harm the three jewels. While they may have accumulated many wholesome roots, it is as if they were covered with dust, and they stay on the path of the three evil destinies (apāya). How can these people gain any benefit? Others fear even the slightest evil and practice nothing but virtue. They exert themselves in the practice of ten tasks: copying texts of the Mahāyāna, memorizing them, reading them, reciting them from memory, thinking about them, meditating on them, listening to them, donating them, promulgating them, and worshipping them. Since they are not overwhelmed by contrary tendencies, why should they not gain the benefit that has just been described? They are like people who base their practice on the three kinds of śāstras and are certain to attain an immortal place (amṛtāpada) where they are free from the afflictions of birth, old age, sickness, and death.

If this is the case, the Mahāyāna is not like Vedānta, for someone who bases his practice on the Tripitaka's teaching of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to awaken-

293 On the claim that the Buddha is always in concentration, see Karthākāvāja, bk. 18, sec. 2 (not exact) and Bāru 1955: 60, where this point is the twelfth thesis of the Mahāsthānghikas. On the significance of this point in Bhāviveka's theory of the Buddha, see Eckerl 1992: Part 11.

294 The Bīh (68) explains that a Bodhisattva should study the bodhisattva-pītaka, the pravakṣa-pītaka, three additional śāstras, and several different varieties of arts and crafts. The three additional śāstras are logic (lokottara), grammar (lakṣāya), and medicine (yātirikta).

295 The text simply says that "there is no similarity." The context does not make clear what is dissimilar to what. The most likely possibility is that the Mahāyāna is not similar to Vedānta, since this section of the chapter has been a response to the Śrāvaka's argument in verse 4.7 that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Śrāvaka's and so forth, like the Vedanta view."
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imperishables, namely, analytical knowledge (pratisthānāna), knowledge (jñāna), wisdom (prajñā), and eloquence (pratibhāṣā). In a similar way, it is the source of four unfathomables (dharmottagāha) and four grounds of self-confidence (nisīkṣārāja), which glow with insatiable energy, and are limitless, invisible, unreachable, inexplicable, and impossible to subdue.302 It also is the source of four treasures: the essences, penetrations (nīvaśīla), radiances (auśabhāsa), and powers (bala). A Bodhisattva who enters this akṣayakaraṇādhiṇa knows the entrance into all syllable-methods, names, terms (sanskreta), and dharmas terms. For all dharmas are pure from the beginning.303 Similarly: “A Bodhisattva who is established in this dhārāṇi seeks awakening from those syllables and enters it in the following way. The syllables (akṣara) are power (bala); their arrangement is the body; the head-view304 that leads into the door of Dharma is the forehead; and wisdom is the eye.” The root of this and similar practices is wisdom. When wisdom is present, there cannot be any delusion, and desire or hatred cannot exist when they have no source. Therefore, when [an opponent] says [that a dhārāṇi cannot remove evil] because it does not counteract its cause, the point is not accepted.

[The opponent’s] point can also be contradicted with a counter-argument (pratisthāna). A dhārāṇi can destroy evil, because it is a form of practice, like the meditation on impure states (śūlhabhūta), which counteracts the cause of evil.

Similarly, mantras are able to produce whatever one wants, because they have great power, like a wishing tree. As a combination of hidden (gupta) syllables that reveal the secret of the Tathāgata’s knowledge, they remain in the continuum of someone who has engaged in this practice (bhūṣanā).

In general, vidyā also show how to destroy defilements with syllables (akṣara) and meanings (artha) that convey the six perfections, the noble truths, and the auxiliaries to awakening (bhūshikṣādharma). For example: “śamayā śamayā dānī śānte dharmarāja”.

Akṣayakaraṇādhiṇa (sic) is listed in MVY 603 as the name of a sūtra. In MVY 750, akṣayakaraṇādhiṇa is listed as the name of a dhārāṇi.

Unfortunately these epiphet, beginning with “glow with invincible energy,” do not appear in the text of the sūtra. It is unclear whether they are adjectives that modify “grounds of self-confidence” or are meant to be categories in their own right.

The reconstruction of the first part of this sentence is unclear, and the parallel passage in the sūtra is not much help: khaśaśdho panaṃ ca gṛitaḥ pāyaḥ sa pujam pāyaḥ ca cha kṛṣitaḥ pāyaḥ sa pūjaḥ pāyaḥ ca cha kṛṣitaḥ pāyaḥ sa pūjaḥ pāyaḥ ca cha kṛṣitaḥ (Dutt, 1905: 120). The Tibetan translation has been edited by Inagaki (1967: 153).

Bhāviveka is paraphrasing a passage that is found in the Peking (Otani no. 820, Pu, folio 147aff. The Śāgranāraṇājñāparipṛcchā Sūtra is quoted twice in the Sūtraamṛta (Lindner 1982a: 177) and frequently in the Sktstāmatācaya.

On the concept of the “imperishable” (akṣara) in Mahāyāna literature, see Braarvig 1993, vol. 2. The term akṣayakaraṇa means “imperishable basket” or “basket of imperishables.”
Even Great Evil Can Be Uprooted

Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to say that one can uproot even great evil (pāpa). In the statement "karmas are not destroyed for hundreds of eons," the words "kālpatāraś" ("hundreds of eons") and the second "api" indicate that [karmas] are destroyed. How? This is accomplished by restraint, by applying antidotes (pratipakṣa), by confessing (deśana) evil, and by strength of reliance (ārayakalpa). As it is said:111 "Maitreya, a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva who possesses four qualities (dharma) can overcome even evil that has already been committed and accumulated. What are these four? They are: (1) the habit of criticism (vidīṣya) which multiplies regrets about unwholesome (akulāka) karmas that already have been committed, (2) the habit that serves as an antidote (pratipakṣa) adds wholesome karmas that greatly outnumber the unwholesome karmas that have already been committed, (3) the strength of turning away (pratipāti) means that one restrains oneself and promises not to commit (evil), and (4) the strength of reliance (āraya) means that one takes refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha and does not relinquish the mind of awakening. With these four qualities, a Bodhisattva removes all remaining evil and does not experience any evil."

In the Karmavaranavaiśuddhi Sūtra it says:114 "When the right time and conditions are present (āsāmya viśaya kūlām ca)." This means that, if the power of a seed is unimpaired, it produces a sprout when the right time and conditions are present: namely, earth, water, fire, wind, and space. But if a seed is burned, rotten, or damaged, it will not produce a sprout, even if the right conditions are present. The same is true if any of the conditions are missing. Similarly, when sentient beings have been helpful or

306 The term "bhāṣīte mahe mahābhūṣya sarvārthaśabdha" occurs several times in the AAA. See Conze 1973a, s.v. agrodharmā. The other two terms are hypothetical reconstructions. Brajvīrī (1997: 32) rejects this idea and states that these paradigmatic signs belong to the ten-syllable mantra of Tārā om tāre tātāre tare mān. Brajvīrī points out that this passage gives the earliest known reference to the Tārā mantra (assuming that this text was written by Bhāviveka). Tārā and Cāmūnda are discussed later in this paragraph. For a more general discussion of the cult of Tārā, see Beyer 1973.

308 Lit. "why can they not destroy...?"

309 The Tibetan transcribes these syllables as dge, dge, dge, and dge. Brajvīrī (1997: 32) identifies the mantras as the nine dge dge dge. Bernhard (1967) has noted that the words of this mantra may have a Dravidian origin and refer to the nine noble truths.

310 Bhāviveka is comparing two female deities, one of whom is useful in removing defilements while the other is not. (Cāmūnda should be compared to Cāmūnda.) The description of Cāmūnda, however, is unclear. The phrase "bhaśīte mahe..." can mean someone who is "sticky with increasing hard to bear (or resist) defilements," but "bhāṣīte nahe..." also could have a sexual reference.

311 The opponent has not actually formulated a syllogism about the effectiveness of viśīṣya. It seems that Bhāviveka is suggesting his own example, namely viśīṣya associated with Tārā. This example would not support the opponent’s saṃśaya-dharma, which is "do not destroy evil."
PART 2: TRANSLATION

harmful and the power of their wholesome or unwholesome karma is unimpaired, [this karma] will produce the appropriate effect, when the conditions of level (pari), place (vijaya), and body are present, and when the appointed time has arrived for [karma] that is to be experienced in this life (dṛṣṭādhamma avadāna), to be experienced in the next life ( Uttaraparyaya avadāna), and to be experienced in a subsequent life (parāparaṃ avadāna).

