

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः श्रावकतत्त्वविनिश्चयावतारः

caturthaḥ paricchedaḥ śrāvaka-tattva-viniścayāvatāraḥ

MH IV Sanskrit 1-30

दुर्विगाहामिमां नितिं बोद्धुं दुर्बलशाक्तयः ।

अस्थानत्राससंरब्धाः प्राहुर्हीनाधिमुक्तयः ॥ १ ॥

durvigāhām imām nitim boddhum durbalaśāktayaḥ ।

asthāna-trāsa-samrabdhaḥ prāhur hīnādhimuktayaḥ । । 1 । ।

4.1 Those who have low aspirations cannot understand this difficult approach. Shaken by baseless fear, they make the following claims.

निर्विकल्पधियः शास्तुः शरिरं नाश्रयः किल ।

शरीरत्वाच्छरिरं हि यथा गोपस्य नेष्यते ॥ २ ॥

nirvikalpadhiyaḥ śāstuḥ śariram nāśrayaḥ kila ।

śarīratvāc chariram hi yathā gopasya neṣyate । । 2 । ।

4.2 The Teacher's body is not the locus of non-conceptual cognition, because it is a body, like the body of a cowherd. So they say

सम्यग्दृष्ट्यादिमार्गेण प्रतितेन प्रतियते ।

संबुद्धानां महाबोधिर्बोधित्वाच्छिष्यबोधिवत् ॥ ३ ॥

samyag-drṣṭyādi-mārgēṇa pratitena pratiyate ।

sambuddhānām mahābodhir bodhitvāc chiṣya-bodhivat । । 3 । ।

4.3 The great awakening of the Buddhas is achieved by following the eight-fold path, because it is awakening, like a the awakening of a student.

इन्द्रियातिशयाच्छास्तुः सर्वज्ञज्ञानसंभवः ।

¹ Lindtner. 2001. *Mādhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya*. India : Adyar Library and Research.
Eckel, Malcolm David 2009. *Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents*. Harvard University Press.

मार्गाभेदे यथाभीष्टाः कस्यचित् प्रतिसंविदः ॥ ४ ॥

indriyātiśayāc chāstuḥ sarvajñajñāna-sambhavaḥ |
mārgābhede yathābhīṣṭāḥ kasya cit pratisamvidah | | 4 | |

4.4 A Teacher can be omniscient because of the excellence of his faculties, just as [we] think that someone can have [different] analytical insights, even though there is no difference in the path.

एतेनैव च मार्गेण ज्ञेयावरणसंक्षयः ।

चैतसत्वे सति वृतेः क्लेशावृतिवदिष्यते ॥ ५ ॥

etena iva ca mārgēṇa jñeyāvaraṇa samkṣayah |
caitasatve sati vṛteḥ kleśāvṛtivad iṣyate | | 5 | |

4.5 [We] think that obstacles to knowledge are removed by the same path, because they are mental obstacles, like obstacles that consist of defilements

महायानेऽप्ययं मार्गः सर्ववित्त्वास्ये मुनेः ।

यानान्तरत्वात् प्रत्येकबुद्धयाने यथेष्यते ॥ ६ ॥

mahāyāne'py ayaṁ mārgaḥ sarvavittvāptye muneḥ |
yā nāntaratvāt pratyekabuddhayāne yatheṣyate | | 6 | |

4.6 Even in the Mahayana, [you] think that this path leads to the omniscience of a Sage, because {the Mahayana} is a different vehicle, like the Pratyekabuddhayana .

न बुद्धोक्तिर्महायानं सूत्रान्तादावसंग्रहात् ।

मार्गान्तरोपदेशाद् वा यथा वेदान्तदर्शनं ॥ ७ ॥

na buddhoktir mahāyānaṁ sūtrāntādāva-saṅgrahāt |
mārgāntaropadeśād vā yathā vedāntadarśanaṁ | | 7 | |

4.7 The Mahayana is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sutrantas and so forth, or because it teaches a different path, like the Vedanta view

फलहेत्वपवादाद् वा यथा नास्तिकदर्शनम्।

अष्टादशनिकायान्तर्भवाभावान्न निश्चितम् ॥ ८ ॥

phala-hetv-apavādād vā yathā nāstikadarśanam ।

aṣṭādaśa-nikāyāntarbhavā-bhāvān na niścitam । । 8 । ।

4.8ab Or [the Mahayana is not the Buddha's teaching] because it improperly denies cause and effect, like a nihilistic view (*nāstikadarśana*).

4.8cd The point is clinched because it is not included in the eighteen schools.

