

2. The Nyaya argument for the Existence of Īśvara

Ratnakīrti's description of a "generic" Naiyāyika.

§2.1 An Informal Description

Nyāya's argument: structurally similar to the cosmological argument: in two steps;

1st step: b/c the world is made up of parts, there must be an intelligent designer;

2nd step: the intelligent agent/maker/designer who constructed the world has the qualities that identify him as the God-like being called "Īśvara" (such qualities include being single, omnipresent, omniscient, and eternal)

§2.2 The Īśvara-Inference

site of inference (pakṣa): 宗有法

target property (sādhya-dharma): 宗法

reason property (hetu, liṅga): 因法

positive example (sa-pakṣa; 同品): "a property possessor in which the target property [i.e., fire] has been clearly ascertained" (niṣcitasādhya dharmā dharmī).

(i) The object under discussion [i.e., our world/the earth] has been constructed by an intelligent agent (*buddhimaddhetuka*);

(ii) On account of being an effect (*kāryatva*)

(iii) Each and every effect has been constructed by an intelligent agent, just like a pot.

(iv) And, the [world/earth] is an effect.

(v) Therefore, it has been constructed by an intelligent agent.

(i) states what the person presenting the argument has already inferred to be the case through an inference-for-one's-own-sake.

(ii) asserting that the reason property is a "property of the site" (*pakṣadharmatā*)

(iii) states the inference-warranting relation called "pervasion" (*vyāpti*; 遍滿) and provides an "example" (*drṣṭānta*; 喻) of a locus where this relation is instanced.

* To function as an example, the locus cited must be one about which both the proponent of the argument and the "beneficiary" of the argument agree.

(iv) expressing the "special consideration" (*parāmarśa*) or third awareness of the reason property; expresses that the reason property that is a property of the site of the inference is pervaded by the target property. → the "functioning intermediary" (*vyāpāra*), the "functioning component" of the instrument.

(v) states the conclusion of the inference and expresses the culminating effect (*phala*) of the event.

Note:

The reason property (hetu) is the instrument.

Step ii: the “cause” component of the instrument

(?) Step iii—as a necessary part of step iv—is the “functioning” component of the instrument.

§2.3 Certification Conditions

Determining that a particular instrument of inferential awareness is well-functioning requires determining that none of the five possible defects apply to the proposed reason property/instrument.

The Naiyāyikas’ account of certification, for both the reason property/instrument and the inferential argument as a whole, can be understood in terms of three sets of certification conditions (C), the five characteristics of a reason property (P), and the five associated defects (H).

§2.3.1 C₁: Performance Conditions

* “Certification condition”: to investigate whether an argument (or, more specifically, a reason property) has any defects.

P₁: a reason must be known to be a property of the site of the inference.

C₁: defined in terms of H_{1a}: “unestablished in the site of the inference” (āśraya-asiddha)

→ A reason property is said to have this defect when the site of the inference in which it is supposed to be located is known not to exist.

For example, “The soul (ātman) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere.” Refutation: “since there is no proof for establishing [the existence of] the soul.”(Kajiyama: 119)

§2.3.2 C₂: Instrument Conditions

Instrument conditions= triple conditions (trirūpaliṅga; 三相)=P₁, P₂, P₃.

The occurrence of each of these three conditions would prevent the reason property from well functioning, namely, from the arising of the third awareness, step iv.

* C_{2.1}=P₁=T₁: (pakṣa-dharmatā; Kajiyama: 65-6; 「遍是宗法性」; 何: 4)

defined in terms of H_{1b} “unestablished in itself” (svarūpa-asiddha), namely, a reason property is known not to be present in the site of the inference. (67)

→ E.g. “Sound is impermanent because of visibility” [like a pot] (Kajiyama: 66)

* C_{2.2}= P₂= T₂: (anvaya; Kajiyama: 67-8; 「同品定有性」: 「因法（僅僅？）存在於同品中」; 何: 4) (h→s?)

(甲) defined in terms of H₂ “opposed” (viruddha):

A reason property is known to be pervaded (vyāpti) by the absence of the target property.

More specifically, the defect H2 means that “the reason property is not present in a single similar case (sapakṣa) and that it is present in at least one dissimilar case (vipakṣa; 異喻).” (67)

(乙) defined in terms of H_{3b} “uncommon” (asādhāraṇa):

A defect that a reason property “is known only to be present in the site of the inference: it is excluded from all similar and dissimilar cases.” (68)

E.g. “Sound is impermanent because of its audibility” (Kajiyama: 67)

(丙) H_{3c} “not universal” (aupasaṃhārin):

A reason property in which both P₂ and P₃ are absent.