But when wholesome [karma] is impaired by wrong views (mithyā dṛṣṭi) and malevolence, or when unwholesome [karma] is weakened by antidotes (pratipakṣa), such as curses (cāsā), restraints (sāvād), and confessions (dālaṇa), how can wholesome or unwholesome seeds have any result when their power has been impaired, even when the right conditions are present?

If the right conditions are not present and the timing has changed, why is it impossible [for a great evil] to be uprooted? As it is said: “The evil that this upholder of the true Dharma is definitely going to experience (nįyaatā avadāna) will be experienced in this life.” It also says: “Furthermore, any karma that leads to bad rebirth may here be just a headache.”

[Object:] If [a great evil] only results in a headache, in what sense has it been uprooted?

[Reply]: When the results of wholesome and unwholesome karmas are completely fulfilled by experiencing the sufferings of hell, and those karmas no longer cause even the slightest experience of the sufferings of hell, then they have been completely uprooted. Here, if [unwholesome karma] produces something like a headache, there certainly has been a result.

[Object:] If unwholesome karma can be completely eliminated, why do [sūtras] say: “with the exception of the result of previous karma”?

Reply: This statement refers to the experience of results in the continuus (sāṃsāra) of people who are blind, one-eyed, lame, maimed, mute, or deaf, because the results of actions that are in the process of maturation cannot be totally eliminated. Something

that has been performed by a thought that is still in its causal state may be succeeded by another distinctive thought and be completely eliminated, as in case of Angulimala, Ajātāsātru, who killed his father, Asoka, and so forth.

If Ajātāsātru and the one who was determined to kill his mother generated other, virtuous intentions, why were they reborn in Avici without eliminating their karma?

Reply: It is taught that they were reborn in Avici and so forth in order to generate confidence in the law of karma (lit. karma and results), but their karma was completely eliminated. They were born there in Avici and then were liberated, like a silk ball that falls down and rises up. They were not touched by the flames of hell. In this way, evil can be uprooted without denying the law of karma.

Scholars of the Mahāyāna think that karmas can only be uprooted when there is application of an antidote; they will not be eliminated unless they are overpowered by an antidote. Just as it is seen that even a small evil brings a result (viṣaya) for someone

315 These three forms of karma (trikārnākāra) are listed in MVY 2308-10. Bhāviveka reverses the order of the second and third items on the list. For a more complete discussion, see Sūtra 4.50ff. The MVY calls the third form of karma lān grāng gāhaṃ la myaṅ ghar "gyar ba," rather than the nām grāng gāhaṃ of our text.

316 These antidotes do not seem to constitute a standard list, at least in MVY and related dictionaries. Perhaps dhūla pa is a promise never to do something evil, while dhūpa pa is a promise definitely to do something good, and dālaṇa pa is what you do when you fail.

317 Lit. “just a hot head” (mgo bo chub ba chen).

318 The logical structure of this passage is difficult to follow. I have attempted to identify the objections and responses, but obscurities remain.

319 Lit. “how can there be no result at all?”

320 Skilling (1992: 148) refers to the phrase “with the exception of the result of previous karma (varamajāti pārastarhāh karṇaśvāpākām) as the “escape clause” that limits the effect of mantras and other forms of protection. He notes that the phrase occurs widely in Buddhist literature.

321 The syntax of this sentence is unclear. It would help the parallelism in the sentence to read rṣya yav yav pai sems pa for rṣya yav yav pai sems pa. Then one thought could “arise” or be succeeded by another. Left as it is, it seems best to assume that the implied object of mriga par lus byes pa is evil karma, since that is what needs to be eliminated. Bhāviveka is clearly describing the mechanism of conversion, as in the examples in the next sentence demonstrate.

322 The Tibetan reads Ajaṭāstūra, Svaka, and pig-killer as if they were separate names (mig byes dgra dang) / lus bo dang / phong gru pa dang). A possible way to make sense of the names “Svaka and pig-killer” is to emend the text from phong gru pa (pig-killer) to phu gru pa (father-killer) and interpret rla ka (the equivalent of the Sanskrit “own”) as modifying phu gru pa (“father-killer”). DPPN explains that Ajaṭāstūra (Pali Ajaṭāstūra) was encouraged by Devadatta to seize the throne from his father, king Bimbisāra. When Bimbisāra learned of the plot, he abdicated the throne, but Ajaṭāstūra was not satisfied until Bimbisāra was killed.

323 A reference to Angulimala. When the king of Kosala sent a despatch of men to seize Angulimala, Angulimala’s mother attempted to warn him. Angulimala was determined to kill his mother and collect her fingers. The Buddha intervened and prevented the murder. See DPPN, s.v. “Angulimala.”

324 The comparison in this passage is unclear. A similar point is made in Śāristara’s Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkārā-yuttī-khyāya on MSA 3.3: “It is as if, because of the power of their lineage, they experience the suffering of a hell being only as great as being bound by a silk ball, like King Ajaṭāstūra (de ying dpal na rgyud pa nyi snye dgra dge lha kyi mdo tshus med pa lha byas kyang rgyi kyi mhaṅs sems can dgra dpal lha sngon dang gcig las byaṅs snying bo lha ba lha ba). The problem lies not only in the term dgr la sbyaṅs snying bo lha ba (silk ball or flowers), for which the available dictionaries offer no decisive Sanskrit equivalent, but also in the adjectives attributed to it. The Tibetan text of TJ reads brad pa lus pher ba (“fall down and rise up”); the Tibetan of Śāristara’s bhāṣya reads brdams pa (“bound”). A solution may lie in the target mngon po phre "bam as cited in “The Online Tibetan to English Dictionary and Translation Tool” (www.thd.org/reference/translations/tool.html): “Because of this karma, someone who comes to Avici is only struck by a silk ball” (las brad dars med du pho snyor las byaṅs snying bo lha ba lha ba). If this reference is to be trusted, the “fall down and rise up” of the TJ can be interpreted as an act of striking, and the term brdams pa of Śāristara’s bhāṣya as a copysist’s error. Tson kha pa quotes this passage in the Lam rin chen mo (Cutler 2000: 256).
who lacks skill-in-means (apaya-kusala), as in the case of Mahāmudrāgāyaṇa and so forth. Even though they have collected great wholesome roots, it is as if their mental flaws have turned them to dust, like the monk who was the attendant (nitiya-yakara) of the Tathāgata Sarvābhūtih. In the past, this [monk] was the first to honor the great Arhants, but he subsequently was overcome by strong desire. He stole the property of the community and, with a spiteful mind, abused it with angry words. As a result he was born as a fifth-eating worm in a place that is very hard to escape, and not even a fraction of his wholesome roots remained. In the Avadāna it says: “Bodhisattvas and others have the power of skill-in-means to eliminate a great heap of evil and do not fail to obtain a small wholesome root.” It also says in a sūtra: “Monks, it is like this: If a man pours an ounce of salt into a small amount of water, the water becomes undrinkable. But if another man pours an ounce of salt into a large amount of water, it cannot be tasted, and the water does not become undrinkable. Why? O monks, it is because there is so much water. O monks, in a similar way, an individual who commits a sin remains [secure] in the second respect.” Thus it is said:

If someone pours an ounce of salt into a large pond, the water is not undrinkable. But, if someone pours an ounce of salt into a handful of water, the handful of water is undrinkable. Similarly, if someone collects a lot of merit and commits a little poison of evil, the result is insignificant and does not lead to a bad rebirth. But if someone does not collect even a little good and collects a lot of evil, just a little evil will lead this defiled person to a lower rebirth.

In other words, this person is like someone who has eaten wholesome food.

[Objection] If all karmas are eliminated by the first production of the mind [of awakening], why did the perfectly awakened Buddha have karmic results (tripāki) such as being wounded by the thorn of an acacia tree, [being accused of] the murder of Sundarīkā, being slandered by a mad woman, returning with an empty begging bowl, teaching the Dharma by eating barley for three months, being insulted by the angry Bhradavāya, becoming sick, [being injured by] a rock thrown by Devadatta, and so forth?