रूपाद्यालम्बना बुद्धिः स्वसंवेद्यापि विद्यते।

यतः प्रत्यक्षबाधपि जायतेऽजातिवादिनः ॥ ९ ॥

rūpādyālambanā buddhiḥ svasaṁvedyāpi vidyate ।

yataḥ pratyakṣabādhapi jāyate'jātivādinaḥ । । 9 । ।

4.9 If a cognition apprehends something like material form and also is aware of itself, it must exist. So someone who holds the doctrine of no-arising also contradicts perception

तत्त्वतो हि न भावानां जन्मेत्येवं विशेषणात्।

न प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिभ्यां बाधा संभवतीति चेत् ॥ १० ॥

tattvato hi na bhāvānāṁ janmety evaṁ viśeṣṇāt ।

na pratyakṣapratītibhyāṁ bādhā sambhavatīti cet । । 10 । ।

4.10 If he says that he does not contradict perception and common sense, because he uses the qualification "In reality things do not arise,"

अगम्या परमार्थेन गम्यास्त्रीत्वाद् यथेतरा।

इत्येवमति वक्तुः स्यान्निर्दोषं दोषवद् वचः ॥ ११ ॥

agamyā paramārthena gamyā strītvād yathetarā ।

ity evamati vaktuḥ syān nirdoṣaṁ doṣavad vacaḥ । । 11 । ।

4.11 Then this faulty argument would be correct: "It is ultimately correct to have sexual relations with a woman who is forbidden, because she is a woman, like another [woman].

सत्यद्यष्टिर्न चेत् तत्त्वं तत्त्वाभावः प्रसज्यते।

योनाकदेवदेश्यं वा तत्त्वं तच्च न हीष्यते ॥ १२ ॥

satyadyaṣṭir na cet tattvaṁ tattvābhāvaḥ prasajyate |
yonākadeva-deśyaṁ vā tattvaṁ tac ca na hi iṣyate | | 12 | |

4.12 If [he says that] the vision of the [four noble) truths is not true, then that is not true. Otherwise, the teaching of Yonaka Deva would be true, and that is not acceptable.

बाह्यायतनसद्भावस्तन्निर्भासोदयाद् धियः।

प्रतीयते प्रतीतं वश्चित्तास्तित्वं यथाप्रियम् ॥ १३ ॥

bāhyāyatana-sadbhāvas tan nirbhāsodayād dhiyaḥ |
pratīyate pratītaṁ vaś cittāstitvaṁ yathā priyam | | 13 | |

4.13 The external sense media exist, because a cognition arises with their image. [The existence of] the object of cognition should be just as acceptable to you as the existence of the mind

अथ चेतोऽस्तित्ता नेष्टा चित्तमात्रं न वो जगत्।

जगत्पक्षीक्रियायां च हेतूदाहरणे न वः ॥ १४ ॥

atha ceto'stitā neṣṭā cittamātraṁ na vo jagat |
jagat pakṣīkriyāyāṁ ca hetūdāharaṇe na vaḥ | | 14 | |

4.14 If you do not think that the mind exists, then the world is not mind-only. And if the world is your subject, there is no reason or example.

तत्र प्रागुक्तनीत्या तु स्वनीतिविपदं परः।

यदमृष्यन्नुपादिक्षत् तन्न युक्तमितीष्यते ॥ १५ ॥

tatra prāguktanītyā tu svanīti vipadaṁ paraḥ |
yad amṛṣyaṅnupādikṣat tanna yuktam itīṣyate | | 15 | |

4.15”According to the approach explained earlier, the opponent's approach has gone wrong. The opponent cannot tolerate this and has spoken out,

but his statements are unreasonable." This is what [we] think.

निर्विकल्पा मतिः शास्तुनैरात्म्यालम्बना मता ।

यथा पुद्गलनैरात्म्यविष्या बुद्धिरित्यतः ॥ १६ ॥

nirvikalpā matiḥ śāstur nairātmyālambanā matā ।

yathā pudgala-nairātmya-viṣyā buddhir ityataḥ । । 16 । ।

4.16 [We] think that the Teacher's cognition is non-conceptual, because his cognition apprehends no-self, just as it has the no-self of persons as its object.

साधनं बाध्यते तस्य विसूद्धाव्यभिचारिणा ।

प्रायोगिकादिबुद्धीनामुत्पादो यन्निषिध्यते ॥ १७ ॥

sādhanam bādhyate tasya visūddhā vyabhicāriṇā ।

prāyogikādi-buddhīnām utpādo yan niṣidhyate । । 17 । ।

4.17ab The [opponent's] argument is refuted, because it does not avoid Contradiction

4.17cd when it denies the arising of functional cognitions and so forth.

ज्ञेयस्य सर्वथासिद्धेर्यस्तत्रानुदयो धियः ।

सोऽयं बोध्योऽभिसंबोधौ ज्ञेयतत्त्वाविपर्ययात् ॥ १८ ॥

jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher yas tatrānudayo dhiyaḥ ।

so'yaṁ bodhyo 'bhisambodhau jñeya-tattvā viparyayāt । । 18 । ।

4.18 Since there is no object of cognition, awakening is understood as the no-arising of cognition with regard to this [no-object], because this [no-arising] is consistent with the reality (*tattva*) of the object.