* C_{2,3}= P₃= T₃ (vyatireka; Kajiyama: 69-70; 「異品定無性」: 「一切異品都不具有因法」;
何: 4) (~s → ~h)

(甲) H₂

(乙) H_{3a} “common/general”:

A defect in which a reason does not meet the requirement that this reason property must be known to be excluded from all dissimilar cases (vipakṣa). Or, the reason property is known to be present in the site of an inference, a similar case, and a dissimilar case.

(乙 1) H_{3a1}: “generally inconclusive” (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika)

(乙 2) H_{3a2}: “generally inconclusive” (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika)

E.g., “[This] living body is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar.” (Kajiyama: 113-4)

(丙) H_{3c} “not universal” (aupasaṃhārin):

A reason property in which both P₂ and P₃ are absent.

Note: H₃ “inconclusive” (anaikāntika)

§2.3.3 C3: Argument Conditions

C₃=P₄ & P₅

P₄: H₄ “equal in scope” (prakaraṇasama): [whether or] “not have a rival that proves the absence of what it seeks to prove. Cf. note 100.

P₅: H₅ “too late” (kālatyāpadiṣṭa): “must be known not to be contradicted by another well-functioning instrument such as perception.”

A reason property with defects H₄ and H₅ could satisfy all three of the instrument conditions (C2) and still not produce warranted awareness. (69)

§3 Defending the Nyāya Argument

The Naiyāyikas defend their argument by showing that none of the above defects applies to the reason property “on account of being an effect.” (69)

Note: Patil’s discussions focus on “how the Naiyāyikas show that neither H₂ (“opposed”) nor H_{3a} (“generally inconclusive”) applies” to the reason property “on account of being an effect.”

§3.1 Satisfying C_{2.2}, H₂

§3.1.1 Three Reasons

Opponents of the Naiyāyikas: “the reason property should prove not just that the world is constructed by an intelligent agent, but that it is constructed by an intelligent agent *who has the special characteristic of being omniscient.*” (73)

Hence, the pot is not a similar case since no potter is omniscient.

→ The example that the pot is made by an intelligent potter does not show that H₂ does not apply to the reason property.

“The reason property ‘being an effect’ is opposed, according to the opponents, since this special characteristic [i.e., being omniscient] is not within its scope, and a characteristic that is opposed to it, ‘being non-omniscient’ (asarvajñānatva), appears to pervade it.” (73)

§3.1.2 Nyāya Response: Being a Property of the Site

In the standard example of an inference, i.e., from the smoke on a mountain to fire on that mountain, the reason property is “smoke-in-general” and the target property is “fire-in-general.”

Although both terms [i.e., the reason property and the target property] are general terms (sāmānya), the Naiyāyikas argue that a reason property “can have within its scope a special characteristic of the target property.”

→ “since it is known that the reason property ‘smoke-in-general’ is pervaded by fire, step iii, and that it is a property of the site of the inference, i.e., that it is present on the mountain, it is also known that the ‘fire-in-general’ that is concomitant with it must be present on the mountain.

→ 推論中使用的是普遍的「因法」(煙)與普遍的「宗法」(火),而不是特殊的「因法」(在那座山上的煙)與特殊的「宗法」(在那座山上的火)。特殊的「宗法」(在那座山上的火)的建立是由於(1)「因法被宗法遍充」以及(2)「因法」與「宗法」同時皆可歸屬於「宗有法」(那座山)的緣故。

→ 由於「因法」不需要是特殊的「因法」,因此在推論中,使用的「同喻」也不必是特殊的「同喻」(在那座山上的廚房),而只需要普遍的「同喻」(廚房)。

→ 同理,正理學派主張:我們使用的論證是由普遍的「因法」(所作性)證明普遍的「宗法」(具知性的作者 intelligent maker)。至於「全知」的性質,不是由普遍的「因法」到普遍的「宗法」所提供的,而是由「宗有法」(世界)的特性提供的,也就是說,能夠製造世界的「具知性的作者」一定必須是「全知」的。

→ 因此,在提供同喻的時候,只需要提供具有普遍的「所作性」的例子即可,不需要提

供具有特殊的「所作性」的例子（被全知者所作）。

“It is important to note that the Naiyāyikas’ identification of a kitchen as a similar case shows that in order for a locus to be a similar case it is only necessary that the ‘generic form’ of the target property, i.e., fire-in-general, be known to be present there.” (74)

§3.2 Satisfying C_{2,3}, H_{3a}

H_{3a}: “generally inconclusive” (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika)

H_{3a1}: identifying a locus in which the reason property is known to be present but the target property is known to be absent.

H_{3a2}: raising doubt about whether the reason property is excluded from all dissimilar cases;

§3.2.1 A Dissimilar Case

Growing grass as a counter-example:

Opponent: growing grass is an effect, but its maker does not exist.

Naiyāyikas’ response: “non-observation is not always an appropriate criterion for determining whether or not a property is present in a particular locus...since the non-observation of the target property...could be due to its being ‘spatially remote’ (deśa-viprakṛṣṭa)... ‘temporally remote’ (kāla-viprakṛṣṭa).”