Reply: All these [karmic results] are displayed with skill-in-means in order to discipline sentient beings. The Blessed One does not have even the slightest bit of karma. As it says in the Upāyakusalalā Sūtra and the Lokottaravārikā, “O son of good family (sukula-putra), one should understand that the Tathāgata’s teachings of the ten karmic results are skill-in-means and have a hidden meaning (abhāsānpakā).” These [karmic results] are impossible. As long as a Bodhisattvā has wholesome roots, even as small as the tip of a hair, it is impossible for him to approach the Bodhi Tree. A Tathāgata has all the wholesome roots and has abandoned all the unwholesome roots. How can a Tathāgata who has removed any connection with traces (sāsanā) possibly have any bad karmic obstacle? Most sentient beings waste karmic results, however, and the Tathāgata teaches [that he has] karmic results in order to teach karmic results to those who have no confidence in karmic results. He teaches: “If even I, a king of Dharma, have a karmic result, why shouldn’t you have a karmic result? But the Tathāgata does not have the slightest karmic obstacle. A skilled doctor who is not sick may prescribe [medicine] for himself as if he were sick, and by prescribing bitter and hot [medicine], he may completely cure the sick people who follow his advice. As the king of physicians, the Tathāgata cures all ailments in the same way. Even though he has no [karmic] obstacles, he teaches karma by saying: “This is the result of my karma.” When sūtras like the Upāyakusalalāya say, “When sentient beings are terrified by karma, they purify their body, speech and mind,” are they not like liberators, for they sustain the mind by freeing it from ignorance and so forth?

Others see someone on the verge of committing a heinous crime (dramantya), know that this action will cause suffering for a long time, and kill that person out of compassion. They certainly know that they will be born in hell, but they adopt a wholesome
two kinds of people who die with no moral failure: those who do not send forth\(^{342}\) any moral failure, and those who, according to the Dharma, confess any moral failures that may occur.\(^{134}\) There is a reason [for this]. We see that someone who has powerful skill-in-means (upāya) can diminish evil and eventually eliminate it completely, as if he were putting salt in water or butter in fire. Someone who knows this skill-in-means has a powerful antidote and can completely eliminate all the evil that has accumulated for a thousand incalculable eons, just as a blazing fire immediately removes darkness from a very dark place. For someone who lacks skill-in-means, the good also can be eliminated, like darkness without the light of the sun. But if [good] is accumulated every day, it will certainly grow and not be lost, like the honey collected by honey bees or like the shape of the waxing moon. Whether karma is damaged or not depends on causes; it is not established by nature. Therefore, it is established that one can minimize and uproot even terrible evil by personally repenting it, criticizing it, confessing it, announcing it, and vowing not to do it again.

**THE VAIPULYA HAS A DIFFERENT TEACHING**

[The opponent] claims that the Vaipulya has a different teaching, but the word [Vaipulya] refers literally to something that is extensive.\(^{144}\) The Mahāyāna is far more extensive than the Śrāvakayāna. If you think that the Vaipulya is something other than the Mahāyāna, this is nothing but words. We think that the entire teaching of the Mahāyāna is called “Vaipulya,” because its texts (grantha) and its meaning (artha) are extensive. The Blessed One did not make a clear distinction by saying: “This is Vaipulya, and that is not.” Therefore, when [we] say that the Mahāyāna is the Buddha’s teaching, and you respond with hatred, your response is not authoritative (pramāna) for us. In this way, it is established that the Mahāyāna is the Vaipulya.

**THE MAHĀYĀNA IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE DREAM OF KING KṚŚIŅ**

**Objection:** When the Blessed One (Kṛṣṇa) was asked about King Kṛśin’s dreams, he said: “The Tathāgata (Śākyamuni) will appear when human beings live a hundred years, and his teaching will be divided into eighteen schools (nikāya).” The Mahāyāna is not mentioned in this division of the teaching.

**Reply:** The Mahāyāna has to do with the inclinations of those who aspire to...
something profound and vast, while the teaching in the eighteen schools is common, like the teaching in śāstras that make no distinction in birth, age, color, country, and time.

Furthermore, there is definitely a distinction between the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna in the teachings of all Buddhās. But there also is a distinction about particular teachings that belong only to Śākyamuni and not to others.144 Tatāhāgatas such as Krakucchanda145 distinguished different vehicles, but Kāśyapa did not. So [this] does not [prove] that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching.

Soon after the Blessed One’s parinirvāṇa, the Śrāvakas and others became attached to the teachings that had been made to each one of them, and they became divided. Their compilers collected [these teachings] accordingly. Since there was no suitable vessel for the Mahāyāna at that time, none of them collected it. [The Mahāyāna] was collected [instead] by Nāgas and so forth, who delighted in the Sugata, and it was taken to the world of the Nāgas and so forth.146 Then the noble Nāgārjuna, whom the Blessed One had predicted would be a suitable vessel [for the Mahāyāna], collected it from them and spread it widely in the human world.

The teaching of the Mahāyāna is consistent with the attainment of the knowledge of all modes (sāravikārañjñatā) and does not belong to Mara, so it is not right to reject or refuse the Mahāyāna. If one is capable of analysis,147 one should rationally investigate it. [This topic] has been adequately discussed. We now return to the point at hand.148

144 A literal translation would read: “Furthermore, in the teaching of all Buddhās, there is definitely a distinction between the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna. And a distinction of particular teachings belongs only to Śākyamuni, but not to another. And Tatāhāgatas such as Krakucchanda made a distinction between different vehicles, and Kāśyapa did not teach [it]. Therefore...” The logical connection between clauses is unclear. It is not obvious what it means to say that a teaching that is present in the teaching of all Buddhās, but Kāśyapa did not teach it.

145 MVY 90 lists ṭhot pa dang sel as the name of Krakucchanda. Edgerton (IHSD s.v. “Krakucchanda”) notes that he is the common equivalent for Krakucchanda’s “bhūka vīj” (“Destroyer of Samsāra”). According to Edgerton, Krakucchanda (also known as Krusatsanda and, in Pali, Kakusandha) is often listed as the third Buddha before Śākyamuni. The two intervening Buddhās between Krakucchanda and Śākyamuni are Kanakamuni and Kāśyapa.

146 On traditional accounts of the transmission of Mahāyāna sūtras, see Lamotte 1954.

147 Lit. “capable of analysis with the mind” (kṣīryāmas tātās an dhāya)." Bhāviveka has just completed his response to the first argument in verse 4.7 (“The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching, because it is not included in the Śrāvastīanīs and so forth, like the Vedānta view”). He also has responded to the “Miscellaneous Objections” that immediately preceded verse 4.9. After this long prose digression, he now returns to the second argument in verse 4.7:

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching, because it is not included in the Śrāvastīanīs and so forth, like the Vedānta view.

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4.36 The reason is unaccepted, because the eightfold path to omniscience is taught in the Mahāyāna.

The majority of Mahāyāna sūtras,149 such as the Prajñāpāramitā, the Bodhiśattvāpātaśaka, the Akṣayamati, the Sāgaramati, the Gāganaṇa, the Dhārmikasvārakīrti, the Ratnacūḍa, and the Sūgarājarājaśṛṣṭi, teach that this eightfold path is the cause of perfect awakening, and they do not teach a different path. Therefore, the reason, “because the Mahāyāna teaches a different path,” is unaccepted.

Objection: Doesn’t [the Mahāyāna] have a different teaching about bathing on the banks of [rivers] such as the Ganges, fasting, and so forth?

Reply: This is true. It teaches that evil and so forth are removed by the power of a Bodhisattva vow, when people bathe in four rivers, the Ganges, the Sindu, the Pākṣu, and the Śīla,150 drink from them, immerse themselves in them, and so forth. But the power to remove evil does not reside in the water. In the Anavatapta Sūtra151 it says: “The Nāga king Anavatapta gained power over karma and rebirth and was born in a great lake called Panasa. He vowed that if any sentient beings bathe in the rivers that flow from his lake, drink from them, and immerse themselves in them, these actions would bring about their awakening. He said that he would eventually take all of them to Buddhahood.” It is not a contradiction for them to become Buddhās with the help of a spiritual friend (kṣīryānasmitā). Fasting and so forth are taught in order to make a viśudhī effective by purifying the body of the person who practices the viśudhī. They are not taught out of a desire for liberation. There is no reason for these [practices] to be a different path. Therefore [the opponent] cannot avoid the fault of an unaccepted reason.