सा स्वभावविकल्पादिरहिताभिमता मतिः ।

तदाक्षयनिषेधश्चेत् साध्यमेव प्रसाध्यते ॥ १९ ॥

sā svabhāva-vikalpādi-rahitābhimatā matiḥ ।

tad ākṣaya-niṣedhaś cet sā dhyam eva prasādhyate | |19| |

4.19 [We] think that [the Buddha's] cognition is free from concepts of identity (*svabhāva*) and so forth. If [you] are denying that this [cognition] has a locus, [you] are proving [our] point.

कल्पनां च समारोप्य तच्छान्तत्वादिदेशना।

सम्यग्दृष्ट्यादिमार्गं च भवत्यभ्यसतो यदा ॥ २० ॥

kalpanām ca samāropya tac chāntatvādi-deśanā |
samyagdr̥ṣṭyādīmārgam ca bhavaty-abhyasato yadā | |20| |

4.20ab It is called peaceful and so forth by superimposing concepts.

4.20cd-21 Someone who practices the path that begins with right vision as no vision, no thought, no speech, no action, no livelihood, no effort, no mindfulness, and no concentration, ...

अदर्शनमसंकल्पो वागव्याकृतिरक्रिया।

अनाजीवोऽसमारम्भोऽसंप्रमोषोऽस्थितिस्तथा ॥ २१ ॥

adarśanam asaṅkalpo vāgavyākṛtir akriyā |
anājīvo'samārambho'saṁpramoṣo'sthitistathā | |21| |

तदानेनैव मार्गेण बुद्धबोधिर्मता हि नः।

सिद्धसाधनदोषोऽतो भावना वा परीक्ष्यताम् ॥ २२ ॥

tadānena iva mārgēṇa buddhabodhir matā hi nah |
siddhas ādhanadoṣo'to bhāvanā vā parīkṣyatām | |22| |

4.22 achieves the awakening of a Buddha. Since this is our position, either there is the fault of proving something that we have already accepted, or one should investigate the practice.

यदागमेनाविधुरमनुमानानुसारिणाम्।

तत् तत्त्वं भावना चास्य तथैवाभिमता सताम् ॥ २३ ॥

yad āgamenāvidhuraṃ anumānānusāriṇām |

tat tattvaṃ bhāvanā cāsyā tathaivābhimatā satām | | 23 | |

4.23 For scholars who follow inference, reality does not contradict tradition, and they think of practice in exactly the same way.

स भुद्धो येन तद् बुद्धमन्यथा मातृमोदकं ।

न बुद्धोक्तिर्महायानमित्यत्राप्येष निर्णयः ॥ २४ ॥

sa bhuddho yena tad buddham anyathā mātṛmodakaṃ |

na buddhoktir mahāyānam ity atrāpy eṣa nirṇayaḥ | | 24 | |

4.24ab To understand this is to be Buddha. Anything else is mother's candy.

4.24cd This is a decisive response to the claim that the Mahayana is not the Buddha's teaching.

बुद्धबोध्याप्तये चायं नालं मार्गः पुरोदितः ।

दुःखाद्याकारतो बोधात् प्रत्येकजिनमार्गवत् ॥ २५ ॥

buddhabodhyāptaye cāyaṃ nālaṃ mārgaḥ puroditaḥ |

duḥkhādyākārato bodhāt pratyekajinamārgavat | | 25 | |

4.25 The aforementioned path is not sufficient to attain the Buddha's awakening, because its awakening has to do with the aspects of suffering and so forth, like the path of the Pratyekabuddhas.

अनुमानेन बाधैवं परपक्षस्य जायते ।

दृष्टान्तासंभवो वापि तद्वद्वृत्तेर्निराकृतिः ॥ २६ ॥

anumānena bādhaivaṃ parapakṣasya jāyate |

dr̥ṣṭāntāsambhavo vāpi tadvadvṛtter nirākṛtiḥ | | 26 | |

4.26 Either the opponent's position is contradicted by inference or the example is impossible. This [path] does not remove those [obstacles].

नानुत्पादक्षयज्ञाने यथार्थे परमार्थतः ।

भ्रान्तिवत् सविकल्पत्वात् तद्वोधः कस्य तत्त्वतः ॥ २७ ॥

nānutpāda-kṣaya-jñāne yathārthe paramārthataḥ ।
bhrāntivat savikalpatvāt tadbodhaḥ kasya tattvataḥ । । 27 । ।

4.27 The cognitions of no-arising and cessation are not ultimately true, because they are conceptual, like an erroneous cognition. What is awakening really about?

हेतूर्यानान्तरत्वाख्य एतेनैव गतोत्तरः ।

कथं चावृत्तिसद्भावादहर्न्नर्हति निर्वृतिम् ॥ २८ ॥

hetūryānāntaratvākhyā etena iva gatottaraḥ ।
kathaṁ cāvṛtisadbhāvād arhannarhati nirvṛtim । । 28 । ।

4.28ab This also responds to the reason in which [the Mahayana] is called a different vehicle.