Naiyāyika: the maker of growing grass is said to be “essentially remote” (svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭa).

§3.2.2 Deviation

Opponent: doubt about the exclusion of the reason property from dissimilar cases (saṃdigdha-vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti) cannot be ruled out. It is always possible that a potential counter-example exists.

E.g. “This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a [Ching: the] man on the highway”; for all the cases in which “being not free from desire” is absent are the cases in which “speaker-ness” is also absent, like a piece of rock. → This inference is wrong, because “though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone because of the absence of the state of being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) because of a dubious negative pervasion.” (Kajiya: 70)

Naiyāyika’s response: “There is no doubt about the exclusion of the reason property from dissimilar cases, since an effect-cause relationship...is established for an effect [the reason property] and an intelligent-possessor [the target property]...” (81)

The nondeviation rule (avyabhicāranīyama) applies only to two sorts of relations: the “identity-mode” (tādātmya) and the “production-mode” (tadutpatti) of pervasion. (81)

Note: the effect-cause relation, Naiyāyikas assert, is established, in part, through the observation (upalambha) of the reason property in a finite number of loci... → The issue with **Induction**???

§3.2.3 Scope of the Reason Property

Opponents: we should distinguish between “effects in general” or “all effects” (kārya-mātra) and “a restricted class of effects” (kārya-viśeṣa).

The reason property should be limited to just a specific class of effects, namely, “those with the property ‘being an effect from the observation of which there could be an awareness of its having been made, even for one who did not observe its being made.’” (84-5)

→ Opponents: “the Naiyāyikas’ reason property is inconclusive, since pervasion can be established only for this specific class of effects and not for effects-in-general.” (85)

Naiyāyika’s response: it is necessary to further analyze the terms in the phrase “an awareness of having been made.”(85)

By “an awareness of having been made,” the opponents could not mean “an effect about which it has been determined that its production depends upon the activity of something other than itself (apekṣitaparavyāpāra).”(85-6)

Naiyāyika: the awareness that an effect “was made by a person” is the awareness either of someone who knows the pervasion relation between “being an effect” and “being made by a person” or of someone who does not.

(a) They argue further that for the former there will certainly be the awareness of an intelligent agent from an effect-in general.

(b) For the latter, they concede that the inference is impossible! But this would make even well-known inferences under suspect. (86)

→ Patil: the strategy of the Naiyāyikas in §3.2.3 is to expose “internal inadequacies in the opponent’s account of the limiting quality ‘an awareness of having been made.’” (87)

Ching: compare the discussions here in §3.2 with the following comments by Jñānaśrīmitra:

If you, in order to remove [the fallacy that *h*] effect-ness, is found in the *vipakṣa* [i.e., in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause], imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the *vyāpti*, since it is deprived of confirmation by the negative *vyāpti*?

Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative *vyāpti*, rely on a visible agent, then [*h*, effect-ness] is clearly seen in the *vipakṣa*, because grass etc. grows without it [i.e., the operation of a visible agent]. (Kajiyama: 100)

§4 Conclusion

§4.1 The Īśvara-Inference as a Hybrid Argument

The hybrid argument of the Naiyāyikas: using elements from both cosmological argument and argument from design. (88)

Three steps in the Īśvara-argument:

(1) begin with a contingent (and usually uncontroversial) existential fact, such as the existence of the universe or of complex well-functioning lifeforms. (89)

--This fact in the Īśvara–argument is both more normative than those appealed to in cosmological arguments, and less normative than those appealed to in the argument from design. (90)

(2) a principle that is supposed to account for the existential fact in step 1.

The principle in the Īśvara-argument is a version of the **causal** principle.

(3) an explanatory argument to the effect that the fact expressed in step 1 is to be finally accounted for by the intentional actions of a God-like being.

A few important issues in the Īśvara-argument:

(a) what the target property of their argument is supposed to be? an agent-in-general, an intelligent agent, and/or an intelligent agent who is Īśvara? (91)

There is a gap that needs to be closed between step 2 and step 3 in the Īśvara-argument.

→ The Naiyāyikas’ proposal is to solve the gap-problem with a design argument in step 3.

(b) the Īśvara-argument requires that each and everything that comes into existence have a cause. It also restricts the kind of “cause” that is relevant, by **ruling out** non-intelligence-possessing ones. [Ching: also ruling out multiple agents!]

§4.2 Satisfaction, Certification, and Justification

The deontological and procedural dimensions of the debates:

Deontological: have a *prima facie* epistemic responsibility to show their opponent that none of the known defeaters apply to the reason property.

Procedural: reflective knowing-event is based upon the practice of certification, i.e., the practice of showing that a set of defects does not apply.

→ certification is how an agent comes to know that a particular first-order awareness-event is warranted. (98)

參考書目：

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