Objection: Even if this is true, the teaching of the Mahāyāna about these paths is useless. [According to the Mahāyāna], the knowledge of suffering does not lead to nirvāṇa, so [the Mahāyāna] contradicts the vision of the four noble truths.

Reply: In this case, you first should examine the following statement by the Teacher: “Purification is the equality (samatā) of the four noble truths.” What is equality? The emptiness of all dharmas, because they have a single taste, which is absence. The emptiness of the four noble truths is analyzed as follows.152

349 In addition to the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, which is widely available in its various versions, the sūtras in Bhāviveka’s list can be consulted in the following sources: Bodhisattvāpātaśaka (Pāland 1985); Akṣayamatiśrutam Sūtra (Bhattacharya 1992); Sāgaraśūkramatiśrutam Sūtra (Carmody 1978); Gāganaṇaśūkramatiśrutam Sūtra (Otani no. 819); Dhārmikasvārakīrti Sūtra, identified by Takasaki (1966a: 146) as the Tathāgatasvāmihācarā Sūtra (Otani no. 814); Ratnacūḍaśūkramatiśrutam Sūtra (Otani no. 760/47); and Śūgarājarājaśṛṣṭiśūkramatiśrutam Sūtra (Otani nos. 820/22).

350 On these four rivers see note 41.

351 Arya Anavataptaśūkramatiśrutam Sūtra, Otani no. 824.

352 In the next verse, the opponent claims that suffering must arise because of traditional statements about the arising and ceasing of suffering. Bhāviveka responds in verses 4.37-38b
PART 2: TRANSLATION

4.37 If someone thinks that suffering arises, because suffering is said to arise and cease, why not hold that, if it arises, it must be empty of the identity of suffering?

[We] have denied that anything arises from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all, so how can the truth of suffering apply to [suffering] that does not arise? The thesis is the following: "Why not hold that the five aggregates (skandha), which someone sees as arising or originating from causes and conditions, are empty of the identity of suffering?"

The reason and example are:

4.38ab Because it is conditioned, like illusion or like the pure aggregates.

"If suffering arises and ceases, it is empty of the identity of suffering!" should be supplied. Therefore, since [suffering] has this identity [namely, to be empty of the identity of suffering],

4.38cd What do you think is the truth of suffering, and what is right vision?\footnote{On Bhāviveka's understanding of samyog-darśana (right vision), compare his commentary on MMK 24.14: To see the non-arising and so forth of entities that are ultimately illusory is to see the noble truths" (Eckel 1980: 276).}

[Suffering] is a truth (satya) in the sense that it is free from error (avitattaya), but it does not have even a trace of the identity (sukhaveya) of suffering. It is free from error in the sense that this [no identity] is its identity.\footnote{The sDe-dge adds “in the sense that it is empty of identity” (tri mnyu bo nyid rig pa nyid mnyu). This addition is not necessary to make sense of the passage. The Peking version can be understood as an example of the standard, paradoxical use of the word sukhava (here translated as "identity"); it is the identity of things to have no identity (nihitsukhaveya) or to be empty of identity (sukhaveya).} This is the truth of suffering. Right vision is to see this correctly, because it too is free from error.

Furthermore,

4.39ab A painful feeling is suffering, but why are birth and so forth suffering?

People want to be free from a painful feelings as soon as they arise, but why are other feelings that are not like this, such as birth, old age, sickness, death, and sorrow, suffering?

4.39cd If impermanence is suffering, then the cause [of suffering] and the path [to the cessation of suffering] also are suffering.

Whatever is impermanent is suffering, so it follows that the origin [of suffering] and the path [to the cessation of suffering] also are suffering. If this is the case, there are only two truths: suffering and cessation.

4.40ab If [birth and so forth] are suffering because they are the causes [of suffering], then the origin [of suffering] also is suffering.

Someone may think that birth and so forth are suffering because they are the causes of painful feelings, and because it is possible to attribute the effect to the cause. If so, if the cause of painful feelings is suffering, it follows that the ignorance, thirst, and karma that are said to be the origin [of suffering] also are suffering, since they also are the cause of painful feelings. If this is the case, there are only three truths: suffering, cessation, and the path.

Furthermore,

4.40cd And if suffering is only a word, how can a cognition of suffering be knowledge of this [truth of suffering]?

Nominal (prajñānā), only a word (sūkyo), relative (samsvā), and metaphorical (upadāna) [are synonyms]. To be only a word is to be nothing more than a way of speaking. If birth and so forth do not have the identity of suffering, but are called suffering by the conventional application of a word, then the knowledge that birth and so forth are suffering is metaphorical. If [this knowledge that birth is suffering] is not correct, however, it is not consistent with the truth.

It is possible to prove by means of argument that the knowledge of the four noble truths is not true (yathārtha).

4.41 [We] do not think that any knowledge that has suffering as its object is really true, because it is knowledge that a certain thing is suffering, like the cognition that something like a stub wound is suffering.

\footnote{The words vinalatā/tya.pa in the first pāla could be emended to something like vinalatā/tya to be consistent with mti rtag phyis na in the Tibetan.}
When knowledge of the form "this is suffering" arises, it is not really (tattvatah) true, because it is knowledge that something has a painful aspect (ākāra), like the unpleasant and painful cognitions experienced by the inhabitants of hell or by those who enter a battlefield and are pierced, slashed, and struck by arrows, spears, and swords. When the truth of suffering has been negated in this way, one should start to negate the truth of the origin (of suffering).

4.42 The cause of suffering cannot be the origin of suffering because it is the cause of suffering, like a sword blow and so forth, or because it is a mental phenomenon, like the path.

The ignorance, thirst, and karma that are considered the cause (bhūta) of suffering cannot be called the origin (samudaya) of suffering, because they are the cause of suffering just as a sword blow and so forth are the cause of suffering, or because the origin of suffering is a mental phenomenon (citta), like the eightfold path, which is not the cause of suffering.

Likewise,

4.43 We do not think that a cognition which has the cause of suffering as its object is true, because it is a cognition of the form (ākāra) of suffering and so forth, like a different cognition of a cause of suffering.

A cognition that has the cause of suffering as its object is not true, because it is a cognition of the form (ākāra) of suffering, and so forth, like a different cognition of a cause of suffering.

Now that the origin (of suffering) has been negated in this way, the next verse negates the truth of cessation.

4.44ab If there is no arising, there is no cessation, because of the negation stated earlier.

Earlier in this text we negated all arising and then proved that if something does not arise, it does not cease. If there is nothing to cease, there cannot be any cessation, and there cannot be any way for the truth of cessation to be correct.

Therefore,

4.44cd Something that arises can cease, but something that does not arise cannot cease, like a flower in the sky.

Arising can be the cause of cessation conventionally (samvyutya), just as one observes that a lamp arises from the combination of a vessel, oil, and a wick, and cesses when these conditions are absent. But if something does not arise, like a flower in the sky, it certainly cannot cease. How can something that does not arise ever cease?

Furthermore,

4.45 When we do not think that there is anything to arise or cease, how can you, as a scholar, claim that the other [i.e. cessation] is true?

When something arises and ceases, it is possible to speak of its cessation. One uses the word "cessation" when something comes to an end. But we have already proved that whenever arises does not arise. How can you, who are so proud of your wisdom, claim that [cessation] is really true (satya)?

If you think that something that does not arise really (tattvatah) ceases, the following inference can be constructed to negate that [position] as well.

4.46 The cessation of something that has not arisen is ultimately not cessation, because it is the cessation of something that has not arisen, like cessation that is not due to discernment.

Cessation that is not due to discernment, which is present when [its conditions] cease, is not real (satya), because everything that is compounded (vyavasthita) is momentary, even if it is not realized (prativedya) through wisdom. Cessation that is due to discernment is a cessation that is attained through discernment by wisdom. This is real in the sense that it causes one to be free from [defilements], because it is preceded by wisdom. Neither of these two forms of cessation has the nature of something that arises (utpannarabhava), so their cessation is imagined. It is reasonable that the cessation that is due to discernment is not ultimate, like the cessation that is not due to discernment.