4.28cd How can an Arhant attain nirvāna if he still has obstacles?

क्लिष्टाविद्याप्रहाणाच्चेत् तन्मुक्तिर्बुद्धवन्मता ।

तदसत् तदसद्भावान्मुख्यनिर्माणबुद्धयोः ॥ २९ ॥

kliṣṭāvidyāprahāṇāc cet tan muktir buddhavan matā ।
tadasat tadasad bhāvān mukhya-nirmāṇabuddhayoḥ । । 29 । ।

4.29 If [the opponent] thinks that [a Sravaka's] liberation is like a Buddha's, because [a Sravaka] removes defiled ignorance, this is wrong, because neither the primary nor the manifested Buddha actually [removes defiled ignorance].

न तत्त्वतो महायाने मार्गः संबुद्धबोधये ।

सविकल्पनिमित्तत्वात् साक्षाल्लोकिकमार्गवत् ॥ ३० ॥

na tattvato mahāyāne mārgaḥ sambuddhabodhaye ।

sa vikalpa-nimittatvāt sāksālokika-mārgavat | | 30 | |

4.30 In the Mahayana, the path does not really lead to the awakening of a Buddha, because it has concepts and cognitive marks, like a path that is clearly mundane.

MH IV Sanskrit 31-60

अथ स्याद् यद्यभूतोऽयं मार्गः क्लेशाक्षयोऽप्यसन्।

अभूतत्वाद् यथा स्थाणौ नरज्ञानान्न तत्क्षयः ॥ ३१ ॥

atha syād yadyabhūto'yam mārgaḥ kleśākṣayo'pyasan |
abhūtatvād yathā sthāṇau narajñānāna tatkṣayaḥ | | 31 | |

4.31 Someone may say: If the path is unreal, then it cannot cause the cessation of defilements, because it is unreal, just as the cognition that a post is a man cannot cause their cessation.

रज्ज्वां सर्प इति भ्रान्तेर्यथान्नस्तस्य कस्यचित्।

लताकुलरज्जुज्ञानं प्रतिपक्षोऽपि जायते ॥ ३२ ॥

rajjvām sarpa iti bhrānter yathānnastasya kasya cit |
latā-kula-rajjujñānaṁ pratipakṣo'pi jāyate | | 32 | |

4.32 It is like the cognition that a rope is a mass of vines, which serves as an antidote to a terrified person's mistaken idea that a rope is a snake.

हेतुः सव्यभिचारोऽतो वादत्यागश्च वादिनः।

संक्लेशप्रतिपक्षत्वमेतेन विहितोत्तरम् ॥ ३३ ॥

hetuḥ savyabhicāro'to vādityāgaś ca vādinaḥ |
saṅkleśapratipakṣatvam etena vihitottaram | | 33 | |

4,33ab The reason is inconclusive, and the opponent loses the argument.

4,33cd This also is an answer to [the argument that the path is real] because it is an antidote to defilements.

महायानं च नो बौद्धं नैरात्म्यादिप्रकाशनात्।

रत्नत्रितयमाहात्म्यप्रथनाच्छिष्ययानवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

mahāyānaṃ ca no bauddhaṃ nairātmyādi-prakāśanāt |

ratnatritaya-māhātmya-prathanāc chiṣyayānavat | | 34 | |

4.34 According to us, the Mahayana is the Buddha's, because it shows that there is no self and so forth, and because it displays the greatness of the three jewels, like the Sravakayana.

प्रतितर्केण बाधातो हेतोश्च स्यादसिद्धता।

महायानोक्तसत्यादिसंग्रहाद् विनयादिषु ॥ ३५ ॥

pratitarkenā bādhatō hetōś ca syād asiddhatā |

mahāyānokta-satyādi-saṅgrahād vinayādiṣu | | 35 | |

4.35ab And the reason is not accepted, because it is contradicted by a counterargument.

4.35cd Because of the teachings of the mahāyāna, beginning with [four] noble truths, are included in the Tripitaka (lit. Vinaya and so forth).

सर्वज्ञताप्तये मार्गः सम्यग्दृष्टिपुरःसरः।

यस्मादुक्तो महायाने तस्माद्धेतोरसिद्धता ॥ ३६ ॥

sarvajñatāptaye mārgaḥ samyagdrṣṭi puraḥsaraḥ |

yasmād ukto mahāyāne tasmād dhetor asiddhatā | | 36 | |

4.36 The reason is unaccepted, because the eightfold path to omniscience is taught in the Mahayana.

दुःखोत्पत्तिनिरोधोक्तेर्नाजातं दुःखमिष्यते।

जातं दुःखस्वभावेन शून्यं तत् किं न गृह्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

duḥkhotpatti-nirodhokter nājātaṃ duḥkham iṣyate |

jātaṃ duḥkha-svabhāvena śūnyaṃ tat kiṃ na gr̥hyate | | 37 | |

4.37 If someone thinks that suffering arises, because suffering is said to arise and cease, why not hold that, if it arises, it must be empty of the identity of suffering?

संस्कृतत्वाद् यथा माया स्कन्धा वानास्रवा यथा ।

दुःखसत्यमतिः किं ते सम्यग्दर्शमतिर्मता ॥ ३८ ॥

saṃskṛtatvād yathā māyā skandhā vā nāsravā yathā |
duḥkha-satyamatih kim te samyagdarśamatir matā | |38| |

438ab Because it is conditioned, like illusion or like the pure aggregates.

4.38cd What do you think is the truth of suffering, and what is right vision?

दुःखा च वेदना दुःखं जात्यादेर्दुःखता कथम् ।

विनाशस्तस्य दुःखं च दुःखत्वं हेतुमार्गयोः ॥ ३९ ॥

duḥkhā ca vedanā duḥkhaṃ jātyāder duḥkhatā katham |
vināśas tasya duḥkhaṃ ca duḥkhatvaṃ hetu mārgayoḥ | |39| |

4.39ab A painful feeling is suffering, but why are birth and so forth suffering?

4.39cd If impermanence is suffering, then the cause [of suffering] and the path [to the cessation of suffering] also are suffering.

हेतुत्वतश्चेत् स्याद् दुःखं दुःखं समुदयो भवेत् ।

भाक्तत्वाच्चापि दुःखस्य तज्ज्ञानं दुःखधीः कथम् ॥ ४० ॥

hetutva-taścet syād duḥkhaṃ duḥkhaṃ samudayo bhavet |
bhāktatvāc cāpi duḥkhasya taj jñānaṃ duḥkhadhīḥ katham | |40| |

4.40ab If [birth and so forth] are suffering because they are the causes [of suffering], then the origin [of suffering] also is suffering.

4.40cd And if suffering is only a word, how can a cognition of suffering be knowledge of this [truth of suffering]?

न दुःखविष्यं ज्ञानं तत्त्वतः सत्यमिष्यते ।

दुःखतस्तत्परिज्ञानाद् यथा वेधादिदुःखधीः ॥ ४१ ॥

na duḥkhaviṣyam jñānam tattvataḥ satyam iṣyate |
duḥkhatas tat pariñānād yathā vedhādi-duḥkhadhīḥ | | 41 | |

4.41 [We] do not think that any knowledge that has suffering as its object is really true, because it is knowledge that a certain thing is suffering, like the cognition that something like a stab wound is suffering.

हेतुर्न दुःखहेतुत्वाद् युक्तः समुदयात्मकः ।

अथा खङ्गाभिधातादि चैतत्त्वाद् वापि मार्गवत् ॥ ४२ ॥

hetur na duḥkhaHetutvād yuktaḥ samudayātmakaḥ |
athā khaḍgābhidhātādi caittatvād vāpi mārgavat | | 42 | |

4.42 The cause [of suffering] cannot be the origin [of suffering] because it is the cause of suffering, like a sword blow and so forth, or because it is a mental phenomenon, like the path.

न दुःखहेतुविष्या दुःखाद्याकारबोधतः ।

मतिस्तथया मता यद्वत् तदन्या दुःखहेतुधीः ॥ ४३ ॥

na duḥkhaHetuviṣyā duḥkhādyākārabodhataḥ |
matis tathayā matā yadvat tad anyā duḥkhaHetudhīḥ | | 43 | |

4.43 [We] do not think that a cognition that has the cause of suffering as its object is true, because it is a cognition of the form (*ākāra*) of suffering and so forth, like a different cognition of a cause of suffering.

सजाते न निरोधोऽस्ति प्रागुक्तप्रतिषेधतः ।

जातेर्निषेधान्नाजातेः खपुष्पस्येव युज्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

sa jāte na nirodho'sti prāgukta pratiṣedhataḥ |
jāter niṣedhānnājāteḥ khapuṣpasyeva yujyate | | 44 | |

4.44ab If there is no arising, there is no cessation, because of the negation

stated earlier.

4.44cd Something that arises can cease, but something that does not arise cannot [cease], like a flower in the sky.

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निरुद्धश्च निरोधः स्यात् सोऽजातो जन्मना यदा ।

नेष्यते किं तदा विद्वान् त्वमन्यं सत्यतो वद ॥ ४५ ॥

niruddhaś ca nirodhaḥ syāt so'jāto janmanā yadā |
neṣyate kiṁ tadā viddhān tvam anyam satyato vada | | 45 | |

4.45 When we do not think that there is anything to arise or cease, how can you, as a scholar, claim that the other [i.e. cessation] is true?

नैवाजातनिरोधोऽपि निरोधः परमार्थतः ।

अनुत्पन्ननिरोधत्वादप्रसंख्यानिरोधवत् ॥ ४६ ॥

naivājātanirodho'pi nirodhaḥ paramārthataḥ |
anutpanna-nirodhatvād aprasaṅkhyānirodhavat | | 46 | |

4.46 The cessation of something that has not arisen is ultimately not cessation, because it is the cessation of something that has not arisen, like cessation that is not due to discernment.