Bhāviveka may have in mind the argument that any cognition of an object is ultimately false, as in the appendix to Pradīpikā 25 (Eckel 1985: 72).

The De Chad makes better sense of this passage than the Peking.

The Tibetan of the verse reads: "The cause cannot be the cause of suffering because it is the origin." The reason for this reversal is made clear in the commentary.

There is a redundant expression in the Tibetan of this sentence that seems best omitted in English.

The Tibetan translator reversed the reason (bhūta) and the point to be proved (sādhyo) in the verse in order to make sense of these two examples (deśīta).

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361 "Cessation that is not due to discernment" (appratijñikvyavastha), as defined in Kāla 1.6 and elsewhere, is a complete cessation of arising attained not through wisdom but through an absence of the conditions that cause arising.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

Now that the truth of cessation has been negated in this way, [the next verse] negates the truth of the path.

4.47 If there cannot be any cessation, where does your path lead? And if [the path] does not arise, how can it be a path, and whom does it cause to attain this [cessation]?

If [you think] that the path causes someone to attain cessation, then, if this is what [you think, and cessation is impossible,] what is being sought and what is being attained when [you use the word ]"path"? And if the path does not arise in its own right, who is a practitioner (yogin) and what truth of cessation does [a practitioner] attain, when neither [a practitioner nor cessation] arises?

This is proved by the following argument:

4.48 The path does not cause anyone to attain liberation (apavarga), because it is conditioned, like another [path], or because it has cessation as its object, like another cognition of cessation.

[The prefix] apa [in the word apavarga] refers to something that is lower, namely, thoughts that are based on the realms of desire, form, and formlessness. Because it removes (vrtti) [these thoughts], apavarga is liberation (nibbana). The path does not cause someone to attain this [liberation,] because it is conditioned, like the path to heaven that is called "the ten virtues" (devakinila). Or [the path does not cause someone to attain liberation], because it has cessation [as an object] to be realized (sakshatkarya), that is, because the path of practice (bhavanaa) objectifies cessation and thus has cessation as an object, like a cognition of the cessation that is not due to discernment.

To negate the eightfold path in detail, [we say:

4.49 [Right] vision of the four noble truths should be considered false, because it has universals as its object or because it is conditioned, like a false cognition.

Right vision (samyagditya) is knowing that suffering is suffering, that origin is origin, and that cessation is cessation. Here vision of the four noble truths is the subject. Its inferred property is to be false. "Because it has universals (samanya), such as impermanence,

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362 Interpret samatha as "possible" even though the Tibetan translates it as sarvabhas.
363 It is often necessary to translate sentences of the form B ni A yin te as "A is B," assuming that the subject and predicate are often reversed in Sanskrit. Here the change in order is justified by the fact that the path is the subject of the syllogism in the verse. The practice cannot be generalized, however, since it often is necessary to follow the Tibetan word order.
364 Literally to know the sufferingness (bhga) of suffering.

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The Śrāvakas

no-self, and emptiness, as its object (anuvana) or because it is conditioned by causes and conditions" are the reasons. "Like a false cognition" is the example.

4.50 Ultimately it is not reasonable for the truth of the path to be true, because right thinking, right effort, and so forth are false.

Right thinking, right effort, right livelihood, right action, right mindfulness, and right concentration are relative (samyati), but ultimately they are false, because they have universals as their objects or because they are conditioned, like a false cognition. This is the way to prove that the truth of the path is not ultimately true.

Then how should the path be truly understood?

4.51 It is not reasonable to practice it in this way, but it is reasonable [to practice it] by not seeing the four noble truths, because the actual state of the thing that is seen is always to be unseen.

According to the Mahayana, it is not reasonable to practice the path as you who are attached to real things explain it in the Śrāvakayana, because of the sequence of analysis of the [eight] aspects of the [path] beginning with right vision. This is because the practice of not seeing the four noble truths is reasonable. Why? The thing that is to be seen is not established as having the identity of the four noble truths. To be "unseen" is to be an absence (abhava). This is always the case. That is, the actual state of things is always like this.

The next verse takes up the opponent's idea and presents it as an objection.

4.52 Someone may say: "An idiot cannot be liberated, because he does not see the truth, like a fool, and the same is true of you."

"The adherents of the Mahayana hate the vision of the four noble truths and cannot be liberated, because they do not see the truth, like a fool." The adherents of the Śrāvakayana make this claim because they want to hurt us.

To respond to them [we say:

4.53 If there is no suffering and no one who suffers, who wants liberation from

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365 The construction of the Tibetan translation makes it difficult to give a better translation of this sentence. Perhaps "the four noble truths" (seng song la sgo po) can be taken as a gloss of "the thing that is to be seen" (degya). If so, the sentence could be translated as follows: "The thing that is to be seen, namely the four noble truths, does not have an established identity." Note that the commentary turns degya (sg) into a plural (pma kyi b).
what? People speak of liberation erroneously, like a product of illusion.

Since suffering does not arise, because of the argument stated earlier, the one who suffers from this suffering also does not arise. Who then thinks that someone escapes from the bondage of saṃsāra, when neither [saṃsāra nor bondage] arise? Those who are bound by the bondage of false concepts, which depend on causes and conditions and are deceptive in nature, speak of liberation erroneously, like a product of illusion. Ultimately, however, there is neither bondage nor liberation.

Likewise,

4.54 [We] think that liberation is the complete no-vision of the four noble truths, so the example is impossible and the reason is unacceptable.

The position of the Mahāyāna stated here is that liberation is the complete no-vision of the four noble truths. The no-vision of these [truths] is beyond the reach of the Śrāvakas and others who see nothing but dharmas. Therefore, the example, “like the awakening of a student,” stated in the objection is impossible. Similarly, the Teacher’s omniscient insight is produced by the excellence (atisaya) of his practice of the path rather than by the excellence of his faculties. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, the reason, “because of the excellence of his faculties,” is unacceptable.

The reason, “because the Mahāyāna teaches a different path,” also is unacceptable. Why?

4.55 This very same path, beginning with right vision, is taught in the Mahāyāna, so the reason is unacceptable.

From a relative point of view (samavyadv), one should practice the eightfold path literally, but when one understands reality (tattva), one should practice it as no-vision and so forth. So a distinctive practice is taught in the Mahāyāna, but not a different path. Therefore, the reason, “because [the Mahāyāna] teaches a different path,” is unacceptable. This is why,

366 The Tibetan translation of the verse and commentary reads 'khrul pa'i dbang gyis, putting the reading of dbutar phyag chad in question. It might be better to read dzoa for dzoa.
367 This example is found in verse 4.3.
368 Bhāviveka here takes up the Śrāvaka’s claim in verse 4.4 that the Buddha’s omniscience comes from the “excellence” (atisaya) of his faculties (indriya). Read phai du kyung ba (D) to correspond to the word atiṣaya in verse 4.4. The translation of verse 4.4 uses another Tibetan equivalent of atiṣay: khyad ’phogs.
369 This reason is found in verse 4.4.
370 This reason is found in verse 4.7.

The Śrāvakas

The Buddha’s teaching is based on two truths: ordinary relative truth and ultimate truth.

The Blessed One seeks the welfare of the world, so he does not always favor reality. For sentient beings whose minds are unstable, he teaches an antidote that leads to freedom from defilements. Its meaning is not true, but ultimately it is consistent with purification. What kind of teaching is this? It is like the following statements: “O monks, if you perceive a woman as a mother, then think of her as a mother; likewise, if you perceive a woman as a sister or daughter, then think of her as a daughter.” “There are spontaneously born (upapādaka) beings.” “A single person arises in the world.” “All sentient beings live by food.” “I am old and weak.”

A concept (ukhaṇḍa) can be beneficial or harmful, just as dirt—such as earth, ashes, or cow dung—can remove some impurities—such as smoke, oil, and mud—and increase others. It is beneficial to think of one’s teacher’s wife as a mother or a sister. This false concept about the [teacher’s] wife removes desire for her. It is said:

For a wise person to be free from impurity, an impurity can provide purification. In this way, the relative (samvrti) is best to free one from things in a relative sense.