निरोधासंभवादेव किं मार्गो मार्गते तव ।

अजातश्च कथं मार्गस्तस्य किं प्रापयिष्यति ॥ ४७ ॥

nirodhā sambhavād eva kiṁ mārgo mārgate tava |
ajātaś ca katham mārgas tasya kiṁ prāpayiṣyati | | 47 | |

4.47 If there cannot be any cessation, where does your path lead? And if [the path] does not arise, how can it be a path. and whom does it cause to attain this [cessation]?

नापवर्गाप्तये मार्गः संस्कृतत्वात् तदन्यवत् ।

निरोधालम्बनत्वाद् वा यथेतरनिरोधधिः ॥ ४८ ॥

nāpavargāptaye mārgaḥ saṃskṛtatvāt tad anyavat |
nirodhālambanatvād vā yathetara-nirodhadhiḥ | | 48 | |

4.48 The path does not cause anyone to attain liberation (*apavarga*), because it is conditioned, like another [path], or because it has cessation as its object, like another cognition of cessation.

सामान्यालम्बनत्वाद् वा संस्कृतत्वादथापि वा ।

दुःखादिदर्शनं मिथ्या मिथ्याज्ञानवदिष्यताम् ॥ ४९ ॥

sāmānyālambanatvād vā saṃskṛtatvād athāpi vā |
duḥkhādidarśanaṃ mithyā mithyājñānavad iṣyatām | | 49 | |

4.49 [Right] vision of the four noble truths should be considered false, because it has universals as its object or because it is conditioned, like a false cognition

एतेन सम्यक्संकल्पव्यायामादिमृषात्वतः ।

मार्गसत्यं न सत्यं ते युज्यते परमार्थतः ॥ ५० ॥

etena samyaksamkalpa-vyāyāmādi-mṛṣātvataḥ |
mārgasatyam na satyam te yujyate paramārthataḥ | | 50 | |

4.50 Ultimately it is not reasonable for the truth of the path to be true, because right thinking, right effort, and so forth are false.

भावनातस्तथायुक्ता युक्ता दुःखाद्यदर्शनात् ।

दृश्यस्यादृश्यरूपेण सर्वदा हि तथास्थितेः ॥ ५१ ॥

bhāvanā tas tathā yuktā yuktā duḥkhādyadarśanāt |
dṛśyasyādṛśyarūpeṇa sarvadā hi tathā sthiteḥ | | 51 | |

4.51 It is not reasonable to practice it in this way, but it is reasonable [to practice it] by not seeing the four noble truths, because the actual state of the thing that is seen

is always to be unseen.

अथापि द्रुग्धबुद्धेः स्यात् कस्यचिन्ननु बालवत्।

न सत्यादर्शनादिष्टो मोक्षोऽपि भवतामिति ॥ ५२ ॥

athāpi drugdhabuddheḥ syāt kasya cin nanu bālavat |

na satyā darśanād isto mokso'pi bhavatām iti | | 52 | |

4.52 Someone may say: "An idiot cannot be liberated, because he does not see the truth, like a fool, and the same is true of you."

दुःखतद्दुःख्यनुत्पादे कस्य को मोक्षमिच्छति।

मुक्तिर्मायाकृतत्वात् सा भ्रान्त्यावेधान्निगद्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

duḥkhatadduḥkhyan utpāde kasya ko mokṣam icchati |

muktir māyā krtatvāt sā bhrāntyāvedhān nigadyate | | 53 | |

4.53 If there is no suffering and no one who suffers, who wants liberation from what? People speak of liberation erroneously, like a product of illusion.

सर्वथादर्शान्मुक्तिर्दुःखादीनां यतो मता।

दृष्टान्तासंभवस्तस्मात् तथा हेतोरसिद्धता ॥ ५४ ॥

sarvathādarśanān muktir duḥkhādīnān yato matā |

drstāntāsambhavas tasmāt tathā hetor asiddhatā | | 54 | |

4.54 [We] think that liberation is the complete no-vision of the four noble truths, so the example is impossible and the reason is unaccepted.

अयमेव यतो मार्गः सम्यग्दृष्टिपुरःसरः।

महायानेऽपि निर्दिष्टस्तस्माद्धेतोरसिद्धता ॥ ५५ ॥

ayam eva yato mārgaḥ samyagdrṣṭipurāḥ sarāḥ |

mahāyāne'pi nirdiṣṭas tasmādd hetor asiddhatā | | 55 | |

4.55 This very same path, beginning with right vision, is taught in the Mahayana, so the reason is unaccepted.

वेदान्ते च हि यत् सूक्तं तत् सर्वं बुद्धभाषितम्।

दृष्टान्तन्यूनता तस्मात् सन्दिग्धं वा परीक्ष्यताम् ॥ ५६ ॥

vedānte ca hi yat sūktam tat sarvam buddhabhāṣitam |

ḍṛṣṭāntanyūnatā tasmāt sandigdham vā parīkṣyatām | | 56 | |

4.56 Everything that is well spoken (*sūkta*) in the Vedānta is taught by the Buddha. Therefore, either the example is deficient or one should analyze its ambiguity.

सदसत्कल्पनापोढप्रज्ञाचारविहारिणाम्।

दृष्टिः कस्य कुतश्चेष्टा फलहेत्वपवादिका ॥ ५७ ॥

sadasat-kalpanāpoḍha-prajñācāra-vihāriṇām |

ḍṛṣṭiḥ kasya kutaś ceṣṭā phalahetv-apavādikā | | 57 | |

4.57 If [we] practice wisdom in a way that excludes the concepts of being and non-being, to whom and for what reason do [you] attribute the view that denies cause and effect?

हेतोः फलेन संबन्धो यथा लोके प्रतीयते।

तथा निषिध्यते नासावतो हेतोरसिद्धता ॥ ५८ ॥

hetoḥ phalena sambandho yathā loke pratīyate |

tathā niṣidhyate nāsāvato hetor asiddhatā | | 58 | |

4.58 The reason is unaccepted, because [we] do not deny the connection between Cause and effect as it is understood in the world.

सांवृतं बालधीग्राह्यं वस्तु प्रत्यक्षगोचरम्।

प्राग्वदत्र समाधानात् तद्बाधापि नबाधिका ॥ ५९ ॥

sāmvṛtam bāladhīgrāhyaṁ vastu pratyakṣagocaram |

prāgvad atra samādhānāt tad bādhāpi nabādhikā | | 59 | |

4.59 The object of perception that ordinary people grasp is relative. The reply to this [objection] is the same as before, so this contradiction is not a contradiction.

विद्वन्नीतिविचारे हि न प्रतीतिः प्रबाधते।

अथा निरात्मका धर्माः क्षणिकाश्चेति जल्पतः ॥ ६० ॥

vidvan-nīti-vicāre hi na pratītiḥ prabādhate |
athā nirātmakā dharmāḥ kṣaṇikāś ceti jalpataḥ | | 60 | |

4.60 Common sense does not contradict the analysis of a sage, as is true with the claim that *dharmas* have no self and are momentary.

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न रूपतत्त्वं बालानां विषयत्वमुपाच्छति।

अध्यात्मविद्यासंस्कारात् तद्यथात्मादिशून्यता ॥ ६१ ॥

na rūpatattavaṁ bālānām viṣayatvam upārcchati |
adhyātmavidyā saṁskārāt tadyathātmādiśūnyatā | | 61 | |

4.61 Ordinary people do not have as their object the reality of material form, because they do not develop inner wisdom, just as [they do not have as their object] emptiness of the self and so forth.

न रूपतत्त्वे बालानां धीर्युक्ता पारमार्थिकी।

अविद्यापटलान्धत्वद् यथा निर्वाणगोचरा ॥ ६२ ॥

na rūpatattave bālānām dhīr yuktā pāramārthikī |
avidyāpaṭalāndhatvad yathā nirvāṇagocarā | | 62 | |

4.62 Ordinary people do not have an ultimate cognition of the reality of material form, because they are blinded by the impediment of ignorance, just as [they do not have a cognition] in which nirvāṇa is the object.

तत्त्वतो हि न भावानां जन्मेत्येवं विशेषणात्।

न प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिभ्यां बाधा कुत्रापि बाधिका ॥ ६३ ॥

tattvato hi na bhāvānām janmety evaṁ viśeṣaṇāt |

na pratyakṣapratītibhyāṃ bādḥā kutrāpim bādḥikā | | 63 | |

4.63 Because of the qualification "in reality things do not arise," perception and common sense do not contradict it. So where is the contradiction?

शान्तेष्वाकाशकल्पेषु धर्मेषु परमार्थतः ।

स्त्रीत्वाद्यसिद्धेर्दृष्टान्ते बाधा कस्य कुतो मता ॥ ६४ ॥

śānteṣvākāśakalpeṣu dharmeṣu paramārthataḥ |

strītvādyasiddher dṛṣṭānte bādḥā kasya kuto matā | | 64 | |

4.64 Since there ultimately is no female identity, when *dharmas* are as peaceful as space, how can [you] think that this example contradicts anything?

गम्या तद्रमनं गन्ता यथैतद् विद्यते त्रयम् ।

अगम्यागमनं साध्यं तथा चेद् दोषदित्सया ॥ ६५ ॥

gamyā tad gamanaṃ gantā yathaitad vidyate trayam |

agamyāgamaṃ sādhyam tathā ced doṣaditsayā | | 65 | |

4.65 If [you] want to refute [us], [you] have to prove that there can be sex with a woman who is permissible for sex, just as [you have to prove] that there is a woman who is permissible for sex, a man to have sex with her, and the action of having sex with her.