Furthermore, the Tathāgata uses various manifestations (nimāṇa) to make correct teaching known in the world. Accordingly,

4.56 Everything that is well spoken (sukta) in the Vedānta is taught by the Buddha. Therefore, either the example is deficient or one should analyze its ambiguity.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

Earlier [the opponent] said: "The Mahāyāna is not the teaching of the Buddha, like the Vedānta view." The claim that the Vedānta is an example must be accepted; so [the argument suffers] the fault of an unaccepted example.

Objection: This is not the case. The parts of the Vedas that contain faulty teachings about killing, stealing, and so forth are the example.

Reply: This is not a fault, because the Mahāyāna does not have such teachings. The Mahāyāna does not contradict the teachings of the three sūtras, and it has no teaching that contradicts the Dharma nature (drhammatā), as has previously been established. The [parts of the] Vedas that are well spoken and do not contradict the teaching of the Buddha should be accepted, and those that are not well spoken should not be accepted. When one analyzes this ambiguity, [the part of the Veda] that is reasonable according to this [analysis] should be accepted, and [the part] that is not reasonable should not be accepted.

The next verse] responds to the claim that the Mahāyāna is like a nihilistic view, because it denies cause and effect.

4.57 If [we] practice wisdom in a way that excludes the concepts of being and non-being, to whom and for what reason do [you] attribute the view that denies cause and effect? If we avoided the position of being (bhūta) and accepted the position of non-being (abhāva), then [our position] would be nihilism (nātītiṣṭhita), and there would be no substance to the claim that we avoid the extremes of being and non-being and establish a middle way. If we know this [middle way] directly (pratiprakāśita), by practicing wisdom without any concepts of being and non-being, how can [you] assert that we are nihilists? When [we] avoid the extremes of being and non-being, what false view (pratiprakāśita) or thing (bhūta) can there be [for us] to grasp? If [we] avoid the extremes of nihilism and the existence of a middle way.

The Śrāvakas

4.58 The reason is unacceptable, because [we] do not deny the connection between cause and effect as it is understood in the world.

We reject the following false views (pratiprakāśita): "This word does not exist, the other world does not exist, and there are no results from good and evil karma." We also do not deny the following claims as they are accepted in the world: "This world exists, and good and evil actions bring results." and "[people] acquire the karmic results that they have accumulated." Therefore, the reason [for the claim that] we deny cause and effect is unacceptable. It is said:

In brief, the view of non-being (nātītiṣṭhita) is the false view that karmas have no result, no merit, and no bad rebirth. In brief, the view of being (bhūta) is the right view that karmas have a result and merit brings a good rebirth. A nihilist (nātīta) goes to a bad rebirth; the opposite (bhūta) goes to a good rebirth. Those who avoid both [extremes] and rely on non-duality are liberated. Therefore, we hold a doctrine of non-duality (adhyatma-darśana) and are not nihilists. The proof of this has been given in The Root [Verses] on the Middle Way (mālamadhyamakā). One should investigate whether the claim that Madhyamikas (madhyamavādins) are like nihilists (nātīta) is made from a conventional (pratiprakāśita) point of view or from the point of view of reality (pratiprakāśita). In the first case, a nihilist is attached to the improper denial (pratiprakāśita) of cause and effect conventionally; he casts off all that is wholesome and enters every unwholesome path. In this way, he violates correct conventional truth. We [Madhyamikas] do not enter any unwholesome path, because we do not deny that there is a connection between cause and effect, as long as it is understood merely as illusion (ūcaya) or a mirage. We think that aggregates are born from defiled aggregates, so we accept that aggregates arise in the present and future from other aggregates that precede them. Therefore, because we think that [the connection between cause and effect] is like an illusion or a dream, we are not like nihilists from a conventional point of view.

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379 Bhāviveka means that it must be accepted for the argument to be valid.
380 Presumably hetu-sūtra (logic), vaca-sūtra (grammar), and abhidharma-sūtra (medicine), as mentioned earlier in the text.
381 This argument is found in verse 4.8ab:

The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching, because it improperly denies cause and effect, like a nihilistic view (nātītiṣṭhita-darśana).

382 The commentary explains the sentence "[our] practice of wisdom avoids the concepts of being and non-being" with another sentence that is virtually identical. To avoid redundancy, it has been omitted.

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383 Ratnakāli 1.34-34: samādhi nāśālokaḥ phalam nāśālokaḥ karmāṇaṁ / apratiprakāśaḥ caiva māyāyāyāyāyām māyā / samādhi nāśālokaḥ phalam nāśālokaḥ karmāṇaṁ / puryā sugatiṣyantā svapnagṛhrtriṁ iti mṛtyukām.
384 Ratnakāli 1.57: nāśāloka durgatim yāt sugatiṁ yāt antakaḥ / yathābhāsita-paryājñānaṁ mokṣam adharmavārikṣitāṁ // For 1.57c, Bhāviveka reads "those who avoid both," corresponding to something like tathā durgatim. For Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, see Hahn 1982.
[We] also are not [nihilists] from the point of view of reality. The nihilists' non-being (abhātā) generates a cognition (svādhitā) that has non-being as its object (viṣaya) and denies all things. Because of this false cognition, they are stained by the impurity of immorality (dabhāla) and do not relieve suffering. According to our vision of reality, [we] understand the emptiness of such things as material form, which previously gave rise to cognitions that objects such as material form were true. As a result, [we] rule out the idea that things such as material form are true. [We] also do not engage in a cognition of non-being (abhātā), which is a cognition that arises from an object. The cognition, "The objects that consist of such things as material form do not exist," is not the ultimate ultimate (pratipratimāpāmārtha), because it is a cognition, like the cognition that [such things as material form] exist. This is the refutation [of the claim that we are like nihilists].

Furthermore, when [we] negate the arising of a cognition of an apparent object, there is an opportunity for a cognition of the non-existence of that [apparent object]. [But], because [the object] that is negated has no identity, [we] understand that [the cognition of the non-existence of this object] is false. Thus [we] also rule out the cognition of non-existence. The cognition of non-existence does not arise when one resides in the practice of wisdom that cannot be removed; it also does not [arise] in isolation. So the Mādhyamikas do not even share the word "non-existence" with the nihilists. According to [our] teaching, the word "non-existence" is merely a denial of existence, not an assertion of non-existence. So [nihilists and Mādhyamikas] are as different as a mustard seed and Mt. Meru. As it is said,

[We] deny existence and do not maintain non-existence. Why should the statement "it is not blue" imply "it is white"?

Therefore, both of these views (dṛṣṭi) are painful to scholars who seek the pleasure of peace by removing all conceptual diversity (pratipadi). Why? It is appropriate conventionally to do certain things to attain wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate [qualities], which relate to [the realms of] form and no-form (arūpa-viśnu) and beyond (lokuttara). But if wholesome and unwholesome qualities exist ultimately in their own

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385 Negi lists apiḥāvā (“removal” or “theft”) as one of the Sanskrit equivalents of śhṛng pā. Because of the parallel between the two sentences, perhaps apiḥāvā is equivalent to the undoṣaṇapantipāda of 4:52.

386 According to Avalokiteśvara, the commentator on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpāramitā, this verse comes from a lost work of Nāgārjuna called the Lokaśāṅkha (Jg tais brtong pā). See Lāṭindera 1982a: 14.

387 Kāś 2.66 and commentary divide the mind ( cittā) into three categories: wholesome (kula), unwholesome (eṣukula), and indeterminate (arṣikā). The “indeterminate” occurs in two forms: defined (miṣra) and undefined (anmiṣra). The Kāśa then associates these categories of mind with the three realms (kāma, rūpa, and arūpa) and also with a state that it refers to as right, it is useless to try to generate or not to generate them. If they truly exist, like a real pot or cloth, the pleasurable ones would not cease to be pleasurable, and the painful ones would not cease to be painful. They also would be attached to particular living beings, according to their caste (jāti), age, size, and posture (āryāpati), like paint on a wall. On the other hand, if wholesome and unwholesome qualities are absent (abhāvatuṣṭhāna), it is equally useless to try to generate or not to generate them, either in the three realms (abhāva) or beyond (lokuttara). If there is no being (atattva), conventional usage is annihilated, as if we were arguing that a rabbit’s horn is sharp.

Concerning those whose wisdom-eye has been damaged by the disease (tiṣṇa) of false views (kṣudrīti), it is said,

Those who have inferior intelligence see existence and non-existence, and they do not see the blessed cessation of things as objects of vision.

It also is said in a sūtra:

Since there is no reason to assert existence, to claim that there is existence and non-existence is to hold wrong views. But when people see this world as neither existing nor not existing, thoughts cease and they understand no-self.

Similarly,

O Kāśyapa, existence is one extreme, and non-existence is another. The middle between these two extremes is formless, invisible, unattainable, without appearance, unknowable even by a superior person, not a basis, and not a support. The middle path is correct penetrative insight into dharma.

Similarly,

“pure” (anirūyata). The commentary explains that the “pure” state corresponds to the stages of “instruction” (tāraka) and “no-instruction” (atāraka). According to the commentary on this verse, wholesome states of mind belong only to the realm of desire. Later in this paragraph, Bhāviveka speaks of generating wholesome and unwholesome qualities in the three realms, not just in the realms of form and no-form. It is likely that this sentence was intended to refer not just to the realms of form and no-form, but also to the realm of desire.

388 MMK 5:8: asitam ye na paññāyati nāvisantavo cālpabuddhavākyam / bhūtānām ne na paññāyai

drastavyapratipade (kāmāntām nāvisantam).

389 Kāśyapaparyantarā 60 (Staal-Holstein ‘90), quoted (in a more extensive version) in Prasannapādā 270: asti kāyapa ayam eko ‘na nāsṛhi kāyapa ayam eko ‘na tad eva dravya drāṣṭārany avataṃśas tu kāyam anuvaṇaṃ anubhāvam asaṃkhyātam ayam niye ṣaṣṭhā kāyape madyaṁ tu prachīḍāvat bhūtram bhūtraprayuktaṃ.
PART 2: TRANSLATION

O Kātyāyana, what do they grasp, who seek to be truly superior in this world? The dharmaḥ, which are based on existence and non-existence, do not exist and do not not exist. 390

Similarly,

O Ānanda, to say “it exists” falls into the extreme of permanence; to say “it does not exist” falls into nihilism. Avoiding these two extremes and accomplishing the middle path, the Tathāgata teaches the Dharma. That is: “When this exists, that arises,” and so forth. 391

The Mahāyāna is based on the middle path; its followers hold the doctrine of the middle and are not nihilists. Therefore, the example is not established and is not concomitant with the point to be proved.

It is not reasonable to argue that “the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching because it contradicts perception.” 392 Why?

4.59 The object of perception that ordinary people grasp is relative. The reply to this objection is the same as before, so this contradiction is not a contradiction.

If an opponent wants to generate a contradiction with perception, it is reasonable to respond by asking what is meant by “perception.” Ultimately the senses are unconscious, because conditioned states (samkhāra) are inanimate; and sense consciousness has no power to apprehend objects, because it is momentary. However, so-called “visual consciousness” arises in a relative sense (samavṛtyā), by depending on the eye and material form. Its object is relative. What ordinary people grasp is called perception. But the vision of reality ultimately is no vision, as has already been established in verses such as the following:

Material form ultimately is not apprehended by visual consciousness, because it is a combination, like sound, or because it consists of gross elements. 393

390 Compare MMK 15.7: kātyāyanakrama deśanti nāśati oṣṭham / pratipadasm bhagavatā bhūtadaksinambhūtind/.
391 Compare SN II 15 (Nidāna Samyutta).
392 In verse 4.59, Bhāviveka responds to the argument in verse 4.9, where the opponent pointed out two separate flaws in the doctrine of non-arising (ajñātavāda): If a cognition has an object, then the denial of external objects contradicts perception, and if a cognition is aware of itself, then the claim that cognition does not arise contradicts common sense.
393 MHK 3.40.
impediment of the ignorance that has this nature. "Just as [they do not have a cognition] in which nirvāna is the object" is the example. Just as ordinary people do not have a cognition in which nirvāna is the object, they also do not have a cognition in which the reality of material form is the object. Because [ordinary people] are blinded by the impediment of ignorance, [our position] is not contradicted by common sense.

4.63 Because of the qualification "in reality things do not arise," perception and common sense do not contradict it. So where is the contradiction?

This answers the previous [objection]. [Our] thesis contains the qualification (upāsāda) "in reality" (tatvato) and is not contradicted by perception and common sense.395 [Our opponents] habitually accuse [us] of unreal faults and repeatedly claim that [our positions] are contradicted, but we are not contradicted, for the reasons396 that have just been stated. This is the intention of the verse.397

[The next verse] answers the objection that begins "it would ultimately be correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden."398

4.64 Since there ultimately is no female identity, when dharmas are as peaceful as space, how can [you] think that this example contradicts anything?

A woman is someone who conceives a child. But ultimately there is no agent, action, or goal. So, when dharmas are like space, where all action is excluded, there can be no [woman]. If there is no [woman], why do [you] think that this example proves anything?

Thus,

4.65 If [you] want to refute [us], [you] have to prove that there can be sex with a woman who is permissible for sex, just as [you] have to prove that there is a woman who is permissible for sex, a man to have sex with her, and the action of having sex with her.399

395 The commentary reads ningen sru di drags pa rather than ningen sru dang drags pa, as in the verse. It is clear from the argument of the preceding verses and from the use of the dual in the verse that the compound should be taken as a dvandva.
396 The term sru byan pa (distaste) refers to Bhāviveka's answer to the opponent's attempted refutation.
397 The Tib. sbes bya ba'i lemas has so / Skt. ity abhiṣpiṣvā indicates that Bhāviveka has just paraphrased the meaning of the verse.
398 Verse 4.64 responds to the opponent's objection in verses 4.10-11: "If he says that he does not contradict perception and common sense, because he uses the qualification "in reality things do not arise," then this faulty argument would be correct: It is ultimately correct to have sex with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another [woman]."
399 Bhāviveka is engaging in some amusing word-play on the terminology of the MMK. The word for having sex is the word for "going" (gāmanā), the topic of MMK chapter 2. Verse 4.65ab echoes MMK 2.25cd: "Therefore there is no going, nothing to be gone to, and no act of going" (namkha gata ca gata ca gata savya ca na ve dibyate).
400 Bhāviveka turns next to the argument in verse 4.12: "If [he says that] the vision of the [four noble] truths is not true, then that is not true. Otherwise, the teaching of Yonaka Deva would be true, and that is not acceptable."
401 An echo of the opening verse in the MMK: "I praise the perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught dependent origination as no cessation, no arising, no destruction, no permanence, not one, not many, not coming, not going, the blessed pacification of conceptual diversity" (Prasannapada 11).
402 On this definition of concepts (vikalpa), see the note on verse 5.14.
are properly defined. But Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas understand only the individual truths of suffering and so forth. The Tathāgata understands the equality (samatā) of the four noble truths, and this is exceptional. As is said in *The Perfection of Wisdom*, "[Nirvāṇa] is not the nirvāṇa of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. I say that nirvāṇa is the equality (samatā) of these four noble truths."

4.68 So it is not reasonable for the teaching of Yonāka Deva to be reality, because they say that this god comes from the first god, Brahmā.

Out of devotion (bhakti) to Yonāka Deva, they say: "The god called Brahmā is the first god, Yonāka Deva is created by the power of Brahmā, and [Brahmā] teaches that it is correct to kill cows and so forth." Brahmā is habitually attached to the view of his own excellence and thinks: "I create living beings." He does not understand reality (tattva). Since Yonāka Deva follows his [i.e. Brahmā’s] view, how can he understand reality? Therefore, the teaching about reality, as defined in the Mahāyāna, is not like the teaching of Yonāka Deva.

From a relative point of view (samurtya),

4.69 [We] think that the existence of the sense media that begin with material form is knowable. If you are arguing that these [sense media] exist in a general sense, we agree.

We think that these [sense media] are knowable by visual consciousness and so forth. If you are arguing that the sense media that begin with material form [exist] in general, without qualifications such as "actually" (uṣṭmakā) or "truly" (ṣyatākā), then we agree. In other words, you are proving something that [we] accept.

But if you accept the qualification,

4.70 If you argue that the sense media, beginning with form exist, and are

derived from the gross elements and so forth, there is no example, and [the argument] is contradicted by a counter-argument.

[If you argue that] the sense media, beginning with form, exist and are derived from the gross elements and so forth, because they are real things (tattvā), because they are objects of knowledge (pajñeyā), and because they are objects of speech (sāvyatā), there is no example, because everything is included in the point to be proved.