सत्यं प्रतीतिबाधैवमसिद्धं तु विशेषणम् ।

नातोऽस्मद्विधिबाधार्थं समर्थं प्रतिसूपकम् ॥ ६६ ॥

satyaṃ pratītibādhaivam asiddham tu viśeṣaṇam |

nāto'smadvidhibādḥārtha samartha pratisūpakam | | 66 | |

4.66 It is true that this [assertion] contradicts common sense, but [we] do not accept that this applies to this qualification. So this fake [inference] is incapable of contradicting our thesis.

निष्प्रपञ्चं स्वसंवेद्यं विकल्पमलवर्जितम् ।

नानात्वैकत्वरहितं शान्तं तत्त्वं विद्युर्बुधाः ॥ ६७ ॥

niṣprapañcaṁ svasamvedyaṁ vikalpamalavarjitam |

nānātvaikatva-rahitaṁ śāntaṁ tattvaṁ vidhur budhāḥ | | 67 | |

4.67 Scholars know reality as free from conceptual diversity, directly known, free from the stain of concepts, not one, not many, and peaceful.

योनाकदेवदेश्यत्वं नातस्तत्त्वस्य युज्यते।

ब्रह्मादिदेवप्रभवं देवमाहुर्यतश्च ते ॥ ६८ ॥

yonākadevadeśya tvaṁ nātas tattvasya yujyate |

brahyādidevaprabhavaṁ devam āhuryataś ca te | | 68 | |

4.68 So it is not reasonable for the teaching of Yonaka Deva to be reality, because they say that this god comes from the first god, Brahmā.

रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं बुद्धिविषय इष्यते।

सामान्येन तदस्तित्वं साध्यं तदिष्टमेव नः ॥ ६९ ॥

rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṁ buddhiviṣaya iṣyate |

sāmānyena tad astitvaṁ sādhyam tad iṣṭam eva naḥ | | 69 | |

4.69 [We] think that the existence of the sense media that begin with material form is knowable. If you are arguing that these [sense media] exist in a general sense, we agree.

भौतिकादिस्वभावा हि रूपाद्यायतनास्तिता।

साध्यते चेन्न दृष्टान्तः प्रतितर्कश्च बाधकः ॥ ७० ॥

bhautikādi-svabhāvā hi rūpādyāyatanāstitā |

sādhyate cen na dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ pratitarkaś ca bādhaḥ | | 70 | |

4.70 If you argue that the sense media, beginning with form, exist and are derived from the gross elements and so forth, there is no example, and [the argument] is contradicted by a counter-argument.

रूपाद्यायतनं नेष्टं भूतभौतिकलक्षणम्।

स्वात्मनिर्भासधीजन्मकारणत्वाद् यथा मनः ॥ ७१ ॥

rūpādyāyatanam neṣṭam bhūtabhautika-lakṣaṇam |
svātma nirbhāsadhījanma kāraṇatvād yathā manaḥ | | 71 | |

4.71 [We] think that the sense media, beginning with material form, are not defined as gross elements or as derivatives of the gross elements, because they cause the birth of a cognition of the appearance of their own identities, like the mind.

चित्तचैतस्वभावं हि प्रसिद्धं चैतचेतसाम्।

हेतूदाहरणे नातो नष्टः पक्षोऽपि योगिनाम् ॥ ७२ ॥

cittacaittasvabhāvaṁ hi prasiddham caitacetasām |
hetūdāharaṇe nāto naṣṭaḥ pakṣo'pi yoginām | | 72 | |

4.72ab It is generally accepted that mind and mental phenomena have the nature of mind and mental phenomena.

4.72cd Practitioners have no position, so they have no reason or example.

विज्ञप्तिमात्रमित्यत्र बाह्यार्थस्य निराक्रिया।

वाक्यार्थ इति तत्यागात् पक्षहानिः कुतः सति ॥ ७३ ॥

vijñapti-mātram ity atra bāhyārthasya nirākriyā |
vākyaṛtha iti tat tyāgāt pakṣahāniḥ kutaḥ sati | | 73 | |

4.73 [We] reject the claim that "mind-only" is meant to deny the existence of external objects, so how can there be a problem with [our] position?

वाग्निर्वचनतः कश्चित् क्रियते न प्रशान्तधीः।

विद्धांसस्तत्र भोत्स्यन्ते वचसः सारपक्वताम् ॥ ७४ ॥

vāgnirvacanataḥ kaścit kriyate na praśāntadhīḥ |
viddhānsastatra bhotsyante vacasaḥ sārapakṣvutām | | 74 | |

4.74ab One does not calm the mind without using words.

4.74cd Let scholars understand which words have substance and which do not.

श्रवकतत्त्वविनिश्चयावतारो नाम चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः।

śravakatattvaviniścayāvatāro nāma caturthaḥ paricchedaḥ।