Others may say: It is possible to use an example of something that is different, so the point can be proved through the possession of the contrary property (uṣṭmate). Whatever is not a derivative of the gross elements [and so forth] does not exist, like the horn of a rabbit, a flower that grows in the sky, and so forth.

We refute this argument with a counter-argument:

4.71 [We] think that the sense media, beginning with material form, are not defined as gross elements or as derivatives of the gross elements, because they cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities, like the mind.

The sense media that begin with material form are the subject. "Not defined as gross elements or as derivatives of gross elements" is the inferred property. Their own identities (uṣṭman) are color and shape in the case of material form, to have human origin or not to have human origin in the case of sound, and to be pleasant or unpleasant in the case of odor. A cognition of the appearance (ābhāśā) of identity (uṣṭman) is a cognition of the distinctive form (ākāraśāsana) of such an identity. To say that a cognition of the appearance of an identity is born is to say that a cognition of the appearance of an identity arises. To say that the sense media, beginning with material form, cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity is to say that they give rise to the birth of the cognition of the appearance of an identity. Because it is the nature of these [sense media] to cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity, [the verse] says "because they cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities." Anything that causes the birth of a cognition of the appearance of an identity is not defined as a gross element or a derivative of the gross elements. For example, they are like the sense medium mind (manasa). Ultimately [the opponent’s argument] is refuted.

403 A reference to the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, DN I 17-19.

404 Verse 4.69 responds to the opponent’s syllogism in 4.13: "The external sense media exist, because a cognition arises with their image, just as the mind exists (citātātā)." The Tibetan translator has read avattātā as if it were abhīṣatātā (vann hi nyid) and interpreted the verse as follows: "We think that the imageness of the sense media, beginning with material form, is the object of cognition." This makes sense of Bhāviveka’s use of the phrase "object of cognition" (buddhiśaya), but it is not consistent with the objection that provokes the verse. This substitution continues in the translation of the commentary, which simply analyzes the compound rupābhāyatātābhāyatātāvyāmutād: "Material-form-and-so-forth-sense-media-image is the image of the sense media that begin with material form. The abstract state of this (buddha) is material-form-and-so-forth-sense-media-image-not." This explanation is redundant in English and has been omitted.

405 Bhāviveka mentions the same categories in the commentary on MHK 3 44. For an explanation of the term spitta see *Karm 1.10* and commentary.

406 In this sentence and the one that follows, Bhāviveka paraphrases the words "cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities." Apparently this passage uses a close synonym for the word "birth," since both words are translated by the Tibetan ḫskyed pa. The next sentence seems to use a synonym of the word "cause" (both translated by the Tibetan ḫgyud).
4.72ab It is generally accepted that mind and mental phenomena have the nature of mind and mental phenomena.

And ultimately,

4.72cd Practitioners have no position, so they have no reason or example.

The ultimate is not accessible to words, so we do not hold a position of existence, non-existence, or both. Therefore, in reality (tattva-sabhā) we have no position. With no position, how can a practitioner (yogin) who understands the ultimate have any reason or example?

Some may say: This is not the case. If the relative (anumāna) is not authoritative (pramāṇa) because it is known by mundane (lokasaśīra) knowledge, and if the ultimate (paramārtha), as understood by a practitioner, is beyond words, how is it possible, for you to state an inference to refute a point that your opponent imagines, and for your inference (anumāna) to prove its point?

Reply: For us there are two kinds of ultimate. The first is effortless (anabhīsāsaścā), supermundane (lokottara), pure (anāraśa), and free from conceptual diversity (napraṇāta). The second is accessible to effort; it is called "purified mundane knowledge" (uddhālaukikajñāna); it is impure (sāraśa); and it is subject to conceptual diversity (napraṇāta). Because this [second] ultimate is used as the qualifier (vīpaśa) in [our] assertions, [our] points are proved.

Furthermore,

4.73 [We] reject the claim that "mind-only" is meant to deny the existence of external objects, so how can there be a problem with [our] position?

Some argue that the statement, "O son of the Conqueror, all of this triple world is mind-only," is meant to deny external objects (bhāvyabhāta). But, according to us, it is meant to deny that there is an agent or a knower, and so forth. We reject the claim that this statement is meant to deny external objects, so how can our position be unacceptable? We accept the existence of external sense media.

Therefore the opponent's objection as formulated at the beginning [of this chapter] is incorrect. Accordingly,

4.74ab One does not calm the mind without using words.

Even someone who is not an excellent debater (suddha) can follow tradition and reason to express a correct argument. Now that we have stated our reply, if it does not please you, set partiality aside and

4.74cd Let scholars understand which words have substance and which do not.

From long practice, the evil-minded became attached to their own position and do not trust anyone else, even someone who says something that is true and good. Those who are wise and honest and who understand the meaning of debate should analyze which words have substance and which do not, and they should speak accordingly. Now it is best to say no more. Let our words stand as a means of protection. In this rational way, scholars will amuse themselves by analyzing whether your words or ours have substance or not.

Adherents of the Mahāyāna are superior, because their intentions are compassionate, even if their conduct is deficient. Adherents of the Śrāvakayāna cannot compare, even if they conduct themselves well, because their intentions are inferior. Even if a
PART 2: TRANSLATION

radiant jewel sits in excrement, it is better than a piece of shiny glass in a golden bowl. Even if someone who rides the good vehicle is stained by karma and defilements, no followers of the other vehicle can surpass him, just as the sun, even when it is covered by clouds, cannot be surpassed by a firefly in a cloudless sky.

This has been "The Introduction to Reality According to the Śrāvakas," the fourth chapter of The Flame of Reason, the commentary on The Heart of the Middle Way.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF REALITY ACCORDING TO THE YOGĀCĀRAS

Now, here begins the fifth chapter, the introduction to the analysis of reality according to the Yogācāras.

INTRODUCTION

5.1 Other scholars, who are proud of their own approach, say that the Yogācāras have given the correct explanation of the introduction to the ambrosia of reality.

1 The term yogācāra can be used in a generic sense to refer to a “practitioner of discipline.” Bhāviveka frequently refers to the Bodhisattva path as a form of yoga (“discipline”) and to the Bodhisattva as a yogin (“practitioner of discipline”), as in the commentary on MiB 3.292. In this respect, he follows the terminology of the Perfection of Wisdom literature as found, for example, in Ratnakarasamayaśāstra 10.9, 22.10, 13; and 26.3. The Bodhisattva practice is referred to as yoga in other Mahāyāna works, such as Āryadeva’s Catuḥsūkha, whose long title in the Tibetan bsTan’gyur is Bodhisattva-yogacaryā-lālita-catuḥśūkha-kārikā ("A Text on the Practice of the Bodhisattva Discipline in Four Hundred Verses"). The title of Āryadeva’s text is discussed in Lang 1986 and Ruegg 1981: 52-53. For examples of this usage in the work of Canisius, see May 1959: 229. In this chapter of the Tattarpāla, however, Bhāviveka uses the term yogācāra to refer not just to a generic “practitioner of discipline” but to the adherent of a rival Mahāyāna tradition, just as he uses the term Śrāvaka to refer to the member of a rival non-Mahāyāna tradition. The commentary on verse 5.1 identifies the Yogācāras as "Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so forth." It is likely that Bhāviveka’s use of the term yogācāra in this chapter comes from the title of the Yogācārabhūmi, the text that defines this rival tradition’s scholarly identity. For further discussion of this point, see Part 1 of this book.

2 Verse 5.1 uses a number of different technical terms that play a key role in Bhāviveka’s argument.

In the commentary on 5.1, Bhāviveka explains that the word “scholar” (dhīra) refers to a “Mahāyāna master (śākyo).” The Tibetan translators give the term an ironic twist when they translate it as māktus par rlon ("those who consider themselves scholars"). For further discussion of the term dhīra, see the note on the introduction to verse 4.3.

Verse 5.1 introduces the argument with the Yogācāras as a dispute about the correct “approach” (nīti or naya). In verse 5.7, Bhāviveka specifies that this approach has to do with the Perfection of Wisdom. Haribhadra māktos a similar point when he refers to the Abhisamayālāṃkāra as a clarification of the “approach” (naya) of the Perfection of Wisdom.